Garlyn, Inc., d/b/a Polzin Glass, Inc. as assignee of Wehling, et al., Respondents,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0376

Garlyn, Inc., d/b/a Polzin Glass, Inc. as assignee of Wehling, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

American Family Mutual Insurance Company, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed November 20, 2017
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-15-15087

Charles J. Lloyd, Brian F. Murn, Livgard & Lloyd, P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Stephanie L. Chandle r, John Bjorkman, Larson  King, L.L.P., St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Automobile insurers sought to vacate an arbitration award in favor of an auto-glass-
repair contractor on the ground that the award contravened the cl ear language of the
insurers’ auto-glass policy. The district court upheld the award, and the insurers appealed
to this court, arguing that the arbitrator and the district court misapplied the policy’s
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definition of competitive prices. We conclu de the arbitrator’s determinations of
competitive prices were factual determinations and unreviewable by la w. We affirm the
district court.
FACTS
Respondent, Garlyn Inc., d/b/a Polzin Gla ss Inc. (Garlyn), is an auto-glass repairer
with a unique way of repairing windshields. To remove the windshield, Garlyn uses a full
cut-out method, in contrast to a close-cut method. And to put the new windshield in place,
Garlyn uses a two-man system instead of a direct set. The details of these methods are not
important; what is important is that because of its unique methods, Garlyn carved out a
special niche in the windshield-repair market. In fact, Garlyn could only name one other
auto-glass repairer in Minnesota who repaired windshields the same way.
Garlyn’s unique repair methods are more time-consuming and expensive than a
traditional windshield installation. Despite the higher cost, Garlyn believes its methods
result in a better product. But higher cost m eans higher prices for insurance companies,
such as appellants, American Family Mutual Insurance Company and American Standard
Insurance Company of Wisconsin (collectively American Family).
At some point, American Family fo und itself on the recei ving end of Garlyn’s
higher prices for windshield repairs. American Family disagreed with the amount charged
by Garlyn for windshield replacements. To settle the dispute, the parties entered arbitration
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 65B.525 (2016).
During arbitration, American Family presented information and data indicating that
Garlyn’s prices were unreasonable. The ar bitrator singled out three problems with
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American Family’s calculations: (1) the numbers were based on American Family’s own
claims but not necessarily on th e payments that were actua lly being made in the area;
(2) American Family used the average pricing, not the median pricing in its calculations;
and (3) most importantly to the arbitrator, American Family did not account for Garlyn’s
more complex methods for repairing and replacing windshields. In the end, the arbitrator
believed Garlyn’s prices were fair, reasonable, and necessary to replace the windshields
involved with American Family’s claims. The arbitrator awarded Garlyn $71,308.39, the
unpaid balance of invoices Garlyn billed to American Family, based on its unique repair
methods and its lack of competition.
American Family filed a motio n to vacate the arbitration award in district court,
arguing that the arbitrator misinterpreted a part of its insurance policy that explained how
to compute competitive prices. The district court upheld the award, concluding that the
arbitrator correctly found that Garlyn’s unique repair methods placed it in a class of its
own. American Family timely appealed.
D E C I S I O N
The underlying issue in this case is whether the arbitrator correctly applied the part
of American Family’s insurance policy that defines how to calculate competitive prices for
auto-glass repairs. American Family asserts that the arbitrator misapplied that definition
by siding with Garlyn’s prices instead of its own. For its part, Garlyn argues that the
arbitrator was well within hi s right to reject American Family’s competitive-price
calculations. Further, Garlyn argues that neither this court nor the district court has the
legal authority to review the arbitrator’s legal or factual determinations in this case.
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There are two issues for our consideration: (1) what is the proper standard of review
to analyze this arbitration award and (2) di d the district court properly uphold the
arbitrator’s award? We examine both issues below.
I. The arbitrator’s legal determin ations are reviewed de novo.
Garlyn argues that neither the district cour t, nor this court, has the authority to
review the arbitrator’s factual or legal determinations in this case. Although Garlyn admits
there is an exception to this rule, it argues that the auto-glass issue in this case does not fall
under that exception.
Garlyn is correct that arbitrators are typica lly the “final judges of both law and fact.”
Fernow v. Gould, 835 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). In fact, as long as
the reasoning and judgment are consistent, a court will not vacate an arbitration award even
if it believes the arbitrator made a mistake in the law or facts. Johnson v. Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Minn. 1988).
However, there is an exception to th is rule: no-fault arbitration. Weaver v. State
Farm Ins. Cos., 609 N.W.2d 878, 882 (Minn. 2000); see Minn. Stat. § 65B.525 (mandating
binding arbitration for claims of $10,000 or less in no-fault benefits, or comprehensive, or
collision-damage coverage). In these cases, arbitrators decide questions of fact, and courts
review any legal determinations de novo. Weaver, 609 N.W.2d at 882; see also State Farm
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 678 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn. App. 2004) (“An arbitrator’s findings
of fact are final.”), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2004). An arbitrator has authority to
find facts and determine th e sufficiency of proof. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sankey , 605
N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2000). This court
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may not review whether the record supports an arbitrator’s findings. Id. Because this case
was arbitrated under section 65B.525 of th e Minnesota No-Fault Au tomobile Insurance
Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2016), we may review the arbitrator’s legal determinations
de novo.
Here, the question is whether the arbitr ator’s conclusions concerning Garlyn’s
prices were factual determinations in the ex clusive province of the arbitrator or whether
they were interpretations of the insurance contract language, which we review de novo.
See Garlyn , Inc. v. Auto-O wners Ins. Co. , 814 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Minn. App. 2012)
(providing that interpretations of insurance-contract langua ge are questions of law).
Although we ultimately conclude that the ar bitrator’s determination of the “prevailing
competitive price” as understood in the policy was a factual determin ation, we pause to
acknowledge that, generally sp eaking, interpretations of au to-glass policies present legal
questions.
II. The arbitrator’s det ermination of the prevailin g competitive price was a
factual determination, and the district court was correct to deny the motion to
vacate.

American Family argues that the arbitrat or misinterpreted the policy language and
incorrectly deferred to Garlyn’s prices instea d of its price determin ations. In the way
American Family frames the case, it presente d the arbitrator with a definition of a
“competitive price” in its policy, and the arbitrator ignored th at definition, presenting us
with a legal question to resolve.
Garlyn argues that the arbitrator’s dete rmination of a “com petitive price” was
inherently a factual determination, which we may not review. See State Farm, 678 N.W.2d
6
at 721 (“An arbitrator’s findings of fact are fi nal.”). Garlyn argues that the arbitrator did
not ignore American Family’s policy language. To the contrary, Garlyn counters, the
arbitrator applied the facts to the language in the policy, an intrinsically fact-based process.
In its policy, American Family defines the “prevailing competitive price” as “the
prices charged by a statistically significant number of repair facilities in the area where
your insured car is to be repaired, as determ ined by us.” This definition may be broken
down as: (1) prices; (2) charged by a statisti cally significant number of repair facilities;
(3) in the area where the vehicl e is going to be repaired; (4 ) as determined by American
Family.1 After reviewing the record, it does not ap pear that the arbitrator misapplied any
of these pieces of the policy. Instead, the arbitrator stuck closely to the letter of the policy
and examined what prices the competitors in the same area as Garlyn were charging.
For instance, the arbitrator took a painstaking look at Garlyn’s full cut-out and two-
man set methods and why they were superior to cheaper, mo re traditional methods. The
arbitrator also took great care to examine what other glass repairers in the area charged and
what kinds of methods they us ed. After sifting through these facts, the arbitrator found
that, despite Garlyn’s higher prices, it was “more likely than not that the prices charged by
[Garlyn] were fair and reasonable and necessa ry to replace the windshields involved in

1 During oral argument, Am erican Family claimed it was not arguing that the “as
determined by us” language meant its price calculations reigned supreme, despite what its
briefing may have implied. Instead, Ameri can Family argued that the “as determined by
us” language was just one piece of a larger error made by the arbitrator in analyzing what
a competitive price was under the policy. Accordingly, we are not solely focusing on the
“as determined by us” language in this ca se; instead, we are examining whether the
arbitrator misapplied the entire policy’s definition of “prevailing competitive prices.”
7
these claims.” While this re sult did not comport with Amer ican Family’s argument, the
policy itself was strictly followed.
And despite its argument to the contrary, th e arbitrator did pay attention to American
Family’s competitive-price calculations a nd found three problems with the math:
(1) the numbers were based on American Fam ily’s own claims but not necessarily on the
payments that were actually being made in the area; (2) American Family used average
pricing and not median pricing in its calculations; and (3) most importantly to the arbitrator,
American Family did not account for Garlyn’ s more complex methods for repairing and
replacing windshields. Again, the arbitrator did not misapply Ameri can Family’s policy,
but instead conducted a fact-based analysis that compared American Family’s data against
his own review of the facts.
While American Family argues that the arb itrator and the district court ignored its
clear policy language, we do not believe that is the case. Th e arbitrator correctly applied
the policy, finding a price based on the number of repair facilities in the area where the
cars were repaired. Because Garlyn’s unique repair methods limit the number of its
competitors to a smaller number than Americ an Family would have preferred does not
mean there was friction with the policy itself. And the arbitrator’s finding that Garlyn’s
prices were fair, reasonable, and necessary is a direct product of the factual determinations
the policy required. Far from ignoring the policy, it appears that the arbitrator went to great
lengths to apply it.
Our decision finds support in the re asoning of the unpublished case of Glass Serv.
Co. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. , No. A06-1074, 2007 WL 1815781 (Minn. App. June 26,
8
2007).2 There, this court was presented with similar policy language to American
Family’s, which read, “[f]or glass losses, the maximum amount that we will pay for repair
or replacement is the preva iling competitive price. Prev ailing competitive price means
prices charged by the majority of glass repairers in the local area as determined by a survey
conducted by us.” Id. at *8 (emphasis omitted). We c oncluded that the arbitrator’s
determination of the “prevailin g competitive price” was within the arbitrator’s authority,
and because it was a factual determination, the arbitration award was “unreviewable by
this court.” Id.
American Family’s policy required the arbitrator to examine the facts on the ground
and determine whether Garlyn was charging a competitive price. The arbitrator weighed
the evidence presented, considered the argument of the parties, and decided that Garlyn’s
prices fell under the policy’s definition of “p revailing competitive prices.” The fact that
he rejected American Family’s calculations speaks to the innately fact-based nature of this
process, and this court will not review an arbitrator’s factual findings. State Farm, 678
N.W.2d at 721. The arbitrat or applied the clear terms of the policy and determined that
Garlyn’s prices were competitive. This was a factual finding, and by law, we leave that
finding intact. The district court correctly denied American Family’s motion to vacate the
award.
Affirmed.

2 We recognize that unpublishe d opinions are of persuasive value at best, and are not
precedential. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. App. 1993). Our
use of an unpublished opinion is to draw a persuasive comparison.