State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0411

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Walter Marquetta Humphrey, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed February 12, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-16-2447

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Ryan C. McCarthy, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presid ing Judge; Worke, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Walter Marquetta Humphrey Jr. challenges his convictions of two counts
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the district court erred in allowing the

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state to introduce inflammatory relationshi p evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2016).
In a pro se supplemental brief, Humphrey ar gues that the state’ s witnesses lacked
credibility and the evidence was insufficient. Because the dist rict court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the relationship eviden ce and Humphrey’s arguments lack merit,
we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its di scretion when it admitted relationship
evidence.

After a jury trial, Humphrey was convi cted of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct—sexual penetration of a minor when the actor is in a significant relationship with
the victim, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct—sexual penetration of a minor when
the actor is in a position of authority. Humphrey argues that the district court deprived him
of a fair trial by allowing the state to intr oduce evidence of Humphrey’s past violence
against the child victim (the child) and her mother. Humphrey contends that the probative
value of the relationship evidence was minimal, and it was far outweighed by the “highly
prejudicial” nature of the evidence.
This court reviews a district court’s deci sion to admit relationship evidence for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Andersen , 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (M inn. App. 2017). The
district court has the discretion to allow the state to present “[e]vidence of domestic conduct
by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household
members,” commonly referred to as “relatio nship evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20; State
v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010). “Domestic conduct” includes “domestic

3
abuse,” which is defined as “ physical harm, bodily injury, or assault,” the “infliction of
fear of imminent physical harm,” or crim inal sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. §§ 634.20,
518B.01, subd. 2. “Family or household me mbers” include “persons who are presently
residing together or who have resided together. . . .” Id. “[E]vidence of domestic conduct
by the accused against family or household members other than the victim may be admitted
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20. . . .” State v. Fraga, 864 N.W.2d 615, 627 (Minn. 2015).
Relationship evidence is used to “illuminate the history of the relationship, that is,
to put the crime char ged in the context of the re lationship between the two.” State v.
McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004). Relationship evidence is generally
admissible, “unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury. . . .” Minn. Stat. § 634.20; McCoy,
682 N.W.2d at 159 n.1. “When balancing the probative value against the potential
prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging
evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving
one party an unfair advantage.” State v. Bell , 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006).
Persuasion by illegitimate means in cludes “leading the jury to improperly conclude that
[the defendant] has a propens ity to behave criminally and should now be convicted, and
punished, for the charged offenses.” State v. Hormann, 805 N.W.2d 883, 891 (Minn. App.
2011).
Humphrey contests the admission of three portions of the child’s statements in her
videotaped forensic interview, which was played for the jury. In the first portion, the child
stated that she was afraid of Humphrey and he “used to beat on [her] mother a lot,” but that

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she forgave him and started treating him like her stepdad. Second, the child said that the
police would come to her house “mostly when [Humphrey] was drunk or when he hit [her
mother].” Third, the child st ated that Humphrey physically abused her with a belt when
she was little, she was scared of Humphrey, and had “always been scared of him.”1
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the relationship evidence
contained in the child’s statements. The statements describing Humphrey’s physical abuse
fit the definition of admissible evidence unde r Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Physical abuse is
“domestic abuse” under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2, and “domestic conduct” under
Minn. Stat. § 634.20. The domestic conduct was against the child and her mother who
were “family and household members” in this case.
The statements’ probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Here, the probative value of the evidence was that it placed the child’s
relationship with Humphrey into context. Both the child and her mother testified that the
child had a good father-daughter type relationship with Humphrey. The child continued to
visit Humphrey at his home after he stoppe d having a romantic relationship with her
mother. The child did not immediately report the sexual abuse. Her statements would have
helped the jury to understand why the child delayed reporting Humphrey’s abuse. Without
such evidence the jury may ha ve been puzzled by why the child was so frightened of

1 Humphrey did not object to the admission of the first and second portions of the child’s
statements at trial but does so for the first time on appeal. Normally, we review unobjected-
to errors under the “plain error” standard. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.
1998). Because we conclude that it was not e rror for the district c ourt to admit all three
portions, and that any such error was harmle ss, we apply the less strenuous objected-to
error analysis for all three portions of the child’s statements.

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Humphrey. The evidence clar ified the child’s delayed re porting, and her fear of
Humphrey, based on the prior assaults.
Furthermore, “evidence showing how a defe ndant treats his fa mily or household
members . . . sheds light on how the defendant interacts with those close to him, which in
turn suggests how the defendant may interact with the victim.” State v. Valentine , 787
N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010). Like in Valentine, the relationship evidence here
sheds light on how Humphrey, in general, interacts with close family members, and this is
probative as to how he may interact with the child.
The relationship evidence surely damaged Humphrey’s case. But to be improper,
the evidence must have “per suade[d] by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair
advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641. As the stat e notes, the prior conduct of physical
abuse is dissimilar to the charged conduct of sexual abuse in this case. As a result, a jury
could not have used the evidence as imperm issible propensity evidence. The evidence
consists of a few sentences within over one hour of the child’s testimony detailing
Humphrey’s sexual abuse. The state did not mention the relationship evidence in its
closing argument. The evidence served its lim ited purpose to explain the child’s delayed
reporting and why she would have been fright ened of Humphrey despite their close
relationship. In short, the prejudicial nature of the child’s statements did not substantially
outweigh its probative value.
Humphrey relies on three cases to support his argument that the district court erred;
see McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161; State v. Barnslater , 786 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. App.
2010); and State v. Word , 755 N.W.2d 776, 784 (M inn. App. 2008). In McCoy, the

6
supreme court held that evidence of similar conduct by the defendant against an alleged
victim of domestic abuse ma y be admitted under Minn. St at. § 634.20 without being
established by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). 682
N.W.2d at 155. In dicta the supreme court noted the un ique challenges the prosecution
faces in domestic abuse cases because abuse of ten occurs within the privacy of the home
and the abuser often exerts control over victims. Id. at 161. In McCoy, the relationship
evidence provided context for the jury, allowing it to judge the credibility of the victim’s
uncooperative testimony that sh e could not remember talki ng with the police about her
allegations of the assault. Id. Humphrey argues that this case is not like McCoy because
the child and her mother cooperated with police and therefore the state did not face a unique
prosecutorial challenge requiring relationship evidence. This argument is not convincing,
however, because the court in McCoy did not require a “unique” prosecutorial challenge as
a prerequisite to the admission of relationship evidence. And in any event, the state in this
case did face such a challenge here. Like the victim in McCoy, the child here was the only
witness to the abuse and her credibility was a central issue. 682 N.W.2d at 161. The
relationship evidence, if believed, provided context for the delayed reporting, allowing the
jury to judge the child’s credibility.
In Word—a violation-of-an-order-for-protection case—the district court admitted
extensive evidence regarding the defendant’s and victim’s troubled relationship and the
defendant’s controlling nature, abuse, and vi olence towards the vic tim. 755 N.W.2d at
784. This court concluded that the distri ct court did not plainly err by not limiting the
victim’s “dramatic and prejudicial” testim ony because it explained why the victim was

7
afraid of Word and provided context expl aining why the victim lied under oath in a
previous prosecution of Word. Id. Humphrey contends that Word is distinguishable,
because the child’s claim that Humphrey hit her and her mother does not make sexual abuse
more or less probable. We disagree. As already stated, the relationship evidence sheds
light on how Humphrey treats family and household members. Further, claims of physical
abuse explain why the child would be afra id to immediately report Humphrey. The
relationship evidence explains the child’s be havior, making her more credible, thereby
making it more probable that the abuse occurred.
In Barnslater, this court held that the distri ct court did not err in admitting
relationship evidence of the defendant’s prior domestic assaults agai nst the victim in a
pattern-of-harassing-conduct case. 786 N.W.2d at 648-49, 652. This court determined that
the evidence was “particularly probative” because the state needed to prove, as an element
of the charge, that the defendant had reason to know that his harassing conduct would cause
the victim to feel terrorized. Id. at 652; see Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5 (2016).
Humphrey argues that this case is not like Barnslater because the state was not required to
prove a pattern of harassment. While th is is true, Humphrey’s reading of Barnslater and
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 is too narrow: relationship evidence may be probative when proving
sexual abuse, as well as a pattern of harassmen t, when it sheds light on the history of the
relationship by putting the charged crime in context. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 159. In short,
the cases cited by Humphrey do not help his case.
Even if the district court abused its di scretion in admitting the evidence, any such
error was harmless. To receive a new trial, Humphrey must show that the admission of the

8
evidence was an abuse of discretion and that its admission was harmful. State v. Thao, 875
N.W.2d 834, 839 (Minn. 2016). An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that
the “wrongfully admitted evidence signi ficantly affected the verdict.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
The entire record demonstrates that it wa s unlikely that the relationship evidence
significantly affected the verdic t. The child gave detailed testimony about three separate
occurrences of Humphrey sexually penetr ating her. The child’s trial testimony was
consistent with her videotaped forensic interview played for the jury. Her testimony was
corroborated by her mother, who testified to the change in her demeanor during the time
the abuse occurred. Humphrey’s prior statem ents to the child on the telephone and his
apology via text message are, at the least, tacit admissions of guilt. Finally, the state did
not mention the child’s statements about the pa st physical abuse in its closing argument.
If the district court committed error, the error was harmless.
II. Humphrey’s pro se supplemental brief
In a pro se supplemental brief Humphrey a ttempts to discredit the child’s mother
with extra-record facts and asse rts that the child was untruthfu l. He argues that he could
not have assaulted the child under the circumstances of this case.
Appellate courts decline to address a pro se appellant’s claims on appeal that are
unsupported by legal analysis or citation, and such arguments are deemed forfeited. State
v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008); State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn.
2002). Here, Humphrey provides no citation to legal authority or the record, and provides
no legal analysis. Humphrey forfeited his arguments. Further, Humphrey asserts facts not

9
in the record. “An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record
on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988).
Nevertheless, Humphrey’s arguments can be liberally construed as challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence. When reviewing whether the ev idence was sufficient in a
criminal case, appellate courts are limited to “ascertaining wh ether, given the facts in the
record and the legitimate infere nces that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” Bernhardt v.
State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and will assume “the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and disbelieved ev idence contradicting those witnesses.” State v.
Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Minn. 1999).
The child’s testimony in this case was deta iled and consistent. She testified that
Humphrey woke her up in the middle of the night on three different occasions and sexually
penetrated her in different ways. When the child confronted Humphrey over the telephone
about the assaults he never denied sexually as saulting her. Humphrey later sent the child
a text message apologizing saying he was so rry for hurting her. A reasonable jury could
have credited the child’s testimony and, on review, we assume the jury did so. While a
conviction may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness, State v.
Hill, 285 Minn. 518, 518, 172 N.W.2d 406, 407 (1969), corroborative evidence may
include testimony from others regarding the victim’s demeanor, emotional condition and
changes in behavior after a sexual assault. State v. Wright, 679 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn.

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App. 2004), review denied (Minn. June 29, 2004). The child’s testimony was corroborated
by her mother’s testimony about the child’s noticeable change in demeanor and behavior.
Humphrey’s convictions are supp orted by sufficient evidence.
Affirmed.