Erin G. Aasen, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0592

Erin G. Aasen,
Respondent,

vs.

Keith Macbride, et al.,
Defendants,

A. H. Bennett Company,
Appellant.

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CV-14-2186

Julie N. Nagorski, DeWitt Mackall Crounse & Moore S.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

John A. Markert, Stephanie L. Chandler, Larson King LLP, St. Pau l, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Respondent Erin Aasen and her husband Robert Aasen owned property in joint
tenancy. Several creditors, including appellant A .H. Bennett Company, had judgments
2
entered against Mr. Aasen, but the judgment liens did not attach to the Aasens’ property
because of the homestead exemption. The Aasens separated , and Ms. Aasen filed for
dissolution several years later . In a partial judgment, the district court dissolved the
marriage, but reserved the issue of division of property . And i n a subsequent final
judgment five months later, Ms. Aasen was awarded the property. Ms. Aasen later filed a
quiet title action seeking a declaratory judgment that the judgment liens of the creditors did
not attach to her home. The district court agreed and held the liens did not attach. A.H.
Bennett Company appeals and argues that during the window of time between the partial
and final judgments, the judgment liens attached to the property. Because the homestead
exemption continued to protect the property during this period of time, we affirm.
FACTS
Respondent Erin Aasen married Robert Aasen in 1997. In 2001, the Aasens moved
into a property in Oak Park . They held the property in joint tenancy. In 2008, appellant
A.H. Bennett Company ( AHBC) and Keith and Patricia Macbride obtaine d judgments
against Mr. Aasen. Also in 2008, the Aasens separated, and Mr. Aa sen moved out of the
property while Ms. Aasen and their two children continued to live there.
Ms. Aasen filed for dissolution in 2013. In April 2014, the court entered a partial
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. This partial judgment dissolved the
marriage, and Ms. Aasen was awarded “temporary exclusive use and possession of [their]
homestead.” But the issues of division of the property and debts were reserved. After this
partial judgment, Ms. Aasen and her children continued to live on the propert y. In
September 2014, the court entered its final findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
3
judgment in the dissolution proceedings. The court determined that Ms. Aasen “shall be
solely awarded all right, title, and interest of the marital real property” and that she “is
awarded the property subject to all mortgages, loans, and encumbrances, free and clear of
any claim by [Mr. Aasen].” The court also determined that all judgments against Mr. Aasen
should be paid by him.
In November 2014, Ms. Aasen filed a quiet title action seeking a declarator y
judgment that her property is her homestead and that the judgment liens of the creditors 1
did not attach to her property at any time. AHBC argued that the liens attached to the
property after entry of the partial judgment, as the homestead exemption cou ld not apply
because Mr. Aasen abandoned the property and Ms. Aasen was no longer entitled to the
exemption as a former spouse . It further contended that the partial judgment dissolving
the marriage severed the Aasens’ joint tenancy, and they instead held the property in
tenancy-in-common during the time between the partial and final judgments.
Ms. Aasen moved for summary judgment. The court determined that Ms. Aasen
occupied the property at all relevant times, and therefore it was her homestead.2 However,
the court denied the motion for summary judgment because there were genuine issues of

1 The creditors listed were AHBC, Terry Gums, and the Macbrides. Gums and the
Macbrides did not file an answer or make any appearances, and the court found them to be
in default. Gums was later dismissed from the action.
2 AHBC sought permission to file a motion for reconsideration regarding the homestead
exemption. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11 (“Motions to reconsider are prohibited except
by express permission of the court, which will be granted only upon a showing of
compelling circumstances.”). The court denied the request and emphasized that the Aasens
continued to hold the property as joint tenants through the final judgment. The court further
explained that the joint tenancy or tenancy -in-common issue was not controlling because
whether the homestead exemption applied was dispositive.
4
material fact as to other components of the homestead exemption that are not a part of this
current appeal.3 The case went to a stipulated-facts bench trial to determine the remaining
questions, and the district court concluded that the homestead exemption applied and the
creditor’s judgment liens never attached to Ms. Aasen’s property. AHBC now appeals.
D E C I S I O N
The issue presented here is whether the judgment liens against Mr. Aasen attached
after the partial judgment dissolving the marriage, but before the final judgment awarding
the property to Ms. Aasen. The parties agree that if the district court had simultaneously
dissolved the marriage and awarded the property to Ms. Aasen, the liens would not have
attached. It would be barred by the homestead exemption. But AHBC contends, as of
April 2014 when the Aasens’ marriage was dissolved in a partial judgment, neither Mr. nor
Ms. Aasen had the protection of the homestead exemption. Mr. Aasen had moved out long
before the dissolution proceedings, and as of the date of the partial judgment, Ms. Aasen
was no longer a spouse. The issue consequently turns on whether the partial judgment
eliminated the homestead exemption.4

3 There were remaining issues of what the homestead exemption cap amount should be,
and whether the value of the property exceeded it. See Minn. Stat. § 510.02, subd. 1 (2016)
(discussing exemption cap amounts depending on the size and purpose of property).
4 AHBC also argues that Minnesota Statutes section 500.19, subdivision 5 (2016), severed
the Aasens’ joint tenancy at the time of the partial judgment, and as a result, its judgment
lien attached to Mr. Aasen’s interest in the property held in tenancy -in-common. That
statutory provision states that a dissolution of a marriage severs all joint tenancy interests
in the property, unless the “decree declares that the parties continue to hold an interest in
real estate as joint tenants.” Minn. Stat. § 500.19, subd. 5. Because our decision rests
entirely on the homestead exemption, we do not reach this issue.
5
To address this issue, we first examine the background of the homestead exemption.
We then turn to statutory interpretation to determine whether Ms. Aasen was protected by
the homestead exemption as a “spouse.” Because this review involves a matter of statutory
interpretation, it is a question of law subject to de novo review. Pietsch v. Minnesota Bd.
of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 683 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 2004).
Background on Minnesota’s Homestead Exemption
The homestead e xemption is an exception to the general rule that a monetary
judgment becomes a lien on the judgment debtor’s real property once the judgment is
docketed. Minn. Stat. § 548.09, subd. 1 (201 6); Minn. Stat. § 510.01 (2016). While the
homestead exemption involves an inherent conflict between a creditor’s entitlement to be
paid and the debtor’s interest in protecting his or her home, the “policy of giving the debtor
‘sanctuary’ from just claims in his ‘homestead’ has prevailed with significant uniformity.”
Denzer v. Prendergast, 267 Minn. 212, 216, 126 N.W.2d 440, 443 (1964). Therefore, the
homestead exemption is to be liberally construed. Torgelson v. Real Prop. Known as
17138 880th Ave., Renville Cty., 749 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Minn. 2008).
In broadly construing the exemption, courts have emphasized that the benefit of the
exemption is not just for the debtor, but the debtor’s family. See Ryan v. Colburn , 185
Minn. 347, 350, 241 N.W. 388, 389 (1932) (“This [homestead] statute rests upon the
thought of family.”). Indeed, a central feature of the homestead exemption is that it extends
not just to the debtor, but also to his or her spouse:
If the debtor be married the homestead title may be vested in
either spouse, and the exemption shall extend to the debts of
either or of both. Any interest in the land, whether legal or
6
equitable, shall constitute ownership, within the meaning of
this chapter, and the dwelling house so owned and occupied
shall be exempt, though situated on the land of another.

Minn. Stat. § 510.04 (2016). And desertion of the owner similarly does not affect the
spouse’s rights to the exemption: 5 “If the owner shall abscond, or otherwise desert the
family, the spouse and the minor children comprising the family may retain the homestead,
with all the rights of owners therein.” Minn. Stat. § 510.06 (2016); see also Grace v. Grace, 96 Minn. 294, 297–98, 104 N.W. 969, 971 (1905) (“no waiver of homestead right by the
husband or wife can affect the vested interest of the other spouse therein; neither can the
abandonment or waiver of such homestead right by the one entitled to enjoy the same
injuriously affect the interest of any other entitled thereto”). Only one spouse needs to
occupy the property for it to be exempt, and the lien cannot attach to the abandoner’s
interest while the other spouse occupies it. See Eustice v. Jewison, 413 N.W.2d 114, 120
(Minn. 1987); see also Vickery v. First Bank of LaCrosse , 368 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Minn.
App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1985).
The Partial Judgment’s Effect on the Homestead Exemption
AHBC contends that Ms. Aasen was not entitled to the protection of the homestead
exemption once the marriage was dissolved pursuant to the partial judgment, because as a
former spouse, the exemption was no longer applicable. See Minn. Stat. § 510.04 (“If the
debtor be married the homestead title may be vested in either spouse.”) (emphasis added);

5 Minnesota Statutes section 510.07 (2016) states that, “If the owner shall cease to occupy
such homestead for more than six consecutive months the owner shall be deemed to have
abandoned.”
7
Minn. Stat. § 510.06 (“No waiver of homestead right by the husband or wife can affect the
vested interest of the other spouse therein.”) (emphasis added). This argument requires
that we interpret the statute to decide whether Ms. Aasen was a spouse for purposes of the
homestead exemption after entry of the partial judgment but before entry of the final
judgment. The first step of statutory interpretation is to determine if the language of the
statute is unambiguous. Rushton v. State, 889 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn. 2017). We give
the text of the statute its plain meaning, and we examine the statute as a whole. Id. at 563-
64. If the statute is ambiguous, then we go beyond the statute to determine the legislature’s
intent. Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. 2012).
Examining the plain meaning of the statute, we determine that a spouse whose
dissolution of marriage is not yet final is protected by the homestead exemption. We
observe that the partial judgment dissolving the marriage in this case was not final. A
judgment dissolving a marriage is “final when entered, subject to the right of appeal .”
Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 1 (2016) (emphasis added).6 In bifurcated dissolution cases,
partial judgments are not subject to appeal until after the final judgment. 7 See Tasker v.
Tasker, 395 N.W.2d 100, 104 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding that the partial judgment in a

6 Minnesota Statutes section 5 18.145, subd ivision 1, discusses both finality and when
parties may remarry during the process, depending on the circumstances. Similarly,
Minnesota Statutes section 517.03, subdivision 1 (2016), discusses when parties may not
remarry, in accordance with Minnesota Statutes section 5 18.145 (2016). However, this
decision is discussing the finality of marriage dissolution in conjunction with the
homestead statutory provisions and is not interpreting when parties may remarry.
7 This is consistent with the general rule that judgments resolving fewer than all claims are
not immediately appealable, unless the district court determines there is no “just reason for
delay” and upon an “express direction for the entry of judgment.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02;
see also Krmpotich v. City of Duluth, 449 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. App. 1989).
8
dissolution proceeding was not appealable until the entry of the final judgment); see also
Bateman v. Bateman, 382 N.W.2d 240, 249 (Minn. App. 1986) (determining t hat time to
appeal a partial judgment dissolving the marriage was tolled until the final judgment),
review denied (Minn. April 24, 1986). Therefore, a partial judgment dissolving a marriage
is generally not final until after entry of a judgment adjudicati ng all of the claims and all
of the rights and liabilities of all of the parties .8 Because the Aasen dissolution was not
final pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 518.145 , subdivision 1, we conclude that the
dissolution judgment was not final until entry of the final judgment on September 2014.
As a result Ms. Aasen continued to benefit from the protection of the homestead exemption
as a “spouse” until that time. The judgment liens did not attach.
Even if the statute was ambiguous, going beyond the plain language to ascertain the
intent of the legislature buttresses this reading of the statute. See In re Kleven, 736 N.W.2d
707, 709 (Minn. App. 2007) (stating that when the language of a statute is ambiguous, the
intent of the legislature controls). To determine the intent of the legislature, we may look
to, amongst other factors, the purpose of the statute, prior caselaw, and the consequences
of an interpretation. See Minn. Stat. § 645.16(4)-(6) (2016); see also In re Conservatorship
of Nelsen, 587 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Minn. App. 1999).
First, protecting the debtor’s family is one of the primary goals of the statute, and
our interpretation advances this purpose by protecting Ms. Aasen and the parties’ children.

8 A partial judgment may be deemed final if it meets the requirement of Minn. Civ. P.
54.02, which here it did not , as there was no express determination that there was no just
reason for delay. In the absence of such express determination, any partial judgment is not
deemed final. Minn. Civ. P. 54.02.
9
See Ryan, 185 Minn. at 350, 241 N.W. at 389 (1932) (holding that a goal of the statute is
to protect the family). Second, prior caselaw directs us to construe t he homestead
exemption liberally, and determining that a spouse with a pending marriage dissolution is
entitled to the exemption is consistent with this directive. See Torgelson, 749 N.W.2d at
26. Third, we recognize the practical impact of following AHBC’s approach, to hold that
a partial judgment severs the homestead exemption, is a consequence likely not intended
by the legislature. This approach would mean a judgment lien against a debtor would
attach to the homestead when the issue of property division is reserved in a decree of
marriage dissolution, but not when the issues are determined simultaneo usly. This would
create a disincentive to resolve selected issues early in litigation, which is particularly
important in family law. See Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997) (“Courts
favor stipulations in dissolution cases as a means of simp lifying and expediting litigation,
and to bring resolution to what frequently has become an acrimonious relationship between
the parties.”).
Finally, t he result reached by our reading of the statute is consistent with t he
language of the partial judgment. The district court explicitly reserved the issue of property
interests: “The issue regarding the equitable distribution of said property and other interests
should be reserved.” This left any determinations related to property interests for a later
date, meaning not only was the dissolution not final at the time of the entry of the partial
judgment, but that the Aasens’ property interests did not change prior to the final judgment.
To strip the property of its homestead exemption status, and subject it to judgment liens,
would be inconsistent with the terms of the judgment itself.
10
Because the partial judgment dissolving the marriage did not affect the homestead
exemption, the district court appropriately determined that the judgment liens did not attach
to Ms. Aasen’s property.
Affirmed.