In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Ely Ovis Emmanuel Sabahot

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0603

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Ely Ovis Emmanuel Sabahot

Filed September 5, 2017
Affirmed in part and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-PR-16-4403

Ryan Blair Magnus, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant Ely Ovis Emmanuel Sabahot)

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, Minnesota County Attorneys
Association, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Crow Wing County)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Ely Sabahot was civilly co mmitted as mentally ill and dangerous.
Sabahot appeals both the di strict court’s initial-commi tment order and its final-
determination order, arguing that (1) the dist rict court violated his due-process rights,
(2) the district court did not support eith er the initial-commitment order or the final-
determination order with adequate factual findings, and (3) the district court’s finding that
Sabahot is mentally ill and dangerous is not supported by sufficient evidence. We conclude

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that Sabahot’s due-process rights were not violated, but we remand both the initial-
commitment order and the final-determination order for further findings.
FACTS
In May 2016, Sabahot was charged with seco nd-degree assault. The district court
ordered Sabahot to undergo a rule 20 evaluation to determin e whether he was competent
to stand trial and whether he should be civilly committed. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01-
.04. The first evaluator, Dr. Edmund Nadolny, concluded that Sabahot is not competent to
stand trial but did not reco mmend civil commitment. The second evaluator, Dr. Ryan
Goldenstein, concluded that Sabahot is not competent to sta nd trial and should be civilly
committed. The criminal matter was stayed.
Crow Wing County Social Services (the county) filed a petition for judicial
commitment on October 14, alle ging that Sabahot is (1) me ntally ill and dangerous and
(2) chemically dependent. An initial-co mmitment hearing was he ld on October 20.
Sabahot conceded that he is mentally ill and chemically dependent but argued that he is not
dangerous. The district court stated that it would not make a finding on dangerousness and
would schedule a hearing on dangerousness for a later date.
The district court filed an initial-commi tment order on Octo ber 20 finding that
Sabahot is mentally ill and chemically depe ndent and committing him for a period not to
exceed six months. The district court amended its order on October 21 to include findings
that Sabahot is a “mentally ill” person and a “d angerous” person and a conclusion that he
is mentally ill and dange rous. Sabahot objected to the district cour t’s October 21 order
because the finding of dangero usness was made without any evidence in the record.

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Recognizing that “Sabahot didn’t have due process in terms of a hearing” and that the court
needed to restart commitmen t proceedings, the district court scheduled an initial-
commitment hearing for November 3. Becaus e Sabahot failed to request the appearance
of Dr. Nadolny, however, the district court rescheduled the initial-commitment hearing for
November 7. The district court filed an interim order permitting the October 21 order to
remain in effect until the November 7 hearing.
Dr. Nadolny, Dr. Goldenstein, and Sabahot testified at the November 7 hearing.
Sabahot stipulated that he was mentally ill and in need of commitment but objected to the
finding of dangerousness. Dr. Nadolny tes tified that Sabahot has a high likelihood of
committing a violent act but that he does no t believe Sabahot requires commitment and
that, if Sabahot’s mental condition is controlled, his dangerousness “is greatly diminished.”
Dr. Goldenstein testified that Sabahot is da ngerous. After Dr. Goldenstein testified,
Dr. Nadolny testified, “I thin k our point of disagreement is that I believe that with an
appropriate containment and treatment, risk of harm to others can be attenuated.”
Sabahot’s attorney agreed that the November 3 interim order should remain in effect until
the district court filed a new order.
The district court filed an initial-commitment order on November 10.1 The district
court found that Sabahot admitted that he is mentally ill and chemic ally dependent. The
district court also found that Dr. Nadolny and Dr. Goldenstein diagnosed Sabahot with
“psychopathy-persecutory type, delusional di sorders.” The district court found the

1 The district court filed an order on November 7, but amended its order after the Minnesota
Department of Human Services sent a letter explaining that the November 7 order did not
comply with the statutory requirements.

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testimony of Dr. Nadolny and Dr. Goldenstein credible. The district court concluded that
Sabahot is mentally ill and dangerous and chemically dependent and committed him to the
Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services. Sabahot was placed in the Minnesota
Security Hospital (MSH).
MSH provided the district court with a report on January 4, 2017, concluding that
Sabahot is mentally ill, has an elevated ri sk of future violence, and needs inpatient
treatment. Sabahot requested that a second evaluation be conducted by Dr. Mary Kenning.
A review hearing was held on February 10. Sabahot moved to dismiss the petition
without prejudice because of the procedural irregularities from the October 20 hearing.
The district court denied Sabahot’s motion. The preparers of the MSH report—Dr. Jennifer
Lewey and Dr. Adam Milz—testified that Sabaho t is mentally ill, has an elevated risk of
future violence, and should be committed to MS H. Dr. Kenning testif ied that Sabahot is
mentally ill, is likely to engage in acts capa ble of causing physical harm, and should be
committed to MSH. Dr. Kenning’s report, which was also adm itted into evidence,
concluded that Sabahot is mentally ill and presents a danger to the safety of others.
The district court filed its final-determina tion order on February 13. The district
court found the testimony of Dr. Lewey, Dr. Milz, and Dr. Kenning credible. The district
court concluded that Sabahot is mentally ill and dangerous and chemically dependent. The
district court committed Sabahot for an indeterminate period of time.
Sabahot appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
A proposed patient may be civilly committed if the district court finds that the
proposed patient is mentally ill, mentally ill and dangerous, developmentally disabled, or
chemically dependent. Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.09, subd. 1, .18 (2016). A proposed patient is
mentally ill and dangerous if the proposed patient (1) is mentally ill and (2), as a result of
that mental illness, presents a “clear danger to the safety of others” as demonstrated by the
facts that the proposed patient has engaged in an overt act causing or attempting to cause
serious physical harm to another and there is a substantial likelihood that the proposed
patient will engage in acts capable of in flicting serious physica l harm. Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.02, subd. 17 (2016).
The district court must co nduct an initial-commitment hearing within 14 days from
the commitment petition but may extend the date of the hearing up to an additional 30 days.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 1 (2016). At the initial-commitment hearing, the proposed
patient and the county may present witnesses and evidence. Id., subds. 5a, 7 (2016). If the
district court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed patient is mentally
ill and dangerous, it shall commit the proposed patient to a secure treatment facility. Minn.
Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a). The district court must make specific findings and conclusions
of law and determine whether there are less-restrictive alternatives available. Minn. Stat.
§ 253B.09, subd. 2 (2016).
After the initial-commitment order, the treatment facility must file a report with the
district court within 60 days. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 2(a). Th e district court must

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then conduct a review hearing to determine whether the patient should remain committed.
Id.
I. Sabahot was not deprived of his right to procedural due process.

Sabahot argues that the district court depr ived him of his constitutional right to
procedural due process by failing to comply w ith the procedures in the Minnesota Civil
Commitment Act. Sabahot identifies a number of procedural irregularities related to the
October 20 hearing and the October 20 and 21 orders. First, Sabahot cites a number of
erroneous findings of the district court. Second, Sabahot argues that the district court did
not receive any evidence during the October 20 hearing on wh ich to base its finding of
dangerousness. Third, Sabahot argues that he was committed in the October 21 order as a
“dangerous person” but there is no category of “dangerous pe ople” for purposes of civil
commitment. The state conced es that there were “initial misunderstandings” about the
proper procedures but argues that there were no procedural due-process violations.
Civil commitment is a depriv ation of liberty requiring procedural due process.
Lidberg v. Steffen, 514 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1994). In determining the sufficiency of
procedural protections, we bala nce (1) the private interest th at will be affected by the
governmental action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest through the
procedures used and the probab le value of additional or subs titute procedural safeguards,
and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893,
903 (1976); see Bendorf v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 727 N.W.2d 410, 415-16 (Minn. 2007)
(applying Mathews to determine prejudice). We revi ew whether a person’s due-process

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rights have been violated de novo. Zellman ex rel. M.Z. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2758, 594
N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1999).
First, we consider the private interest of Sabahot. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96
S. Ct. at 903. While Sabahot has a liberty interest in the commitment proceedings,
additional facts limit his private interest. See Bendorf, 727 N.W.2d at 416. Because
Sabahot concedes that he is mentally il l, chemically dependent, and in need of
commitment, and because a finding of mental illness or chemical dependency is sufficient
to commit Sabahot, see Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1, Sabahot could have been
committed even if the district court had not concluded that he is mentally ill and dangerous.
While Sabahot has an interest in avoiding being declared mentally ill and dangerous, his
interest is less than that of a proposed patient who is not facing assured commitment.
Second, we consider the risk of errone ous deprivation of Sabahot’s interest. See
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903. The risk of erroneous deprivation was
alleviated when the district court restarted proceedings, conducted an evidentiary hearing
on November 7, and vacated the orders aris ing from the October 20 hearing. From the
November 7 hearing onward, the district cour t adhered to the statutory requirements.
Sabahot was represented throughout the proc eedings. Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 2c
(2016). Sabahot was afforded an opportunity to present ev idence and witn esses at the
November 7 hearing. Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subds. 5a, 7. MSH filed a treatment report
for the review hearing. Minn. Stat. § 253B. 18, subd. 2(a). The di strict court permitted
Sabahot to obtain a second examination. Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 3 (2016). Finally,
the district court conducted a review heari ng on February 10 be fore filing its final-

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determination order on February 13. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 2(a). There was little
risk of erroneous deprivation of Sabahot’s interest following the October 20 hearing
because, after that date, the district cour t restarted the proceedings and followed the
procedures outlined in the relevant statutes.
Finally, we consider the government’s interest. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96
S. Ct. at 903. The county has a strong interest both in protecting the public from mentally
ill and dangerous persons and in ensuring that mentally ill and dangerous persons receive
mental-health treatment.
Balancing these factors, we conclude th at Sabahot’s right to due process was not
violated.
II. The district court’s factual findings are inadequate.

Sabahot argues that the district court’s November 10 initial-commitment order and
February 13 final-determination order are not supported by adequate factual findings.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 2, requires the district court to make specific findings
of fact. “Where commitment is ordered, the findings of fact and conclusions of law shall
specifically state the proposed patient’s conduct which is a basis for determining that each
of the requisites for commitment is met.” Minn. Stat. § 253B. 09, subd. 2. The district
court must make written findings that properly reflect its consideration of the relevant
statutory factors. In re Civil Commitment of Spicer , 853 N.W.2d 803, 809 (Minn. App.
2014). “[R]ecitation of what others have obs erved is not a finding of fact that those
observations are true.” Id. at 810 (quotation omitted). Remand for further findings is

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appropriate when a district court fa ils to make adequate findings. In re Alleged Mental
Illness of Stewart, 352 N.W.2d 811, 813 (Minn. App. 1984).
In Spicer, this court considered the particularity of a district court’s factual findings
following the commitment of a sexually danger ous person. 853 N.W. 2d at 806. The
district court issued a 79-page order with 317 paragraphs of findings of fact, reflecting “a
considerable degree of effort and care on th e part of the district court judge.” Id. at 810.
Nevertheless, this court reversed for three reasons. First, the majority of the findings were
recitations of the evidence presented at trial. Id. Second, the district court stated its true
findings in a conclusory manner, simply concl uding that one expert was more persuasive
than another. Id. This court noted, “A district court cannot satisfy its obligation to find
facts with particularity by simply adopting in toto the opinions of a particular expert. The
problem with such an a pproach is illustrated by the fact th at the experts’ opinions in this
case are varied and sometimes inconsistent.” Id. at 810 (citation omitted). Finally, the
district court’s findings of fact were not meaningfully tied to its conclusions of law because,
while the order recited the relevant factors, it did not explain what evidence the district
court found more persuasive or less persuasive. Id. at 811. This court reversed and
remanded to the district court for further findings. Id. at 812.
A. The November 10 Order
The November 10 order is a five-page form order. The order begins by noting that
Sabahot admitted to “findings of mental illness and chemi cal dependency.” Two boxes
labelled “mentally ill and danger ous” and “chemically depende nt” are checked, and next
to these boxes are summaries of the statutory language. Beneath the finding of “mentally

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ill and dangerous” is a line that states, “a recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or
others: overt act of dangerousness—second degree assault.” With respect to the testimony
of Dr. Nadolny and Dr. Goldenstein, the order states:
The Court also heard testimony from Dr. Nadolny and
Dr. Goldenstein, the Court-appo inted examining physicians.
They both opined that Respon dent’s disorder would seem
consistent with psychopathy- persecutory type, delusional
disorders, in addition to chemic al dependency. Both doctors
also considered lesser alternatives to an inpatient facility and
did not find them to be acceptable. The Court finds the
testimony of Dr. Nadolny and Dr. Goldenstein to be credible.

We conclude that the November 10 order is not supported by adequate findings for four
reasons.
First, the findings are conclu sory and do not explain wh at evidence supported the
district court’s legal conclusions. See id. at 811. In particular, the finding that Sabahot is
mentally ill and dangerous simply paraphrases the statutory language without applying the
statutory language to the facts of this case. As written, these are legal conclusions and not
factual findings. See Graphic Arts Educ. Found., Inc. v. State , 240 Minn. 143, 146,
59 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1953) (“[T]he labeling of a conclusion of law as a ‘finding of fact’ is
not determinative of its true nature . . . .”). While the district court recites the elements of
both definitions, it does not explain what evid ence led to its conclusion that Sabahot met
the requirements for “mentally ill and dangerous .” The district court must meaningfully
tie its conclusions of law to its findings by explaining what evidence it found most
persuasive and least persuasive. See Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 811.
Second, the district court does not ade quately explain what overt act Sabahot
engaged in for purposes of its conclusion th at Sabahot is mentally ill and dangerous. See

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Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17. The order states, “a recent attempt or threat to physically
harm self or others: overt act of danger ousness—second degree assault.” The order
contains no factual findings about where, when, or against whom the alleged second-degree
assault occurred. Even if we were to look at the elements of second-degree assault, the
order does not contain sufficient findings to assess whether Sabahot’s overt act constitutes
second-degree assault.
Third, the district court failed to ad equately weigh the expert testimony of
Dr. Nadolny and Dr. Goldenstein. Dr. Na dolny and Dr. Goldenstein disagreed about
whether Sabahot should be committed as mentally ill and dangerous. The November 10
order finds that both Dr. Nadolny and D r. Goldenstein diagnosed Sabahot with
“psychopathy-persecutory type, delusional disorders” and that the testimony of
Dr. Nadolny and Dr. Goldenstein is credible. As in Spicer, the district court cannot satisfy
its obligation to find facts with particul arity by simply adopting the opinions of both
Dr. Nadolny and Dr. Goldenstein because their opinions are varied and sometimes
inconsistent. Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 810.
Finally, the district court failed to find th at Sabahot is dangerous as a result of his
mental illness. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17(a)(2). Whether Sabahot was dangerous
as a result of his mental illness was the subject of debate be tween Dr. Nadolny and
Dr. Goldenstein. The order’s summary of the statutory definitio n of “mentally ill and
dangerous” even excludes the requirement that the person be dangerous “as a result of that
mental illness.” Id.

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For these reasons, we conclude that the district court failed to make adequate
findings in its November 10 order, and we re mand the November 10 or der to the district
court to make adequate findings. Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 809; Stewart, 352 N.W.2d at 813.
B. The February 13 Order
The February 13 final-determination order is more thorough than the November 10
order. At the February 10 reviewing heari ng, Dr. Lewey, Dr. Milz, and Dr. Kenning
testified consistently regarding the facts su rrounding their conclusi ons that Sabahot is
mentally ill and dangerous. The district court found the testimony of Dr. Lewey, Dr. Milz,
and Dr. Kenning credible and adopted their te stimony in its findings in the February 13
order. Nevertheless, we conclude that the February 13 order is not supported by adequate
findings.
Like the November 10 order, the February 13 order does not make adequate findings
about the overt act that led to the finding that Sabahot is me ntally ill and dangerous. In
describing the contents of the MSH report, the February 13 order finds that the report noted
“a prior overt act.” The order makes no furthe r findings about the overt act, which is a
necessary element to conclude that Sabahot is mentally ill and dangerous.
For this reason, we conclude that the district court failed to make adequate findings
in its February 13 order, and we remand the February 13 order to the district court to make
adequate findings. Spicer, 853 N.W.2d at 809; Stewart, 352 N.W.2d at 813.
Affirmed in part and remanded.