In re the Marriage of: Praveen Prabhakaran, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0482

In re the Marriage of: Praveen Prabhakaran, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Vadivazhaghi Kannan,
Appellant.

Filed January 29, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-14-4939

Bridget R. Landry, Cordell & Cordell, P.C., Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jennifer M. Macaulay, Macaulay Law Offices, Ltd., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Reyes, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant-wife Vadivazhaghi Kannan (wife) argues that the district court (1) abused
its discretion in admitting as admissible hearsay respondent-husband Praveen
Prabhakaran’s (husband) valuation of marita l India properties; (2) erred in adopting
husband’s comparative market analysis (CMA) as evidence of the value of the parties’
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home; (3) abused its discreti on by denying wife’s claim for the reservation of spousal
maintenance; (4) erred in determining that the parties received a loan from wife’s brother
for $30,000, which had been repaid in full; and (5) abused its discretion in awarding
conduct-based attorney fees to husband. We affirm.
FACTS
In 1995, the parties married in Chennai, India. In 2004, husband had an opportunity
with his current employer in the United States. The family moved to the United States in
January of 2004 on husband’s H1-B visa and purchased a townhome in Plymouth,
Minnesota. In 2005, the par ties purchased an apartment in Arun, Chennai, India (Arun
apartment) and in 2006, the par ties purchased a vacant parcel of land in Padappai, India
(Padappai land). In 2007, the parties purchas ed a second home located in Plymouth for
$425,000.
In July of 2014, husband served wife with a summons and petition for marriage
dissolution. In August of 2014, wife transferred the two India properties, both in her name
at the time, to her mother, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1a (2016), which
prohibits a party from transferring a marital a sset without the consent of the other party
during the pendency of a marriage-dissolution action.
The district court determined the parties’ marital debts after a hearing in February
of 2016 and held a trial in Ju ly of 2016. In its well-wri tten and comprehensive post-trial
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and ju dgment and decree of November 9, 2016, the
district court found that wife’s conduct “unreasonably contributed to the length and
expense of the proceedings,” an d reserved the amount of con duct-based attorney fees in
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favor of husband for an amount to be determined based on husband’s itemization of fees
incurred. In December of 2016, wife filed her first notice of appeal with this court. In
January of 2017, the district court filed ame nded findings of fact and conclusions of law
granting conduct-based attorney fees to husband in the am ount of $28,453.84 based on
wife’s conduct. In March of 2017, wife filed her second notice of appeal. We dismissed
wife’s first appeal as premature. We review wife’s second appeal.
D E C I S I O N
I. Appellate review of wife’s hearsay objection is precluded.

Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted husband’s
valuation of the India properties as admiss ible hearsay under the business-records and
residual exceptions. We disagree.
Evidentiary rulings are subject to appellant review “only if there has been a motion
for a new trial in which such matters have been assigned as error.” Satuer v. Wasemiller,
389 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Minn. 1986). In Alpha Real Estate Co. v. Delta Dental Plan , the
supreme court “observed that a ‘general de marcation line’ could be drawn between the
assignment of errors that require a post-trial motion, referring to rulings of the district court
that reside within the court’s discretion, and substantive questions of law that we review
de novo.” Continental Retail, LLC v. Cty. of Hennepin, 801 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn. 2011)
(quoting Alpha Real Estate , 664 N.W.2d 303, 310-11 (Min n. 2003)). Thus, evidentiary
rulings made at trial must be assigned as error in a motion for a new trial or amended
findings in order to properly preserve an objection for appellate review. Continental Retail,
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801 N.W.2d at 399 (citing Sauter, 389 N.W.2d at 201). Wife’s failure to bring such a
motion precludes appellate review. Sauter, 389 N.W.2d at 202.
Applying Sauter and Alpha Real Estate, we conclude that the evidentiary ruling that
wife challenges is a matter that required a motion for a new trial to preserve it for appellate
review. Because wife did not move for a new trial based on the district court’s hearsay
ruling, her challenge to the ruling is not properly before this court on appeal.
II. The district court did not err in adopti ng husband’s CMA as evidence of the
value of the parties’ home.

Wife argues that the district court erred in adopting husband’s CMA because it was
insufficient evidence of the pr ice of the second home loca ted in Plymouth. Wife’s
argument lacks merit.
The district court is afforded broad di scretion in making valuation decisions.
Wopata v. Wopata, 498 N.W.2d 478, 485 (Minn. App. 1993). However, the valuation must
be supported by either clear documentary or testimonial evidence or by comprehensive
findings issued by the district court. Ronnkvist v. Ronnkvist, 331 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn.
1983). The district court’s findings of fact relative to the issue of valuation will not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous. Wopata, 498 N.W.2d at 485.
At trial, husband presented testimony and evidence from a real -estate agent with
over 15 years of experience selling homes in the Plymouth area. The real-estate agent
testified that the value of homes increased between 2015 and 2016, raising the home’s
value from its purchase-price of $425,000 to $448,000. Husband also provided CMAs that
provided values for the home.
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At trial, wife argued that the home is worth $383,910. Wife’s valuation was based
on a comparison of tax-market values and sale prices of comparable homes and calculating
a likely sale price of the home, assuming it wo uld also be sold for the same percentage
under its tax-market value. The district c ourt found that the real-estate agent credibly
testified that he and other real-estate professionals do not rely on tax-market values because
they are typically low and do not provide useful information regarding likely sales prices.
The district court’s valuation decision is supported by sufficient, clear documentary
evidence and the real-estate agent’s testimonial eviden ce, as well as extensive
comprehensive findings. See Ronnkvist, 331 N.W.2d at 766. Wife has not met her burden
to show that the district court erred in weighing the evidence and making credibility
determinations.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a reservation
of spousal maintenance was not warranted.

Wife argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to reserve the
issue of spousal maintenance for a future time because her employment was tenuous at the
time. We are not persuaded.
District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to reserve maintenance.
Haefele v. Haefele, 621 N.W.2d 758, 766 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Feb.
21, 2001). A district court abuses this discretion if its findings of fact are unsupported by
the record or if it improperly applies the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 2020
(Minn. 1997) (quoting Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988)). Findings
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of fact concerning spousal maintenance must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.
Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. App. 1992); see Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
Spousal maintenance is “an award made in a dissolution . . . proceeding of payments
from the future income or earni ngs of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the
other.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2014). A district court
may grant a maintenance order for either spouse if it finds that
the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) lacks sufficient property , including marital property
apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable needs of
the spouse considering the sta ndard of living established
during the marriage, especially, but not limited to, a period of
training or education, or
(b) is unable to provide ad equate self-support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circum stances, through appropriate
employment . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2014); see Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989)
(noting that an award of maintenance requires a showing of need, even if the statute is
otherwise satisfied). The maintenance statut e lists non-exclusive factors that courts
consider when crafting maintenance orders. Lee v. Lee , 775 N.W.2d 631, 636 (Minn.
2009); see Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2. “[N]o single statutory factor for determining
the type or amount of maintenance is dispositive.” Broms v. Broms, 353 N.W.2d 135, 138
(Minn. 1984). A district court must balanc e the financial needs of the spouse seeking
maintenance and his or her ability to meet t hose needs against the financial condition of
the spouse from whom the maintenance is sought. See Erlandson v. Erlandson , 318
N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (Minn. 1982).
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Here, the district court found that wife owns sufficient property and has sufficient
income to support herself at the standard of living established during the marriage. It also
found that wife is able to provide adequa te self-support based on the factors outlined in
Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subds. 1, 2.
Wife was not authorized to work in the United States until 2010 because of her
immigration status. Once authorized, wife started an IT company and tutored children until
2012. She then worked as an IT contractor until March 2015. She received unemployment
income until July 2015. From July 2015 to January 2016, she worked as an IT contractor
earning $48.00 per hour. In June of 2016 sh e began a contract position under a seven-
month contract-to-hire, where she earned $55.00 per hour.
During trial in July 2016, wife worked under contract and earned $9,526.00 per
month, nearly equal to husband’s monthly income of $9,636.00. The district court awarded
her $868.00 in monthly child support. She was awarded an equitable distribution of the
marital estate. Wife has a pos t-secondary education and is not in need of any additional
education or training. She re ceived additional certifications since the parties’ separation
that have increased her employability in the IT field. Based on the record, we discern no
abuse of the district court’s broad discretion.
IV. The district court did not err in determining that the loan received from wife’s
brother was for $30,000 and that the entire principal had been retired.

Wife argues that the district court erred in concluding that the parties previously
owed a marital debt to wife’s brother for $30,00 0, that the debt had been paid in full, and
that wife did not carry her burden of provi ng the existence of further debts because the
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district court did not have personal jurisdiction over wife’s brother, and therefore could not
adjudicate his interests in the loan. Wife’s argument is misguided.
“Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law, wh ich we review de
novo.” Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC , 884 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn. 2016) (quotation
omitted), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1331 (2017).
Here, wife argues that in a dissolution pr oceeding, a district court lacks personal
jurisdiction over a nonparty and cannot adjudicate a nonparty’s property rights. She makes
this assertion based on our decision in Danielson v. Danielson, 721 N.W.2d 335, 339-40
(Minn. App. 2006). The Danielson court held that, in marriage dissolutions involving
third-party interests, the district court may: (1) exclude the asset from the property division
as omitted property and amend the division after the resolution of any third-party disputes
based on the various interests in the asset; (2 ) award each party a percentage interest in
whatever may later be determined to be the marital interest in the asset; or (3) include the
asset in the property division, “recognizing that if a nonparty is later determined to have an
interest in the asset, the dissolution judgmen t may be reopened and adjusted under Minn.
Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2.” Danielson, 721 N.W.2d at 339-340. “[W]hatever method a
district court selects . . . [it] is required to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions
of law to explain its decision.” Id.
The district court exercised the third opti on, finding that, at one point, the parties
owed wife’s brother $30,000, but that the par ties satisfied that debt, did not owe wife’s
brother anything further, and that the prope rty division could later be reopened for
amendment. The district court sufficiently explained its decision. Nevertheless, wife
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argues that the district court should have adopted option one and foregone its marital-debt
calculations. However, it is plain from the Danielson holding that the district court may
“select” an option and is not bound to one in particular. Wife has not satisfied her burden
to show that the district court erred in ma king its calculations of the previous amount of
debt owed to wife’s brother.
V. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in awarding conduct-based
attorney fees to husband.

Wife argues that the district court a bused its discretion in awarding husband
$28,453.84 in conduct-based attorney fees. We are not persuaded.
A district court may award attorney fe es against a party who “unreasonably
contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1
(2016). The party moving for conduct-based a ttorney fees “has the burden to show that
the conduct of the other party unreasonably contributed to th e length or expense of the
proceeding.” Baertsch v. Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Minn. App. 2016). We review
a district court’s award of conduct-based attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Brodsky
v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Minn. App. 2007).
Conduct-based attorney fees are warrant ed when a party takes “duplicitous and
disingenuous” positions that le ngthen and increase the expe nse of the proceedings.
Redmond v. Redmond , 594 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Minn. App. 1999). Under the law, “[a]
motion for conduct-based attorney fees may be based on the opposing party’s pursuit of
frivolous or bad-faith claims.” Baertsch, 886 N.W.2d at 239.
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Here, the district court found that wife contributed to the length and expense of the
litigation for five reasons: (1) wife’s transfer of the India properties to her mother after she
had been served with the dissolution of marri age; (2) wife’s frequent retention of new
counsel; (3) wife falsely increasing the amount allegedly owed to he r brother and falsely
claiming additional alleged debts owed to her parents; (4) wife falsely alleging that husband
had business interests and ear ned additional income outside of his W-2 wages; and
(5) wife’s counsel’s assertions during husband’s closing arguments that referenced exhibits
that were not properly admitted into evidence.
Wife focuses solely on her retention of new counsel. She argues that it is fair and
reasonable for a party to retain seven attorneys in a divorce proceeding. The district court
found that, with each new counsel retain ed, husband incurred co sts in repeating
conversations with wife’s new counsel and was forced to duplicat e work, including the
participation in multiple alternative-dispute -resolution sessions. Th e record supports the
district court’s finding. Wife has not met he r burden in showing that the district court
abused its discretion in awarding conduct-based attorney fees to husband.
Affirmed.