State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0570

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shane Scott Stone,
Appellant.

Filed January 29, 2018
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Pennington County District Court
File No. 57-CR-16-576

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Al Rogalla, Pennington County Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle
and possession of drug paraphernalia, arguing that (1) the district court violated his

2
constitutional right to present a defense by limiting his testimony about why he fled police
and (2) the district court erred by instructing the jury that it could have a reasonable doubt
but still find appellant guilty of possessing drug paraphernalia. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 9, 2016, a Thief River Falls police officer observed appellant Shane Stone,
with whom he had been familiar for several years, driving through the city. The officer
knew that Stone’s driver’s license was revoked, so he activated his lights to execute a traffic
stop. Stone did not stop but continued “at a high rate of spee d” and made several “sharp
turns.” He ran a stop sign and reached speeds of approximately 90 miles per hour , then
drove off of the road , causing the vehicle to roll into a ditch. Stone ran from the vehicle,
and the officer gave chase. Stone eventually lay down on the ground, stating that he was
done running. The officer held Stone at gunpoint until another police officer and a state
trooper arrived.
As they arrested Stone, the officers observed that his vehicl e contained apparent
drug paraphernalia, including hypodermic needles and baggies. They obtained a warrant
to search his vehicle and also recovered a scale, a digital camera, a glass tube that appeared
to be a narcotics pipe, a rubber band/tubing, and a case containing hypodermic needles.
Stone was charged with fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle, fleeing a police
officer on foot, reckless driving, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1

1 Stone was also charged with fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance and driving
after revocation of his driver’s license, but the state dismissed the charges during trial.

3
While in jail, Stone wrote a letter to the officer who had pu rsued him. Stone
apologized for “risking [the officer’s] life and the community’s,” expressed surprise that
nobody was hurt in the chase, and stated that he is working on sobriety.
At trial, Stone elected to testify in his defense. He advised the district court that he
intended to testify that he fled from the squad car because he was concerned the driver
might be a Thief River Falls police officer who had lied under oath during a prior federal
prosecution against him, which was subsequently dismissed. The state objected. The
district court ruled that Stone could testify about why he fled the police officer but would
not be permitted to “give his opinion that officers at the other trial lied” or testify as to why
the federal case was dismissed because these matters are outside Stone’s personal
knowledge and would confuse the issues for the jury.
Stone testified that he had been the subject of a federal criminal case that arose out
of an investigation that included the Thief River Falls Police Departme nt, that the charges
were ultimately dismissed, and that “ based on that experience that [he] had and the result
of that case,” he distrusts “certain people” in the police department. He testified that on
the day of the chase, he could not see which police officer was pursuing him and fled
because he was afraid to “face those issues again.”
The jury found Stone guilty of all charges, and the district court sentenced him to
22 months’ imprisonment. Stone appeals his convictions of fleeing a police officer in a
motor vehicle and possession of drug paraphernalia.

4
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting Stone’s testimony
regarding his reason for fleeing from police.

We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, “even when a
constitutional violation is alleged.” State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306 (Minn. 2015).
Erroneous exclusion of evidence does not require reversal if the error is “harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.” In re Welfare of M.P.Y., 630 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Minn. 2001).
“[C]riminal defendants have a due process right to explain their conduct to the jury,
whether or not their motives constitute a valid defense.” State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716,
719 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Jan. 30, 1992). But that right is limited by
the rules of evidence. State v. Richardson , 670 N.W.2d 267, 277, 282 (Minn. 2003). A
district court may restrict a defendant’s testimony pursuant to an evidentiary rule, so long
as the restriction is not arbitrary or disproportionate. Id. at 282.
Stone argues that the district court infringed on his right to present a defense by
preventing him from testifying about “the details” of the federal prosecution that led him
to fear a Thief River Falls police officer. We disagree for three reasons.
First, the district court’s limitations on Stone’s testimony about the federal case did
not prevent him from explaining his conduct to the jury. Stone testified that he faced
federal charges based in part on an investiga tion by Thief River Falls Police, that the
charges were ultimately dismissed, and that he feared one of the police officers as a result
of how the federal prosecution proceeded. On this record, we conclude Stone’s
constitutional right to present his defense was vindicated.

5
Second, the district court acted well within its discretion by excluding “the
details”—including proposed testimony about “why the federal charges were dismissed,”
and that a Thief River Falls police officer “lied during the federal prosecution ”—on
grounds of confusion of the issues and lack of personal knowledge.2 A district court “may
limit the defendant’s evidence to ensure that the defendant does not confuse or mislead the
jury.” State v. Jenkins , 782 N.W.2d 211, 224 (Minn. 2010) ; see Minn. R. Evid. 403
(permitting exclusion of relevant evidence to avoid confusion). This includes a defendant’s
own testimony explaining his conduct. State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 91 (Minn. 2001).
The prospect of juror confusi on is particularly salient when a defendant’s explanation is
not a defense to the charged offense. In such case, the district court must balance the
defendant’s right to present that explanation with its obligation to ensure the jury clearly
understands the applicable law, including how that explanation does or does not constitute
a legal defense to the charge. Cf. State v. Thompson, 617 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Minn. App.
2000) (discussing possibility of limiting instruction to avoid confusion in consideration of
defendant’s erroneously excluded explanation of her conduct ). The district court could
have mitigated possible confusion by instructing the jury that fear of the police is not a
defense to the fleeing offense. But such an instruction was never discussed and may have
been unacceptable to Stone. And, importantly, such an instruction would not have
addressed the other basis for the district court’s ruling —Stone’s lack of personal
knowledge.

2 Stone asserts that the district court improperly limited his testimony on hearsay grounds.
The district court mentioned hearsay but did not restrict Stone’s testimony on that basis.

6
Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding testimony about
which the witness lacked personal knowledge. “A witness may not testify to a matter
unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has pers onal
knowledge of the matter. ” Minn. R. Evid. 602. Stone asserts that he has personal
knowledge the officer lied and that the false testimony precipitated the dismissal because
he was in the federal courtroom when the case was dismissed. This assertion is flawed in
multiple respects. As to the purported lie, credibility is a nuanced concept, “ broader . . .
than truthfulness versus lying .” State v. Leutschaft , 759 N.W.2d 414, 422 (Minn. App.
2009), review denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2009). Stone apparently disagreed with the officer’s
unspecified testimony but did not articulate any foundation for his opinion that the officer
lied. As to the basis for the dismissal, Stone strongly implies that it was because of the
officer’s allegedly false testimony but ha s never actually stated as much. In fact, he has
not identified any precise reason for the dismissal, let alone established how he has personal
knowledge of the reason.
Finally, the record demonstrates that any error in limiting Stone’s testimony was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Stone directly admitted at trial all elements of fleeing
a police officer. And his admissions were corroborated by his letter to the police officer
and the video from the officer’s dashboard camera . Accordingly, Stone’s evidentiary
challenge fails.

7
II. The district court ’s misstatement during jury instructions did not impair
Stone’s substantial rights.

Where, as here, an appellant challenges jury instructions to which he did not object
at trial, we review for plain error. State v. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. App.
2012). Under that standard, an appellant must show that there was: (1) an error; (2) that is
plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 522
(Minn. 2016). If he satisfies the first three prongs, we then consider whether reversal is
necessary to protect the fairness, integrity, or public repu tation of judicial proceedings.
State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 1998).
When reviewing jury instructions, we examine the instructions in their entirety to
determine whether they fairly and adequately explain the law of the case. State v. Kuhnau,
622 N.W.2d 552, 555-56 (Minn. 2001).
It is undisputed that the district court judge misspoke in reading a portion of the
instructions regarding the drug-paraphernalia offense. Regarding the possession element
of that offense, the judge stated: “You may find that the element of possession, as that term
is used in these instructions, is present if you find a reasonable doubt that the defendant
had actual or constructive possession.” Because the instruction inadvertently omitted the
word “beyond” preceding the words “a reasonable doubt,” it is erroneous—and plainly so.
But that does not end our analysis.
Stone contends that th e error is also structural, requiring reversal regardless of
prejudice. We disagree. A defect in a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt only
requires automatic reversal of a conviction if the defect is so substantial as to deny the

8
defendant the right to a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 2 75, 281, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993); see State v. Peterson , 673
N.W.2d 482, 487 (Minn. 2004) (following Sullivan). The defect here falls far short of this
standard.
There is little doubt that despite the misstatement, the jury understood that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt was required for the possession element. At the beginn ing of
the final instructions, the district court provided each juror with a copy of the written
instructions and invited them to “follow along.” These written instructions correctly state
that the element of possession must be found beyond a reasonable d oubt. Indeed, the
discrepancy between the oral instruction and the written instruction, while legally
significant, was so inconsequential in the moment that it did not stimulate an objection
from defense counsel.
Moreover, the instructions as a whole requ ire the state to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Both the written and oral instructions accurately state the presumption
of innocence and repeatedly admonish the jury to find Stone guilty only if the state proves
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court also repeatedly instructed the jury that
each element of the four charged offenses must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. And
in its final instructions to the jury, after closing arguments, the district court reiterated: “It
is fair to find the defendant guilty if you are convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, it is fair and proper to find the defendant not guilty if you are not
convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” On this record, we are not persuaded that

9
there is a reasonable likelihood that the district court’s misstatement substantially affected
the jury’s verdict. State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002).
In sum, the district court plainly erred in orally misstating th e instruction that
possession of drug paraphernalia must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . But Stone
has not demonstrated that the error was structural or impaired his substantial rights.
III. Stone’s pro se arguments lack merit.
In a pro se supplemental brief, Stone reiterates his challenge regarding the limitation
of his testimony. And he argues that (1) the district court erred by permitting the police
officer to “suggest this case was a meth case”; (2) the officer “lied repeatedly throughout
his testimony,” particularly regarding the duration of his acquaintance with Stone; and
(3) he “was neve r allowed to view the [dash board-camera] video before trial.” These
arguments are unavailing.
First, there was no impropriety, let alone plain error, in the police officer’s
unobjected-to references to methamphetamine. See Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d at 230 (applying
plain-error review to evidentiary challenge without objection). The officer did not state
that Stone used or possessed methamphetamine but simply testified that several of the items
found in Stone’s vehicle are commonly associated with methamphetamine. This testimony
may have supported unfavorable inferences but was not unfairly prejudicial as it was
necessary to establish the drug -paraphernalia possession charge. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 152.01, subd. 18(a), .092 (2014).
Second, Stone’s challenge to the police officer’s credibility is misplaced. It is the
role of the jury, not appellate courts, “to determine the credibility of the witnesses and

10
weigh the evidence before it.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017). Stone
had ample opportunity to and did cross-examine the police officer. The jury nonetheless
accepted the officer’s testimony. We defer to that credibility determination.
Third, even if Stone did not view the dash board-camera video, the record reflects
that defense counsel was not surprised by the video at trial and had no objection to its
admission. And Stone does not identify any prejudice that resulted from his personal lack
of prior access.
Affirmed.