In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. S. W. and J. L. W., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0440

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
S. S. W. and J. L. W., Parents.

Filed July 31, 2017
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File Nos. 43-JV-16-156, 43-JV-15-182

Amber R. Donley , Gavin, Donley & Ostlund, Ltd., Glencoe, Minnesota (for appellant
S.S.W.)

Michael Junge, McLeod County Attorney, Amy E. Olson, Assistant County Attorney,
Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent McLeod County)

Troy Scotting, Hutchinson, Minnesota (for respondent J.L.W.)

Dianne Schaefer, Chaska, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant-mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the
involuntary termination of her parental rights . Because c lear and convincing evidence
supports the district court’s conclusion that (1) reasonable efforts failed to correct the
conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement; (2) reunification would not be

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possible in the foreseeable future; and (3) termination was in the child’s best interests, we
affirm.
FACTS
In April 2015 , the child J.J.W. was born to appellant -mother S. S.W., a m inor.
Mother grew up in a n extremely dysfunctional home. On July 8, 2015, mother was
removed from her parents’ home in a CHIPS 1 proceeding and placed in out-of-home
placement with the child. From July 2015 to May 2016, mother lived in four different out-
of-home placements because her negative behaviors caused her to be relocated.
In September 2015, mother and the child moved to mother’s second out-of-home
placement, where the child continues to reside. In October 2015, mother was arrested for
assaulting the child’s father J.L.W . in the child’s presence.2 Earlier that day, mother felt
overwhelmed and texted J.L.W. that she had shaken the child and h oped that the child
would fall off the bed . The child was not harmed , and mother later described the text
messages as a cry for help. The county filed a CHIPS petition for the child, and the child
was removed from mother’s care and custody. The child was placed in foster care status,
but remained with mother in the second out-of-home placement until January 22, 2016 ,
when mother was moved to her third out-of-home placement. The child has not lived in
the same residence as mother since January 2016. In February, mother moved to her last
placement, a group home focused on developing independent living skills.

1 Child in Need of Protection or Services.
2 J.L.W. voluntarily terminated his parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.

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In May, shortly before her 18th birthday, mother chose to leave her out-of-home
placement to live with her parents. Mother made this decision, despite having discussions
with her service providers about the option of extended foster care and the other benefits
available to her until the age of 21 . The court made clear at that time that reunification
with the child would be very difficult if mother left her placement to live with her parents.
After residing with her parents for a short t ime, from June until the January 2017
trial, mother lived in t hree rental units . Mother’s residence at her first two rentals w as
terminated for non-payment of rent . Mother had only lived in the third rental for a few
weeks at the time of trial, and it appeared unlikely that she would be able to make future
rent payments without assistance from her parents. M other claimed at trial that she had
completely distanced herself from her parents in the three weeks prior, but the record shows
that they had ongoing contact and that she received financial assistance from them. Mother
had also been employed for a few weeks at the time of trial, but the record shows that
mother failed to maintain consistent employment or de monstrate financial stability
throughout the proceedings, as required by her case plans.
Starting before the child’s birth and throughout mother’s and the child’s CHIPS
cases, the county provided, recommended, and arranged for services, treatment, and
providers to help rehabilitate mother and facilitate her reunification with the child. Mother
was required to complete or comply with these services as part of her various court -
approved case plans. The county’s efforts included: providing or offering out -of-home
placements for both mother and the child; over 100 hours of in-home parenting education;
in-home public health nursing services; probation support and services; social worker case

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management; education support and services; medication management services; a
psychological evaluation; children’s mental health case management and adult mental
health case management; arrangements and referrals for individual therapy and dialectical
behavior therapy (DBT); and extended foster care or benefits until the age of 21.
Mother’s engagement with, follow through, and success in following her case plans
during the proceedings was inconsistent at best. Mother showed sporadic success and
developed a pattern of showing initial motivation and effort, which then deteriorated after
a short time. Mother struggles with several mental health issues and often exhibited
emotional instability, volatile behavior, and def iance. Mother’s therapists, out-of-home
placement providers, social workers, parent educator, public health nurse , and the child’s
guardian ad litem testified that mother presented as resistant to the advice and support of
providers and demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to meaningfully engage or make
significant progress. Despite this, in June 2016, the court extended the permanency
timeline by six months to give mother additional time to prove herself. The county filed a
permanency petition for the child in September.
At the January 2017 trial , the district court concluded that despite exhaustive
support, mother had: disrupted her out-of-home placements and declined extended foster
care and benefits; not maintained employment or financial or housing stability; been
discharged from two individual therapists and DBT therapy ; failed to cooperate with and
complete individual and DBT therapy ; elected not to pursue adult mental health services ;
not engaged with, or was not meaningfully progressing in, her parenting skills with the
support of the parent educator and the public health nurse; and mother would not be able

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to independently parent the child on a full-time basis in the foreseeable future. The district
court terminated mother’s parental rights on February 27. Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Mother argues that the district court erred in concluding that: she was palpably unfit
to parent the child, reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
out-of-home placement, the child was neglected and in foster care , and termination of her
parental rights was in the child’s best interests. The court may terminate parental rights if
clear and convincing evidence proves: (1) one or more of the statutory bases for termination
set forth in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1-9) (2014); (2) that reasonable efforts were
made to reunite the family; and (3) that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P ., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 -87 (Minn. 2008 ). “Only one
[statutory] criterion needs to be proven to support termination.” In re Welfare of M.H., 595
N.W.2d 223, 227 (Minn. App. 1999).
Termination may be based on the failure of reasonable efforts to correct th e
conditions leading to the child’s out -of-home placement. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5). Mother does not dispute that the county’s efforts were reasonable here.
There is a presumption that reasonable efforts have failed if a child under the age of eight
has been placed out of the home for more than six months, the parent has not substantially
complied with a court-approved case plan, and the county has made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. Id., subd. 1(b)(5)(i-iv). We review a district
court’s termination of parental rights to determine whether its findings address the statutory
criteria, are supported by substantial evidence , and are not clearly erroneous. Welfare of

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S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. Termination of parental rights always lies within the discretion
of the district court, even after one or more statutory bases for termination has been met.
In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 -37 (Minn. 2014). “We give
considerable deference to the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights. But we
closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and
convincing.” Welfare of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385 (citations omitted).
The child entered out-of-home placement in October 2015. The record supports the
district court’s finding that the county went above and beyond in its efforts to rehabilitate
mother and to promote reunification . The district court detailed, and the record
demonstrates, mother’s sporadic participation in and lack of progress with the extensive
services provided to her. We agree with the district court that mother’s chaotic upbringing
and her ongoing emotional, behavioral, and mental health issues impeded her ability and
willingness to meaningfully engage in and benefit from the county’s rehabilitative efforts.
Nonetheless, the record overwhelmingly supports the district court’s findings that mother
failed to substantially comply with her court-approved case plans and failed to develop the
skills necessary to independently parent the child on a full-time basis.
There is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the district court’s
conclusion that reasonable efforts did not correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-
of-home placement , and consequently, reunification would not be possible in the
foreseeable future. Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support termination
under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), this court need not address the other two
statutory bases found by the district court.

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Once the district court has determined that there is a statutory basis for termination
of parental rights, it must consider whether termination is in the child’s best interests. In
re Welfare of the Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “We review a district court’s ultimate determination that
termination is in a child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” Id.
Mother argues that the district court erred in concluding that termination was in the
child’s best interests because she loves and is clearly bonded with the child and deserves
more time to prove herself. The district court did not question mother’s love for the child
or that she seemed genuine about her recent progress at trial. But a parent’s love and desire
to regain custody may not be enough to establish that reunification is in the child’s best
interest. See In re Welfare of A.D. , 535 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 1995) (concluding that
mother’s love for the child and desire to regain custody were not sufficient where she failed
to demonstrate requisite parenting skills).
Here, the district court relied on the collective and resolute opinion s of the parent
educator, social worker , and the child’s guardian a d litem that termination was in the
child’s best interests. The court concluded that mother had not historically and could not
currently provide a safe, secure, and stable environment for the child and that there was no
reason to believe that mother would be able to do so in the foreseeable future. After 15
months in out-of-home placement, the law demanded permanency. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that t ermination of mother’s parental rights was in
the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.