Kathryn Eich, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0496

Kathryn Eich,
Respondent,

vs.

City of Burnsville,
Appellant,

Ted Oakland, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed January 8, 2018
Reversed
Connolly, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CV-15-2668

Kay Nord Hunt, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Valerie Sims, Heley, Duncan & Melander, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Jeffer Ali, Carlson, Caspers, Vandenburgh, Lindquist & Sch uman, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Paul D. Reuvers, Jason J. Kuboushek, Nathan C. Midolo, Iverson Reuvers Condon,
Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Susan L. Naughton, League of Minnesota Cities, St. Paul, Minnesota (for Amicus Curia e
League of Minnesota Cities)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

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S Y L L A B U S
Neither Minnesota law nor the National Manufactured Housing Construction and
Safety Stand ards Act of 1974 , 42 U.S.C. § § 5401-5426 (2012) preempts a local or
municipal authority from enforcing zoning, subdivision, architectural, or aesthetic codes
applicable to manufactured home parks, provided that they do not involve construction or
safety standards related to manufactured housing.

O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant City of Burnsville challenges the district court’s order granting a
permanent injunction against the city’s enforcement of its city code within a manufactured
home park where respondent Kathryn Eich resides. The city argues that the district court
erred in enjoining enforcement of its codes because the city is expressly authorized by state
law to enforce its codes within manufactured home parks when the code s are not
inconsistent with federal or state laws . The city also argues that respondent’s as-applied
state constitutional claims for injunctive relief are moot. Because neither federal nor state
laws preempt the city codes within the manufactured home park and because respondent’s
state constitutional claims are moot with respect to injunctive relief, we reverse.
FACTS
Among other sections, the Burnsville city code includes the city’s zoning code and
property maintenance code, and it adopts the state building code, which includes the state’s
Manufactured Home Building Code (MHBC). Before 2013, the city enforced its city code
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on a complaint basis, whereby the city building o fficial would inspect a property and its
neighboring properties after a citizen filed a complaint. Effective January 2013, the city
adopted a proactive policy, whereby the c ity established the Licensing and Code
Enforcement Department to enforce the city code and a schedule for conducting
inspections.
This policy stated that it was adopted under the city’s authority to administer the
implementation of city ord inances, subdivi sion r egulations, and the Minnesota State
Building and Fire Codes. If the city observed a violation, it would send the property owner
a first -notice letter identifying the nature of the violation, providing the applicable
ordinance information, itemizing the necessary actions to correct, and setting a compliance
deadline of ten days. After a follow-up inspection, the property owner would not be
charged if the property had been in compliance, but if the violation had not been corrected,
the city would send the property owner a second -notice letter, giving seven more days to
correct the violation and charging a $110 reinspection fee. After another inspection, if the
violation still had not been corrected, the city would mail the property owner a citation
reviewed and approved by the city’s licensing and code enforcement c oordinator, and the
property owner would be charged a $50 citation filing fee and another $110 reinspection
fee. If the violation remained uncorrected after the citation , the city would ini tiate a
criminal complaint charging the property owner with the violation.
Rambush Estates is the manufactured home park in which respondent Kathryn Eich
rents her home lot. Rambush Estates is licensed by the Minnesota Department of Health
(MDH), which has the authority to prescribe rules regarding the operation and maintenance
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of manufactured home parks to safeguard the health and safety of manufactured home park
residents. Minn. Stat. § 327.20, subd. 2 (2016). Manufactured home parks are owned and
operated by entities that lease space to residents, while park residents own the ir
manufactured homes and related accessories. The se rental relationships are governed by
Minn. Stat. §§ 327C.01-.15 (2016 & Supp. 2017). Rental agreements must include “the
rights, duties and obligations of the parties, and all rules applicable to the resident.” Minn.
Stat. § 327C.02, subd. 1(3). A resident may be evicted for violating park rules. Minn. Stat.
§ 327C.09, subd. 4. In accordance with Minn. Stat. § 327C.02, respondent is subject to the
Rambush Estates park owners’ rules and regulations. Pursuant to Minn . Stat. § 327.20,
subd. 2 and Minn. R. 4630.2210 (2017), t he MDH annually inspects Rambush Estates in
accordance with its promulgated rules in Minn. R. 4630.0200 -.2210 (2017), and it found
no violations in its 2015 inspection.
Before the city conducted its first scheduled inspection in Rambush Estates, it
invited park residents, including respondent, to the Burnsville City Hall for a presentation
on the city’s proactive property-maintenance program. At this presentation, the city stated
that there were problems with manufactured home parks because owners were not
enforcing rules and multiple authorities were causing inconsistent enforcement, which led
to fire and safety issues. At the meeting, the city stated that carports and exterior storage
were prohibited and awnings could not be attached to manufactured homes. The city also
sent respondent a letter warning about specific issues for which the city was looking,
including trash receptacle screening, setbacks for accessory buildings, and self -supported
awnings.
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In May 2015, the city code inspector inspected Rambush Estat es and issued first -
notice letters to 160 of the 223 home lots. The violations were primarily related to structure
setbacks, carports, and awnings that the city deemed nonconforming. The city also
identified lots that had exterior storage and trash containers in view. In July 2015, the city
sent responden t a second -notice letter and an invoice for the $110 inspection fee. No
criminal charges were brought against the residents of Rambush Estates.
The lots that had carports received notices that demanded removal, but failed to state
the reason that a carport was nonconforming or whether it could be made conforming. The
carport notices cited a provision in the city’s property maintenance code, which has since
been repealed and replaced , but this provision did not address why carports were not
permitted.1 See Burnsville, Minn., City Code (BCC) § 4-8-3-2(G) (2015) (providing that
“[a]ll accessory structures, including detached garages, fences and retaining walls, shall be
maintained structurally sound and in good repair, and the garage exterior shall be the same
color as the principal structure.”).
The setback-violation notices also stated requirements that were inconsistent with
the city code. These notices did not cite to any city code provision, but the relevant zoning-
code language, which has since been repealed and replaced, required that “[n]o accessory
building or structure, unless an integral part of the principal building, shall be erected,
altered, or moved within five feet (5’) of the principal building.” BCC § 10-7-4(I) (2015).

1 The notice letters cited the 2015 version of the city code. Many of the relevant provisions
have since been repealed and replaced.
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However, the city’s notices stated that accessory buildings must be five feet from the
principal building or ten feet from a neighboring structure.
The notices for trash violations required that trash be screened from view by at least
80% opaqueness. However, the city code provision cited, BCC § 4-8-3-5(C) (2015), which
has since been repealed and replaced, required that garbage be screened pursuant to BCC
§ 10-7-18 (2015 & 2017), which requires that screens be at least six feet tall and provide
100% obstruction of the view from adjacent propert ies and the right-of-way. The notices
cited the 80% opaqueness requirement from a prior city code provision, which a district
court had found unconstitutionally vague in 2013.
The residents of l ots that had objects outside the home were notified that exterior
storage is generally prohibited under BCC § 10 -7-21 (2017). However, pursuant to BCC
§ 10-7-21(A), exterior storage is not prohibited; rather, like garbage, it is required to be
screened in accordance with BCC § 10-7-18. Additionally, BCC § 10-7-18(F)(3) (2017)
requires objects that have “existing uses” to comply with screening rules within 30 days’
notice. The city’s notices did not provide such an exception for objects in use, such as the
wheelbarrow for which Kathryn Eich was cited.
The notices for awning violations demanded the awnings be detached, citing BCC
§ 4-8-3-3 (2015), which has since been repealed and replaced. However, BCC § 4 -8-3-
3(I) and (K) did not require that awnings and other attached appurtenances be “detached”
from manufactured homes . They required proper anchorage . In his deposition, the city
inspector admitted that the city c ode provisions cited in the notices did not require that
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awnings be detached and that individuals who received awning-related notices would not
understand why they were being ordered to remove their awnings.
In June 2015, t he city sent another letter regarding carports and awnings within
Rambush Estates, explaining that the structures must comply with the state building code.
This letter outlined the state’s variance application process.
The city’s first -violation notices stated that respondent had the right to appe al a
compliance order, to the city manager, in writing, accompanied by a filing fee, and within
five days of the compliance order’s service. However, this appeals language was taken
from the city code’s business regulations section, which applies to business rental license
holders. BCC § 3-28-9(F) (2017). The notices also stated that any unpaid fee would be
assessed against the property in accordance with Minnesota law, but did not identify the
assessment statute or assessment appeals process. The district court found that Minn. R.
1350.5900 (2017) may have adequately governed the appeals process because it allows an
aggrieved person to appeal to the commissioner of labor and industry any grievance
regarding Minn. R. 1350.3900 -.5700 (2017), which are the stat e rules governing Minn.
Stat. §§ 327.31-.36 (2016), the state’s MHBC. However, the district court ultimately found
that respondent was neither notified of an applicable appeals process nor notified that the
city was enforcing these state rules. Instead, respondent was notified that she violated
provisions of the ci ty’s property-maintenance and zoning codes and was informed about
an inapplicable appeals process with the city.
Respondent commenced this proposed class action seeking damages and injunctive
relief and alleging that the city’s enforcement within Rambush Estates was preempted by
8
federal and state law and violated her due process rights under the Minnesota Constitution.
The district court granted class certification and temporary injunctive relief, enjoining the
city from (1 ) communicating with respondent , (2) collecting or assessing fees from
respondent, (3) notifying respondent of violations, (4) accepting or processing variance
applications, and (5) conducting code -enforcement inspections of housing and p roperty
inside Rambush Estates.
After the action c ommenced, but before the district court granted respondent
permanent injunctive relief on summary judgment, the city adopted a new appeals process
for city-code violations, whereby a resident must pay a $100 fee or appeal within ten days
of receiving a vio lation letter . The city also adopted the International Property
Maintenance Code (IPMC) to replace its existing property maintenance code. After
adopting this new process, the city rescinded all pending violations and violation letters
that had been issued within Rambush Estates.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary
judgment and permanent injunctive relief to respondent, but stayed the issue of whether
respondent was entitled to sanctions and damages based on her state constitution claims ,
pending resolution of this appeal. In support of its order issuing an injunction, the district
court concluded that the city’s code enforcement within Rambush Estates (1) was expressly
preempted by federal law, (2) was expressly and field preempted by state law , and
(3) violated respondent’s procedural- and substantive -due-process rights because the
enforcement action was arbitrary, the notices did not adequately provide respondent with
notice of what was permitted or how the city c ode applied, and the city did not have a
meaningful appeals process.
This appeal follows.
ISSUES
I. Does federal law expressly preempt the city code within Rambush Estates?

II. Does s tate law expressly or field preempt the city code within Rambush
Estates?

III. Are respondent’s Minnesota State Constitutional claims moot as to injunctive
relief?

ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, despite the city’s repealing and replacing the majority of
the city code that the district court analyzed in its order finding preemption and enjoining
the city, the scope of the district court’ s injunction prevents the preemption issue from
being moot. Minnesota courts will only decide actual controversies. “If the court is unable
to grant effectual relief, the issue raised is deemed to be moot resulting in dismissal of the
appeal.” In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1989 ). The district court did not
limit its order to specific provisions of the city code; rather, it ruled that the entire city code
is preempted and that the city is permanently enjoined from enforcing any city code within
Rambush Estates. Thus, the city seeks the ability to enforce its city code within Rambush
Estates.
Preemption is an issue of statutory interpretation. Meyer v. Nwokedi, 777 N.W.2d
218, 222 (Minn. 2010). When a district court grants injunctive relief based upon statutory
interpretation, this court ’s review is de novo. Williams v. Nat’l Football League , 794
10
N.W.2d 391, 395 (Minn. App. 2011). “Where the legislature’s intent is clearly discernable
from plain and unambiguous language, statutory construction is neither necessary nor
permitted and we apply the statute’s plain meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Federal or state laws may preempt local laws in three ways: (1) express preemption,
where a federal or state statute explicitly defines the extent to which it preempts local law;
(2) field preemption, where a local law attempts to regulate cond uct in a field that the
federal or state l egislature intended federal or state law to exclusively occupy; and
(3) conflict preemption, where a local law permits what a federal or state statute forbids or
vice versa. See In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 63-64 (Minn. 2008) (explaining three
ways federal law may preempt state laws) ; see also State v. Kuhlman , 722 N.W.2d 1, 4
(Minn. App. 2006) (explaining three ways state law may preempt local laws).
I. Does federal law expressly preempt the city code within Rambush Estates?

The city first challenges the district court ’s conclusion that federal statutes and
agency regulations expressly preempt the city from enforcing its city code within Rambush
Estates.
“Along with Congress, ‘a federal agency acting within the scope of its
congressionally delegated authority may preempt state regulation and hence render
unenforceable state or local laws that are otherwise not inconsistent with federal law.’ ”
Hous. & Redev. Auth. of Duluth v. Lee, 832 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. App. 2013) (quoting
City of N.Y. v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64, 108 S. Ct. 1637, 1642 (1988)), aff’d, 852 N.W.2d
683 (Minn. 2014). States and political subdivisions may be preempted from regulating in
11
a specific field if federal authority has an express preemption provision. Here, the federal
legislation at issue has such a provision:
Whenever a Federal manufactured home construction and
safety standard established under this chapter is in effect, no
State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority
either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any
manufactured home covered, any standard regarding the
construction or safety applicable to the same aspect of
performance of such manufactured home which is not identical
to the Federal manufactured home construction and safety
standard. Federal preemption under this subsection shall be
broadly and liberally construed to ensure that disparate State or
local requirements or standards do not affect the uniformity
and comprehensiveness of the standards promulgated under
this section nor the Federal superintendence of the
manufactured housing industry as establis hed by this chapter.
Subject to section 5404 of this title, there is reserved to each
State the right to establish standards for the stabilizing and
support systems of manufactured homes sited within that State,
and for the foundations on which manufacture d homes sited
within that State are installed, and the right to enforce
compliance with such standards, except that such standards
shall be consistent with the purposes of this chapter and shall
be consistent with the design of the manufacturer.

National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (the Act),
42 U.S.C. § 5403(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is a federal agency
that has promulgated standards under the Act. These standards regulate actual construction
of manufactured housing units, and include provisions on the preemptive effect of the Act:
No State may establish or keep in effect through a building
code enforcement system or otherwise, procedures or
requirements which constitute systems for enforcement of the
Federal standards or of identical State standards which are
outside the system established in these regulations or which go
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beyond this system to require remedial actions which are not
required by the Act and these regulations.

No State or locality may establish or enforce any rule or
regulation or take any action that stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress. The test of whethe r a State rule or
action is valid or must give way is whether the State rule can
be enforced or the action taken without impairing the Federal
superintendence of the manufactured home industry as
established by the Act.

24 C.F.R. § 3282.1l(c)-(d) (2017) (emphasis added).
Numerous federal courts have held that the Act’s express preemption provision is
limited to prohibiting states and municipalities from regulating the “construction or safety”
of manufactured homes in any manner that is not identical to federal HUD standards. See
Lauderbaugh v. Hopewell Twp., 319 F.3d 568, 576 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that “the [Act]
prohibits localities from imposing any safety and construction standard upon manufactured
homes that differs from the federal standard.”); see also Ga. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v.
Spalding County, G a., 148 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “a zoning
requirement related to aesthetics is not preempted because the goals and effects of such a
standard have nothing to do with consumer protection”); Tex. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n,
Inc. v. City of Nederland , 101 F.3d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir. 1996); Parkview Homes, LLC v.
City of Lexington, No. 15-CV-3692, 2017 WL 758573, *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 27, 2017).
Here, the district court concluded that the Act “expressly preempts state and local
laws that are inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the Act,” but did not explain why
the particular city code provisions were inconsistent with federal law. Instead, the district
court stated that the city’s “code enforcement conflicts . . . [by] imposing fines inconsistent
13
with Congress’s objective to maintain affordability of this vital form of housing as
expressed in [the Act] and adopted by the State of Minnesota .” (Emphasis added.) We
disagree.
The district court erred in its interpretation of the Act. Since the Act concerns itself
with “safety and construction” standards of manufactured homes, and since states and
localities may adopt safety and construction standards that are identical to the Act’s
standards, enforcement of any local law impairs the federal supe rintendence of the
manufactured-home industry only when a local law attempts to regulate construction or
safety standards inconsistent with the Act’s standards. The Act does not preempt the city
from enforcing its city code within Rambush Estates because the Act is limited to consumer
protection, and the city code does not purport to regulate within that construction or safety
standards context.
The city attempted to regulate carports, awnings, zoning setbacks, trash screening,
and exterior storage within a manufactured home park . None of those regulated items
relates to the construction or safety of the manufact ured home itself. Therefore, the Act
does not expressly preempt the relevant city code provisions.
II. Does state law expressly or field preempt the city code within Rambush
Estates?

The district court also found that Minnesota state law both expressly and field
preempts the city code within Rambush Estates. Again, we disagree.
Municipalities generally do not have inherent powers, so they “can enact regulations
only as expressly conferred by statute or implied as necessary in aid of those powers which
14
have been expressly conferred.” Bicking v. City of Minneapolis , 891 N.W.2d 304, 312
(Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted). Burnsville is a statutory Plan B city. See Minn. Stat.
§ 410.015 (2016). “Among other powers, statutory cities have the power to enact and
enforce ordinances to promote ‘health, safety, order, convenience, and the general
welfare.’” City of Morris v. Sax Invs., Inc., 749 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Minn.
Stat. § 412.221, subd. 32 (2006)). Statutory cities also have the power to enact and enforce
ordinances to promote zoning, subdivision, architectural, or aesthetic requirements
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § § 462.12-.398 (2016). See Minn. Stat. § 327.32, subd. 5.
However, “state law may limit the power of a city to act in a particular area. For example,
. . . state law may fully occupy a particular field of legislation so that there is no room for
local regulation.” Sax Invs., Inc., 749 N.W.2d at 6 (quotation omitted).
State law does not preempt the city zoning and property maintenance codes.
Minnesota has incorporated the Act and the HUD regulations pursuant to the Act.
Minn. Stat. § 327.31, subd. 3. Thus, Minnesota’s state standards concerning the safety and
construction of manufactured homes , known as the MHBC, are identical to the federal
standards. For the same reasons that federal law does not expressly preempt the city from
enforcing its zoning and property maintenance codes within Rambush Estates, the MHBC
does not expressly preempt the city’s zoning and property maintenance codes from being
enforced within Rambush Estates. Moreover, a provision in the code -compliance section
of the MHBC expressly prohibits cities from applying additional safety and construction
standards to manufactured homes, while expressly authorizing local code enforcement that
is outside the context of construction and safety:
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No manufactured home which bears a seal or label as provided
in this section shall be req uired by any agency or political
subdivision of this state to comply with any other building,
plumbing, heating, or electrical code or any construction
standards other than the Manufactured Home Building Code[,]
nor be subject to any other state or local b uilding inspection,
except as the commissioner shall, by rule, provide in the case
of alterations, manufactured home accessory structures and
installations, or except as otherwise provided by federal or
state law. No manufactured home installation or manufactured
home accessory structure shall be required by any agency or
political subdivision of this state to comply with any
installation standards other than those adopted and
promulgated by the commissioner. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to i nhibit the application of zoning,
subdivision, architectural, or [a]esthetic requirements
pursuant to chapter 462.

Minn. Stat. § 327.32, subd. 5 (emphasis added).
Further, the district court erred in finding that the rules promulgated by the
Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry ( DOLI) and MDH and related statutes
occupy the field of manufactured -home-park regulation because state law explicitly
permits action by municipalities. DOLI deals with the actual construction of manufactured
homes, and MDH has the authority to prescribe rules regarding the operation and
maintenance of manufactured home parks to safeguard the health and safety of
manufactured home park residents. Minn. Stat. § 327.20, subd. 2 . However, Minnesota
statutes also explicitly protect the city’s authority within manufactured home parks.
Minn. Stat. § 327.32, subd. 5 , specifies that a city is permitted to apply “zoning,
subdivision, architectural, or [a]esthetic requirements” within a manufactured home park.
Minn. Stat. § 327.26, subd. 2 (2016), explicitly permits the city to enforce its ordinances
relating to the safety and protection of people within a manufactured home park:
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Subd. 2. Local law enforcement. Any municipality which
enacts or has enacted laws or ordinances relating to the safety
and protection of persons and property is empowered to
enforce the laws or ordinances within any manufactured home
park or recreational camping area located in the muni cipality,
notwithstanding the fact that the park or area may constitute
private property.

The city’s property maintenance c ode, which has been replaced by the IPMC, had
the express purpose to “ensure public health, safety, aesthetics, and welfare insofar as they
are affected by the continued occupanc y and maintenance of structures, premises and
land.” BCC § 4-8-1-1(C) (2015). The IPMC has a very similar statement of purpose; “to
ensure public health, safety and welfare insofar as they are affected by th e continued
occupancy and maintenance of structures and premises.” IPMC § 101.3 (2017). The city’s
zoning code has the express purpose to “promote the general health, safety and the welfare”
of the community. BCC § 10-2-1 (2017).
State law has explicit ly authorized municipalities to regulate within manufactured
home parks. Thus, state law has not fully occupied the field of manufactured -home-park
regulation. The district court erred in finding that state law expressly and field preempts
the city from enforcing its zoning and property maintenance codes within Rambush Estates.
State law does not preempt the city from enforcing the state building code.
The city also challenges the district court’s finding that the city is preemp ted from
enforcing Minnesota’s state building c ode within Rambush Estates. The city argues that
while the MH BC applies to manu factured homes themselves, the state building c ode
applies to all other structures within the manufactured home park. See Minn. Stat.
§ 326B.151 (2016). Minn. Stat. § 327.16, subds. 4 -5 (2016) indicates that before a
17
manufactured home park is approved, it must comply with applicable state building code
rules:
Subd. 4. Compliance with current state law. Any manufactured
home park or recreational camp ing area must be constructed
and operated according to all applicable state electrical, fire,
plumbing, and building codes.

Subd. 5. Permit. When the plans and specifications have been
approved, the state Department of Health shall issue an
approval report permitting the applicant to construct or make
alterations upon a manufactured home park or recreational
camping area and the appurtenances t hereto according to the
plans and specifications presented.

Such approval does not relieve the applicant from securing
building permits in municipalities that require permits or from
complying with any other municipal ordinance or ordinances,
applicable thereto, not in conflict with this statute.

(Emphasis added.) Additionally, the Rambush Estates park rules, which were specified in
written leases pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 327C.02, subd. 1(3), provide that “[a]ll structures
and improvements on the Lot m ust meet all city, state, and federal codes, guidelines, and
regulations.”
Through its city code, the city adopted the state building code. BCC § 4-1-1 (2017).
Because the MHBC is a subsection of the state building code, the city has also adopted the
MHBC. The state building c ode and the MHBC regulate different structures within
manufactured home parks. The state building c ode applies to the “construction,
reconstruction, alteration, repair, and use of buildings and ot her structures.” Minn. Stat.
§ 326B.101 (2016). The MHBC applies to manufactured homes and their “accessory
structures.” The city is no t preempted from enforcing the state building c ode within
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manufactured home parks if that enforcement action is related to a structure other than a
manufactured home or to a manufactured home’s “accessory structures.”
A manufactured home accessory structure is defined as “a factory-built building or
structure which is an addition or supplement to a manufactured home and, when installed,
becomes a part of the manufactured home.” Minn. Stat. § 327.31, subd. 19; Minn. R.
1350.0100, subp. 39 (2017). Thus, structures not attached to the manufactured home, such
as carports, are not accessory structures under the MHBC. Similarly, structures that are
not “factory-built” are not accessory structures under the MHBC. Since these structures
fall outside the scope of the MHBC, the city has the authority to regula te them in
accordance with the state building c ode. The MH BC does not preem pt the city from
enforcing the state building code within manufactured home parks.
State law does not preempt the city from enforcing the MHBC.
The district court also held that the city is preempted from enforcing the MHBC
within manufactured home parks. T he MHBC is a subsectio n of the state building c ode.
See Minn. R. 1300.0050 (2017) (“The Minnesota S tate Building Code adopted under
§ 326B.106, subdivision, 1 [2016], includes the following chapters : . . . 1350,
Manufactured Homes . . . .”). The state legislature has expressly authorized municipalities
to administer and enforce the state building c ode by adopting it . See Minn. Stat.
§ 326B.121, subd. 2(b) (2016) (a “municipality may choose to administer and enforce the
[s]tate [b]uilding [c]ode within its jurisdiction by adopting the code by ordinance ”). City
officials are expressly given the authority to enforce all provisions of the state building
code. See Minn. Stat. § 326B.133, subd. 4 (2016) (“Building officials shall, in the
19
municipality for which they are design ated, be responsible for all aspects of the code
administration . . . .”; see also Minn. R. 1300.0110, subp. 1 (2017) (“The building official
is authorized and directed to enforce the provisions of this code.”). Thus, the city is not
preempted from enforc ing the MHBC; rather, it is expressly authorized to enforce the
entirety of the state building code, which includes the MHBC, within Rambush Estates.
III. Are respondent’s Minnesota State Constitution al claims moot as to injunctive
relief?

Finally, the city argues that respondent’s Minnesota Constitutional claims cannot
justify an injunction. The district court concluded that the city’s application of its city code
violated respondent’s substantive- and procedural-due-process rights. The district court
granted summary judgment to respondent on her constitutional claims, but stayed the issue
of whether respondent was entitled to sanctions and damages , pending resolution of this
appeal.
Respondent challenged the constitutionality of the ordinances as -applied, rather
than facially. Since the city rescinded its enforcement action agains t respondent,2 with
respect to injunctive relief, which is the only issue before this court, respondent’s state
constitution claims are now moot.
D E C I S I O N
Since the city code does not regulate construction and safety standards for
manufactured homes, the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety

2 At oral argument, counsel for the city stated that certain reinspection fees had not been
reimbursed to some class members. After oral argument, this court received a letter from
counsel indicating that all such fees have been refunded.
20
Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5403(d) , does not expressly preempt the city code.
Additionally, since the city is authorized under Minn. Stat. § 327.32, subd. 5, to apply any
zoning, subdivision, architectural, and aesthetic requirements within manufactured home
parks, state law does not expressly or field preempt the city code. Finally, because the
city’s code enforcement activities inside Rambush Estates have been rescinded and the
reinspection fees have been refunded, respondent’s as-applied due-process claims are moot
with respect to injunctive relief.
Reversed.