State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0475

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Darren Clinton,
Appellant.

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-25526

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Veronica M. Surges, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; C onnolly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary after stealing property from a
hotel room. He now challenges his convicti on, arguing that a hotel room does not fall
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under the definition of a “building” for purposes of the burglary statute. We disagree and
affirm.
FACTS
On September 25, 2016, appellant Darren Cl inton snuck into a hotel room, grabbed
an individual’s gym bag, and then attempted to abscond from the hotel with the bag.
Clinton was quickly caught and charged with second-degree burglary. He pleaded guilty
to the charge and admitted that he “enter[ed] a hotel room” without permission and stole
the property. The district court accepted Clin ton’s guilty plea and sentenced him to forty
months in prison. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Clinton argues that his conviction shoul d be reversed because he did not lay a
sufficient factual basis for his plea to second-degree burglary. Specifically, he argues that
he only admitted to entering a hotel room w ithout permission, but a hotel room is not a
“building” under the meaning of the burglary statute.
Appellate courts “review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.” State v. Vasko,
889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 20 17). Clinton was convicted under the s econd-degree
burglary statute, which reads in relevant part,
[w]hoever enters a building without consent and with intent to
“commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and
commits a crime while in the building, either directly or as an
accomplice, commits burglary in the second degree . . . if. . .
the building is a dwelling . . . .”

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Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016). The term “building” is defined as “a structure
suitable for affording shelter for human beings including an y appurtenant or connected
structure.” Minn. Stat. § 609.581, subd. 2 (2016). “Structure” is not defined.
This court recently addressed whether a mo tel room fits within the definition of a
building under the same statute in State v. Lopez where we held that “[a] motel room is a
building within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.582.” 897 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Minn. App.
2017), review granted (Minn. June 20, 2017). Cl inton acknowledges that Lopez may be
dispositive, but argues that it was wrongly decided because this court read new words into
the statute. Clinton urges us to reconsider the Lopez decision. But under the doctrine of
stare decisis, appellate courts are encouraged to “adhere to former decisions in order that
there might be stability in the law.” State v. Ross , 732 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Minn. 2007).
Generally, we will not overrule a previous precedent without a compelling reason to do so.
State v. Obeta, 796 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 2011).
Here, we see no compelling reason to overrule Lopez. We reasoned in Lopez that a
motel room is a building because it is “intentionally constructed from the component parts
of walls, a ceiling, and a door, for the express purpose of affording shelter for guests. It is
precisely because a motel room is so constructed that a person rents such a room.” Lopez,
897 N.W.2d at 298. The same reasoning holds for hotel rooms, and Clinton does not give
us a compelling argument to backtrack from our Lopez decision.
Clinton also argues that even if we accept Lopez, his conviction should be reversed
because he did not specifically admit that by enteri ng the hotel room he also entered a
“building” without consent. In essence, Clinton argues that entering a hotel room does not
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necessarily imply that he ente red a “building.” However, a su fficient factual basis exists
if there are “facts on the record to support a conclusion that [the] defendant’s conduct falls
within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346,
349 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). Minnesota’s appellate courts have never held that
strict incantation of a criminal statute’s exact statutory language is required in order to lay
a sufficient factual basis.
Clinton admitted that he “en ter[ed] a hotel room” with “the purpose of stealing,”
and he took property in that room without permission. He was not required to specifically
say the word “building” in or der to lay a sufficient factual basis. Instead, all that was
required were sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that Clinton’s conduct
fell within the second-degree burglary charge. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d at 349. His admission
that he entered a hotel room illustrates that his conduct fell within the charge.
Because we conclude that a hotel r oom is a building under the second-degree
burglary statute, and because Clinton sufficiently admitted to entering a building, we affirm
Clinton’s conviction.
Affirmed.