State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0588

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Joseph Clement, Jr.,
Appellant

Filed March 5, 2018
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-15-3372

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Jonathan D. Holets, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Allison Lange Garrison, Special Assistant Public Defender, Norton Rose Fulbright US
LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his c ontrolled-substance-crime conviction , arguing that the
district court erred by applying the emergency and automobile exceptions to the
warrantless search of his vehicle. We affirm.
FACTS
On September 19, 2015, police officers were dispatched to an alley on a report of a
“suspicious occupied vehicle” with an interior light on that had been parked for several
hours where it had “no reason” to be.
Officer Thamm approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and found appellant
Robert Joseph Clement, Jr. “unresponsive” in the driver’s seat holding a cell phone.
Clement was “slumped over, either texting on his phone or unconscious.” Clement had a
“small box with vi sible drug paraphernalia” on his lap. Officer Thamm knows that it is
common that narcotics users keep their supplies in a box where illegal items are kept secure
and easily concealed. Believing this was a possible overdose, Officer Thamm opened the
door to check on Clement. Clement woke up and tried to p ull the box away. Officer
Thamm grabbed the box and set it aside.
Officer Saburn watched Officer Thamm place the box outside of the vehicle and
“recognized right away that this is a type of box that drug users commonly used to transport
their drugs and scales, packaging, etc.” Officer Saburn approached the passenger side of
the vehicle and “could see a sm all baggie containing a crystal -like subst ance next to
[Clement]’s right leg.” In the box, officers found: two digital scales and multiple baggies,
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packages of a white crystalline substance that field teste d positive for methamphetamine,
containers of suspected marijuana that field te sted positive, and 14 pills —13 Schedule II
narcotic drugs and one Schedule IV narcotic drug.
Clement was charged with two counts of controlled-substance crime. Clement
moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of his vehicle. The district court
denied Clement’s motion, concluding that the emergency and automobile exceptions to the
warrant requirement justified the search. Clement stipulated to the state’s case to obtain
appellate review of the district court’s pretrial ruling, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4. The district court found Clement guilty of one count of third-degree controlled-
substance crime and sentenced him to 39 months in prison. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Pretrial ruling
Clement argues that the district court improperly denied his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the search.
The matter was submitted to the district court on stipulated evidence. See Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The parties acknowledged that the district court’s pretrial ruling
on the suppression motion was dispositive of the case or made a contested trial
unnecessary. See id. Appellate review is limited to the dispositive pretrial issue. Id.,
subd. 4(f). When reviewing a district court’ s pretrial order on a motion to suppress
evidence when the facts are undisputed, we determine, “as a matter of law, wh ether the
evidence need be suppressed.” State v. Sterling, 782 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Minn. App. 2010)
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(quoting State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009)) (applying de novo review of
pretrial order pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee people the right to be free
from unreasonable searches. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A
warrantless search is generally unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception
to the warrant requirement. State v. Flowers , 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). If a
warrantless search does not fall within an exception, evidence collected from the search
must be suppressed. State v. Craig, 807 N.W.2d 453, 464 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d, 826
N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013). The state bears the burden of establishing that an exception to
the warrant requirement applies. State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Minn. 2001). The
district court determined that the emergency and automobile exceptions applied here.
Emergency exception
An exception to the protections aga inst warrantless searches exists for emergency
situations. State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18, 23 (Minn. App. 2005). There is a two-part test
to determine whether the emergency exception applies: “(1) is the officer motivated by the
need to render aid or assistance; and (2) under the circumstances, would a reasonable
person believe that an emergency existed.” Id.; see also State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783,
788 (Minn. 2007) (stating that two principles must be kept in mind when applying the
emergency exception: the state bears the burden to demonstrate that police conduct was
justified and the reasonableness of an officer’s belief that an emergency existed is judged
from an objective standard).
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“Generally an officer responding to a call to investigate someone unconscious or
sleeping in a vehicle is justified in investigating the welfare of that individual.” Lopez, 698
N.W.2d at 23; see State v. Volkman, 675 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. App. 2004) (stating that
initial investigation “of a motorist slumped over his steering wheel was clearly lawful”).
“As part of this investigation the officer must be permitted to make contact with the
individual and ensure that the individual does not require addi tional medical assistance. ”
Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 23.
Here, Officer Thamm found Clement “unresponsive” and “slumped over,” in the
driver’s seat possibly “texting on his phone or unconscious.” Clement had a small box
with visible drug paraphern alia on h is lap. Officer Thamm knows that narcotics users
commonly keep their supplies in this type of box. Officer Th amm believed this was
“possibly . . . an overdose,” and opened the door to check on Clement.
Applying the two-part test, Officer Thamm was motivated by the need to render aid
because he believed that Clement, unresponsive and holding a box of drug paraphernalia,
possibly overdosed. And under the circumstances —the report of the suspicious vehicle
parked for several hour s where it had no reas on to be and the discovery of Clement
“slumped over” and “unresponsive” in the vehicle holding a box of drug paraphernalia—a
reasonable person would believe that an emergency existed. Therefore, the district court
did not err in determining that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement applied.
Automobile exception
Under the automobile exception, police may search a vehicle without a warrant if
police have “probable cause to believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence or
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contraband.” State v. Lester , 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (M inn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
“Probable cause to search exists when there are facts and circumstances sufficient to
warrant a reasonably prudent [person] to believe that the vehicle contains contraband .”
State v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 1979).
Probable cause is an objective inquiry dependent upon the totality of the
circumstances. Lester, 874 N.W.2d at 771. The totality of the circumstances includes
“reasonable inferences that police of ficers draw from facts, based on their training and
experience, because police officers may interpret circumstances differently than untrained
persons.” Id. Appellate courts give due weight to the reasonable inferences drawn by
police and to district cou rt findings that t hese inferences were reasonable. Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699-700, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996).
Here, while investigating the report of a suspicious vehicle, officers found Clement
in the vehicle holding a small box of visible drug paraphernalia. Officer Saburn looked
through the passenger -side window and saw a small baggie containing a crystal -like
substance next to Clement’s right leg. See State v. Riley , 667 N. W.2d 153, 156 (Minn.
App. 2003) (stating that “a police officer, while standing in a place in which he has a right
to be, next to an automobile which he has not stopped,” may look through the window “and
observe anything in plain view ”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003). P robable cause
existed to search Clement’s vehicle because the “facts and circumstances [were] sufficient
to warrant a reasonably prudent [person] to believe that the vehicle contain[ed]
contraband.” See Johnson, 277 N.W.2d at 349. The district court did not err in concluding
that the automobile exception applied.
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Sentence
In his pro se supplemental brief, Clement challenges his sentence. This issue is not
related to the pretrial issue preserved during Clement’s stipulated-evidence proceeding. As
stated above, under rule 26.01, subd ivision 4, “appellate review will be of the pretrial
issue.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(f). Thus, Clement is not entitled to appellate
review of his pro se argument. See Ortega, 770 N.W.2d at 149 (stating that because the
defendant stipulated to t he evidence against him, review was limited to the pretrial order
denying the motion to suppress).
Affirmed.