State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0471

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John James Jackson, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-15-9334

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Pete r R. Marker, Assistan t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s de nial of his presentence plea-withdrawal
motion, arguing that the district court erred by failing to evaluate the motion under the fair-

2
and-just standard. Alternatively, appellant argues that his guilty plea was invalid because
the district court impermissibly involved itself in plea negotiations. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant was charged with second-degre e assault in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.222, subd. 2 (2014), and third-degree assa ult in violation of Mi nn. Stat. § 609.223,
subd. 1 (2014), with a sentencing enhancement for an offense committed using a dangerous
weapon other than a firearm, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.11, subd. 4 (2014). At the time,
appellant was on federal parole for a bank-robbery conviction.
At a pretrial hearing, after he initially i ndicated a desire to plead not guilty, appellant
and his attorney had extended discussions during multiple recesses concerning a plea offer
made by the state. Appellant eventually pleaded guilty to third-degree assault, without the
sentencing enhancement concerning the us e of a dangerous weapon. Appellant was
informed on the record that his guilty plea would likely result in additional consequences
for violating his federal parole, but he was not informed that his plea would require that he
register as a predatory offender.
Following his guilty plea, appellant lear ned that he would have to serve an
additional 41 months on his federal sentence because of the third-degree-assault
conviction. Appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he did not “fully
appreciate or understand his plea agreement,” because he was not aware of the predatory-
offender-registration requirement it would trigge r; that “[h]e felt rush ed and pressured in
making his decision, because it was a last-mi nute resolution made during the pretrial
motions hearing immediately before trial”; that “[h]e did not understand the seriousness of

3
charges in that the plea would add additiona l consequences to the remaining prison time
he had on his federal sentence”; and that he continued to assert his innocence. The district
court stayed the proceedings on appellant ’s motion until the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 2016) (holding that “a defense attorney’s
failure to advise a defendant about predatory-offender-registration requirements before the
defendant enters a guilty plea does not viol ate a defendant’s rights to the effective
assistance of counsel . . . and, thus, [the defendant] is not entitled to withdraw his guilty
plea”).
At the subsequent plea-withdrawal hearing after Taylor was decided, the district
court found that (1) appellant was not aware that he was required to register as a predatory
offender at the time he pleaded guilty but that, under Taylor, this was not a sufficient reason
to allow plea withdrawal; (2) it had given appellant ample time to discuss the plea
agreement with his attorney and that the district court was “particularly patient” under the
circumstances and had given appellant “whate ver time [he] needed”; (3) appellant was
“fully aware of [his] federal charge and of the potential consequences” when he pleaded
guilty; and (4) that appellant “g ave a sufficient factual basis under oath to establish the
elements of the crime.” The district court denied appellant’s plea-withdrawal motion and
sentenced appellant to 24 months in prison, with credit for time served.
This appeal followed.

4
D E C I S I O N
We first consider whether the district cour t erred when it denied appellant’s plea-
withdrawal motion. Appellant argues that the district court improperly failed to apply the
fair-and-just standard applicable to plea-withdrawal motions before sentencing.
“We review a district court’s decision to deny a withdrawal motion for abuse of
discretion, reversing only in the ‘rare case.’” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn.
2010) (quoting Kim v. State , 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 19 89)). District courts have
discretion to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn before sentencing “if it is fair and just to
do so[,]” giving “due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of
the motion and any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by
reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant’s plea.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 2. The burden of advancing reasons to support plea withdrawal is on the defendant,
while the burden of showing prejudice caused by a withdrawal is on the state. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d at 97. Even in cas es where the state fails to demonstrate prejudice, a district
court may still deny a plea-withdrawal mo tion if the defendant fails to “advance
substantiated reasons for wit hdrawal of his plea” under th e fair-and-just standard. Id. at
98.
Here, the district court did not explicitly identify the fair-and-just standard as being
the basis for denial of appellant’s motion. But it is evident from a review of the record that
the district court applied the proper standard after careful consider ation of appellant’s
arguments. The parties presented the motion to the district court using the fair-and-just
standard. Appellant stated that he wanted the motion to be considered using that standard,

5
and the state argued that it would be prejudice d by plea withdrawal. The district court
considered and rejected on th e record each of appellant’s reasons for plea withdrawal.
Although the district court did not evaluate prejudice to the state on the record, prejudice
to the state is not necessary to deny a plea-withdrawal motion if “substantiated reasons for
withdrawal” are not shown. Id.
The record indicates that the district court gave appellant adequate time and
opportunity to consult with his attorney before he pleaded guilty. We agree with the district
court’s characterization of its having been “par ticularly patient.” Appellant stated on the
record that he was aware th at his guilty plea would likely result in additional federal
consequences. Appellant’s lack of knowled ge regarding predatory-offender registration
requirements is not a sufficient reason to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea. Taylor,
887 N.W.2d at 826. Appellant’s plea included an adequate factual basis, consisting of his
admission to intentionally pushing a 60-year-o ld female, causing her substantial bodily
harm. The district court acted within its di scretion when it denied appellant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
We next consider whether the district c ourt impermissibly interjected itself into the
plea negotiations, rendering appellant’s guilty plea invalid. A guilty plea is per se invalid
when a judge is impermissibly in volved in a plea negotiation. State v. Anyanwu , 681
N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App. 2004). Whether a guilty plea is valid is a question of law
subject to de novo review. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94.
At the plea-withdrawal hearing, the distri ct court commendably took pains to ensure
that appellant understood the state’s plea offer. The district court explained to appellant

6
that, while it was not part of his plea agreement with the state, appellant’s sentence would
be concurrent with his preexi sting federal sentence. Appella nt argues that this was an
impermissible promise by the district court of a particular sentence. A reading of the trial
transcript, however, indicates that the district court’s purpose in making this statement was
informational. The state was not seeking a consecutive sentence. Unlike previous
decisions where we have found a district court to have impe rmissibly intervened in plea
discussions, the district court here was promising nothing inconsistent with the state’s plea
offer. See State v. Moe , 479 N.W.2d 427, 428-2 9 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied
(Feb. 10, 1992) (determining th at a district court impermissibly participated in plea
negotiations where it granted a downward departure over the objections of prosecution).
Rather, the district court was informing a ppellant that, under the state’s plea offer,
appellant’s sentence would be concurrent because there was no apparent reason for it to be
otherwise. See State v. Wakefield, 263 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978) (holding that a state
sentence imposed after a federal sentence “must be presumed to run concurrently with the
Federal sentence when there has been no specif ic determination by the trial court”). The
district court’s provision of accurate factual information to appellant did not amount to it
impermissibly participating in plea negotiations.
Appellant’s pro se supplemental brief re iterates several of the same arguments and
appears to argue that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at the time he
pleaded guilty. After careful review of the r ecord, we see no merit in appellant’s pro se
challenges.
Affirmed.