State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0452

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brett Allen Goulet,
Appellant.

Filed March 26, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Polk County District Court
File No. 60-CR-15-2078

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney,
Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Publi c Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Brett Allen Goulet was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
for sexually penetrating his minor step daughter . On appeal, he argues that the only
evidence of penetration was the victim’s own testimony which—he contends—was so
contradictory and inconsistent that it could not lead a reasonable juror to find him guilty.
Goulet also claims the district court’s erroneous decision to allow prosecutors to question
him about being on probation caused him not to testify in his own defense. He argues that
either error requires this court to reverse and remand for a new trial . We disagree and
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Brett Allen Goulet married Dwan Thompson in 2010 . Thompson had
four children from a previous relationship , one of whom was the victim in this case, six-
year-old M.A. But the marriage did not last and the couple divorced in February 2013.
One day in August of 2014, a bout a year and a half after the divorce , M.A.
approached Thompson in such a strange way that Thompson later testified that she thought
M.A. must have “had a bad dream.” According to Thompson, M.A. said “I need to talk to
you mom and I have to talk to you alone.” M.A. shut the door behind her and told
Thompson that Goulet had done “something bad to her, ” that Goulet “had touched her
private parts with his mouth and his . . . penis.” After more questioning, Thompson learned
that the abuse occurred sometime in 2012 before she and Goulet separated. Thompson
went to the police.
3
M.A. was interviewed by a social worker for child protection in Polk County. M.A.
discussed the abuse with the interviewer, stating that Goulet “put his private in [her].”
When the interviewer asked how this felt, M.A. described it as “pokey” and that Goulet
“smelled like sweat.” The interviewer asked M.A. how she knew that Goulet’s penis went
inside her, and M.A. replied that she knew because she “ felt it.” During a follow -up
interview, M.A. again said that Goulet put his penis “in” her.
M.A. was examined by a medical professional who reported that her exam was
normal and did not reveal evidence of injury, either new or old. But the professional
cautioned that a normal examination is not un usual in child-abuse situations. Later, the
professional testified that in the world of child-abuse pediatrics “a normal exam never rules
out that something has occurred.” The professional estimated that in sexual abuse cases,
95% of cases would show a normal exam.
In November, 2015, t he state charged Goulet with two counts of first -degree
criminal sexual conduct, alleging that Goulet sexually penetrated M.A. While on the stand,
the prosecutor asked M.A. if Goulet’s “ boy parts” went “inside of [her] pri vate parts?”
M.A. replied, “[y]es,” and testified that she felt discomfort when it happened. But on cross-
examination M.A. admitted that she did not remember saying in her interview with child
protection that her underwear had been on when the abuse occurred . After more
questioning, M.A. admitted that she cou ld not actually remember if she was wearing
underwear when the abuse occurred.
During trial, the state made it clear that it intended to use impeachment evidence
against Goulet if he took the stand. One of the pieces of evidence the state wanted to use
4
was the fact that Goulet was on probation for a 2012 assault conviction in North Dakota.
Goulet opposed the use of this evidence because he only pleaded guilty to—and was put
on probation for —this offense after the alleged sexual abuse occurred. But the district
court allowed the state to question Goulet about being on probation if he took the stand .
When the time came, Goulet chose not to testify in his own defense.
The jury found Goulet guilty of both counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct-
penetration. He was sentenced to 306 months in prison on count one,1 and 144 months for
count two against M.A., with count two running consecutively. Goulet appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. There was sufficient evidence that Goulet penetrated M.A.

Goulet was convicted of first -degree criminal sexual conduct . An element of
Goulet’s charge required the state to prove that he engaged in “sexual penetration,” defined
as “any intrusion however slight into the genital or anal openings . . . of the complainant’s
body by any part of the actor’s body . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 12(2)(i) (201 4).
Goulet argues that the state did not present sufficient evidence that would have allowed the
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he sexually penetrated M.A. He contends that
the only evidence showing penetration was M.A.’s testimony and her prior statements,
which were contradictory and inconsistent.

1 There was another victim as well and Goulet was eventually convicted of first -degree
criminal sexual conduct against both victims, but only M .A. is the focus of this appeal.
Count one corresponds to the allegations against the second victim.
5
Goulet’s argument is better known as a sufficiency -of-the-evidence claim. To
analyze this claim, we review the trial record to determine if the evidence was sufficient to
allow the jury to reach its verdict. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We
view the evidence in a way that paints that verdict in a favorable light. Id. And we enter
the analysis assuming that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
evidence to the contrary.” State v. Moore , 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). If we
determine that the jury, after considering the evidence, reasonably concluded that the
defendant was guilty, then we will not disturb its verdict. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d
465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004). Of course, to reach its verdict, the jury must have kept in mind
that the defendant was presumed innocent and the state was required to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Although Goulet claims that the victim’s statements were contradictory and
inconsistent, it is important to note that credibility assessments and how much weight to
give a witness’s testimony are exclusively in the hands of the jury. State v. Wright , 679
N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Jun. 29, 2004). Juries are free
to accept some aspects of a witness’s testimony and reject others. State v. Poganski, 257
N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. 1977). But even if there are inconsistencies and conflicts i n
testimony, this does not automatically justify a reversal. State v. Stufflebean, 329 N.W.2d
314, 319 (Minn. 1983). As we have said, “inconsistencies are a sign of human fallibility
and do not prove testimony is false, especially when the testimony is a bout a traumatic
event.” State v. Mosby, 450 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 16, 1990).
6
We begin by examining the record for evidence that Goulet penetrated M.A. Goulet
is correct that the only direct evidence of penetration were M.A.’s statements in three
contexts: (1) accusations of penetration M.A. made when she testified at trial ,
(2) accusations of penetration she made in an interview with child protection after telling
her mother, and (3) general statements she made to a medical professional during a physical
examination. We will discuss all three contexts through the prism of the jury’s verdict.
First, we begin with M.A.’s trial testimony. M.A. testified that during the summer
between her first - and second -grade years,2 Goulet “touched [her] personal parts” with
“[h]is boy parts.” The prosecutor asked M.A. how this felt and she responded that it was
uncomfortable. F inally, the prosecutor asked, “ when [Goulet’s] boy parts touched your
private parts, did they go inside of your private parts?” “Yes,” M.A. answered.
But M.A. could not remember if Goulet was wearing any clothes. And on cross -
examination, M.A. admitted that she did not remember giving a statement years ago where
she claimed to be wearing underwear during the abuse. Pressed further by defense counsel,
M.A. admitted that she did not remember if she was wearing underwear or not.
The second piece of evidence showing penetration were M.A.’s statements to child-
abuse interviewers. After revealing the abuse allegations to her mother, M.A. met with a
social worker whom she told that Goulet touched her in “the bad part. ” M.A. identified

2 M.A. testified at trial that she was currently twelve years old and a sixth grader, and that
the incident happened about four years prior.
7
“the bad part” as her “private.” She also told the examiner that Goulet “put his private in
mine” on one occasion.3
Goulet argues that M.A. is not consistent in these interviews, pointing to an
exchange where the examiner asked M.A. if Goulet’s penis touched her underwear, her
skin, or someplace else. In that interview, M.A. answered, “[m]y underwea r.” The
examiner follow ed up by asking, “Then what?” and M.A. responded, “Um, that’s all.”
Later, the examiner tries to clarify what happened, telling M.A. “I wanna understand your
situation the best I can. Did the skin of [Goulet’s] private touch your skin at all?” M.A.
apparently made a “no” noise 4 which the examiner con firmed by answering back, “No ,”
signaling some hesitation about admitting to penetration.
Despite this hesitation, a few questions later the examiner asked, “Then you woke
up? Then what happened?” and M.A. replied that Goulet “put his private in mine.” The
examiner asked how M.A.’s body felt when this happened. “Surprised,” M.A. said. And
when asked what Goulet’s penis felt like inside her, M.A. described the feeling as “pokey.”
The examiner eventually circled back to the question of penetration and tried once
more to clarify what happened:
EXAMINER: Okay. I’m gonna go back to something and I just wanna
remind you that it’s not that I don’t believe you, or I want you to change your
message, it means I need to understa—I’m trying to understand it better. Um,
but—you said that his private touched your underwear . . .
M.A.: Mm-hm.
EXAMINER: . . . And it went inside? How do you know it went inside?
M.A.: Because I felt it.
EXAMINER: Okay.

3 M.A. identified Goulet’s “private” as his “weenie” during the interview.
4 In the record, this is written as “Mm-mm.”
8

In a second interview with a different examiner, the interview returned to the topic of
penetration in the following exchange:
EXAMINER: Okay. Um, then what happened?
M.A.: And he [Goulet] pulled down my shorts and then pulled down his
pants.
EXAMINER: Okay. And then what?
M.A.: He put it in.
EXAMINER: Um, where was his underwear?
M.A.: His underwear were – he had to – it was still on him but the – he had
something that opened it in the – his pants.
. . . .
EXAMINER: Okay. Um, you said he put his penis in your vagina?
M.A.: Mm-hm.
EXAMINER: Okay. Was it his skin to your skin then?
M.A.: Yes.

Lastly in our examination of M.A.’s statements showing penetration, we look to her
comments to a medical professional who conducted a physical examination . This
professional testified that during the examination M.A. said that Goulet touched her with
“his front area,” and that it “tingled when his genital area touched hers.” According to the
professional, M.A. reported some “discomfort” after this and she experienced pain ful
urination the next day. M.A. did not explicitly describe penile penetration to this
professional.
Goulet argues that all of M.A.’s statements were too contradictory to sustain the
jury’s verdict finding that penetration occurred. He highlights two alleged inconsistencies:
the first being a statement during M.A.’s medical examination where she did not tell the
professional that she had been penetrated. Second, during M.A.’s trial testimony, she could
9
not remember if her clothes were on or off when the abuse occurred. Both inconsistencies,
Goulet believes, cast enough doubt on the question of penetration to reverse his conviction.
To support his argument for reversal based on these inconsistencies, he cites to two
cases. The first case is State v. Ani for the general idea that evidence lacking corroboration
may be enough to reverse a jury’s verdict, depending on the circumstances. State v. Ani,
257 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Minn. 1977). In Ani, however, the verdict remained intact because
the supreme court concluded that the victim’s testimony was “positive and not
contradicted, and was strongly corroborated by other evidence.” Id.
Goulet’s second support is State v. Huss, 506 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1993). In Huss,
the only direct evidence that the defendant sexually abused his three-year-old daughter was
the victim’s own testimony—testimony that took nearly an hour of questioning on the stand
to finally reach the abuse accusations . Id. at 290, 292. Even when the victim finally
discussed the abuse, she implicated both of her parents when the father was the only one
suspected. Id. The victim was asked by the prosecutor multiple times if she had “yucky
secrets” and she denied it each time. Id. The victim then testified that six people touched
her private parts, which was completely baseless; she considered hugs and anyone touching
her hair to be “bad touches”; she claimed to have been at her father’s house on the day of
trial despite not having seen him for the last year; she could not identify her father in the
courtroom; and finally, she testified that her father w as bald and blind when he actually
had hair and could see just fine. Id.
The supreme court in Huss concluded that the victim’s testimony was contradictory
and inconsistent with her prior statements. Id. Even so, the supreme court wrote that it
10
might be inclined to keep the conviction intact if it were not for the fact that the victim was
clearly influenced by a suggestive book and videotape on sexual abuse that her mother
repeatedly showed her for months leading up to the allegations. Id. at 292-93. The supreme
court concluded that the repetitious use of this book and video “raise[d] questions about
the validity of the accusations made against [the father]. This is especially so in light of
the child’s testimony.” Id. at 293. The supreme court then reversed the conviction for
insufficient evidence. Id.
We do not believe the inconsistencies in this case are as troubling as those in Huss.
Goulet does identify some minor inconsistencies or narrative holes in M.A.’s statements,
like failing to tell h er examining physician that Goulet penetrated her or failing to
remember if she wore underwear. But none of the se issues call into question the very
essence of the allegations and make us seco nd-guess the jury’s credibility determination
regarding M.A. Of course, some inconsistencies are to be expected. Inconsistencies are a
“sign of human fallibility,” but they do not automatically prove that the testimony is false—
especially when it comes to young children recounting their own sexual abuse. Mosby,
450 N.W.2d at 634.
In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, the task is not to hunt for minor
incongruities; the task is to comb through the record to determine if the evidence was
sufficient to allow a jury to arrive at its decision. Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 430. For our
purposes, this means asking whether Goulet’s jury could have reasonably concluded that
he penetrated M.A. , and whether we are convinced that the jury gave due regard to the
11
presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doub t. Bernhardt, 684 N.W.2d
at 476-77.
We are convinced on all accounts. Whether M.A. remembers if she had her
underwear on years after the abuse occurred does not undercut the reasonable conclusion
that Goulet penetrated her. And just because M.A. did not tell the examining physician
that Goulet penetrated her does not mean it did not happen. M.A. was a young child who
had just endured a traumatic experience. I t was reasonable for the jury to determine that
she was none too eager to effusively discuss the event with a stranger. Given M.A.’s age,
the overall detail in her statements, and the general consistencies, we conclude that the jury
could reasonably find that Goulet penetrated M.A. For these reasons, we conclude that
Goulet’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim fails.
II. The district court’s decision to allow the state to cross -examine Goulet about his
probationary status was an error, but the error did not substantially influence the
jury’s verdict.

Goulet also argues that the district court’s decision allow ing the state to impeach
him with his probationary status was reversible error. We will not overturn a district court’s
evidentiary rulings unless the ruling was an abuse of discretion, even when consti tutional
rights are implicated. State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 510 (Minn. 2005). And even
if a district court ’s evidentiary ruling is an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse that
decision unless the error substantially influenced the jury’s verdict. State v. Carridine, 812
N.W.2d 130, 141 (Minn. 2012).
The district court decided that, if Goulet took the stand, the state would be allowed
to impeach him with the fact that he was on probation in another state. The court reasoned
12
that Goulet’s probationary status gave him an incentive to lie about committing the sexual
abuse since this would likely be a violation of his probation. The state admits this was
likely an error because Goulet was not placed on probation until after the criminal sexual
conduct in Minnesota occurred.5
Goulet argues that the court’s error was serious enough to demand reversal of his
conviction because it tipped the scales in his decision not to testify in his own defense. We
disagree. Besides allowing the state to impeach Goulet with his out -of-state probationary
status, the district court also allowed the state to impeach him with three previous felony
convictions.6 These prior felonies appear far more damaging to Goulet’s credibility than
being on probation in another state . And w e have stated that, even if a district court
improperly admits evidence of prior bad acts, if there is other properly admitted evidence
of prior bad acts that counterbalances the error, this can render the net result a harmless
error. See Laughnan v. State, 404 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Minn. App. 1987) ( concluding that
although the admission of two prior felony convictions was improper it was not prejudicial
error in light of proper ly admitted evidence of ten o ther previous convictions), review
denied (Minn. June 9, 2017); see also State v. Hendrickson, 528 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Minn.
App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995) (determining that trial court incorrectly

5 The state writes in its brief that “at the time of trial, [Goulet] was on supervised probation
for his Aggravated Assault conviction, but thi s offense and conviction occurred after
[Goulet] committed the crimes in this case. Accordingly, it seems doubtful that [Goulet]’s
probation could have been revoked based solely upon his conviction in this case.”
6 Two of these convictions were for theft of a motor vehicle; the third conviction was for
aggravated assault but would only be referred to as an “unspecified felony.”
13
admitted two previous burglary offenses, but the error was harmless since the remaining
evidence was sufficiently strong).
Even if we assume that Goulet did not testify because he feared facing this improper
impeachment evidence, the cumulative effect of three properly -admitted felony
convictions overwhelmed any prejudicial effect of his probationary status. We will not
reverse the district court unless its error substantially influenced the jury’s verdict.
Carridine, 812 N.W.2d at 141. While we acknowledge that the district court made an error
in this case , that error did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict. For this reason,
Goulet’s evidentiary argument fails as well.
In summary, M.A. faced her abuser in court and testified in graphic detail about her
sexual abuse. That is difficult for any victim to do, let alone a child. While Goulet isolates
some inconsistencies in her testimony and statements, they are relatively minor and
ultimately inconsequential when put in context of the overall allegations. So too is the
district court’s decision to admit Goulet’s probationary status, which was an error, but not
a prejudicial error. We conclude that Goulet fails to show that the evidence against him
was insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict and that the district court’s evidentiary error
was substantially prejudicial. For these reasons, we affirm the district court.
Affirmed.