State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0625

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Darrick James Bellecourt,
Appellant.

Filed February 5, 2018
Reversed and remanded
Bjorkman, Judge

Hubbard County District Court
File No. 29-CR-16-1457

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jonathan D. Frieden, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree arson, arguing that he should
be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea as manifestly unjust. We agree and, therefore,

2
reverse appellant’s conviction and remand this matter t o the district court for further
proceedings.
FACTS
On November 23, 2016, the Park Rapids Police Department received a report that a
garage was aflame. At nearly the same time, a man identified as appellant Darrick James
Bellecourt entered a nearby grocery store claiming that he had started the fire. Bellecourt
left the store before police arrived. A short time later, he appeared at the Hubbard County
Sheriff’s office, stating that he had started the fire. Bellecourt was arrested and taken into
custody.
On January 18, 2017, Bellecourt appeared in court to enter a guilty plea to second -
degree arson. Defense counsel stated that Bellecourt was mentally ill, but competent to
stand trial. During this hearing, Bellecou rt began to speak in a rambling fashion about
being poisoned and denied medical care by the jail staff. At the end of his monologue, the
county attorney suggested that Bellecourt be evaluated for mental competency under Minn.
R. Crim. P. 20.02 ; defense counsel concurred. After questioning Bellecourt, the district
court agreed that no plea could be made and that Bellecourt should be referred for either a
rule 20.02 evaluation or civil commitment.
On January 30, Bellecourt appeared with his attorney, and renewed his request to
plead guilty to the arson charge. Bellecourt assured the district court that he was “okay”
now. No plea petition was prepared, but Bellecourt was questioned about the rights he was
waiving and stated that he understood the proceedings and was satisfied with his attorney’s
representation.

3
When questioned about the factual basis for his plea, Bellecourt agreed that he set
fire to a building in Park Rapids on November 23, 201 6. When asked more specifically
what he did, he said, “ I went into a building and I started a fire with a lighter.” He
acknowledged that he did not own the building and did not have permission to burn it
down, and told the fire department, the police, and the sheriff that he started the fire.
The district court accepted Bellecourt’s guilty plea, imposed a 24-month sentence,
executed the presumptive stayed sentence at appellant’s request, and ordered restitution.
Bellecourt appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Bellecourt argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because it
was neither accurate nor voluntary, and he was not mentally competent to participate in the
court proceedings.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 20 10). But a court must permit a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea, even after sentencing, if it is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice occurs if a plea is not
valid; to be valid, a plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d
at 94. A plea is accurate if it is “established on a proper factual basis.” Id. We review a
guilty plea’s validity de novo, as a question of law. State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603
(Minn. 2017).
Bellecourt pleaded guilty to second -degree arson under Minn. Stat. § 609.562
(2016). A person commits second-degree arson when he “by means of fire or explosives,

4
intentionally destroys or damages” an unoccupied building. Id. “‘Intentionally’ means
that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes
that the act performed by the actor, i f successful, will cause the result.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2016). Specific-intent crimes require that the defendant has an “intent
to cause a particular result,” rather than just do the act that causes the result. State v. Fleck,
810 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Second-degree arson is a specific -intent crime beca use a defendant must
intentionally destroy or damage a building by use of fire or explosives . Minn. Stat.
§ 609.562. That is, a defendant must intend the result (destruction or damage), not just the
act (use of fire or explosives). See State v. Bergstro m, 413 N.W.2d 206, 209 -10 (Minn.
App. 1987) (discussing intent necessary for third -degree arson); State v. Yeager , 399
N.W.2d 648, 651 -52 (Minn. App. 1987) (discussing intent necessary for first -degree
arson).
Bellecourt admitted to entering a garage without permission and starting a fire with
a lighter. These facts do not support Bellecourt’s guilty plea because they do not address
his intent. And he admitted to no facts that would directly or circumstantially establish that
he intended to damage or destroy the garage. An accurate plea ensures that the defendant
is not pleading guilty to a more serious offense tha n that for which he could be convicted
at trial. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Bellecourt’s factual basis is aligned with a lesser
degree of arson. Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.576, subd. 1(3) (2016) (negligent fires), with
Minn. Stat. § 609.562 (second-degree arson).

5
Because Bellecourt’s plea is inaccurate, we reverse his conviction and remand this
matter to the district court. In light of our dec ision, we need not reach Bellecourt’s
arguments that his plea was involuntary or that he lacked competency to participate in court
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.