The Bank of New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate holders of CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-21, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0425

The Bank of New York Mellon
f/k/a The Bank of New York,
as Trustee for the Certificate holders of CWABS, Inc.,
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-21,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeannie Ball,
Appellant,

Midland Funding, LLC, et al.,
Defendants

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-16-664

Amanda Govze, David R. Mortensen, Shapiro & Zielke, LLP, Burnsville, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Jeannie Ball, Duluth, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
In this judicial -foreclosure action, a ppellant argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of respondent, denying her motion to remove the
action from the expedited litigati on track (ELT), and denying her a continuance. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jeannie Ball owns three parcels of land —A, B, and C. Ball’s residence
straddles the parcels; parcel B is in the middle . In 2006, Ball executed a mortgag e that
secured a promissory note. The mortgage was re corded against parcels A and C, but the
legal description on the mortgage excluded parcel B. In 2016, respondent The Bank of
New York Mellon f/k/a The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificate holders of
CWABS, Inc., Asset -Backed Certificates, Seri es 20 06-21 (the bank) commenced a
foreclosure action after Ball allegedly defaulted on the terms of the note and mortgage.
The bank also sought to reform the mortgage.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. Dur ing a telephone hearing, the bank
argued that the mortgage should be reformed because the legal description on the mortgage
failed to include the “middle of the house.” The bank proffered evidence to show that the
parties intended to encumber the entire h ome. Ball’s attorney challenged the bank’s
request to reform the mortgage and the amount the bank claimed that she owed.
The district court denied Ball’s motion for summary judgment and granted the
bank’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

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D E C I S I O N
Summary judgment
Ball challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the bank. This
court “review[s] a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. In doing so, [this
court] determine[s] whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there
are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Riverview Muir
Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC , 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation
omitted). Summary judgment must be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [any] affidavits . . . show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. A genuine issue of fact exists when reasonable
minds can draw different conclusions from the evidence presented. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566
N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997).
Ball claims that summary judgment was not appropriate and that the district court
should not have reformed the mortgage because the bank “breached [the] contract by not
curing [the] defect for years after [she] bro ught [it] to their attention.” But Ball’s claim
that the bank waited until the foreclosure action to reform the mortgage despite knowledge
of the defect does not support a conclusion that the district court erred in granting the bank’s
request to reform the mortgage.
“Reformation is an equitable remedy that is available when a party seeks to alter or
amend language in a contract so that the contract reflects the parties’ true intent when they

4
entered into the contract.” SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn -McReavy Funeral
Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011). Reformation of a contract is appropriate when:
(1) there was a valid agreement between the parties expressing
their real intentions; (2) the written instrument failed to express
the real intentions of the parties; and (3) this failure was due to
a mutual mistake of the parties, or a unilateral mistake
accompanied by fraud or inequitable conduct by the other
party.

Id. at 865 (quotation omitted). First, t here is no dispute that there is a valid mortgage
contract. Second, the mortgage failed to include parcel B in the property’s legal
description, and Ball concedes that there was a “d efect” in the legal description on the
mortgage. Third, t he record shows that Ball intended for parcel B to be included in the
legal description on the mortgage.
The mortgage includes the entire home address, which includes p arcel B. Ball’s
loan application includes the entire property, identified by its address. Ball indicated on
her application that she applied for a conventional mortgage; she did not indicate her intent
to apply for a mortgage that encumbered only two-thirds of her property. The application
required Ball to provide the “subject property address ,” and she provided the full address
of the property that includes p arcel B. Simply put, there is nothing on Ball’s loan
application that suggests that she intended to include only parcels A and C. Additionally,
Ball’s home was appraised du ring the loan-approval process and the entire residence was
valued; thus, the appraised value includes parcel B. Finally, Ball filed for bankruptcy and
her bankruptcy filing indicated that the entire property is encumbered by the mortgage.

5
The district court appropriately reformed the mortgage contract to reflect the parties’ intent
when they entered into the agreement.
Ball also argues that t he district court erred by not ordering the bank to verify the
principal balance, claiming that the amount that the bank alleged that she owes “does not
match documents of evidence she has [in] a big bo x.” But the bank provided evidence of
the amount owing and Ball failed to provide evidence of payment. Further, Ball asserted
in a September 13, 2011 letter to Bank of America that she had been unemployed “for some
time” and believed that by December 2011 she would “be able to start to make affordabl e
payment[s]” on her mortgage. This letter demonstrates that Ball stopped making mortgage
payments and suggested that her future payments may be less than the installment amounts
due. Ball has not adequately challenged the amount the bank claims that she owes.
Because there is no genuine issue of material fact and the bank is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law, the district court did not err in granting the bank’s motion for summary
judgment.
ELT
Ball also argues that the case should have been removed from the ELT. This court
reviews the application of procedural rules de novo. See Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754
N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008).
The purpose of the ELT is to promote efficient processing of certain civil cases and
reduce costs. Spec. R. Pract., First Jud. Dist., preface. Certain actions receive mandatory
assignment to the ELT. Spec. R. Pract., First. Jud. Dist. 1(a). “[A]ll civil matters having
the case type indicator . . . [o] ther [c]ivil” shall be assigned to the ELT. Id. 1(b)(1). The

6
bank filed a complaint with case -type header other civil —foreclosure; thus, the district
court properly assigned the case to the ELT.
A party may object to an ELT assignment. Id. 1(c). In ruling on a motion to remove
a case from the ELT, a district court should consider factors, including: multiple parties or
claims, multiple or complex theories of liability or damages, complicated facts that require
discovery options, substantial likelihood of dispositive motions, or any factor showing that
the ELT would substantially affect a fair and just resolution. Id.
Ball timely objected to the ELT assignment, arguing that the case included multiple
claims—reformation and foreclosure—and the bank sought a monetary judgment in excess
of the ELT threshold. The district court, in its order granting the bank’s motion for
summary judgment, stated: “Based upon the C ourt’s ruling on the . . . issues , . . . Ball’s
motion for removal [from the ELT] is moot. . . . [And] must be denied.”
The district court appropriately denied Ball’s motion to remove the case from the
ELT. First, it was a mandatory assignment and the district court noted that “this kind of
case is exactly why [the] ELT was . . . adopted into the [r]ules.” Second, Ball claims that
the case was complex and required discovery to prove the amount that the bank claimed
that she owed. The bank provided evidence of the amount owed. Ball claims that the
amount that the bank alleged that she o wes “does not match documents of evidence she
has [in] a big box.” But Ball did not provide this evidence and could have provided it
without discovery. Moreover, the district court’s ruling on the summary-judgment motions
rendered the ELT assignment moot.

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Continuance
Finally, Ball argues that the district court should have granted her a continuance .
The decision to deny a continuance is discretionary, and the ruling will not be reversed
absent a clear abuse of discretion. Chahla v. City of St. Paul , 507 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Minn.
App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 1993). “The test is whether a denial prejudices
the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 32.
During a case-management conference held via telephone, t he district court stated
that it received a note that “Ball . . . was seen at the clinic today for a medical appointment
and is not able to attend a court hearing due to illness .” The district court noted that the
note did not say that Ball could not pick up a telephone and participate. Ball’s attorney
stated that she did not know how to proceed because Ball directed her to “withdraw” from
representation if the hearing was held without Ball’s presence. The district court stated:
[Y]ou’ve already done the lion’s share of the work. The legal
arguments relative to the motions . . . have already been made
in writing. . . . [B]oth parties have had full and ample
opportunity to brief the legal issues[.] . . . [If Ball were present]
she wouldn’t be arguing, . . . she’s not a lawyer[.] . . . [T]here
is no withdrawal in front of me. Nothing has been filed. I have
not heard from [Ball] in any way. . . . I see no reason why this
matter should not move forward. . . . We are goi ng to go
through the documents . . . [and] the arguments of the
attorneys, and we are going to make decisions based upon the
law, not whether or not Ms. Ball is here or not. . . . [G]iven the
information provided by the medical provider, and given the
fact that this wasn’t sent in until long after noon today, I have
no reason to grant a continuance . . . so we’re going to move
forward with the motions.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ball a continuance. First,
the letter arrived the day of the telephone conference. Second, the district court noted that

8
nothing in the letter stated that Ball was unable to participate via telephone. Third, the
district court stated that Ball would not present argument because she is not an attorney
and her attorney was prepared to argue the motions. The district court was not inclined to
grant a continuance because the legal arguments were briefed. Further, Ball fails to argue
in her brief to this court how the denial prejudiced the outcome. Based on the record, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ball a continuance.
Affirmed.