State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0381

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Marland Len Corr, Sr.,
Appellant.

Filed February 26, 2018
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-16-5710

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictio n for violatin g an order for protection (OFP),
arguing that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated when the district court

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denied his requests to admit extrinsic evidence of three prior instances when the victim
recanted allegations of OFP violations and domestic abuse by appellant. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Marland Corr and S.B. married in November 2009 and have two children.
The marriage has been marked by discord and physical violence by Corr. On April 6, 2016,
S.B. obtained an OFP against Corr . Three months later, the district court issued an
amended OFP, which allowed Corr to pick up the children from school. But the amended
OFP still prohibited Corr from coming to S.B.’s residence and only allowed him to contact
S.B. in writing or at counseling appointments.
On the morning of August 30, 2016, S.B. heard her doorbell ring and a knock at her
front door. She looked through the window on the door and saw Corr standing outside.
S.B. told him to leave, and called the Coon Rapids Police Department when he refused to
do so. Her first call was disconnected. The dispatcher called back, and S.B. stated that
Corr, whom she identified as subject to an OFP, was just at her front door but was now
walking away. Although S.B. told the dispatcher that she did not need police assistance,
Officer Melcher was sent to the home to conduct a welfare check.
While Officer Melcher was talking with S.B., Officer Smith r eceived information
from the dispatcher that someone matching Corr’s description was observed on a video
camera walking on a street near S.B.’s residence. Officer Smith drove to the location and
found Corr. Corr denied being at S.B.’s residence, explaining that he had been to the bank
and was heading to a store to buy a cigar. Officer Smith arrested him. The next day, the
state charged Corr with violating the OFP.

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Before trial, Corr moved the district court to admit evidence, including an audio
tape, letter, and interview transcript, under Minn. R. Evid. 616 and Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).
Each item reflects a separate instance of S.B. recanting allegations of prior domestic
violence committed by Corr. 1 The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the
evidence of S.B.’s recantations was not intended to show bias but, rather, her propensity to
lie.2 Although Corr was unable to submit extrinsic evidence of S.B.’s recantations, on
cross-examination he impeached S.B. with the facts underlying the excluded documents.
And he was permitted to use the documents themselves to refresh S.B.’s recollection when
she struggled to remember specific events, allegations, and recantations.
The jury found Corr guilty and the district court sentenced him to 27 months in
prison. Corr appeals.
D E C I S I O N
In o ur justice system , a criminal defendant has “the right to be treated with
fundamental fairness and ‘afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.’” State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn. 1992) (quoting California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 478, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984)). This right allows the
defendant “‘to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to
the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.’” Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.

1 S.B. has never recanted the allegations underlying the current offense.

2 The district court also ruled that even if the extrinsic evidence was meant to show bias or
motive, it would still be excluded because “it’s more prejudicial than probative ” under
Minn. R. Evid. 403.

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14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967)) . But a party seeking to present his defense must
comply with the rules of evidence. State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 510 (Minn. 2005).
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, even if a
constitutional right is implicated . Id. It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate that the
district court’s evidentiary ruling constitutes abuse of discretion that was prejudicial. Id.
Corr argues that the district cou rt abused its discretion when it excluded extrinsic
evidence of S.B.’s recantations of prior abuse allegations. He further argues that exclusion
of this evidence was prejudicial. We address each argument in turn.
Corr asserts that the documents reflecting S.B.’s recantations are admissible as
extrinsic evidence under two theories. First, he argues that the evidence is admissible to
establish bias because the false accusations show that S.B. “had an ulterior motive to lie to
the police to get Corr in trouble and [had] a history of doing just that.” We are not
persuaded. Evidence of bias is admissible to attack a witness’s credibility. Minn. R. Evid.
616; see, e.g., United States v. Abel , 469 U.S. 45, 55, 105 S. Ct. 465, 470 -71 (1984)
(membership in Aryan Brotherhood is probative of bias). But, as the district court
observed, Corr did not offer the extrinsic evidence for this purpose. Rather, he offered the
evidence to demonstrate S.B. has a propensity to lie about abuse by Corr. This is precisely
the type of evidence Minn. R. Evid. 608(b) prohibits: “Specific instances of the conduct of
the witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ character for
truthfulness . . . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.” A district court may , at its
discretion, permit inquiry into a witness’s character for truthfulness on cross-examination.
Minn. R. Evid. 608(b). That is what the district court did.

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Second, Corr argues that S.B.’s prior recantations are admissible as extri nsic
evidence under State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 19, 1993). In Goldenstein, the defendants were accused of sexually assaulting
their three foster children. 505 N.W.2d at 335. The district court excluded evidence that
the children had also accused a social worker of sexual ly abusing them. Id. at 340. This
court reversed and remanded, holding that evidence of prior false accusations may be
admissible to attack a complainant’s c redibility if the district court makes a threshold
determination “that a reasonable probability of falsity exists.” Id.
Corr did not cite Goldenstein or argue that the case supports admission of extrinsic
evidence of S.B.’s prior recantations in the dist rict court.3 As a general rule, we “will not
decide issues which were not raised before the district court, including constitutional
questions of criminal procedure.” Roby v. State , 5 47 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) .
Because the pivotal question identified in Goldenstein—whether there is a reasonable
probability that S.B.’s prior allegations of domestic abuse by Corr are false —was not
presented to the district court, we decline to consider Corr’s argument.
Moreover, our review of the record persuades us that any evidentiary error
occasioned by the district court’s exclusion of extrinsic evidence of S.B.’s prior
recantations is harmless. See State v. Cram, 718 N.W.2d 898, 904 (Minn. 2006) (stating
that even if the district court abuses its discretion, “the decision will not be reversed if it is
found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (quotation omitted)). Error regarding the

3 Rather, Corr argued at various times that the extrinsic evidence was admissible under
Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) and Minn. R. Evid. 616, and not excluded by Minn. R. Evid. 608(b).

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exclusion of evidence is harmless if the verdict is “surely unattributable to the error.” State
v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 279 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted).
The record is replete with evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Corr violated
the OFP. In addition to S.B.’s testimony concerning the violation, the evidence included
her 911 call, testimony of the officers who responded to her call and contemporaneously
located Corr on a street adjacent to S.B.’s home, and photographs showing where Corr was
picked up by Officer Smith in relation to S.B.’s home. And the record includes testimony
from three different officers and S.B. regarding Corr’s past domestic abuse against S.B.,
which Corr does not challenge on appeal.
Corr contends that the length of the deliberations, the jury’s question about the
excluded exhibits, and the fact the jury wanted the 911 tape replayed means that the jury
wavered in determining Corr’s guilt. This argument is mere speculation. And his assertion
that defense counsel’s repeated impeachment o f S.B. on cross -examination was not
sufficient because S.B. did not recall her prior recantations is belied by the record. While
S.B. did not remember the specifics of certain past incidents of abuse, defense counsel used
the excluded documents to refresh her memory. After reviewing each document, S.B.
testified that her recantations were false.
In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in excluding extrinsic
evidence of S.B.’s recantations of prior abuse allegations. And because ample evidence
supports the jury’s verdict, and defense counsel impeached S.B. with her prior recantations
during cross-examination, any claimed evidentiary error was harmless.
Affirmed.