State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0643

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Leanda Rae Muhonen,
Appellant.

Filed May 29, 2018
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-15-207

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Roger Knutson, Chanhassen City Attorney, Campbell Knutson, Eagan, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presid ing Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
On appeal from her conviction of second- degree refusal to submit to chemical
testing, appellant contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress
2
evidence obtained as a result of a traffic stop, arguing th at the arresting officer lacked
reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the stop of appellant’s vehicle. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 2, 2015, while following a vehicl e traveling northbound in the left lane
of a four-lane divided highway, a state tr ooper observed the vehicle move to the right
toward the right lane, and then make a “jer king motion.” The trooper testified that the
motion was out of the ordinary, and she thought the vehicle was going to hit a car in the
right lane. The vehicle moved back to the le ft and then weaved back and forth a number
of times, appearing to cross over both the center line and the dotted lane-divider line. The
trooper initiated a traffic stop and identified a ppellant Leanda Rae Muhonen as the driver
of the vehicle. After detecting the odor of alcohol and observing appellant slur her speech,
the trooper performed field sobriety testing of appellant and th en ordered her to sit in the
backseat of the trooper’s squa d car to take a preliminary breath test. Appellant initially
refused to sit. She eventually sat in the backseat but refuse d to place her feet inside the
squad car as the trooper instructed. After repeated warnings, the trooper used her taser on
appellant’s leg. Appellant kicked the taser out of the trooper’s hand and then kicked and
hit the trooper in the chest and shoulder as th e trooper retrieved it. The trooper used the
taser on appellant again, secure d appellant in the backseat of the squad car, and arrested
her.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appe llant with: (1) refusal to submit to a
chemical test in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2014); (2) driving while
impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2014); (3) fourth-degree assault
3
of a peace officer in violation of Minn. Stat . § 609.2231, subd. 1 (2014); (4) obstructing
legal process in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(1) (2014); and (5) failure to drive
in a single lane in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7( a) (2014). Appellant filed a
pretrial motion to suppress evidence, challenging the legality of the traffic stop, which the
district court denied. Appella nt later discharged her public defender, waived her right to
counsel, and proceeded to trial pro se. The jury found appellant guilty of all charges.
Following the verdict, the district cour t granted appellant’s motion to acquit for
failure to drive in a single lane. The district court convicted appellant of refusal to submit
to a chemical test, entered no convictions on the remaining three charges, and sentenced
appellant to 365 days in jail, with 305 days stayed, and ordered her to serve 30 days in jail
followed by 30 days of electronic home monitoring.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress
evidence because the trooper lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
to justify the traffic stop. We disagree.
In reviewing a district court’s pretrial suppression ruling, “we may independently
review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whethe r the district court erred in
suppressing—or not suppre ssing—the evidence.” State v. Harris , 590 N.W.2d 90, 98
(Minn. 1999). We will not set aside the dist rict court’s factual findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016).
4
The United States and Minnesota Constituti ons guarantee the right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,
§ 10. A police officer may conduct a limited, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle “if the
officer has an objectively reasonable and articul able basis for suspecting the motorist of
criminal activity.” State v. Kilmer , 741 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Minn. App. 2007). “The
reasonable-suspicion standard is not high.” Morse, 878 N.W.2d at 502 (quotation omitted).
In determining whether reasona ble suspicion exists, we consider the totality of the
circumstances in light of any inferences a nd deductions drawn from the officer’s training
and experience. Kruse v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Minn. App. 2018).
A traffic stop is supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion “if an officer
observes a violation of a traffic law, no ma tter how insignificant the traffic law.” State v.
Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004). Ho wever, “it is not necessary that the
police detect an actual vi olation of the law.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825
(Minn. 2001). “Even observing a motor vehicle weaving within its own lane in an erratic
manner can justify an officer stopping a driver.” Id. at 826 (citing State v. Kvam , 336
N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983)). But a single sw erve by a vehicle within its own lane of
traffic does not establish an adequate basis to stop the vehicle. State v. Dalos, 635 N.W.2d
94, 96 (Minn. App. 2001) (citing State v. Brechler , 412 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Minn. App.
1987)).
Appellant admits that the squad-car video shows her weaving within her own lane,
but contends that the video does not clearly show that she committed a traffic violation by
crossing over the center line or the dotted lane-d ivider line or that sh e drove in an erratic
5
manner.1 Appellant argues that Warrick v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety is controlling, in which
we concluded that the police officer’s obse rvation of a vehicle’s “subtle weaving,”
involving inches, within its own lane dur ing windy and impaired-visibility conditions
failed to establish reasonable su spicion sufficient to justify a traffic stop absent another
violation. 374 N.W.2d 585, 586 (Minn. App. 1985). We are not persuaded.
Here, the trooper’s testimony indicates that she observed appellant’s vehicle
weaving in an erratic manner rather than engaging in “subtle weaving.” First, while driving
behind appellant’s vehicle, the trooper saw the vehicle move to the right and make a jerky
movement, nearly hitting a car in the adjacent lane. Second, appellant’s vehicle weaved
left and right multiple times. The trooper tes tified that the vehicle appeared to cross over
the center line and then app eared to cross over the do tted lane-divider line for
approximately 30 feet while navigating a sharp curve in the road. The squad-car video
supports the trooper’s testim ony. The vehicle’s movements were so extreme that the
trooper shouted an expletive, as captured by the squad-car video, in reaction to the weaving.
Neither the trooper’s testimony nor the video suggest that the weaving to which appellant
admits was either a mere matter of inches or “subtle.”

1 Although a lane violation provides an officer a sole basis to conduct an investigatory stop,
because the district court acquitted for failure to drive in a single lane, we address whether
the officer’s observations provided a basis fo r the stop regardless of whether an actual
traffic violation occurred. We also note that Kruse clarified that the markings that delineate
traffic lanes do not comprise part of the lane and that driving on the markings constitutes
movement from a lane and a pot ential violation of Minn. Stat . § 169.18, subd. 7(a). 906
N.W.2d at 558.
6
The trooper testified that, as the vehicle navigated a sharp curve and appeared to
cross the lane-divider line, she was “worried [it would] go straight over the center median
and hit people head on.” The trooper was also concerned about what was going on inside
the vehicle to cause the drivin g conduct, including that the dr iver may be texting. The
record supports the trooper’s observations, which, based on the totality of the
circumstances, form an objectively reasonable and articulable basis for the traffic stop.
Therefore, the trooper lawfully stopped appe llant, and the district court did not err in
denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.