State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0398

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eddie Morris Miller,
Appellant.

Filed August 14, 2017
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-4547

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Paul D. Baertschi, Tallen and Baertschi, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Mart in, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
The Hennepin County District Court found Eddie Morris Miller guilty of driving
while impaired. Before trial, the district court denied Miller’s motion to suppress evidence
that arose from a traffic stop. We conclude that the district court did not err by denying
2
that motion because law-enforcement officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
Miller was speeding, which justified the traffic stop. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
On January 28, 2016, at 2:16 a.m., Officer Friese and Officer Weber of the
Robbinsdale Police Department were on patrol on Victory Memorial Drive . The officers
saw an oncoming vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed. Their radar instrument indicated
that the vehicle was traveling at a speed of 50 m.p.h. in a 25 -m.p.h. zone. Officer Friese
made a U -turn and followed the vehicle for approximately one and one-half m inutes,
during which time the vehicle was traveling between 28 and 35 m.p.h.
Officer Friese activated the squad car’s flashing lights to initiate a traffic stop. He
identified Miller as the driver of the vehicle. Officer Friese noticed that Miller had
bloodshot and watery eyes and smelled of alcohol. Officer Friese conducted three field
sobriety tests, and Miller failed all three. Officer Friese administered a preliminary breath
test, which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.139. Officer Friese arrested Miller for
driving while impaired. Miller later consented to a breath test, which revealed an alcohol
concentration of 0.10.
The state charged Miller with one count of driving a motor vehicle with an alcohol
concentration of more than 0.08, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2014),
and one count of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) . In August 2016, Miller mo ved to suppress the
evidence that was obtained due to the traffic stop. The district court conducted an
evidentiary hearing at which t he state called Officer Friese and Officer Weber to testify ,
3
and Miller testified on his own behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court
denied Miller’s motion from the bench.
In November 2016, Miller waived his right to a trial by jury and stipulated to the
prosecution’s case, and the parties agreed that the district court’s ruling on the suppression
motion would be dispositive. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The district court
found Miller guilty of one count and dismissed the other count. The district court sentenced
Miller to 365 days in jail, with credit for time served and with the remaining time stayed
for two years. Miller appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Miller argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence. Specifically, he argues that the officers ’ visual estimation of his speed is not a
sufficient basis for a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was speeding.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The
Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their motor vehicles.
State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). As a general rule, a law -enforcement
officer may not seize a person in a motor vehicle without probable cause. State v. Flowers,
734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). But a law-enforcement officer may, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory stop of a person in a motor vehicle if
the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person might be engaged in
criminal activity. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011) (citing Terry v. Ohio,
4
392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). Even a minor traffic violation, “however insignificant,”
may justify an investigatory stop. State v. George , 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997);
see also Berge v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Minn. 1985). To
be specific, a reasonable suspicion of speeding justifies a n investigatory stop. See, e.g.,
State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 2003); State v. Thiel, 846 N.W.2d 605, 610
(Minn. App. 2014) , review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 2014) . This court applies a de novo
standard of review to the question whether an investigatory stop is valid . Britton, 604
N.W.2d at 87.
Miller acknowledges in his brief that “[a]n officer’s visual estimation of speed may
support a traffic stop.” Indeed, this court has upheld a n investigatory stop based on an
officer’s observation of a speeding vehicle and visual estimate of an excessive speed. In
Sazenski v. Commissioner of Pub . Safety, 368 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. App. 1985), we noted
that the officer “had received formal training in the estimation of traffic speed” and
concluded that “the record amply supports the trial court’s determination that the stop was
proper.” Id. at 409. Furthermore, in State v. Ali, 679 N.W.2d 359 (Minn. App. 2004), we
affirmed a speeding conviction by reasoning that an officer’s visual estimate of the
defendant’s speed was, by itself, sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Id. at 367-
68. In support of that reasoning, we cited Lemiuex v. Bishop, 296 Minn. 372, 209 N.W.2d
379 (1973), in which the supreme court recognized that the estimation of “the speed of an
automobile lies in a field in which a lay person gifted with reasonable intelligence, given a
fair opportunity to observe, and having ordinary experience with moving vehicles may give
5
opinion testimony.” Ali, 679 N.W.2d at 367 (quoting Lemieux, 296 Minn. 378, 209 N.W.2d
at 383).
In this case, both Officer Friese and Officer Weber testified that they had received
formal training in making visual estimates of the speed of a moving vehicle. In addition,
Officer Weber testified that he had further developed his ability to make visual estimates
of speed during his five years of experience as a law-enforcement officer. Officer Weber
testified that Miller’s car was traveling “at a very high rate of speed.” In addition, after
making that observation, Officer Weber saw that the squad car’s radar instrument measured
Miller’s speed at 50 m.p.h. The district court found Officer Weber’s testimony to be
credible. In light of this evidence, we have no difficulty concluding that the officers had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Miller was speeding. Furthermore, there is additional
evidence in the record that corroborates the district court’s finding of reasonable,
articulable suspicion . The squad car ’s video-recording, which includes a GPS -based
measurement of speed, shows that the officers’ squad car was traveling at speeds of
between 28 and 35 m.p.h. while the officers were following Miller’s vehicle at a constant
interval. Moreover, Miller admitted in his own testimony that he was driving at “30, 32,
something like that” before the officers stopped him.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Miller’s motion to suppress evidence.
Affirmed.