In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R.K., Parent

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0497

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R.K., Parent

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-JV-16-4476

Kenneth R. White, Law Office of Kenneth R. White, P.C., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant-father L.A.)

Patrick R. McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mark A. Lindahl, Assistant County
Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Anthony F. Nerud, Nerud Law Office, Arlington, Minnesota (for respondent-mother R.K.)

Susan Kohls, St. Peter, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Pres iding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant-father challenges the district court’s order terminating his parental rights,
arguing that the district court failed to make particularized findings necessary for appellate
review of the decision. He also contends that , even if the district court’s factual findings
are sufficient for appellate revi ew, the district court abused its discretion by determining

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that the factual findings support a statutory ground for termination and the conclusion that
respondent-county made reasonable efforts toward reunification. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant L.A. is the father of S.K., born in 2010. Prior to any county involvement,
S.K.’s mother, R.K., was the sole custodian of S.K. In 2013, S.K. was removed from
R.K.’s care in a Child in Need of Protec tion or Services (CHIPS) case from LeSueur
County. Before the LeSueur CHIPS file was dismissed in June 2015, S.K. had spent over
a year outside of R.K.’s home. It is uncl ear whether L.A. was ac tively involved in the
LeSueur County CHIPS proceeding.1
On August 4, 2016, Blue Earth County (the county) filed a CHIPS petition after
receiving a report from Blue Earth County Human Services (BECHS) that R.K. was using
methamphetamine in the home while S.K. was present and that a registered predatory
offender may also be living in the home. That same day, the district court ordered BECHS
to remove S.K. from the home and place her into foster care.
The county created an out-of-home placemen t plan (case plan) for S.K., which L.A.
signed and the district court adopted on September 16, 2016. The case plan required L.A.
to (1) comply with random urinalysis (UA) testing and not have diluted, missed, or positive
UAs; (2) undergo a mental-health diagnos tic assessment and follow through with
subsequent recommendations; (3) obtain and maintain stable housing; (4) maintain
employment; (5) have any individuals resi ding with him be approved by BECHS;

1 The evidence in the record suggests th at L.A. was incarcerated at the time S.K. was
removed from R.K.’s care in 2013.

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(6) remain law abiding; (7) sign all releases for case management purposes; (8) participate
in a family-group-decision-making meeting; (9) work with a parenting educator as
recommended by BECHS; (10) attend S.K.’s medical and dental appointments; and
(11) provide for S.K.’s basic needs while she was in his care.
On November 16, 2016, the county filed a permanency petition to terminate L.A.’s
and R.K.’s parental rights based on three stat utory grounds: (1) that L.A. and R.K.
“substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties
imposed upon [them] by the parent and ch ild relationship,” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. (1)(b)(2) (2016); (2) that “reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have
failed to correct the conditions leading to [S.K.’s] placement,” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. (1)(b)(5) (2016); and (3) that S.K. “is neglected and in foster care,” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. (1)(b)(8) (2016).
The district court held a pr etrial hearing on January 6, 2017, at which R.K. consented
to the termination of her parental rights to S.K. The district court then conducted a trial on
January 19 to address the perm anency petition as it related to L.A.’s parental rights. The
district court heard testimony from several individuals, including L.A.
In March 2017, the district court ordered that L.A.’s parental rights to S.K be
terminated. The district court determined that the county proved that clear and convincing
evidence supported the three separate grounds for termination and that it was in S.K.’s best
interests for L.A.’s parental rights to be terminated. The district court also concluded that
the county made reasonable efforts to reunite S.K. with L.A.
L.A. appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
L.A. contends that the district court faile d to make particularized factual findings
and that, even assuming the district court made proper findings, the findings are insufficient
to support the statutory grou nds for termination or to es tablish that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite L.A. and S.K. 2 Minnesota courts presume that a parent is fit
to care for his child. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App.
2012). “Ordinarily, it is in the best interest of a child to be in the custody of his or her
natural parents.” In re Welfare of A.D. , 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (M inn. 1995). Therefore,
parental rights may only be terminated for “grave and weighty reasons.” J.K.T., 814
N.W.2d at 87 (quotation omitted).
The county has the burden of proving a st atutory ground for te rmination by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. We will affirm the district court’s decision to terminate
parental rights if at least one statutory ground is sup ported by clear and convincing
evidence and termination is in the child’s best interests, In re Welfare of Children of T.R.,
750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 20 08), and, where required, th e county made reasonable
efforts to reunite the parent with the child, In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708
(Minn. 2005). Although we give “considerable deference” to the district court’s decision,
we conduct a close review of the record in determining whether the evidence supporting

2 With respect to whether termination is in S.K.’s best interests, L.A. argues that the factual
findings are not sufficiently particularized but does not argue that, if the findings are
proper, they are insufficient to support the district court’s conclusion regarding S.K.’s best
interests.

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termination is clear and convincing. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381,
385 (Minn. 2008).
In addressing whether a statutory ground supports terminating a parent’s rights to a
child, the district court must make findings that consider the “underlying” or “basic” facts
relating to the statutory basis for termination. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805
N.W.2d 895, 899-900 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). The district
court must next assess whether the underlying facts demonstrate that a basis for terminating
parental rights is present and then, if there is clear and convincing evidence that termination
would be in the child’s best interests, deci de whether to terminate parental rights. Id. at
900. We review this exercise of judgment for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 901. An abuse
of discretion occurs if the di strict court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous, if the
district court misapplies the law, or if it resolves the matter in a manner that is against logic
and the facts on the record. See Dobrin v. Dobrin , 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997);
Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).
I. The district court’s factual findin gs are sufficiently particularized.

L.A. first argues that we should reverse the district court’s decision because the
district court failed to make sufficiently par ticularized findings. He contends that the
majority of the district court’s findings ar e “merely recitations” of testimony. L.A.’s
argument relies significantly on In re Civil Commitment of Spicer , a case in which this
court determined that it is insufficient for the district court to recite or summarize excerpted
portions of a witness’s testimony without providing independent comment on the
testimony. 853 N.W.2d 8 03, 810 (Minn. App. 2014). “[A] district court’s recitation of

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what others have observed is not a finding of fact that thos e observations are true.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
For effective appellate review, the district court’s findings must provide insight into
the facts that are most persuasive of the u ltimate decision and demonstrate the district
court’s consideration of the stat utory bases for termination. In re Welfare of M.M. , 452
N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1990). This court has been critical of a district court’s findings
that are limited to recitati ons beginning w ith phrases such as “petitioner claims,”
“according to petitioner’s application,” and “r espondent asserts,” and has stated that
recitations of claims or testimony do not constitute “true findings.” Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at
810 (quotations omitted).
L.A. points to paragraphs in the district court’s order in which the district court uses
phrases such as the witness “testified,” to assert that the district court failed to make “true
findings.” He also claims that other paragraphs in the order are not factual determinations
but are rather conclusory statements regarding his conduct. L.A. argues that a review of
the district court’s order will reveal only a few paragraphs in which the district court made
actual factual findings. See id. We disagree.
The district court’s findings, as a whole, do more than merely recite or summarize
the testimony. The district court made findings regarding L.A.’s compliance with the case
plan independent of any lan guage suggesting that it was si mply reciting the testimony of
witnesses. For instance, the district court found that L.A. was not fully compliant with the
requirement to submit to random UA testing, citing missed and positive tests. The district
court later tied these concerns to L.A.’s crim inal history and his longstanding issues with

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chemical dependency. The district court al so emphasized that L.A. had missed several
therapy and psychiatric appointments to th e point of being suspended from therapy
services. The district court al so found L.A. to have been untruthful with the parenting
assessor about his mental-health history, his medications, his treatment history, his
visitation history with S.K. and other matters.
It is true that the district court described witness testimony, but the district court also
indicated which testimony it found credible and persuasive. The district court described
the testimony of the parenti ng assessor and the case mana ger, including their concerns
regarding L.A.’s lack of stability and an esta blished, bonded relati onship with the child.
The district court then outlined the testimony of L.A.’s witnesses and explained why their
limited knowledge about L.A. undermined the re levance of their testimony. The district
court described L.A.’s testim ony, in which he claimed prog ress in his case plan and a
commitment to attending therap y in the future. The court immediately followed that
summary with a finding that “[f]ather’s credibility is questionable,” noting L.A.’s
untruthfulness with the parenting assessor and his prior conviction of a crime of dishonesty.
In laying out the witnesses’ testimony and finding L.A.’s testimony not to be credible, the
district court indicated that it found the tes timony of other witnesses to be more credible
and more persuasive. We defer to the di strict court’s credibility determinations. In re
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Minn. 1990). Together, the findings have
sufficient detail to explain what evidence the district court found to be persuasive. We
conclude that the district court’s findings are sufficient to permit effective appellate review.

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II. The findings support a statutory ba sis to terminate parental rights.

L.A. also contends that the district c ourt erred by determining that the factual
findings sufficiently support the alleged statutory grounds for termination of his parental
rights. In this case, the district court dete rmined that three different statutory grounds
warranted termination of L.A.’s parental rights, including that S.K. “is neglected and in
foster care.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. (1)(b)(8).
The district court concluded that S.K. is neglected and in foster care because she
had been living in foster care for over 700 days and L.A.’s conduct and circumstances
demonstrate that she cannot be placed with him. “Neglected and in foster care” is defined
by statute as a child:
(1) who has been placed in foster care by court order; and

(2) whose parents’ circumstances , condition, or conduct are
such that the child cannot be returned to them; and

(3) whose parents, despite the availability of needed
rehabilitative services, have failed to make reasonable
efforts to adjust their circumstances, condition or conduct,
or have willfully failed to meet reasonable expectations
with regard to visiting the child or providing financial
support for the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 24 (2016). In deciding whether a child is neglected and in
foster care, the district court considers the following factors:
(1) the length of time the child has been in foster care;

(2) the effort the parent has made to adjust circumstances,
conduct, or conditions that ne cessitates the removal of the
child to make it in the child’s best interest to be returned to
the parent’s home in the fore seeable future, including the
use of rehabilitative services offered to the parent;

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(3) whether the parent has visite d the child with in the three
months preceding the filing of the petition, unless extreme
financial or physical hardship or treatment for mental
disability or chemical depe ndency or othe r good cause
prevented the parent from visiting the child or it was not in
the best interests of the child to be visited by the parent;

(4) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with
the agency or person temporarily responsible for the child;

(5) the appropriateness and adequacy of services provided or
offered to the parent to facilitate a reunion;

(6) whether additional services would be likely to bring about
lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child to
the parent within an ascertai nable period of time, whether
the services have been offered to the parent, or, if services
were not offered, the reasons they were not offered; and

(7) the nature of the efforts made by the responsible social
services agency to rehabilitate and reunite the family and
whether the efforts were reasonable.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 9 (2016). Alth ough the district court did not specifically
address each of these factors, it is sufficient if the district court makes “detailed findings of
fact [that] demonstrate the existence of many of the factors outlined in the statute.” See
A.D., 535 N.W.2d at 648-49.
L.A. argues that the county failed to prove that the “pre sent conditions of neglect
will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” See In re Welfare of Chosa , 290
N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980). He further asserts that th e district court could not make
an adequate prediction for the foreseeable future because it had “little to say” regarding his
ongoing ability to parent S.K. or his circum stances that were unlik ely to change. We
disagree.

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The district court explicitly found that S.K., who is now seven-years old, was placed
outside the home from September 2013 to Oc tober 2014 before un dergoing trial home
visits with R.K. during the LeSueur County CHIPS proceeding. After LeSueur County’s
CHIPS petition was dismissed in June 2015, S.K. had spent 664 days in out-of-home
placement. She was again removed from R.K.’s care and placed in foster care on August 4,
2016 when the county filed its CHIPS petition. Accordi ngly, the district court calculated
that S.K. had been placed outside the home for over 700 days. The district court also noted
that L.A.’s recent cooperation with portions of his case plan was relatively minor in
duration when compared to the amount of time S.K. had stayed in foster care. These
findings demonstrate that the district court strongly considered the length of time that S.K.
had been in the foster-care system and further support the need for permanency.
The findings also indicate that L.A. has not made adjustments to his circumstances,
conduct, or conditions that required placing S.K. in foster care. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.163, subd. 9(2). L.A.’s conduct shows that S.K. will continue to be neglected even
if she were placed in his home. Based on the parenting educator’s evaluation, the district
court noted that L.A. “tends to use children to meet his own self-needs, and expects children
to make life better for him by providing lo ve, assurance and comfort.” The parenting
educator’s evaluation, along with L.A.’s difficulties in complying with his UA testing and
addressing his mental-health issues, illustrate th e district court’s reasonable concerns that
S.K. “cannot continue to wait to see if [L.A.]” can improve his own issues to ensure that it
is in S.K.’s best interests to be placed with him in the fo reseeable future. Additionally,
L.A.’s interactions with S.K. demonstrate that there is not a secure bond between them.

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During their visits, S.K. was reluctant to engage with L.A., did not make eye contact, and
did not greet L.A. when he entered the room. It is appropriate, based on the findings, to
conclude that the present cond itions of neglect would likely co ntinue if S.K. were placed
in L.A.’s care.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding
that Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8) is a proper basis for terminating L.A.’s parental
rights. And because we conclude that one statutory ground for terminating parental rights
exists, we need not review the other two gr ounds identified by the district court for
terminating L.A.’s parental rights. See In re Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49,
55 (Minn. 2004) (“Termination of parental rights will be affirm ed as long as at least one
statutory ground for termination is supp orted by clear and convincing evidence and
termination is in the child’s best interests.”).
III. The findings support the conclusion that the county made reasonable efforts to
reunite L.A. and S.K.

L.A. also argues that the district court erred by concluding that the county made
reasonable efforts towards reunification. Mi nn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2016),
requires the district court to make “specific findings” in a termination proceeding regarding
whether “reasonable efforts to finalize the perm anency plan to reunify the child and the
parent were made.” These must be “indiv idualized and explicit findings regarding the
nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family.” Id.

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In deciding whether the coun ty made reasonable efforts, the district court must
determine whether the services were: “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child;
(2) adequate to meet the ne eds of the child and family ; (3) culturally appropriate;
(4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2016). These services must include real,
genuine assistance and be more than mere matters of form. In re Welfare of Children of
S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 1 50 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007).
“Whether the county has met its duty of reas onable efforts requires consideration of the
length of the time the county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare
of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 53 2 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).
Here, the district court concluded that the co unty made reasonable efforts to reunite L.A.
with S.K.
L.A. asserts that the district court’s findi ngs fail to support its determination that the
county undertook reasonable efforts toward reunification. He claims that the district court
failed to address the nature of the problem relating to his parenting skills. But the findings
demonstrate that, as part of the case plan, the county offered L.A. several different services
that were specifically tailored to his needs and intended to further his relationship with S.K.
The county provided him with the following serv ices: outpatient treatment, individual
therapy, a parenting assessment, a family-g roup-decision-making meeting, random UA
testing, medication management, mental-health diagnostic assessment and psychotherapy,
and supervised visits with S.K. Despite these services, L.A. failed to provide UA samples,

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failed to cooperate with the parenting educat or, and failed to attend numerous therapy,
psychiatric, and medication-management appointments.
L.A. argues that because the case plan wa s only in effect for 90 days before trial,
the duration of the county’s services was insufficient to constitute reasonable efforts. But
it appears from the record that the county provided him with some of these services as part
of probation before filing the CHIPS petition and executing the case plan. And the findings
show that L.A. was unwilling to fully cooperate with these se rvices until after the county
filed the permanency petition. For example, he did not start undergoing random UA testing
until December––one month before trial. L.A. appeared to blame his lack of full
compliance with his case plan on not understanding the process, being overwhelmed with
his services, believing that his outpatient treatment did not require random testing, and his
learning disability. But, in light of his service providers’ attempts to help him achieve full
compliance, the district court did not find his alleged justifications to be persuasive.
Even if the duration of these services is relatively short, the reasonableness of the
services must also be evaluated in th e context of S.K.’s circumstances. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 7 (2016) (stating that the “best interests of the child” are the “paramount
consideration” in a termination proceeding). Between September 2013 and January 2017,
S.K. had spent over 700 days in out-of-home placement. Long-term foster care is “highly
disfavored” for a child under the age of 12. In re Welfare of J.M. , 574 N.W.2d 717, 722
(Minn. 1998). For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite L.A. with S.K.
Affirmed.