State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0501

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Lee Cannon,
Appellant.

Filed January 8, 2018
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-16-1379

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of felony domestic assault and fleeing a police
officer, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. We
affirm.
FACTS
A jury found a ppellant, Christopher Cannon, g uilty of (1) felony domestic assault
of his wife, D.C., under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2016), and (2) fleeing a police
officer under Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6 (2016) . The individuals who testified about
the events leading up to appellant’s arrest included: appellant; police officers; D.C.; and
D.C.’s neighbors, C.W., G.D., and C.M.W.
D.C. testified that she and appellant got into an argument after appellant saw
something on her phone. During the argument, appellant tried to strangle her with his arm,
an extension cord, and a belt , while their two -year-old daughter watched nearby. While
trying to choke her, appellant said, “I’m going to put you to sleep and w hen you wake up,
we can talk.” Appellant also threatened D.C. by saying he was going to bury her alive and
that she would ne ver see her daughter again. The incident lasted about 45 seconds.
Appellant tried to lock D.C. in her room, but D.C. was able to grab her daughter and run to
C.W.’s house to call the police. On the day of the cha rged assault, D.C. was taken to the
police station for a recorded statement, where she stated that appellant tried to choke her
with his arm, a belt, and a cord.
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C.W., testified that D.C. came to his door with her daughter looking distraught and
emotional. D.C. told C.W. that her “boyfriend” had assaulted her and to call 911. C.W.
saw appellant pee k his head out of D.C.’s front door a nd heard him say something like
“don’t do it” or “stop doing that.”
Officers testified that they responded to the scene and found D.C. panicked and with
red marks on her neck. D.C. told the officers that her husband had tried to choke her. The
officers found an extension cord in D.C.’s bedroom. When asked about the last time she
had contact with appellant before this altercation, D.C. said she had not seen him in about
six weeks. At trial, D.C. admitted that she lied because she did not want to get evicted, as
having appellant at her townhouse violated her lease.
C.M.W. and G.D. testified that appellant came to their back p orch and asked each
of them if he could come inside. Appellant had a belt slung over his shoulder. He told
C.M.W. that he had been in a fight with his girlfriend. Appellant first asked C.M.W. if he
could come inside her home, and she declined. Appellant asked if he could speak with
G.D. Appellant looked scared and told G.D. that the police were looking for him. He told
G.D. that his girlfriend had a husband and that the husband was going to beat his girlfriend
up. Appellant asked G.D. three times if he could come inside the house , and each time
G.D. said no. Appellant left after he saw police officers, leaving his belt on the porch.
An arresting police officer testified that he found appellant near a high school. After
the officer announced his presence, appellant got on the ground on his stomach. The officer
asked why appellant did this, and appellant stated that his wife was upset and she asked
someone to call the police. Appellant told the officer that he left t he area because he saw
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police. Appellant said he did not harm his wife. He appeared nerv ous and was talking
very fast. During his statement to police, appellant said he and D.C. got into an argument
and “stuff got crazy” while they were in D.C.’s bedroom. He denied any use of force, but
affirmed that he knew someone had called the police. He said his belt was off because he
and D.C. had sexual intercourse and he did not have time to put i t on before leaving the
house. Appellant told police that both he and D.C. used methamphetamin e and said they
might be going through withdrawals.
Appellant testified that he had never harmed D.C.; rather, D.C. was aggressive
toward him on the day of the charged offenses. His belt was off because he and D.C. had
just “had sex” and that while D.C. w as yelling at him, D.C. went into the bathroom with
the cord, then came back into the bedroom and th rew the cord. Appellant suspected that
D.C. might be going through methamphetamine withdrawal because she “usually will have
a tantrum or something like that, but this was a little overboard.” Appellant heard D.C. tell
her neighbor that he had hit her and choked her with a cord. Appellant leaned out the door
and asked D.C. if she were going to send him to jail. D.C. responded that she should have
taken care of his outstanding warrant. Thinking he was going to jail, he grabbed hi s belt
and a sweater and left. Appellant stopped at C.M.W.’s and G.D.’s porch, but denied saying
that D.C.’s husband was going to beat her up. He denied asking C. M.W. and G.D. if he
could go inside their house. Appellant left when he saw an officer walking up the trail.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated:
So we’ve got the story the victim told which is essentially the
same at the scene, a recorded statement yesterday, and then you
have the defendant throwing as much mud at the wall as he can
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in the hopes that something will stick. And I’d like to tell you
why that mudslinging is nothing but mudslinging and should
be completely and utterly discounted because it would require
you to believe him, a convicted felon on the run from the law
who’s twice been convicted of producing a false name to police
officers, providing false information to police officers that
resulted in his conviction of a crime.

The prosecutor also argued that appellant was lying about D.C. using drugs because “he’s
trying to sully her. He’s trying to dirty her up so that she is not a believable person.” The
jury found appellant guilty of domestic assault and fleeing a peace officer on foot.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
For the first time on appeal, appellant claims that he is entitled to a new trial because
during closing arguments the prosecutor belittled and disparaged the defense. Minnesota
appellate courts review unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct challenges for plain error
by determining whether (1) there was error, (2) that error was plain, and (3) that error
affected the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 299 -300
(Minn. 2006). If the appellant cannot satisfy any of the three prongs, the others need not
be addressed. Montanaro v. State, 802 N.W.2d 726, 732 (Minn. 2011).
Plain error is error that contravenes caselaw, rule, or a standard of conduct. Ramey,
721 N.W.2d at 302. If appellant shows plain error, the burden shifts to the state to prove
the misconduct did not prejudice the appellant’s substantial rights. Id. The state then must
show that there is “no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question
would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. (quotation omitted). If
the state cannot meet its burden, this court then considers whether fairness and integrity of
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the judicial proceedings require addressing the error. State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543,
551 (Minn. 2010).
When reviewing a closing argume nt for prosecutorial misconduct, this court
“look[s] to the closing argument as a whole, rather than to selected phrases and remarks.”
State v. Graham , 764 N.W.2d 340, 356 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). Prosecutors
have “considerable latitude” during closing argument s and are “not required to make a
colorless argument.” State v. Williams, 586 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1998). One example
of misconduct includes disparaging the defendant’s defense to the charges. State v. Griese,
565 N.W.2d 419, 427 (Minn. 1997). “While the prosecutor is free to argue that there is no
merit to a particular defense or argument, and prosecutors are free to anticipate arguments
defense counsel will make, the prosecutor may not generally belittle a particular defense
in the abstract.” State v. Ashby, 567 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1997).
Appellant argues that the prosecutor committed error by belittling appellant’s
defense in the abstract when he told the jury that appellant’s testimony was mudslinging
that was meant to sully D.C. Respondent argues that the closing argument was not error
because the prosecutor merely pointed to evidence inconsistent with appellant’s
statements, then argued that appellant’s statements to police and trial testimony were not
credible and “largely served to impugn D.C.’s character.” The prosecutor then pointe d to
evidence that corroborated D.C.’s statements and argued that D.C.’s statements to police
and trial testimony were credible.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that similar closing -argument statements
did not amount to misconduct. See State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111, 125 (Minn. 2009)
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(holding that there was no misconduct when a prosecutor argued that defendant offered
evidence to smear a witness’s character in the jury’s eyes); see also State v. Simion, 745
N.W.2d 830, 844 (Minn. 2008) (holding that there was no error when a prosecutor argued
that the defendant took “every opportunity to dirty up [victims] by accusing and insinuating
that they were violating some rule or regulation.”)
Similarly, here, there was no prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor supported
his arguments with evidence that contradicted appellant’s testimony and supported D.C.’s
testimony. The prosecutor was arguing that appellant’s testimony was not credible. He
was not belittling a particular defense. Therefore, there was no error.
Affirmed.