State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0636

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ryan Lloyd Pogatchnik,
Appellant.

Filed February 20, 2018
Affirmed
Randall, Judge*

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-16-523

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RANDALL, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for fifth-degree possession of a controlled
substance, arguing that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient for a jury to convict.
We affirm.
FACTS
On June 24, 2016, a state trooper pulled over a car for speeding. After identifying
the driver as appellant Ryan Pogatchnik, the trooper detected a slight marijuana odor , and
noticed Pogatchnik wearing a hat with an eight -ball logo, which, based on the trooper’s
experience, refers to “a common measurement ” of methamphetamine. The trooper asked
Pogatchnik to get out of the car and if any drug -related items were present, to which
Pogatchnik responded “there shouldn’t be. ” The trooper then questioned the passenger,
N.Z., who gave the trooper a marijuana dugout.1
The trooper searched the vehicle and found a bandana between Pogatchnik’s seat
and the center console. The bandana contained a clear plastic bag of a crystalline -like
substance and a cylinder -shaped pipe. Both the pipe and the crystalline -like substance
tested positive for methamphetamine.
After arresting Pogatchnik for possession of a controlled substance, Pogatchnik
admitted to using methamphetamine two weeks prior , but stated that a friend had given
him the bandana and pipe, and denied they were his. Pogatchnik also admitted that the car

1 A marijuana dugout is a case containing spaces for a pipe and marijuana.
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belonged to him, but added he shared it w ith another individual. Although Pogatchnik
admitted his DNA might be on the bandana, he claimed that it was only because it was the
same one he used when he smoked methamphetamine previously, and that his DNA
“could” be on the methamphetamine bag because he used that same type of bag to store
screws. Respondent State of Min nesota charged Pogatchnik with fifth -degree possession
of a controlled substance.
At trial, Pogatchnik testified that his girlfriend used his car, but explicitly stated that
he was not offering her as an alternative perpetrator and did not state when she had last
used the car. He also admitted smoking methamphetamine two weeks prior to his arrest
from a pipe wrapped in t he same bandana entered into evidence, but denied that the pipe
and bandana belonged to N.Z. The jury found Pogatchnik guilty as charged.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
To support a conviction of fifth -degree controlled-substance possession, the state
must prove that Pogatchnik unlawfully possessed one or more mixtures containing
methamphetamine. Minn. Stat. §§ 152.02 (Supp. 2015), .025, subd. 2(b)(1) (2014). The
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “consciously possessed . . .
the substance and that [the] defendant had actual knowledge of the nature of the substance.”
State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 104, 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (1975).
Pogatchnik argues that this court should overturn his conviction because the state
provided insufficient evidence proving that he knew about the methamphetamine in his
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car. The state responds that the evidence supports the reasonable inference that Pogatchnik
possessed and controlled the methamphetamine found in his car.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court limits its review to a
“painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to r each [their]
verdict.” State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We will
not disturb the jury’s verdict if, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, they could reasonably find the defendant guilty. Id.
“While it warrants stricter scrutiny, circumstantial evidence is entitled to the sa me
weight as direct evidence.” State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Minn. 1999). In applying
the circumstantial -evidence standard, we use a two -step analysis. State v. Harris , 895
N.W.2d 592, 600 –01 (Minn. 2017). First, we “identify the circumstances proved …
deferr[ing] to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of
evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved.” State v. Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d 594, 598–99 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
We identify the circumstances proved here as: (1) Pogatchnik owned his car when
the trooper found methamphetamine in it; (2) “he wore a hat ” with a methamphetamine
reference;2 (3) N.Z. gave the trooper a marijuana dugout whe n asked if he had any drugs;
(4) Pogatchnik stated “there shouldn’t be” when asked if any drugs were in the car; (5) the
trooper found a pipe and a baggie of methamphetamine in the car below Pogatchnik’s seat;

2 Of marginal value as credible evidence, much like a hat stating “Vikings 2017 NFC
Champions.”
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(6) Pogatchnik admitted to smoking methamphetamine in a pipe with the same bandana
found below his seat, the one he claimed his “friend” had given him ; and (7) he admitted
some of his DNA may be on the pipe, bandana, and methamphetamine bag.
Next, we consider if the above circumstances are consistent with Pogatchnik’s guilt
and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except guilt . Id. at 599 . Here, the state
proceeded on a theory of constructive possession . To prove constructive possession, the
state must show that there is a strong probability, inferable from the evidence, that the
defendant consciously exercised dominion and control over the controlled substance.
Florine, 303 Minn. at 104-05, 226 N.W.2d at 610.
Pogatchnik did not have exclusive possession of his car , so we cannot
“automatically infer from the mere fact that [methamphetamine] was found in [his car] that
[it] belonged” to Pogatchnik. Id. at 105, 226 N.W.2d at 611. Consequently, the state must
prove that Pogatchnik “exercised dominion and control over the contraband.” State v. Sam,
859 N.W.2d 825, 834 (Minn. App. 2015) . “Proximity is an important consideration in
assessing constructive possession.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In support of his argument that the state presented insufficient evidence tying him
to the methamphetamine, Pogatchnik cites Sam, in which the circumstances proved
included: the defendant borrowing another’s car, with another passenger present, and
methamphetamine found in the glove compartment. Id. at 83 4. This court reversed the
constructive-possession conviction, because merely driving a car containing contraband “is
insufficient to eliminate all reasonable inferences inconsistent with appellant’s guilt.” Id.
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But here, th e evidence presents more than just Pogatchnik driving a car with
contraband inside. First, the car belonged to Pogatchnik , so he had direct access to it, and
he did not specify when his girlfriend last used it prior to his arrest. Second, he recognized
the bandana found in his car and he admitted to smoking methamphetamine out of a pipe
that was wrapped in the same bandana. Third, he stated that the methamphetamine bag,
bandana, and pipe could contain his DNA. Finally, the trooper found the bandana , with
methamphetamine and a pipe wrapped inside, in close proximity to Pogatchnik.
After scrutinizing the record for the circumstances proved at trial, it was reasonable
for the jury to have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Pogatchnik constructively
possessed the methamphetamine. We conclude the circumstance s proved support
Pogatchnik’s conviction. See Florine, 303 Minn. at 105, 226 N.W.2d at 611 (affir ming
constructive-possession conviction where the evidence supported an inference that the
defendant at one time had physic al possession of the substance and was consciously
exercising dominion and control over it when the police found it).
Pogatchnik argues that this court must reverse his conviction because the state failed
to present sufficient evidence that he alone constructively possessed the methamphetamine.
Pogatchnik argues, as a reasonable inference inconsistent with his guilt, that the
methamphetamine belonged to N.Z. The state argues that even if N.Z. possessed the
methamphetamine, a jury could infer that he and Pogatchnik jointly possessed it.
A reviewing court must “examine independently the reasonableness of all
inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at
599 (quotation omitted). A reviewing court “assume[s] that the jury disbelieved any
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testimony in conflict with the result it reached.” State v. Asfeld , 662 N.W.2d 534, 546
(Minn. 2003) (quotation and emphasis omitted).
Here, Pogatchnik testified at trial that the pipe and bandana did not belong to him
and could belong to N.Z. The state impeached Pogatchnik with two prior crimes of
dishonesty. Deference is given by reviewing the court favoring the jury’s ability to evaluate
the credibility of testimony. See State v. Stein, 776 N.W.2d 709, 717 (Minn. 2010) (stating
that “although the defendant’s version of the events, if believed might give rise to different
inferences, the jury w as free to, and evidently did, reject defe ndant’s version of these
events” (quotation omitted)).
The state provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury , as factfinders, to
convict Pogatchnik. We affirm Pogatchnik’s conviction of fifth-degree possession of a
controlled substance.
Affirmed.