State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0458

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justen Paul Linskie,
Appellant

Filed March 26, 2018
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-15-3687

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ross,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of criminal vehicular homicide —leaving the
scene of a collision causing death, arguing that the state failed to prove that he caused the

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victim’s death, and the district court erred by not instructing the jury on the mens rea
element of the offense. We affirm.
FACTS
On October 13, 2015, shortly after 6:00 p.m., K.J., S.O., and B.B. saw a vehicle in
a pond. Appellant Justen Paul Linskie climbed out of the pond and stated as he fled, “You
guys never saw me.” Linskie appeared to be carrying “almost every personal belonging he
had in the car.” Seconds later, S.O. noticed a camera bag floating kitty-corner 10-15 feet
from the passenger side of the vehicle . He immediately saw a body in the water near the
camera bag; he pulled the body out of the water and began CPR. K.J. called 911 and
reported an unconscious woman with a head injury. During CPR the woman started
breathing and moaning. An ambulance transported the woman, S.M., to the hospital where
she died.
Around 6:11 p.m., Linskie called his mother and stated that he “f-cked up” and had
an accident in his girlfriend’s mother’ s car. Linskie told his mother to pick him up.
Linskie’s mother picked him up, drove him to get dry clothes, and dropped him off at
treatment where he was supposed to be. Linskie also called his girlfriend and told her to
report her mother’s car stolen.
Among items retrieved from the pond, officers found paperwork with Linskie’s
name on it indicating that he lived at a work-release program. Officers met with Linskie.
Because his license is invalid, Linskie initially told officers that he had not been driving .
Linskie eventually admitted that he drove the car and claimed that t here was something
wrong with it. Linskie stated that the sun was in his eyes, the car bounced after hitting “a

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rock or something, ” and then rolled. An officer told Linskie that he hit somebody. The
conversation continued:
Officer: [W]hen you hit this person, this person was
walking, they were up there just taking some
photos of leaves, you hit them and they ended up
in the [pond] with you. You didn’t see them --
Linskie: No.
Officer: -- in the water by you or anything like that when
you left?
Linskie: I would have never ran.
Officer: Well, you did.
Linskie: Well, no, if I would have known that somebody
was hurt, I wouldn’t have ran from it; you know
what I mean?
Officer: Well, somebody was hurt and they were hurt
really bad, okay? You didn’t see this person
floating in the water as you were crawling out of
the car, grabbing stuff out of the car?
Linskie: No.
Officer: People standing there, okay. Because what
ended up happening is you ended up hitting and
killing somebody, okay? There was a pedestrian
– a woman that was walking along the road there
and you ran into her and killed her. . . .
Linskie: (Inaudible) (crying).

Linskie stated that he ran because he was not where he was supposed to be and did not
want to get into trouble. Linskie was charged with criminal vehicular homicide, in
violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.2112, subd. 1(7); 169.09, subd. 1 (2014).
During Linskie’s jury trial, the medical examiner (M.E.) testified that he performed
the autopsy on S.M. The M.E. testified that S.M.’s cause of death was “complications of
cardiopulmonary arrest (resuscitated) due to multiple blunt -force injuries and cold water
immersion.” The M.E. testified that the preliminary information he received indicated that

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S.M. was found floating face down in the pond next to a vehicle and could have been a
pedestrian hit by the vehicle. He was also aware that S.M. was resuscitated at the scene.
The M.E. testified that S.M. suffered multiple blunt -force injuries to her body, 1
including contusions of the left lung and heart, multiple rib fractures, collapsed lungs,
bruised leg and knee, and dislocated right knee. He testified that “[i]t appeared to be kind
of a broad impact to the right side of [her] body,” meaning multiple sites of impact over a
larger area.
The M.E. testified that S.M. suffered multiple blunt -force injuries to her head,
including lacerations on her forehead, bruising on the right side of her mouth, bleeding
between the membrane attached to the skull and the membrane overlapping the br ain, and
bleeding inside the brain. The M.E. testified that the bleeding in the brain is a “significant
blunt-force injur[y],” from “some sort of rotational motion or sudden acceleration or
sudden deceleration to the head.” The M.E. testified that S.M. did not have any skull
fractures and that her injuries indicated that her brain was rotating inside her head due to
some rapid acceleration or deceleration.
The M.E. testified that he had performed between 15 -20 autopsies when the
deceased was hit by a car and stated that S.M.’s “injuries would be consis tent with being
hit by a car.” The M.E. explained that the right-side, broad-impact constellation of
injuries— head, rib, and leg injuries—are seen when “a person is hit by a car.”

1 S.M. also had typical injuries due to CPR.

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On cross-examination, the M.E. testified that “the injury mechanism that caused the
injuries to [ S.M.] was a motor vehicle collision,” but that t here were other possibilities
because of S.M.’s nonspecific injuries. He testified that it was possible that S.M.’s injuries
could have come from falling out of a tree. He testified that a fall off the roadway onto a
concrete ledge “could cause some of [ S.M.’s] injuries.” The M.E. testified that context is
important with nonspecific inj uries because it allows him to form an op inion as to “the
most likely” cause of the injuries. Based on the rotational injuries to S.M.’s head; the
multiple areas of right -side, blunt-force injuries; and the circumstances surrounding how
S.M. was found, including the fact that S.M. was resuscitat ed at the scene, indicating that
it was a short time between when she went into the pond and was pulled out and she was
not in the pond well before the vehicle, the M.E. testified that, “most likely,” S.M. was a
pedestrian struck by a vehicle.
A sergeant who worked on reconstructing the accident scene testified that one shoe
was found on the concrete ledge just below where the car would have gone off the ledge
and the other shoe was found farther down under the bridge, pushed by the current into a
second pond. The sergeant testified that shoe evidence is important in pedestrian crashes
because a pedestrian could be knocked out of her shoes when struck; he explained:
[I]f somebody is hit and flung, that force, that centrifugal force
is going to fling those feet up, they are going to fling the shoes
which are heavier, and how tight they are on . . . those shoes
will often come off.
Sometimes using the shoes is actually a good place to
identify a good point of impact, because it’s kind of like pulling
the t ablecloth out from the dishes, where if somebody is
walking and they get hit, if their shoes are gripping on to the

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roadway, they can get flung out and directly taken out of their
shoes.

An investigator testified that there was no trace evidence on the vehicle, which was
not surprising because the majority of the damage to the vehicle was underwater and fluids
from the vehicle —oil and gasoline —would have conta minated DNA or blood evidence.
Photos of the vehicle showed front-end damage, including “crush” damage to the hood and
windshield, which occurs after the vehicle “hit something hard,” like a concrete pad or
bridge. There was also a small spot in the center of the windshield that spider-webbed out.
The investigator testified that it looked like “something hit it directly in the center to cause
that damage as it expande d out from that impact point.” That “something” did not cause
an impact hard enough to completely push the windshield in as crush damage would do.
The investigator could not say what caused the spider webbing, but stated that as the “car
was making its way to its final rest position, something would have hit the windshield.”
The jury found Linskie guilty of criminal vehicul ar homicide. The district court
sentenced Linskie to 88 months in prison. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Sufficiency of the evidence
Linskie challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.
“Whe[n] there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court reviews the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine if the evidence was
sufficient to permit the jury to reach the verdict it did.” State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 225
(Minn. 1995). This court assumes t hat the jury believed the state’ s witnesses and

7
disbelieved contrary evidence. State v. Huss , 506 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1993). The
state does not have the burden of removing all doubt, but of removing all reasonable doubt.
State v. Hughes, 749 N.W.2d 307, 313 (Minn. 2008).
There was no direct evidence that Linskie hit S.M. While a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny, “circumstantial evidence is entitled to the
same weight as direct evidence.” State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Minn. 1999). The
circumstantial-evidence standar d requires a two -step analysis. State v . Silvernail , 83 1
N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, this court must “identify the circumstances proved,”
“defer[ring] to the jury’ s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances ” and rejecting
evidence conflicting with the circumstances proved by the state. Id. at 598-99 (quotations
omitted). Next, this court must “determine whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id.
at 599 (quotations omitted).
A person is guilty of criminal vehicular homicide if the person “causes the death of
a human being . . . as a result of o perating a motor vehicle,” when the driver causes a
collision and “leaves the scene of the collision in violation of section 169.09, subdivision
1.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(7). Linskie claims that the state failed to prove that he
caused a collision with S.M. that caused her death.
First, we identify the circumstances proved. The circumstances proved by the state
relevant to Linskie’s conduct include: (1) Linskie drove a vehicle that hit something and
rolled into a pond; (2) Linskie crawled out of the pond and ran, telling witnesses that they
never saw him; (3) Linskie told his mother that he “f -ucked up” and was i n an accide nt;

8
(4) Linskie had his mother pick him up and get dry clothes ; (5) Linskie told his girlfriend
to report the vehicle stolen; (6) Linskie lied to police officers about driving the vehicle; and
(7) Linskie admitted to driving the vehicle and “hit[ting] a rock or something.”
The circumstances proved relevant to S.M. include: (1) immediately after Linskie
fled, witnesses found S.M. floating in the water 10-15 feet kitty-corner from the passenger
side of the vehicle; (2) S.M. was unconscious with a head injury; (3) S.M. was resuscitated
at the scene; (4) S.M. died at the hospital; (5) S.M.’s cause of death was “complications of
cardiopulmonary arrest (resu scitated) due to multiple blunt -force injuries and cold water
immersion”; (6) S.M. suffered multiple “nonspecific” bl unt-force injuries, predominantly
on the right side of her body ; (7) S.M. suffered multiple blunt -force injuries to her head;
(8) S.M. had bleeding in her brain, indicating that her brain was rotating due to rapid
acceleration or deceleration; (9) S.M.’s injuries were “consistent with being hit by a car”;
(10) “some” of S.M.’s injuries could have been caused by f alling onto a concrete ledge;
(11) S.M.’s injuries could possibly have come from falling out of a tree; and (12) in context,
“the most likely injury mechanism” was a motor-vehicle collision.
The circumstances proved relevant to the accident scene include: (1) one shoe found
on the concrete ledge just below where the car would have gone off the ledge and the other
shoe found farther down under the bridge; (2) no trace evidence due to the vehicle being
underwater or contaminated by vehicle fluids; (3) “crush” damage to the vehicl e’s hood
and windshield; (4) a small spot in the center of the windshield that spider webbed; and
(5) something hit the windshield directly in the center as the car made its way into the pond,
but did not cause an impact hard enough to completely push it in.

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These circumstances proved regarding Linskie’s conduct; Linskie’s admission to
involvement in a collision; the timing and location of the discovery of S.M.’s body; S.M.’s
injuries and cause of death; the M .E.’s opinion that S.M. was a pedestrian struck by a
vehicle; S.M.’s shoes; and the damage to the vehicle, particularly the windsh ield, are
consistent with guilt—that Linskie collided with S.M. and caused her death.
Linskie argues that there are reasonable inferences other than guilt because the M.E.
testified that S.M. could have sustained the injuries by falling on the concrete ledge. But
the M.E. testified that “the injury mechanism . . . was a motor vehicle collision.” The M.E.
explained that there were other possibilities because S.M.’s i njuries were “nonspecific
blunt-force injuries.” Because the injuries were “nonspecific ,” context was important in
forming an opinion as to how the injuries came about. Given the context, the M.E. did not
concede that it was a rational hypothesis that S.M. fell off the roadway —he stated that
“[j]ust looking at [her] injuries,” it was a “pos sibility.” He also testified that it was
“possible” that S.M. was injured falling out of a tree. But he stated that “most likely,” S.M.
was a pedestrian struck by a vehicle.
The jury heard the evidence. This court recognizes that the jury is in the best
position to determine credibility and weigh the evidence. State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355,
360 (Minn. 1992). And this court “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” State v. Lahue , 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.
1998). Because the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
any rational hypothesis except that of guilt, the evidence is sufficient to support Linskie’s
conviction.

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Jury instruction
The district court denied Linskie’s requested jury instruction regarding a mens rea
element of the charged offense . Jury instructions are entrusted to the district court’ s
discretion, and a district court’s refusal to give a requested instruction will not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43, 50 (Minn. 1996). The focus
of this court’s analysis is on whether the refusal resulted in error. State v. Kuhnau , 622
N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 2001).
The district court instructed the jury on the elements of criminal vehicular homicide,
including: Linskie caused a collision, “failed to stop as close as possible to the scene to
reasonably investigate what was struck in the collision,” and “failed to give notice of the
accident by the quickest means of c ommunication to law enforcement.” Linskie argues
that this instruction failed to include a mens rea element —that he knew or had reason to
know that the accident involved the death of a human being.
Under section 609.2112, subdivision 1(7), a person is guilty of criminal vehicular
homicide if the person “ca uses the death of a human being . . . as a result of o perating a
motor vehicle,” when the driver causes a collision and “leaves the scene of the collision in
violation of section 169.09, subdivision 1.” Under section 169.09, subdivision 1, a driver
“involved in a collision shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the collision, or
as close to the scene as possible, and reasonably investigate w hat was struck.” “If the
driver knows or has reas on to know the collision resulted in injury to or death of another,
the driver . . . shall remain at the scene of the collision until the driver has fulfilled the
requirements . . . as to the giving of information.” Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd. 1.

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Linskie concedes that because he was involved in a collision, he was obligated to
investigate what was struck. Linskie argues, however, that the second part of the statute
addressing injury or death requires a mens rea element. He argues that “[b]oth sentences
are needed to criminalize a person who leaves the scene of a collision after causing injury
or death.”
Under the first sentence, the mens rea element is knowledge of involvement in a
collision and then a duty to stop and investigate. See id. (stating that a driver involved in
a collision must immediately stop and reasonably investigate what was struck). Linskie
knew that he was involved in a collision; thus, he was required to investigate what was
struck. But Linskie failed to investigate what was struck; therefore, the second sentence of
the statute was not triggered. Under the second sentence, the mens rea element is
knowledge that the collision resulted in injury or death and then a duty to remain at the
scene until requirements of giving informati on are fulfilled. See id. (“If the driver knows
or has reason to know the collision resulted in injury to or death of another, the driver”
must remain at the scene to fulfill giving -of-information requirement s). Th e second
sentence will not always be an element of the crime because the sentence starts with the
word “if.” In its entirety, the subdivision states that a driver involved in a collision must
immediately stop and reasonably investigate what was struck, and that if the driver knows
or has reason to know that the collision resulted in injury to or death of another, he has an
additional obligation to remain at the scene and provide information. See id.
It is a hierarchical scheme of what a driver must do when involved in a collision:
immediately stop and reasonably investigate what was struck. If the investigation results

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in the driver knowing or having reason to know that the collision resulted in injury to or
death of another, the driver must remain at the scene to fulfill givin g-of-information
requirements. The district court appropriately instructed the jury and did not abuse its
discretion by denying Linskie’s requested jury instruction.
Affirmed.