State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0465

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Eric Deonta Hill,
Appellant

Filed February 5, 2018
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-16-4476

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court plainly erred by admitting evidence of
another crime and by imposing sentences for both possession of a firearm and possession
of ammunition by an ineligible person. We affirm.
FACTS
On June 16, 2016, Officer Cragg was in his squad car conversing with a pedestrian.
Officer Cragg heard a voice say , “Why are you f-cking with my people?” and observed a
man, later identified as appellant Eric Deonta Hill, sitting in an SUV at a stop sign with his
head out the window. Officer Cragg asked Hill if he was speaking to him, to which Hill
replied, “Yeah. You’re always f -cking with my people.” Hill then drove away at a high
rate of speed and went through two stop signs without stopping.
Officer Cragg initiated a traffic stop and called for backup. Officer Cragg removed
Hill from the vehicle and placed him in the rear of a squad car. The police determined that
Hill’s driver’s license was revoked and searched the vehicle , where they found a loaded
handgun in the center console. While in the squad car, Hill stated that he had “cocaine in
[his] buttock.” Hill pulled out a small bag containing a white substance and handed it to
the officer.
Police later conducted a recorded interview in which Hill was asked if the car was
his. Hill replied, “Yeah, that’s my car, everything is mine’s [sic].” Although he denied
that the gun was his or tha t he had touched it before, w hen asked if he had ever used the
gun, Hill replied, “Never used it, never nothin’, it’s to protect my family from someone

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[trying to] run up on me and kill me because all this crazy ass sh-t going on out there.” Hill
also stated that the cocaine was for personal use and that he was not selling.
Hill was charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person and possession
of ammunition by an ineligible person. At trial, the state introduced into evidence the
recorded interview and a photograph of the bag of cocaine. Hill did not object to either
exhibit. The jury found Hill guilty on both c ounts, and the district court sentenced him to
60 months in prison for each count, with the sentences running concurrently. This appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
Evidence
Hill claims that the district court plainly erred by admitting evidence referring to his
possession of cocaine. When a defendant does not object to the admission of evidence,
this court reviews the district court’s admission of the evidence for plain error. See State
v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). The appellant must sh ow (1) an error,
(2) that is plain, and (3) the error affects the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Vick ,
632 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2001). If the appellant satisfies all three prongs of the plain-
error test, this court must consider “whether reversal is required to ensure the fairness and
integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (citation
omitted). If this court concludes that any of the requirements of the plain-error test are not
satisfied, it need not consider the others. State v. Brown , 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn.
2012).

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To establish that the admission of evidence affected his substantial rights, the
appellant must demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would
have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 38 (quotation
omitted). To that end , this court considers the persuasiveness of the evidence and the
manner in which it was presented. State v. Jackson , 764 N.W.2d 612, 620 (Minn. App.
2009), review denied (Minn. July 22, 2009).
In State v. Hollins , we concluded that the appellant failed to prove a significa nt
effect on the jury’s verdict, noting that there were only three references to the inadmissible
evidence during the prosecutor’s case -in-chief and the prosecutor did not mention th e
evidence in his opening statement or closing argument. 765 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. App.
2009). We also determined that the jury had a mple evidence to support a conviction
without improperly relying on the erroneously admitted evidence. Id.
Here, the prosecutor referred to the cocaine once in her opening statement, asked a
police officer three questions about the cocaine, played Hill’s full recorded interview, and
mentioned the cocaine once in closing argument. In her opening statement, the prosecutor
mentioned the cocaine in describing the events leading to Hill’s arrest. In closing
argument, the prosecutor mentioned the cocaine to explain that although Hill’s decision to
attract police attention while illegally possessing a firearm, ammunition, and cocaine defied
common sense, that was not a defense to the charged crimes . While the record here does
contain more references to the err oneously admitted evidence than Hollins, the state did
not emphasize Hill’s possession of cocaine.

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Furthermore, the jury had ample evidence to support both of Hill’s convictions.
Police recovered a firearm and ammunition in the center console of Hill’s vehicle. Hill
confirmed that the vehicle and everything inside it was his. Hill st ated that the wea pon
was there to protect his family from someone trying to kill him. He also told police that he
is supposed to be able to have a gun to protect himself. Because the state did not emphasize
Hill’s cocaine possession and there was ample evidence to support his convictions, Hill has
not established that the admission of evidence relating to cocaine affected his substantial
rights. Therefore, the district court did not plainly err by admitting that evidence. Because
we conclude that Hill cannot satisfy the third prong of the plain-error analysis, we need not
consider the first two prongs.
Sentencing
Hill claims that we must vacate one of his 60 -month concurrent sentences because
both offenses were committed during a single behavioral incident. Alt hough the state
agrees with Hill , this court must still conduct an independent inquiry. See State v.
Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (noting that it is the responsibility of
appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with the law, regardles s of whether counsel
chooses to contest an issue). Statutory construction is a question of law that this court
reviews de novo. State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 2003).
Generally, Minnesota law prohibits district courts from imposing multiple sentences
for offenses committed as part of a single behavioral incident. Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd.
1 (2016). However, “a prosecution for or conviction of a violation of section . . . 624.713,
subdivision 1, clause (2), is not a bar to conviction of o r punishment for any other crime

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committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.” Id., subd. 3 (2016 ). Hill was
convicted of possession of a firearm by an ineligible person and possession of ammunition
by an ineligible person pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2014).
Resolution of this issue turns on the meaning of “any other crime” in section
609.035, subdivision 3. In State v. Holmes, the supreme court interpreted this phrase in the
context of the burglary exception to the single-behavioral-incident rule. 778 N.W.2d 336,
340-41 (Minn. 2010). The supreme court stated:
We read the statute to allow a conviction of another crime
committed in the same course of conduct as the burglary
provided that the statutory elements of that crime are different
than the crime of burglary. The phrase “any other crime”
means a crime that requires proof of different statutory
elements than the crime of burglary.

Id. at 341.
Hill’s convictions require proof of different elements; one requires the state to prove
possession of a firearm, and the other requires the state to prove possession of ammunition.
Applying the supreme court’s reasoning from Holmes, a defendant may be sentenced for
both possession of a firearm as well as possession of ammunit ion.1 Consequently, the
district court did not err by sentencing Hill to two concurrent 60-month sentences.
Affirmed.

1 Hill relies on a 2016 unpublished opinion to support his argument. In that case, however,
the appellant was sentenced for multiple convictions of possession of a firearm by an
ineligible person, each of which requires proof of the same statutory elements.