Honorable Galen J. Vaa, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0489

Honorable Galen J. Vaa,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CV-16-2405

Galen J. Vaa, Moorhead, Minnesota (attorney pro se)

Lori Swanson, Attorney Ge neral, Kathryn Iverson Land rum, Kathryn A. Fodness,
Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Pr esiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant-judge appeals the dismissal of hi s claims raising various challenges to the
interpretation of Minn. Const. art. VI, § 9 and the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 490.121,
subd. 21d (2016) and Minn. Stat. § 490.125, subd. 1 (2016). We affirm.

2
FACTS
Appellant Honorable Galen J. Vaa, Judge of the Seventh Judicial District, appeals
the district court’s dismissal of this case under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. All pertinent facts are undisputed.
Judge Vaa was appointed to the Seventh Judicial District in 1999 by Governor Jesse
Ventura. He was subsequently elected to si x-year terms in 2002, 2008, and 2014. Judge
Vaa was born on March 5, 1948, and will turn 70 years old next yea r, at which point he
will have to retire under Minn. Stat. § 490.121, subd. 21d and Minn. Stat. § 490.125, subd.
1 (the mandatory-retirement provision).
On July 15, 2016, Judge Vaa filed the unde rlying lawsuit seeking injunctive relief
from the mandatory-retirement provision based on numerous constitutional challenges.
Respondent State of Minnesota filed a motion to dismiss, and Judge Vaa filed a motion for
summary judgment.
On March 14, 2017, the dist rict court granted the state’s motion to dismiss and
determined that Judge Vaa’s claims fail as a matter of law. The district court reasoned that
the issues Judge Vaa raised have alrea dy been decided by the supreme court in Saetre v
State, 398 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1986), and Weis v. State, 459 N.W.2d 129 (Minn. 1990).
Judge Vaa filed his notice of appeal and a petition for accelerated review by the supreme
court, which was denied. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Judge Vaa appeals the dismissal of his claims, challenging the district court’s
interpretation of article VI, section 9 of the Minnesota Constitution (the judicial-retirement
3
clause) and the constitutionality of the mand atory-retirement provision, which mandates
retirement of judges upon attaining the age of 70. On appeal from a rule 12.02(e) dismissal,
“[w]e review de novo whether a complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.
We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn.
2014) (citation omitted). This court will not u phold a dismissal under rule 12.02(e) “if it
is possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with [appellant’s] theory,
to grant the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395, 122
N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963).
Judge Vaa specifically argues that (1) stare decisis does not apply with regard to
Saetre and Weis, or alternatively, these opinions should be overruled; (2) the supreme
court, in Saetre and Weis, failed to apply a proper c onstitutional analysis of these
provisions; (3) the judicial-retirement clause does not clearly and unmistakably authorize
the mandatory-retirement provision; (4) the plain language of the judicial-retirement clause
does not empower the legislature to enact the mandatory-retirement provision because it is
“strictly limited to providing retirement bene fits for district court judges”; and (5) the
judicial-retirement clause conflicts with article VI, section 7 (the term-of-office clause) and
article VII, section 6 (the elective-franchise clause).
We conclude that Saetre and Weis control and are dispositive of all of Judge Vaa’s
claims. We address issues (1) through (4) together and issue (5) separately.

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I. Saetre and Weis are binding precedent holding that the judicial-retirement
clause of the Minnesota Constitution clearly authorizes the mandatory-
retirement provision.
In 1956, by way of constitutional amendment, the le gislature added the judicial-
retirement clause to the state constitution, which states:
The legislature may provide by law for retirement of all judges
and for the extension of the te rm of any judge who becomes
eligible for retirement within three years after expiration of the
term for which he is selected. The legislature may also provide
for the retirement, removal or other discipline of any judge who
is disabled, incompetent or guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 9.
In 1973, in response to this constitutional clause, the state legi slature enacted the
Uniform Retirement and Su rvivors’ Annuities for Judges Act (the act). See 1973 Minn.
Laws, ch. 744, §§ 1-13, at 2227-36; see also Minn. Stat. §§ 490.121- .133 (2016); Saetre,
398 N.W.2d at 541. As part of the act, the legislature set a mandatory retirement age of 70
for all state judges. See Minn. Stat. §§ 490.121, subd. 21d; .125, subd. 1.
In Saetre, the Honorable Gaylord A. Saetre, also from the Seventh Judicial District,
challenged the constitutionality of the mandat ory-retirement provision, arguing that the
judicial-retirement clause does not allow th e legislature to enac t a mandatory-retirement
provision, but rather that clause is limited to providing for retirement benefits. 398 N.W.2d
at 540-41. Judge Saetre also argued that the mandatory-retirement provision conflicts with
the term-of-office clause as well as other constitutional clauses. Id. In upholding the
constitutionality of the mandatory-retirement prov ision, the supreme court held that “the
clear intention of Minn. Const. art. [VI], § 9 is to empower the legislature to develop a
5
comprehensive plan for the retir ement of judges, not strictly limited to a provision of
benefits . . . . A mandatory-retirement provisi on is an appropriate component of this
comprehensive plan.” Id. at 541. Finally, the supreme court held that mandating retirement
at age 70 “constitutes a reasonable exercise of [the legislature’s] authority” under the
judicial-retirement clause. Id.
In Weis, the supreme court again addresse d a constitutional challenge to the
mandatory-retirement provision by the Honorable Rainer L. Weis. In a succinct opinion,
the supreme court reaffirmed the legal pronouncement espoused in Saetre and upheld the
constitutionality of the mandatory-retirement provision. 459 N.W.2d at 129.
Here, the district court, in a thorough and well-reasoned order, based its dismissal
of this case mainly on the supreme court’s decisions in Saetre and Weis. The district court
determined that these cases are compelling and binding precedent under the doctrine of
stare decisis that bar Judge Vaa’s lawsuit. We agree.
First, Saetre and Weis are binding precedent, and J udge Vaa’s claim that stare
decisis does not apply fails. The doctrine of stare decisis directs courts to adhere to prior
decisions in order to maintain stability and fairness in the law. Doe v. Lutheran High Sch.
of Greater Minneapolis, 702 N.W.2d 322, 330 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 26, 2005). While this co urt may overrule its own precede nt if there is a compelling
reason to do so, State v. Martin , 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009), we cannot overrule
supreme court precedent and are bound by its decisions. State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763,
767 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).
6
Next, although Judge Vaa claims that Saetre is not binding precedent because the
supreme court failed to engage in a proper constitutional analysis, the supreme court
expressly considered the co nstitutionality of the mandator y-retirement provision as it
relates to the judicial-retirement clause. The first step in resolving any constitutional issue
is to look to the langua ge of the constitution. Schowalter v. State, 822 N.W.2d 292, 300
(Minn. 2012) (citing State ex rel. Gardner v. Holm, 241 Minn. 125, 129, 62 N.W.2d 52, 55
(1954) (stating that “the language of the [clause] itself is the best evidence of the intention
of the framers of the constitution”)). In Saetre, the supreme court examined the mandatory-
retirement provision and held that it is cons titutional under the judicial-retirement clause,
which broadly empowers the legislature to provide the method and procedures for the
retirement of Minnesota judges, and that the mandatory-retirement provision is a
reasonable implementation of that constitutional authority. 398 N.W.2d at 541. Therefore,
Judge Vaa’s second argument that the Minneso ta Supreme Court failed to engage in a
proper constitutional analysis is without merit.
Finally, Saetre explicitly addresses and disposes of Judge Vaa’s third and fourth
arguments that the judicial-retirement clause does not clearly authorize the mandatory-
retirement provision and that the legislature is limited to providing retirement benefits for
judges. The supreme court stated, “It is our view that the clear intention of Minn. Const.
art. [VI], § 9 is to empower the legislatur e to develop a comprehensive plan for the
7
retirement of judges, not strictly limited to a provision of benefits.”1 Id. (emphasis added).
In sum, Judge Vaa’s arguments fail because Saetre and Weis are binding precedent on these
issues.
II. The judicial-retirement clause is consistent with the term-of-office and elective-
franchise clauses of the Minnesota Constitution.
Judge Vaa argues that Saetre is inapplicable and not binding precedent because the
supreme court did not explicitly address whether the term-of-office clause or the elective-
franchise clause conflict with the judicial-retirement clause. Judge Vaa further asserts that,
because of this conflict, we should interpret the judicial-retirement clause to harmonize and
give effect to all three constitutional clauses. Judge Vaa cites to the principle that “stare
decisis is never properly invoked unless in the decision put forward as precedent the
judicial mind has been applied to and passed upon the precise question.” Fletcher v. Scott, 201 Minn. 609, 613, 277 N.W. 270, 272 (1938). We are not persuaded.
We first note that the issue of whether th e judicial-retirement clause conflicts with
the term-of-office clause regarding a judge’s term of office and election was expressly
raised and rejected in Saetre. 398 N.W.2d at 540-41. The term-of-office clause states that
“[t]he term of office of all judges shall be six years and until their successors are qualified.”
This constitutional clause defines the length of a judge’s term of office but it does not limit
the removal of judges for other reasons and, as Saetre made clear, “retirement terminates

1 Judge Vaa dedicates much effort to arguing that the meaning of “retirement” in the
judicial-retirement clause is limited to provid ing financial benefits. By its holding, the
supreme court clearly rejected this interpretation in Saetre. 398 N.W.2d at 540-41
8
both the tenure and term of office .” 398 N.W.2d at 54 1 (emphasis added). Saetre is
controlling and binding precedent on this issue. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d at 767.
While the issue of whether the judicial-retirement clause conflicts with the elective-
franchise clause was not expressly raised in Saetre, we reject Judge Vaa’s argument for
several reasons. First, we note that the s upreme court dismissed Judge Saetre’s argument
that the judicial-retirement clause conflicte d with numerous other constitutional clauses,
including the term-of-office clause, concerning judicial term of office and election. Id. at
540-41. We start with the presumption that the supreme court’s interpretation of the
judicial-retirement clause does not conflict with any other constitutional clauses, including
those not specifically raised in Saetre. See Clark v. Ritchie , 787 N.W.2d 142, 147 n.4
(Minn. 2010) (“Constitutional [clauses], like stat utory provisions, are to be interpreted in
light of each other to avoid conflicting interpretations.”).
Second, Saetre establishes supreme court precedent that the legislature is broadly
empowered to enact the mandatory-retirement provision. 398 N.W.2d at 541. The Saetre
decision did not involve an as-applied constitutional challe nge nor did it include any
language to indicate that the supreme court in tended to limit its holdi ng to the facts and
arguments of that case.
Third, in Weis, the supreme court had the opportunity to limit or overrule Saetre.
Instead, it unequivocally affirmed that precedent. 459 N.W.2d at 129.
Fourth, like the term-of-office clause, the elective-franchise clause governs
eligibility to become a judge, which is a different concept than setting a mandatory
retirement age. Meeting the eligibility requirements is a threshold consideration that
9
permits an individual to hold office as a judge in the first instance so long as the person is
entitled to vote and is 21 years old. Manda ting retirement subseque ntly terminates a
person’s eligibility to hold office because “retirement terminates both the tenure and term
of office” “for which [the judge] was elected.” Saetre, 398 N.W.2d at 541.
Finally, the elective-franchise clause provides a carve-out exception to the general
eligibility requirements for elec tion to any office: “except as otherwise provided in this
constitution.” This exception allows the judi cial-retirement clause to be interpreted
consistent with the elective-franchise clause. Accordingly, we are bound by the supreme
court’s holding enunciated in Saetre and affirmed in Weis that the mandatory retirement-
age provision is constitutional.
We commend Judge Vaa for his service to the State of Minnesota and his desire to
continue to serve beyond the age of 70. However, both the legislature and the Minnesota
Supreme Court have clearly and unequivocally spoken on this issue.
Affirmed.