Barclays Bank Delaware, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0417

Barclays Bank Delaware,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdulkarim Dahir,
Appellant.

Filed December 11, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-16-5499

Shawn Anderson, Gurstel Law Firm, Golden Valley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Abdulkarim Dahir, Blaine, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent-
creditor on its claims against appellant to collect credit-card debt, arguing that the district
court erred in deeming adm itted respondent-creditor’s re quests for admission and that
genuine issues of material fact exist that preclude summary judgment. Appellant further
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argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of the district
court’s summary-judgment order. We affirm.
FACTS
On November 12, 2015, respondent Barcla ys Bank Delaware (Barclays) filed a
complaint against appellant Ab dulkarim Dahir. Barclays alleged that Dahir applied for
credit from Barclays, Barclays accepted Dahir’s application, and Barclays issued a credit
account to Dahir. It also alleged that Dahir accepted and used the account, owes Barclays
$14,616.42 for credit extended on or before August 15, 2015 , and has failed to pay that
amount to Barclays despite receiving invoi ces and statements of account detailing the
amount owed. Barclays requested a j udgment of $14,616.42 and its costs and
disbursements incurred in the action. On N ovember 27, Dahir answ ered the complaint,
denying Barclays’s allegations.
On August 1, 2016, Barc lays served discovery on Dahir, including requests for
admission related to its allegations. Dahir did not respond to the requests for admission.
On October 28, 2016, Barclays moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) by failing
to timely respond to the requ ests for admission, Dahir “adm itted facts that conclusively
establish liability to [Barclays] in the total amount of $14, 616.42”; (2) “[Barclays] is
entitled to the contract balance remaining on [Dahir’s] credit card as a matter of law”;
(3) Dahir must pay Barclays under the account-stated doctrine; (4) Dahir waived the right
to dispute the balance due by failing to object in writing within 60 days; and (5) Dahir has
been unjustly enriched to Barclays’s detriment. Barcla ys attached an affidavit to the
motion from a Barclays employee regarding the credit account and credit-card statements.
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On January 9, 2017, Dahir filed a memorandum in opposition to Barclays’s motion
for summary judgment. Dahir also moved to “withdraw and/or deny any admission,”
arguing that he “denied any lia bility to the claims mentione d in the Complaint” in his
answer.
On January 31, the district court held a summary-judgment hearing. Dahir did not
appear at the hearing. Following the hear ing, the district court granted Barclays’s
summary-judgment motion. The district court not ed that if a party receives a request for
admission and fails to respond within the time limits in Minn. R. Civ. P. 36, the statements
contained in that request are deemed admitted. The district court found that Barclays’s
affidavits and billing statements establishe d an account stated and that Dahir was
accordingly indebted to Barclays in the amount claimed by Ba rclays. The district court
entered judgment of $15,155.92 for Barclays, consisting of the amount owed of $14,616.42
as well as $539.50 in costs and disbursements.
Dahir moved for reconsideration of the su mmary-judgment order. The district court
denied Dahir’s motion, stating that motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express
permission of the court, that under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11, such requests must be
made by letter to the district court and not by motion, and that Da hir failed to establish
“compelling circumstances” justifying a motion to reconsider. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err in gr anting summary judg ment in favor of
Barclays because there are no genuine issues of material fact.

Dahir argues that the district court impr operly determined th at he admitted the
statements in Barclays’s reque sts for admission and that genuine issues of material fact
exist. We address each issue in turn.
“A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993); see also Minn.
R. Civ. P. 56.03. A nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere averments or denials of
the adverse party’s pleading but must present specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05; DLH, Inc. v. Russ , 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn.
1997). We review a district court’s grant of summary ju dgment de novo. Dukowitz v.
Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2014). In doing so, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by deeming the statements
in Barclays’s requests for admission admitted.

Dahir contends that he denied any admissi on in his answer whic h is sufficient to
meet the standard required by rule 36, moved the district court to vacate any admission
pursuant to rule 36(b), and that the district c ourt never responded to his motion to vacate.
We are not persuaded.
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Minn. R. Civ. P. 36.01 prov ides that a “matter is admi tted unless within 30 days
after service of the request” the party serves upon the reque sting party a “written answer
or objection.” If the district court determines that the party receiving requests for admission
has not complied with this requirement, it may order that the matter is admitted or that an
amended answer be served. Minn. R. Civ. P. 36.01.
Any matter admitted pursuant to rule 36 is “conclusively established unless the court
on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 36.02.
The district court may allow a party to with draw or amend an admission when doing so
will further the presentation of the merits of the action and the requ esting party fails to
establish that withdrawal or ame ndment will prejudice that party. Id. Rulings regarding
requests for admission under rule 36 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Dahle v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 352 N.W.2d 397, 402 (Minn. 1984) (allowing extension for
responding to requests for admission within discretion of district court).
Here, it is undisputed that Dahir neve r served a written answer or objection on
Barclays regarding Barclays’s requests for admission. Rather, Dahir moved to “withdraw
and/or deny any admission” and “denied any liability to the claims mentioned in the
Complaint” in his answer to that complaint.
First, Dahir’s answer to th e complaint does not meet the requirements of rule 36.01.
Dahir served his answer on Barclays on November 27, 2015, approximately eight months
before Barclays served its requests for admissi on on Dahir. Because Dahir’s answer was
not served “within 30 days after” Barclays’s request, it does not qualify as a written answer
or objection addressed to that request.
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Second, Dahir is correct that the district court did not expressly rule on his motion
to withdraw or vacate the admissions. Howe ver, Barclays mentioned the motion at the
motion hearing, and in its summary-judgment order, the district court found that Dahir had
failed to respond to the request s for admission, noted that th e statements contained in a
request for admission are deemed admitted if a receiving party fails to timely respond to
the request, and granted summary judgment in favor of Barclays. The district court
implicitly determined that gr anting Dahir’s motion would not further the presentation of
the merits of the action here. The record supp orts this determination. Dahir has failed to
present evidence containing specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. Instead, Dahir has relied on hi s answer denying the allegations contained in
Barclays’s complaint.
Finally, Dahir appears to argue that it was unfair for the district court to deem the
statements in Barclays’s requests for admissi on admitted because he is a pro se party.
“Although some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has
repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as
attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115,
119 (Minn. App. 2001). “The right to represent oneself in legal proceedings does not entitle
a party to modification of procedural rules.” Ronay v. Ronay, 369 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Minn.
App. 1985). As a pro se party, Dahir is governed by the same procedural rules as an
attorney, including rule 36. Dahir has not established that the district court abused its
discretion in applying the rule here and deem ing admitted the statem ents in Barclays’s
requests for admission.
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B. The district court did not err in gr anting summary judgment to Barclays
because it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Dahir argues that “[t]he district court erred when it granted summary judgment in
the face of the existence of genuine material facts without due process.” We disagree.
In the absence of evidence of an express contract, a party may establish liability for
a debt through the doctrine of account stated. Am. Druggists Ins. v. Thompson Lumber
Co., 349 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. App. 1984). An “account stated” is an expression of
agreement by a debtor and creditor to a charge as an accurate amou nt due the creditor.
Cherne Contracting Corp. v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 572 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Minn. App. 1997)
(quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998). A party’s “acquiescence in the
charges result in the law implying a promise to pay those charges.” Am. Druggists Ins.,
349 N.W.2d at 573; see also Meagher v. Kavli, 251 Minn. 477, 487, 88 N.W.2d 871, 879,
(1958). “[A]n account stated is prima facie evidence of the accuracy and correctness of
the items noted thereon and of the liability of the party against whom the balance refers.”
Erickson v. Gen. United Life Ins. Co., 256 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Minn. 1977).
The credit-card statements in the record indicate that Dahir has had a credit account
with Barclays since at least December 2012. Dahir used th e account to make purchases
and made monthly payments from January 2013 through August 2014. Dahir did not make
payments on the account from September 2014 through February 2015. Dahir’s February
2015 statement indicates that the outstandi ng balance on the account was $14,616.42.
There is no evidence in the record that Dahir disputed these charges, and the district court
found that Dahir did not disput e any of the charges with Barclays in writing. Dahir’s
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acquiescence to the charges establishes a promise to pay the balance of $14,616.42 and the
existence of an account stated. Barclays has therefore presented prima facie evidence of
Dahir’s liability.
Dahir does not support his due-process alle gations with constitutional analysis or
citation. Therefore, this court need not address them. See, e.g., Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn.,
512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (declining to address due-process arguments
unsupported by constitutional analysis or citation).
To the extent that Dahir ar gues that the district court erred in granting Barclays
summary judgment because genuine issues of ma terial fact exist, we disagree. Dahir’s
assertion that Barclays lacks standing because he was never “made aware by Barclays that
[he] owned a credit card or a loan with them” is a mere averment unsupported by specific
facts in the record and therefore does not es tablish a genuine issue of material fact. See
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05. Moreov er, it is contrary to the stat ements in Barclays’s requests
for admission that the district court deemed Dahir had admitted. Li kewise, Dahir’s mere
assertion that he and Barclays did not have a contractual re lationship does not establish a
genuine issue of material fact because Barclays established prima facie evidence of Dahir’s
liability under the account-stated doctrine, whic h does not require evidence of a contract.
See Am. Druggists Ins., 349 N.W.2d at 573.
Finally, Dahir is correct that this court has cautioned that “wholesale adoption of
one party’s findings and conclusions raises th e question of whether the [district] court
independently evaluated each party’s testimony and evidence.” Bliss v. Bliss, 493 N.W.2d
583, 590 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Feb. 12, 1993). However, Dahir did
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not present any evidence for the district c ourt to consider and failed to respond to
Barclays’s requests for admission. Our careful, de novo review of the record indicates that
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Barclays.
II. The district court did not err in de nying Dahir’s motion for reconsideration.

Dahir argues that the district court erre d in denying his motion for reconsideration
of the summary-judgment order. We are not persuaded.
Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11 provides that “[m]otions to reconsider are prohibited
except by express permission of the court, wh ich will be granted only upon a showing of
compelling circumstances.” “Requests to make such a motion . . . sh all be made only by
letter to the court. . . .” Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11. This court reviews a district court’s
denial of a request for leave to file a motion to reconsider for an abuse of discretion.
Anderson v. Rengachary, 608 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 2000).
Dahir contends that he failed to atte nd the summary-judgment hearing because he
reasonably believed the district court had denied summary judgment based on its issuance
of a scheduling order 11 days before the hearing listing a tr ial date. Dahir asserts that he
called the district court judge’s law cler k on the day before the scheduled summary-
judgment hearing inquiring as to any change s to the July 17, 2017 trial date, left a
voicemail, and never received a response from the court. At the summary-judgment
hearing, the district court confirmed receivi ng the message, but did not indicate that any
court staff had responded to it. The district court denied Dahir’s request for reconsideration
because Dahir failed to establish compe lling circumstances justifying a motion to
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reconsider and because Dahir had made the request by motion rather than by letter to the
court.
Dahir does not argue that he lacked noti ce of the summary-judgment hearing. But
Dahir contends that his misunderstanding of the district court’s scheduling order caused
him to not attend the summary-judgment hearing and constitutes a compelling
circumstance. Dahir argues that “any reasonable person asking for a trial and dismissal of
a summary judgment [motion] would, under similar circumstances, conclude the summary
judgment moot in absence of any other new orders from the court.” But Dahir does not
explain why it was reasonable to conclude that the district court had denied summary
judgment absent an explicit order from the district court denying summary judgment.
Moreover, Dahir called inquir ing about the trial date, not about the su mmary-judgment
hearing. And, as noted above, Dahir is held to the same standards as an attorney, despite
his pro se status. See Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d at 119.
It is unfortunate that Dahir did not recei ve a response to his message before the
summary-judgment hearing, espe cially given Dahir’s pro se status. However, given the
circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Dahir’s
misunderstanding regarding the summary-j udgment hearing was not a compelling
circumstance justifying a motion to reconsider. Moreover, Dahir requested reconsideration
through a motion rather than through a letter to the court as required by the plain language
of Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Dahir’s request for reconsideration.
Affirmed.