LaFayette Temple, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0410

LaFayette Temple,
Appellant,

vs.

Metropolitan Council,
Respondent.

Filed December 11, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-16-4143

Leslie L. Lienemann, Celeste E. Culberth, Culberth & Lienemann, LLP, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Sydnee N. Woods, Metropolitan Council, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kurt J. Erickson, Jessica J. Bradley, Littler Mendelson PC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order for summary judgment dismissing his
claims of racial discrimination and reprisal against respondent. He argues that the district
2
court erred by narrowly construing the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and b y
making inferences in favor of respondent’s evidence while disregarding his evidence. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant LaFayette Temple, an African-American man, worked as a police officer
for the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD), a law enforcement agenc y established
by respondent Metropolitan Council to police, investigate, and make arrests in relation to
offenses regarding transit property, equipment, and passengers within the metropolitan
area. Minn. Stat. § 473.407, subd. 1 (2016) . MTPD hired Temple in July 2013, and he
successfully completed both field training and the standard probationary period by July
2014.
After Temple completed training, MTPD assigned him to work on the light-rail train
(LRT) lines in Minneapolis and St. Paul. In September 2014, while on patrol in a squad
car, Temple responded to a standard radio call for assistance by activating the car’s lights
and sirens. Passing through an intersection, Temple’s squad car was struck by an oncoming
vehicle. Both Temple and his partner suffered injuries from the accident. Temple was
placed on injured-on-duty medical leave to receive treatment for his injuries.
MTPD conducted an investigation into the accident, and after revi ewing the
investigator’s and the crash review board’s recommendations that Temple could have
prevented the accident, Chief John Harrington determined that Temple’s actions warranted
discipline of 16 hours of unpaid leave and eight hours of paid driver’s tr aining. Chief
3
Harrington later conducted a Loudermill hearing and reduced Temple’s discipline to
driver’s training and a written reprimand for failing to listen to his radio.1
While Temple was still on medical leave, MTPD conducted its biannual shift
bidding process, which enables its police officers to bid for s hift slots based on seniority.
The bid sheet’s posting stated that “[o]fficers bid only the hours of the shift. . . .
[Assignments] are listed but [s]upervisors may change those assignments due to
[d]epartmental needs.” Temple submitted a bid for a patrol shift but was assigned to a LRT
shift. In December, Temple emailed Captain James Franklin regarding his assignment to
a LRT shift:
Captain,

Good morning Sir. I am sending this email in resp onse to the
Jan 2015 Officers Schedule.

It appears that I have been placed on the B side Mid LRT E.
Respectfully, I placed my bid for the B side Mid E. I am aware
that we’re only bidding the hours.

Captain if you are willing to help me with this situation I will
be very thankful. As I look at the schedule I notice there are
many other officers on the schedule with less seniority than I
that are on patrol shifts.

Captain to be perfectly honest, I’m just burned out with being
on the LRT right now, and I needed the break to recharge my
batteries. Every assignment I’ve had since FTO completion
has been the LRT.

1 A public employee with a constitutionally protected property right under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is entitled to a hearing (commonly referred to as a
Loudermill hearing) and an opportunity to respond to charges against him in matters of
discipline or termination. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 532, 541 –
42, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985); Pelerin v. Carlton County , 498 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn.
App. 1993), review denied (Minn. May 18, 1993).
4

I wanted to request your help as the commanding officer over
the East Division, and see if there was anything that we can do?

Thank you so very much for your immediate [attention] to this
matter!

Captain Franklin replied, stating:
LaFayette,

You are correct in that patrol officers only bid the hours and
not the assignment.
With that being said, yes you have been plugged into the
schedule as a rail officer. However, all officers on that 1400
shift are subject to daily assignment changes. In essence, any
officer can be assigned anything within the prescribed hours
bid.

I will say though that I am somewhat perplexed about you
being burned out from an assignment on the LRT? We are the
Transit police after all, and therefore, are expected to ride the
buses and rails. In fact, if you boil it down, very few officers
actually are assigned to patrol cars. As a younger officer with
a long career ahead of you as a Metro Transit Police Officer, I
suggest perhaps you recalibrate your expectations of
assignments.

Upon your return we can discuss further.

I wish you a speedy recovery!

Temple returned to work full -time on his LRT as signment in lat e January 2015.
Temple’s immediate supervisor was Sergeant Peter Peterson, who had served as Temple’s
field training officer for the first month of Temple’s training. Sergeant Peterson submitted
an MTPD personnel complaint form on January 31, stating tha t he had counseled Temple
on his expectations for working on the LRT, specifically that Temple was “to stay on the
LRT and not respond to patrol calls.”
5
On March 31, Temple met with Sergeant Peterson to discuss his LRT assignment.
Temple surreptitiously recorded the meeting using his cellphone. Sergeant Peterson
explained to Temple that his assignment requires him to ride the LRT and that he is not to
patrol in a squad car. Temple stated, “I’ll be on the train, but I’m not going to ride the train
all day. I’m not going to do it. I’m going to get back in the car, and I’m going to drive the
Green Line.” Temple also stated,
[Y]ou guys aren’t being fair in this department with me.
You’re not being – you guys are casting me on the outside, and
you’re picking on me. . . . I’m tired of coming to work in a
hostile environment. . . . I feel like I’m being harassed in this
department. It needs to stop.

Sergeant Peterson prepared a second complaint form, documenting that Temple “feels he’s
being harassed” and that MTPD is treating him unfairly. There is no indication that
Temple’s claim of harassment was investigated.
Sergeant Peterson submitted another complaint form on April 12. The complaint
noted that four officers had approached Sergeant Peterson with requests to not be partnered
with Temple due to his dislike for working on the LRT. The complaint also provided that
Temple had appeared in a picture of a newspaper article in which he was on a LRT platform
without a ticket validator. Peterson also docu mented that he had reviewed some of
Temple’s patrol logs, which noted “high mileage” in patrol cars even though Temple was
assigned to the LRT.
On April 13, Temple met with Captain Franklin, Sergeant Peterson, and Lieutenant
Michael Johnson to discuss Temple’s work performance and his complaint about the shift
6
bidding process. Temple also surreptitiously recorded this meeting. During the
conversation, Temple and Captain Franklin engaged in the following exchange:
CAPTAIN FRANKLIN: Did you actually tell Sergeant
Peterson that you were not going to ride rail after he told you
that you are going to ride rail?
TEMPLE: I told him I wouldn’t stay on the train all day. Yes,
I did.
CAPTAIN FRANKLIN: You did.
TEMPLE: Yes, sir.
CAPTAIN FRANKLIN: What is that to you?
TEMPLE: Would be clearly what you guys would describe it
as insubordination.
. . . .
CAPTAIN FRANKLIN: We are here because of your
performance deficiency. And that is, you are not obeying
orders. You are not obeying the Sergeant. You are not doing
your job. You bid the hours. We pick the assignment. That’s
where you’re assigned. And I expect, I expect, improvement.
. . . .
TEMPLE: I feel like I’m being harassed like that. I told
[Sergeant Peterson] that.
. . . .
TEMPLE: All I am asking is that, if you guys are going to do
the things you do, include me in them. Don’t exile me out of
here. I don’t feel like I’m part of this team when I come in.
. . . .
TEMPLE: And, yes, I did tell him I wasn’t going to be on the
train all day.
. . . .
CAPTAIN FRANKLIN: Truthfully, if I wanted to, if I really
wanted to pick on you, that right there is enough for an Internal
Affairs investigation of insubordination. Not ready to go there
yet. I’m willing to say this is serving as your wake-up call, and
I pray you accept it as that.

On April 22, MTPD documented another personnel complaint form after being
contacted by a ci tizen complaining about Temple ’s conduct during a traffic stop. The
7
citizen, who admitted that he was uncooperative and argumentative with Temple, alleged
that he felt disrespected and threatened by his interaction with Temple.
On the day after the citizen complaint was received, C aptain Franklin met with
Chief Harrington to discuss Temple’s work performance, particularly the citizen complaint
and Temple’s difficulty with working on the LRT. Chief Harrington subsequently
authorized an internal affairs (IA) investigation. Sergeant Mario Ruberto notified Temple
that MTPD’s IA unit would be investigating into allegations regarding “multiple
performance issues including [his] refusal to follow lawful orders given by a supervisor,
and failure to properly carry out [his] work assignments.” The letter also noted that the
investigation would review the citizen ’s complaint that Temple threatened him with
violence and used profanity during the traffic stop. On April 27, Temple met with Captain
Franklin, Lieutenant Johnson, and Sergeant Peterson a second time . Temple again
surreptitiously recorded the meeting. Captain Franklin reiterated that “[w]e still feel that
you’re still having trouble staying on the train,” and informed Temple that he would be
transported to and from the LRT during his shift.
MTPD circulated another biannual shift -bid posting in late May. The posting
provided that “[o]fficers bid only the hours of the shift.” Temple submitted a bid for a
downtown beat assignment, but was later assigned to the LRT.
In June, Temple and his partner, Noah LaBathe, responded to a call from the St.
Paul Police Department involving a high speed vehicle pursuit. Temple and LaBathe, who
shared a patrol car, engaged in the pursuit without notifying or requesting permission from
MTPD’s dispatch or their supervisor, Sergeant Peterson. Later that day, neither Temple
8
nor LaBathe reported the pursuit on their daily log sheet. Instead, LaBathe reported on the
log sheet that they were at a gas station during that same time period. Both Temple and
LaBathe signed the log sheet at the end of the shift to confirm its accuracy. Sergeant
Ruberto notified Temple a few days later that Chief Harrington had ordered another IA
investigation to review Temple’s conduct during the vehicle pursuit and his failure to report
the pursuit in the daily log sheet and to determine whether his conduct violated any of
MTPD’s policies.
Sergeant Ruberto completed the IA investigation commenced in April and
recommended to Chief Harrington tha t the allegations from Captain Franklin a nd the
citizen that Temple violated MTPD’s policies be sustained. Chief Harrington sustained the
violations and imposed preliminary discipline against Temple, which included: (1) a
written reprimand for unsatisfactory work performance; (2) a written reprimand for use of
profane language while on duty; (3) a one-day suspension for disobedience or
insubordination; and (4) a two-days suspension for threatening to inflict unlawful bodily
injury. Chief Harrington imposed 24 hours of unpaid leave for the sustained violations and
informed Temple that he could schedule a meeting to discuss the pre liminarily planned
discipline. Chief Harrington then conducted a Loudermill hearing and subsequently
reduced Temple’s discipline to 16 hours of unpaid leave.
On June 30, Temple emailed Chief Harrington, stating that he has “been heavily
scrutinized, harassed, discriminated against, and expected to work in a hostile work
environment created by [his] superiors since [his] return to work following [his] injur ies
resulting from last year’s crash on 9/19/14.” Temple further stated in the email:
9
My efforts to bring my concerns to light on both occasions
warranted a very unfavorable response starting with Sgt.
Peterson on 3/31, and then Capt. Franklin, on 4/13. I know
there is a policy in place for the Metro Transit Police that is to
be followed in the event an employee addresses an issue of
harassment, or form of mistreatment to his/her superiors!

I thought I took the appropriate channels to address the issues;
and following those meetings, where I disclosed my feelings
of harassment [I] was shortly thereafter notified via email by
our [department’s] Internal Affairs Division that I was being
investigated referring to our meeting on the 6th.

Temple met with Chief Harrington in early July and surreptitiously recorded a
portion of the meeting. Temple stated that he had told Sergeant Peterson during their
March meeting that he felt harassed because he was the only officer directed to stay on the
LRT and that nobody explained to him why he was assigned to the LRT instead of patrol.
Sergeant Ruberto then finished the IA investigation concerning Temple’s
involvement in, and his failure to report, the June vehicle pursuit. Upon completion of his
investigation, Sergeant Ruberto recommended that Chief Harrington sustain the policy
violations by Temple in conjunction with the June vehicle pursuit.
In August, while Temple was on medical leave for an off -duty injury, Chief
Harrington sent hi m a letter terminating his employment for the following policy
violations: (1) failure to properly perform duties, (2) surreptitious use of an audio recorder,
(3) disobedience or insubordination for refusing or deliberately failing to carry out lawful
directives, (4) failure to notify dispatch of involvement in a vehicle pursuit, and (5)
falsification of work -related records. Chief Harrington conducted a Loudermill hearing
with Temple the following day to address the allegations in the termination letter. At the
10
hearing, Temple and Chief Harrington discussed Temple’s June 30 email. The termination
of Temple’s employment took effect on September 1.
In May 2016, Temple sued Metropolitan Council, alleging claims of racial
discrimination and reprisal in vio lation of the MHRA. Metropolitan Council moved for
summary judgment on both claims. The district court granted the motion and entered
judgment in favor of Metropolitan Council. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Temple challenges the district court’s order dismissing his racial discrimination and
reprisal claims. A district court may grant summary judgment if the record reflects “no
genuine issue as to any material fact” and the moving party “is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. “A genuine issue of material fact arises when there
is sufficient evidence regarding an essential element . . . to permit reasonable persons to
draw different conclusions.” Kelly v. Kraemer Constr., Inc., 896 N.W.2d 504, 508 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted).
In addressing an appeal from a district court’s grant of summary judgment, we
review de novo whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the district
court erred in applying the law to the facts. Commerce Bank v. W . Bend Mut. Ins. , 870
N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015). Appellate courts “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted.” Lee v. Fresenius
Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).
11
I.
Temple contends that the district court erred by determining that he did not establish
a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The MHRA makes it “an unfair employment
practice for an employer, because of race . . . to . . . discharge an employee; or . . .
discriminate against a person with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms,
upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.08,
subd. 2 (2016). In evaluating issues concerning th e MHRA, we may analyze and apply
law developed by federal courts in Title VII cases due to the similarities between the two
statutes. See, e.g. , Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co. , 417 N.W.2d 619, 623
(Minn. 1988).
Racial discrimination under the MHRA may be established under a theory of
disparate treatment. Goins v. W . Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. 2001). “Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical in a disparate treatment claim.” Id. Discriminatory motive
may be proven by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence in accordance with the
three-part burden-shifting test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S.
792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking , 632
N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2001).
A. Direct Evidence of Adverse Employment Actions
Temple argues on appeal that he provided sufficient direct evidence of racial
discrimination to avoid summary judgment. “[D]irect evidence is evidence showing a
specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision,
sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion
12
actually motivated the adverse employment a ction.” Griffith v. City of Des Moines , 387
F.3d 733, 736 (8th C ir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Stated otherwise, Temple may prove
his racial discrimination claim if he establishes that his race “actually motivated” MTPD’s
actions. See LaPoint v. Family Orthodontics, P.A., 892 N.W.2d 506, 514 (Minn. 2017).
While racial animus may be relevant to proving motivation, it is not required, and Temple
may prove motivation by showing that his race was a “substantial causative factor” in
MTPD’s decisions. See id. at 514, 517.
Temple specifically argues that the district court construed the MHRA too narrowly
by determining that an adverse employment action must be related to the employee’s
compensation. To constitute an adverse employment action, the action must have created
a materially adverse impact on Temple’s employment terms or conditions. See Coffman v.
Tracker Marine, L.P. , 141 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1998). Temple asserts that MTPD
engaged in a series of adverse employment actions leading up to his termination, including
racial hostility, discriminatory assignments, and discriminatory scrutiny.
First, he claims that the district court failed to fully consider Sergeant Peterson’s
racist remarks and the effect that Sergeant Peterson’s conduct had on hi s discipline.
Temple alleges that Sergeant Peterson made several racially hostile comments during
Temple’s field training, including telling Temple to “kill yourself . . . we don’t want you
here; I don’t like your kind, black people” on his first day of training. Temple also alleges
that his training officers encouraged him to be aggressive toward minorities and that he
frequently overheard fellow officers boast about using excessive force against black men.
13
Contrary to Temple’s assertions, the district court evaluated Peterson’s alleged
comments and determined that they were not simply “stray remarks” as compared to the
statements from Temple’s fellow officers. See Diez v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 564 N.W.2d
575, 579 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 1997) (“Stray remarks made
in the workplace cannot serve as direct evidence of discrimination.”). But because Chief
Harrington, not Sergeant Peterson, made the decisions to conduct the IA investigations and
to impose discipline, the district court determined that Sergeant Peterson’s comments were
not direct evidence of racial discrimination. See id. (explaining that statements from
individual who is not decision -maker in employee’s discharge are not direct evidence of
discrimination). We conclude that Sergeant Peterson’s comments during Temple’s field
training, which occurred numerous months before Temple’s discipline and termination, are
not on their own sufficient evidence to satisfy the direct evidence method in proving that
MTPD’s treatment and termination of Temple constituted racial discrimination.
Temple next claims that the evidence, including emails expressing skepticism about
his prior injuries and illnesses, reflect s MTPD’s malicious intent towards him. 2 He also
claims that he was the only officer to have his bid changed to a less desirable assignment,
his squad car taken away, and his log sheets reviewed. But none of this evidence directly
demonstrates a discriminatory animus or that race was a substantial causative factor in

2 Temple’s argument also refers to emails between Captain Franklin and Sergeant Ruberto,
which he believes portray the hostility toward him. But these emails were not sent to
Temple and none of them amount to direct evidence of racial animus. See Clearwater v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 166 , 231 F.3d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 200 0) (concluding that
superintendent’s statements about Native American teacher pitching tent and “scrub Indian
ponies” were stray remarks and not direct evidence of discrimination).
14
MTPD’s treatment of him . Moreover, as the district court properly concluded, Temple’s
assignment to a LRT shift does not constitute an adverse employment action because it
does not result in a reduction of pay, benefits, or title when compared to a patrol
assignment. See Jones v. Fitzgerald , 285 F.3d 70 5, 714 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that
reassignment involving minor changes in working conditions that does not involve
reduction in pay or benefits is not adverse employment action). And, while losing squad
car responsibilities may have inconvenienced Temple, a mere inconvenience or alteration
of job responsibilities, without a material change in employment, is insufficient to be
considered an adverse employment action. See Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37
F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Tuggle v. Mangan , 348 F.3d 714, 722 (8th Cir.
2003) (“Undesirable work assignments are n ot adverse employment actions.” (quotation
omitted)); Montandon v. Farmland Indus., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that
employee’s unhappiness is not actionable adverse action). Indeed, as Captain Franklin
advised Temple in his December 2014 email, being an officer of the MTPD comes with
the expectation that a significant responsibility of the position would be to monitor metro
transit systems such as the LRT.
Temple argues that the district court disregarded much of his evidence as irrelevant
and viewed MTPD’s actions in isolation. But the undisputed evidence in the record
demonstrates that Temple has failed t o show a “specific link” between any alleged
discriminatory motive on the part of MTPD and an adverse employment action, or that race
was a “substantial causative factor” of his termination. See Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736 ; see
also LaPoint, 892 N.W.2d at 513 (quotation omitted). We conclude that the district court
15
properly interpreted the MHRA and the pertinent caselaw, and therefore did not err by
determining that Temple failed to provide direct evidence of discriminatory motivation
causing an adverse employment action.
B. The Prima Facie Case and Similarly-Situated Comparators
Because Temple lacks direct evidence of a discriminatory motive, he must establish
the requisite inference of unlawful discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework in order to evade summary judgment. See Guimaraes v. SuperValu,
Inc., 674 F.3d 962, 972–73 (8th Cir. 2012). The first step of this analysis is making a prima
facie case of discrimination. Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 542. If Temple sets forth a prima
facie case, the burden of production then shifts to MTPD to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for his termination. See id. at 545. And if MTPD provides a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to rebut Temple’s prima facie case, then the bu rden
shifts back to Temple to establish that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.
See id. Throughout this burden-shifting analysis, Temple retains the burden of persuasion
that MTPD’s adverse actions were based on unlawful discrimination. See id. at 546.
A prima facie case of employment discrimination requires Temple to show: (1) that
he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he was meeting MTPD’s legitimate
expectations; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) t hat similarly
situated employees outside the protected class were treated differently. See Martinez v.
W.W. Grainger, Inc., 664 F.3d 225, 230 (8th Cir. 2011); see also Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at
542 (explaining prima facie case of discriminatory discharge). T emple contends that the
district court erred by determining that Temple did not have partners who were similarly
16
situated for purposes of comparin g MTPD’s treatment of Temple. In analyzing this
comparison for a disparate treatment claim, Temple need not show that one of his partners
is a “precise clone” but rather is “similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Ridout v. JBS
USA, LLC, 716 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “Specifically, the
individuals used for comparison must have d ealt with the same supervisor, have been
subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or
distinguishing circumstances.” EEOC v. Kohler Co., 335 F.3d 766, 776 (8th Cir. 2003).
Temple claims that his partners are val id comparators because they were also
supervised by Sergeant Peterson and were assigned to the LRT. The district court
recognized that Temple presented evidence that MTPD treat ed him differently than other
officers to the extent that it monitored his dail y logs to observe how much time he spent
riding on the LRT. But the district court ultimately determined that Temple could not
identify any comparators from non -protected groups who shared his history of discipline
but did not experience similar adverse employment actions.3

3 Temple asserts that his discipline history was grounded in discriminatory scrutiny,
beginning with his discipline resulting from the September 2014 accident. Temple alleged
that he was punished for not listening to dispatch and not turning off his lights and sirens
while a white officer in the squad car following him was not disciplined for traveling with
lights and sirens. Though Chief Harrington amended the discipline, stating that the policy
violation was for failing to properly perform his assigned d uties, the fact that Chief
Harrington still imposed driver’s training as part of the discipline indicates that he
evaluated Temple’s failure to prevent the accident as part of the fai lure in performing his
duties. Even construing Temple’s allegations of d ifferential treatment in the light most
favorable to him , the driver ’s training demonstrates that the discipline was based on
Temple’s conduct as a whole, not solely on his race.
17
Temple asserts that the district court interpreted the phrase “similarly situated” too
narrowly, and he relies on City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, which states that in cases in
which a comparison is essentially impossible, “it is re asonable to require a prima facie
showing of treatment so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent
discrimination that discrimination is the probable explanation.” 307 Minn. 80, 87, 239
N.W.2d 197, 202 (1976). Before returning to work from medical leave, Temple emailed
Captain Franklin expressing his desire to not work the LRT shift, specifically stating, “I’m
just burned out with being on the LRT right now.” Temple’s expressed displeasure with
his LRT assignment led both Captain Fran klin and Sergeant Peterson to reiterate the
expectations that he remain on the LRT and not respond to patrol calls. Despite these
expectations, Temple later told Sergeant Peterson, “I’m not going to ride the train all day.
I’m not going to do it. I’m goi ng to get back in the car, and I’m going to drive the Green
Line.” Based on the evidence in the record, it is reasonable to conclude that Temple’s
insubordination and unwillingness to remain on the LRT, not his race, is the explanation
for MTPD’s increased monitoring of Temple’s work performance.
Temple also implies that his termination was racially motivated because of MTPD’s
hesitancy to fire LaBathe, a white officer, for the same violations. Temple need only
establish that he was treated differently than other employees “whose violations were of
comparable seriousness.” See Ridout, 716 F.3d at 1085 (emphasis omitted). But LaBathe
did not share the same history of discipline as Temple. For example, there is no indication
that LaBathe directly op posed orders to ride the LRT. And, even if we assume that their
conduct was the same, LaBathe was ultimately fired as well. T herefore, no reasonable
18
argument can be made that MTPD exercised different treatment between Temple and
LaBathe.
Temple repeatedly asserts in his appellate brief that he was treated differently than
his fellow officers. “But treating an employee differently is not the threshold question .
. . .” Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 82 (Minn. 2010). The question presented in
this summary judgment was whether it is reasonable to believe that MTPD’s treatment of
Temple is prohibited by the MHRA. See id. Temple overlooks that the crux of a disparate
treatment claim is that an employee is treated less favorably than others on the basi s of
race. Hubbard v. United Press Int ’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 442 (Minn. 1983). In his
efforts to make a prima facie case, Temple has failed to satisfy his burden to show that
MTPD’s actions regarding discipline and termination were grounded in racial
discrimination. The district court did not err by concluding that Temple did not establish
his prima facie case.
C. Pretext and the Cat’s Paw Theory
As discussed previously, if Temple presented a prima facie case, the burden would
shift to MTPD to demonstr ate that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Temple’s discipline and discharge. See Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 545. Here, the district
court found that this burden was met for purposes of imposing discipline because evidence
in the record indica tes that Temple ignored direct orders, repeatedly violated MTPD’s
policies, admitted to insubordination, and admitted to the facts regarding the ci tizen
complaint in April 2015. And, the district court determined that MTPD fulfilled the burden
for imposing termination because it produced evidence that Temple admitted to failing to
19
notify dispatch regarding the vehicle pursuit in June 201 5, surreptitiously recording other
officers, and committing a possible Brady violation.4 On appeal, Temple does not
challenge the district court’s findings regarding this second step of the McDonnell Douglas
test but contends that the district court erred in determining that he was unable to prove
that MTPD’s reasons for discipline and termination were pretext for discrimination.
Temple argues that the district court erred by disregarding evidence that race was a
motivating factor in his discipline and discharge. He claims that , although Chief
Harrington made the ultimate decisions to discip line Temple and terminate his
employment, the officers who actively discriminated against Temple directly influenced
the IA investigations that led to his discipline and discharge. Temple’s argument advances
what is known as the “cat’s paw” theory of liability.
“In the employment discrimination context, ‘cat’s paw’ refers to a situation in which
a biased subordinate, who lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal decisionmaker as
a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment actio n.” Qamhiyah
v. Iowa State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 566 F.3d 733, 742 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Under this theory, the employer may be liable for an unbiased, final decision maker’s
adverse employment action because the decision maker’s subordin ates are motivated by

4 The Brady violation was for Temple’s failure to enter the pursuit on his activity log, which
Chief Harrington deemed to constitute a falsification of a work -related record. See, e.g.,
Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194 , 1196 –97 (1963) (holding that
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
20
discriminatory animus and intentionally and proximately cause the adverse action. Bennett
v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 721 F.3d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 2013).
Temple asserts that Chief Harrington is the “cat’s paw” because he based his
decisions on investigations by Sergeant Ruberto , who in turn relied on information
provided by Captain Franklin and Sergeant Peterson. But, as the district court noted, Chief
Harrington conducted his own independent Loudermill hearings prior to imposing any
discipline. Although Sergeant Peterson may have acted with racial animus toward Temple
during his field training, Sergeant Peterson had little influence or involvement in Temple’s
discipline or termination. Chief Harrington ordered Sergeant Ruberto to cond uct the IA
investigations and requested that Captain Franklin prepare a review of Temple’s file. And,
Temple fails to produce any evidence that either Captain Franklin or Sergeant Ruberto
were motivated by racial animus with the specific intent of causing his discipline and
termination.
Moreover, the district court correctly reasoned that because Chief Harrington, an
African-American, both hired and fired Temple, a strong inference exists that
discrimination was not a motivating factor in the firing. See Arraleh v. County of Ramsey,
461 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006). We conclude that Temple did not provide sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the reasons for his discipline and discharge were
pretext for racial discrimination.
In summary, we conclude that the district court did not err by entering summary
judgment against Temple on his racial discrimination claim.
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II.
Temple also contends that the district court erred by dismissing his reprisal claim.
The MHRA reprisal provision states in relevant part:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice for any individual
who participated in the alleged discrimination as a[n] . . .
employer . . . to intentionally engage in any reprisal against any
person because that person: . . . opposed a practice forbidden
under this chapter or has filed a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this chapter. . . .

Minn. Stat. § 363A.15 (2016). “A reprisal i ncludes, but is not limited to, any form of
intimidation, retaliation, or harassment.” Id. Similar to MHRA discrimination claims, we
may also look to federal caselaw to review a reprisal claim. See, e.g., Fletcher v. St. Paul
Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999).
A. Direct Evidence of Retaliation
Temple alleges that he presented direct evidence that retaliation motivated MTPD’s
decision to discipline him and terminate his employment. As with a discrimination claim,
a MHRA reprisal claim can be proven by direct evidence. See Twymon v. Wells Fargo &
Co., 462 F.3d 925, 936 (8th Cir. 2006). “Direct evidence of retaliation is evidence that
demonstrates a specific link between a materially adverse action and the protected conduct,
sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that the harmful adverse -action
was in retaliation for the protected conduct.” Lors v. Dean, 746 F.3d 857, 865 (8th Cir.
2014) (quotation omitted).
22
Temple points to Captain Franklin’s comments during the meeting in April 2015 as
direct evidence of retaliation. At this meeting, Temple said, “And, yes, I did tell [Sergeant
Peterson] I wasn’t going to be on the train all day.” Captain Franklin responded to Temple,
Truthfully, if I wanted to, if I really wanted to pick on you, that
right there is enough for an Internal Affairs investigation of
insubordination. Not ready to go there yet. I’m willing to say
this is serving as your wake-up call, and I pray you accept it as
that.

The district court determined that this is not direct evidence of retaliation and that Temple
presented this evidence out of context by suggesting that it was this conversation that led
to the IA investigation in April 2015. We agree with the district court. Captain Franklin’s
statement indicates that he could have initiated an investigation based on Temple’s own
admitted insubordinate conduct, not based on Temple’s allegations of harassment. And,
as the district court noted, the IA investigation was initiated in late April due, at least in
part, to a ci tizen’s complaint regarding Temple’s conduct at a traffic stop. We conclude
that the district court properly determined that, as a matter of law, Temple failed to provide
direct evidence of retaliation.
B. Protected Conduct
Absent direct evidence, Temple may avoid summary judgment by demonstrating a
prima facie case of reprisal. See Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 305 F.3d 826, 830
(8th Cir. 2002). Temple appears to argue that the district court erred by applying the
McDonnell Douglas analysis to his reprisal claim but later contends that he established an
inference of reprisal under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Minnesota law has
established that much like a discrimination claim, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
23
framework applies to a reprisal claim. Dietrich v. Canadian Pac. Ltd. , 536 N.W.2d 319,
327 (Minn. 1995). In order to make a prima facie case of reprisal under the MHRA, Temple
must establish (1) that he engaged in statutorily-protected conduct; (2) that MTPD took an
adverse employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the
two. See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 81. The parties dispute the first and third elements in this
case.
Temple asserts that the district court inappropriately interpreted the MHRA
narrowly by determining that Temple’s complaints to Sergeant Peterson and Captain
Franklin in March and April 2015 of being “harassed” or “picked on” did not constitute
statutorily protected conduct. Temple engaged in statutorily protected conduct if he voiced
opposition to MTPD’s alleged discriminatory practices. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.15(1).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has declined to decide whether an actual violation is
necessary to establish statutorily -protected reporting. Bahr, 788 N.W. 2d at 82. Other
federal courts tend to apply a good-faith, reasonable belief standard instead of requiring an
actual violation. See, e.g., Helton v. Southland Racing Corp., 600 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir.
2010); Tate v. Exec. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2008). To be a good-
faith, reasonable belief, the belief must be “connected to the substantive law” and not
depend solely on Temple’s own reasoning and sense of what is discriminatory. See Bahr,
788 N.W.2d at 83–84. Stated otherwise, “if a practice is not unlawful under the plain terms
of the MHRA, a party’s belief that the practice is unlawful cannot be reasonable.” Id. at
84.
24
Here, the district court applied the good -faith, reasonable belief standard and
concluded that Temple failed to demonstrate a good-faith belief that he opposed practices
forbidden under the MHRA before the IA investigation in April 201 5. In his March 2015
meeting with Sergeant Peterson, Temple said:
[Y]ou guys aren’t being fair in this department with me.
You’re not being – you guys are casting me on the outside, and
you’re picking on me. . . . I’m tired of coming to work in a
hostile environment. . . . I feel like I’m being harassed in this
department. It needs to stop.

In the April 2015 meeting, Temple stated, “I feel like I’m being harassed.” And in his June
email to Chief Harrington, Temple stated that he has “been heavily scrutinized, harassed,
discriminated against, and expected to work in a hostile work environment created by [his]
superiors since [his] return to work following [his] injuries resulting from last year’s crash
on 9/19/14.”
Because Temple did not mention race or another protected characteristic under the
MHRA, the district court concluded that Temple could not link his claim of harassment to
a protected activity. See Hunt v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 282 F.3d 1021, 1028–29 (8th Cir.
2002) (affirming dismissal of retaliation claim in which plaintiff did not engage in
protected conduct because she did not attribute her complaint about employer’s failure to
give raise or promotion to gender discrimination). Temple claims that he reported the “kind
of conduct” that is prohibited by the MHRA and did not have to explicitly claim that the
harassment was due to his race. But the MHRA explicitly provides that Temple must
“oppose[] a practice forbidden under this chapter.” Minn. Stat. § 363A.15(1). This record
does not provide evidence from which a fact finder could determine that Temple had a
25
good-faith, reasonable belief that his assignment to the LRT or his subsequent discipline
were unlawful act s that violated the MHRA on the basis of racial discrimination. We
conclude that the district court did not err by determining that his complaints were not
statutorily protected conduct.
C. Causal Connection
Assuming that Temple establishes the first two elements of the prima facie case, he
next contends that the close temporal proximity between his protected conduct and
MTPD’s increased discipline and eventual discharge raises a presumption of retaliation.
See Hite v. Vermeer Mfg. Co. , 446 F.3d 858, 866 (8th Cir. 2006). Temple may establish
the causal connection between his protected conduct and MTPD’s adverse employment
action through “the tim ing of the two events.” Id. (quotation omitted). For instance, “ a
pattern of adverse actions that occur just after protected activity can supply the extra
quantum of evidence to satisfy the causation requirement.” Id. (quotation omitted).
However, coincidental timing “is rarely suff icient to establish” causation. Id. (quotation
omitted).
Here, the evidence in the record provides three instances in which Temple could
have potentially engaged in statutorily -protected activity: (1) his meeting with Sergeant
Peterson on March 31, 2015, (2) his meeting with Captain Franklin, Lieutenant Johnson,
and Sergeant Peterson on April 13, 2015, and (3) his email to Captain Harrington on June
30, 2015. And, the evidence demonstrates that MTPD initiated an IA investigation on
April 23, 2015 and notified Temple of his termination of employment on August 24, 2015.
Based on the relatively close timeframe between the meetings (March 31, 2015 and April
26
13, 2015) and the IA investigation (April 23, 2015) , as well as the email (June 30, 2015)
and Temple’s discharge (August 24, 2015), the timing of MTPD’s adverse employment
actions could raise an inference that the actions were causally connected to Temple’s
alleged protected conduct.
However, the district court determined that the citizen complaint, submitted on April
22, 2015, and the vehicle pursuit on June 21 , 2015, were intervening events that eroded
any causal connection between the meetings and Temple’s termination of employment.
Intervening events, such as employee complaints or additional misconduct, between
protected activity and adverse action may defeat an employee’s retaliation claim, either as
amounting to breaks in the causal chain or serving as the employer’s legitimate reasons for
its actions. See Mervine v. Plant Eng’g Servs., LLC, 859 F.3d 519, 527 (8th Cir. 2017);
Cheshewalla v. Rand & Son Constr. Co., 415 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Whether we
cabin our examination of these intervening events under the third element of the prima
facie case or under the subsequent step of the defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions, the result is the same.” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, MTPD had already begun expressing concerns about Temple’s
willingness to meet its expectations and perform the duties required by his LRT assignment
prior to his complaints of harassment. See Kasper v. Federated Mut. Ins. , 425 F.3d 496,
504 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Evidence of an employer’s concerns about an employee’s
performance before the employee’s protected activity undercuts a finding of causation.”).
Therefore, the district court did not err by concluding that Temple failed to establish a
27
causal connection between the alleged protected conduct and his adverse employment
actions.
D. Pretext
Much like Temple’s racial discrimination claim, the district court determined that
MTPD met its burden of offering legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his discipline
and discharge. Temple asserts that the proffered reasons for his escalating discipline and
eventual termination is mere pretext because it is so at odds with what is reasonably
expected that a r etaliatory motive is the only possible explanation. See Richardson, 307
Minn. at 87, 239 N.W.2d at 202. Temple may prove pretext by (1) showing that the
proffered reason is “unworthy of credence,” or (2) persuading the court that a prohibited
reason, such as retaliation, more likely motivated MTPD. Tyler v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs.,
628 F.3d 980, 988 (8th Cir. 2011). In other words,
An employee may prove pretext by demonstrating that the
employer’s proffered reason has no basis in fact, that the
employee receive d a favorable review shortly before he was
terminated, that s imilarly situated employees who did not
engage in the protected activity were treated more leniently,
that the employer changed its explanation for why it fired the
employee, or that the employer deviated from its policies.

Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2006).
Temple first argues that the district court ignored evidence that the information
provided by Captain Franklin, Sergeant Peterson, and Serg eant Ruberto was not credible.
However, this argument is unpersuasive. Beyond mere argumentative assertions, Temple
does not point to any evidence of intentional untruthfulness. As discussed previously,
MTPD provided several legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, supported by evidence in
28
the record, for Temple’s discipline and dis charge. Therefore, Temple has not shown
MTPD’s reasons for discipline and discharge to be “unworthy of credence” or have “no
basis in fact.”
Temple next contends that MTPD intended to terminate Temple before the IA
investigation was completed and that Chief Harrington and Sergeant Ruberto initially
assured LaBathe that he would not be terminated.5 He also points to instances in which
other officers were accused of committing Brady violations but were not discharged.6 But
there is evidence in the record of other officers who committed Brady violations being
terminated from employment at MTPD. And, although Harrington apparently considered
lesser discipline for LaBathe, he ultimately terminated LaBathe’s employment as well.
Temple does not prove that s imilarly situated officers, who did not engage in protected
conduct, were treated more favorably.
Temple also alleges that MTPD’s explanation for his termination has shifted to
focusing on his driving speed during the vehicle pursuit. “Evidence of a subs tantial shift
in an employer’s explanation for an employment decision may be evidence of pretext , but
an elaboration generally is not.” Mervine, 859 F.3d at 528 (quotation omitted). A reference
to “an additional aspect of the same behavior” is not considered a substantial change in the

5 Temple asserts that the record indicates that Chief Harrington did not intend to make a
decision regarding LaBathe’s termination until after he discussed the matter with the
Metropolitan Council’s Equal Opportunity officer.
6 Temple also alleges that Chief Harrington improperly imposed a level of discipline on
Temple for a verbal threat against a citizen that typically equaled the punishment imposed
for an excessive use of force. But, this allegation misses the point. Temple does not present
any evidence that other officers were disciplined differently for threatening the use of force.
29
employer’s explanation. Phillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation
omitted). Here, MTPD has consistently provided that Temple’s termination was based on
multiple violations of its policies and procedures.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err by determining that
Temple did not demonstrate that MTPD’s reasons for his discipline and termination were
pretext for retaliation. Therefore, the district court did not err by entering judgment against
Temple on his reprisal claim.
Affirmed.