Jerome Robert Beck, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0579

Jerome Robert Beck, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Cottonwood County District Court
File No. 17-CV-17-11

Paul M. Malone, Malone & Mailander, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saraswati Singh, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition to rescind a license -
revocation order, arguing that the Commissioner of Public Safety failed to comply with its
statutory duty under Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 3(b) (2016), and violated appellant’s due-

2
process rights by publishing an incorrect fax number on an application to remove a no -
alcohol-use license restriction. We affirm.
FACTS
On July 3, 2005, respondent Commissioner of Public Safety cancelled appellant
Jerome Beck’s driver’s license after an alcohol -related driving incident , finding him
inimical to public safety. On July 20, 2006, after Beck completed a one-year rehabilitation
requirement, the commissioner reinstated his driving privileges with a no -alcohol-use
restriction on his license. The restriction stated that Beck “may not consume any drink or
product containing alcohol or controlled substances.” Beck could request remov al of the
restriction after ten years. Sometime after June 26, 2015, Beck faxed an application to the
commissioner seeking removal of the license restriction, using the fax number on the
application. Beck believed that the restriction would be removed by faxing the application.
On November 10, 2016, a Minnesota state trooper stopped Beck for “over fog, over
center, and improper lane use.” The trooper noticed an odor of alcohol. Beck admitted to
drinking, and the trooper could see an open bottle in the back seat. Beck was arrested for
violating the “no alcohol use” restriction on his driver’s license and for driving with an
open bottle.
After arresting Beck, the trooper asked the Minnesota Department of Public Safety
Driver and Vehicle Services Division (DVS) to review Beck’s license. DVS notified Beck
that his license would be cancelled on December 23 because he violated the no-alcohol-
use restriction on his license. DVS advised Beck that his license may be reinstated if he

3
submits evidence of chemical -dependence rehabilitation , completes an ignition -
interlocking device program for three years, and applies for a new license.
After Beck rea lized that the license restriction had not been removed, he went to
DVS and discovered that the commissioner had provided an incorrect fax number in the
instructions on the license -restriction removal application. Beck moved the district court
to rescind the order revoking his driver’s license on the grounds that the commissioner
violated his due -process rights by publishing an incorrect fax number on the application
and that the commissioner failed to comply with its statutory duty under Minn. Stat.
§ 171.09, subd. 3 (2016). The district court denied his motion. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I.
Beck argues that the commissioner failed to comply with a duty imposed pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 3(b), by publishing an incorrect fax number on the license-
restriction-removal application. “[S]tatutory construction is a question of law, which we
review de novo.” Lee v. Lee , 775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009). Our objective when
interpreting the language of a statute is “to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
legislature.” Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 278 (Minn. 2000). If that
intent is clear from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, we apply the plain
meaning of the statute. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant , 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn.
2001). Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 3(b), states:
Upon proper application by a person having a valid driver’s
license containing the restriction that the person must not
consume alcohol or controlled substances , who has not been

4
documented as having consumed alcohol or having possessed
or used a controlled substance within the past ten years, and
whose driving record contains no impaired driving incident
within the past ten years, the commissioner must remove th e
no-alcohol/controlled substance restriction on the person’s
driving record and issue to the person a duplicate driver’s
license that does not show that restriction.

Under the plain meaning of subdivision 3(b), the commissioner’s duty to remove
the license restriction begins “ [u]pon proper application.” The district court found that
“Beck did not make [a] proper application to the Commissioner for removal of the
restriction [and] remained subject to the total abstinence restrictions.” Beck does not
dispute the district court’s findings of fact. The district court received no testimony or
other evidence demonstrating that the commissioner received Beck’s application, and DVS
has no record of receiving the application before Beck was arrested on November 10, 2016.
Because the commissioner never received Beck’s application, the commissioner did not
violate its statutory duty under Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 3(b).
II.
Beck argues that the commissioner violated his due-process rights by publishing an
incorrect fax number on the application to remove the license restriction. To analyze
Beck’s due-process argument, we must analyze the “application of law to undisputed facts.
Accordingly, our review is de novo.” Bendorf v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 727 N.W.2d 410,
413 (Minn. 2007). The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty or property , without due process of
law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Minnesota Constitution provides that no person
shall be deprived of property rights without due process of law. Minn. Const. art. I, § 7.

5
“The due process protection provided under the Minnesota Constitution is id entical to the
due process guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.” Sartori v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Minn. 1988). The amount of process due
depends on the particular situation. Lamusga v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 536 N.W.2d 644,
646 (Minn. App. 1995).
Beck asserts that his due -process rights were violated because the commissioner
actively misled him as to his legal obligations. In support, Beck relies on a case in which
a law -enforcement officer improperly informed a driver that he could be subjected to
criminal penalties for refusing to take an implied-consent test. Johnson v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 887 N.W.2d 281, 285-88 (Minn. App. 2016), review granted (Minn. Jan. 25, 2017).
This court held that the driver’s due -process rights were violated because “[d]ue process
does not permit those who are perceived to speak for the state to mislead individuals as to
either their legal obligations or the penalties they might face should they fail to satisfy those
obligations.” Id. at 288. We reject Beck’s argument that the state actively misled him as
to his legal obligations because Beck was under no legal obligation to remove the
restriction. See Black’s Law Dictionary 978, 1179 (9th ed. 2009) (defining legal obligation
as a “legal or moral duty to do or not do something”). 1 Instead, he had the option of

1 Beck also argues the district court created a clerical -error exception and a citizen’s duty
exception in its due-process analysis. We disagree that the district court created a clerical-
error exception because this mischaracterizes the district court’s analysis. The district court
stated that the “incorrect fax number is a clerical error, not a violation of the law” in
concluding that the commissioner did not violate a statutory duty under Minn. Stat.
§ 171.09, subd. 3. We also disagree with Beck’s claim that the district court created a
citizen’s duty exception. In addressing whether Beck’s reliance on the incorrect fax
number was unreasonable, the district court stated that a reasonable person would have

6
submitting the application if he wanted the restriction removed. Minn. Stat. § 171.09,
subd. 3(b).
In analyzing Beck’s due-process claim, we rely on a three-factor balancing test we
have previously used to determine whether an individual was erroneously deprived of a
driver’s license. Hamilton v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 587 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Minn. App.
1999) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 321, 96 S. Ct. 893, 896 (1976)), aff’d,
600 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999). We consider:
[1], the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; [2], the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3], the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted).
The first factor considers “the nature and the weight of the private interest affected
by the official action challenged.” Davis v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 509 N.W.2d 380, 388
(Minn. App. 1993). The private interest in a driver’s license revocation case “is the drivers’
interest in the continued possession of a license.” Id. Beck’s private interest is therefore
his interest in possessing a license.
In addressing the weight given to Beck’s private interest, we consider “(1) the
duration of the revocation; (2) the availability of hardship relief; and (3) the availability of

checked on the status of the application. The district court did not hold, as Beck claims,
that he had a duty “to verify that the Commissioner of Public Safety is complying with the
statutory imposed duty.”

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prompt post-revocation review.” Williams v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 830 N.W.2d 442, 446
(Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). Due -process analysis is flexible and “calls for
procedural protections as th e particular situation demands.” See Bendorf, 727 N.W.2d at
415. As to the first factor, Beck may not apply for a new license until he completes
chemical-dependence rehabilitation and uses an ignition -interlocking device for three
years. But Beck has access to hardship relief because he may still drive before he receives
an unrestricted license so long as he uses the ignition-interlocking device. The third factor,
the availability of a post-revocation review, is not relevant to Beck’s case. Therefore, we
do not analyze it.
Next, we consider the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Hamilton, 587 N.W.2d at 847. The risk
that an individual would be erroneously deprived of his driver’s license because of the
procedures used in this case, particularly by the commissioner providing an incorrect fax
number on an application, is low. The benefits of additional procedural safeguards would
also have minimal value here. The applicati on instructions stated that the applicant
“[would] be notified to apply for a duplicate or renewal driver license to have the restriction
removed” if the background check show ed no reference to alcohol consumption. The
application also provided a website link and telephone number for questions.
The district court found:
A reasonable person in Beck’s situation would have taken steps
to verify his fax transmitted successfully. The form also
clearly informs him that he will be notified to apply for a
duplicate driver’s license. With this information in mind, a
reasonable person in Beck’s situation would have contacted

8
DVS to inquire about the status of his application after a period
of time passed and he did not receive a new license with “any
use of alcohol of drugs invalidates license” removed from it.

We agree with the district court’s reasoning. Because the application informed Beck that
more steps were required before the restriction-removal process was complete and the
application included contact information to allow him to inquire about his application’s
status, there is a low risk that others would be erroneously deprived of a driver’s license
because of the procedures used in this case. The risk is also low because an applicant could
mail th e application or take it to a DVS location . Although we would not exp ect an
applicant to submit the application through multiple delivery methods, the risk of erroneous
deprivation decreases because the commissioner’s mistake would not affect every
applicant.
Third, we consider “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.” Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes , 823 N.W.2d 627, 63 2 (Minn.
2012) (quotation omitted). In applying procedural due-process factors to an alcohol-related
license revocation, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the state has a “compelling
interest in highway safety justifying efforts to keep impaired drivers off the road.” Bendorf,
727 N.W.2d at 417. The government also has “an interest in avoiding the increased costs
and administrative burdens that additional procedures would entail.” Sawh, 823 N.W.2d
at 635.
Here, the commissioner has a strong interest in ensuring that a driver’s license
restriction is only removed for those who have complied with the ten -year abstinence

9
restriction. The state has addressed this interest by only removing the restriction upon
receipt of a proper application and verification that the applicant has no history of alcohol
use within the last ten years. See Minn. Stat. § 171.09, subd. 3(b). The state and the
commissioner also have an interest in preserving scarce resources. It would impose an
unreasonably high burden on the state if we held that Beck’s due -process rights were
violated based on a typographical error on the application, particularly when we consider
that Beck had not checked on the status of his application despite being informed that the
process would not be compl ete until the commissioner notified him to apply for a new
license.
In weighing these three factors, we conclude that Beck’s due-process rights were
not violated. Although Beck has a significant private interest in maintaining his driver’s
license and preventing a job loss that may result from the requirement of an ignition -
interlocking device, Beck will only be required to use the device for three years. The
procedural safeguards in place adequately pr otected his private interest. Beck could have
called to check on the status of his application, as he was never notified to apply for a new
license. Additionally, the government has a strong interest in maintaining public safety
and removing license restrictions only upon receipt of a proper application. Although we
acknowledge that Beck suffered unfortunate consequences because of the commissioner’s
error, this conduct did not rise to a violation of Beck’s due-process rights.
III.
Beck argues he is entitled to equitable relief as a result of the commissioner’s error
and neglect. We will not consider an issue on appeal if the appellant does not support the

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allegation with analysis or citation. Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn. , 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1
(Minn. App. 1994) (citing Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co. , 290 Minn.
518, 519, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971)). Because Beck cites no supporting authority
to show that he is entitled to equitable relief, we do not consider this argument.
Affirmed.