Michael Scott Torfin, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0416

Michael Scott Torfin, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed November 20, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CV-16-925

Richard L. Swanson, Chaska, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Maria N. Zaloker, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Michael Scott Torfin challenges the district court’s order sustaining the
revocation of his driving privileges and the impoundment of his license plates. Appellant
argues that, after he was stopped for speeding, the police officer did not have a reasonable
and articulable suspicion of ot her criminal activity sufficient to justify expansion of the

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traffic stop. Because ample evidence in the record shows that the officer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion of an impaired-driving offense, we affirm.
FACTS
On September 27, 2016, at approximately 1:52 a.m., while on regular patrol, a
Victoria police officer “heard the aggressive acceleration of a vehicle from [a] stop sign
. . . [at] the intersection of 78th Street a nd County Road 13” on an otherwise “very quiet,
peaceful” night. In that area, the posted sp eed limit is 45 miles per hour. Based on his
experience observing the speed of moving ca rs, the officer estima ted the car was going
“[o]ver 50 miles an hour.” He was able to get a radar indication of the car’s speed and
clocked it at 57 miles per hour. The officer pursued and signaled the speeding car’s driver
and only occupant to stop. He did.
The officer approached the car and identified appellant, the driver. Appellant “was
very cooperative throughout the process.” Yet, the officer “could smell the odor of
consumed alcohol coming from inside the vehicle.” Appe llant “admitted to having a
couple of beers.” Appellant looked straight ahead and did not maintain eye contact with
the officer as the two conversed. The officer moved closer to the car and “took a . . . deep
breath from inside the vehicle and detected . . . the odor of consumed alcohol.” Appellant
again admitted to consuming alcohol before dr iving that night, and refused to take a
preliminary breath test because he did not want to “find himself in trouble.”
The officer had appellant step from the car to perform four field sobriety tests.
Appellant’s performance on the tests suggested impairment. The officer then arrested
appellant for driving while impaired. A later breath test, not challenged on appeal, revealed

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excessive alcohol in appellant’s system, and his driving privileges were revoked and his
license plates impounded.
Appellant challenged the revoc ation and license-plate impoundment in the district
court. The district court sustained the revocation and impoundment, finding that the officer
had reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficien t to expand the scope of the traffic stop to
include an impaired-driving investigation because he “noticed an odor of consumed alcohol
emanating from [appellant’s] vehicle . . . and [appellant] admitted to having had ‘a couple’
of beers.” It also concluded that appellant’s arrest was supported by probable cause.
This appeal followed, challenging only the stop-expansion issue.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues on appeal that the district court erred in determining that the officer
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of crim inal activity to justify the expansion of the
traffic stop for speeding. He concedes that, if the expansi on was permissible, the results
of the expansion were sufficient to justify his arrest.
We apply a de novo standard of review to a district court’s determination of
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, State v. Miller , 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn.
App. 2003), review denied (Minn. July 15, 2003), and a cl ear-error standard to a district
court’s factual findings, considering the “tota lity of the circumstances pertaining to the
issue, including possible inno cent explanations for the a lleged suspicious activity,” State
v. Baumann, 759 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d
173, 182 (Minn. 2007)).

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The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “A search
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is generally unreasonable.” State
v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). In some instances, a police officer may
conduct a limited, investigative traffic st op without a warrant wh en the officer has
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88
S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968).
A traffic stop initially supported by reasonable suspicion may be expanded, so long
as the expansion is “strictly tied to and ju stified by the circumstances which rendered the
initiation of the stop permissible.” State v. Asherooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004)
(quotations omitted). Justification comes from “(1) the original legitimate purpose of the
stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry v. Ohio.”
State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (M inn. 2012) (discussing the scope of a traffic stop
under Minn. Const. art. I, § 10). Reasonable suspicion for the expanded stop must be based
on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” Baumann, 759 N.W.2d at 240 (quoting Davis,
732 N.W.2d at 182).
Minnesota courts have articulated se veral bases on which an officer may
permissibly expand the scope of a traffic stop to investigate a driver’s possible intoxication.
Some indicators of intoxication include the od or of alcohol, slurre d speech, glassy eyes,
and poor balance. Johnson v. State, Dept. of Pub. Safety, 351 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Minn. 1984);
see e.g., State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 694-96 (Minn. App. 2012) (observing the odor

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of alcohol and bloodshot and watery eyes, facts which gave the trooper a reasonable basis
to suspect impairment). The parties cite numerous cases discussing factors that may
support an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion. We apply the rule of law identified
in State v. Wiegand to the evidence here. 645 N. W.2d 125, 136 (Minn. 2002). The
Wiegand court construed
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to limit the
scope of a Terry investigation to that which occasioned the
stop, . . . and to the investig ation of only those additional
offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable,
articulable suspicion within the time nece ssary to resolve the
originally-suspected offense.

Id.
Here, the officer initially stopped appellant ’s car for speeding but, given the hour
and the driver’s aggressive acceleration, the officer suspected from the outset that this
might be a drunk driver. Upon approachin g the car, the officer could smell consumed
alcohol, appellant admitted to drinking alcohol before driving, and appellant stared straight
ahead while the two talked. The officer expanded the stop to determine whether the driver
was impaired only after having developed a reasonable suspicion of impairment. The
officer expanded the stop based on a number of factors including driving conduct, odor of
alcohol, admitted consumption of alcohol, and appellant’s somewhat unusual behavior in
avoiding eye contact. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the evidence in the
record supports the district court’s determination that the officer had reasonable, articulable
suspicion of impaired driving when he expanded the traffic stop to include field sobriety
tests. As noted, appellant concedes on appeal that, if the expansion of the stop was

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permissible, then the officer arrested him on prob able cause; the field sobriety testing
yielded additional evidence of impairment sufficient to merit an arrest for impaired driving.
The district court did not err.
Affirmed.