Christopher Hall Posey, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0646

Christopher Hall Posey, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-17-686

Christopher Hall Posey, Woodbury, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Cory Beth Monnens, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Pr esiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s order sustaining the revocation of his
driving privileges. We affirm.

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FACTS
Respondent Minnesota Commissioner of P ublic Safety (CPS) revoked appellant
Christopher Posey’s driving priv ileges following his arrest for driving while intoxicated
(DWI). Posey petitioned for judicial review of his license revo cation. At a hearing on the
petition, Officer Daniel Walton testified that on January 6, 2017, he stopped Posey for erratic
driving. Officer Walton observed that Posey had a “flushed face,” “watery and bloodshot
eyes,” and smelled of alcohol. Posey also failed several field sobriety tests and a preliminary
breath test, which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.114. Officer Walton arrested Posey
and transported him to the police department where he read the implied-consent advisory to
Posey. Posey stated that he understood the advisory and agreed to provide a breath sample,
which showed an alcohol concentration of 0.09.
The district court found that Posey operated his vehicle with an alcohol concentration
of 0.09 and therefore sustained the revocation of Po sey’s driving privileges. This appeal
follows.
D E C I S I O N
This court reviews the district court’s factual findings supporting an order sustaining
a license revocation for clear error. Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435, 440
(Minn. 2002). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, [the
reviewing court is] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State
v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 846–47 (M inn. 2011). “[We] defer to the district court’s
credibility determinations and ability to weigh the evidence.” Constans v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 835 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Minn. App. 2013).

3
Under Minnesota law, CPS must revoke a driver’s license when the driver has
submitted to a chemical test and the test resu lts indicate an alcohol concentration of 0.08
or more. Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4(a) (2016). Such a revocat ion becomes effective
when the commissioner or a peace officer “notifies the person of the intention to revoke . .
. and of revocation.” Id., subd. 6 (2016). A person may obtain judicial review of the
revocation by serving and filin g a petition within the statut ory time-peri od “following
receipt of a notice and order of revocation or disqualification pursuant to section 169A.52.”
Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2(a) (Supp. 2017). “In a civil action to rescind the revocation
of driving privileges under the implied-cons ent law, the commissioner has the burden to
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the ev idence, that revocation was appropriate.”
Ellingson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 800 N.W.2d 805, 806 (Minn. App. 2011), review
denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011).
Posey argues that his driver’s license s hould be reinstated because the revocation
imposes the following hardships: (1) he resi des in a neighborhood that does not provide
public transportation; (2) he has to “seek ri des to and from doctor appointments” for his
broken ankle; and (3) he has a pregnant da ughter who needs trans portation to her doctor
appointments. But these types of personal hardships are outside the limited scope of issues
that may be raised in an implied-consent hearing. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)
(Supp. 2017) (stating that the scope of an implied-consent hearing “is limited to the issues
in clauses (1) to (12)”); see also Dornbusch v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 860 N.W.2d 381,
383 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. May 27, 2015). Moreover, “[a]n assignment
of error based on mere assertion and not su pported by any argument or authorities in

4
appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is
obvious on mere inspection.” State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Minn. 2009) (quotation
omitted); see also State v. Bartylla , 755 N.W.2d 8, 22–23 (M inn. 2008) (declining to
review pro se issues that “are lacking in supportive arguments and/or legal authority” and
that do not reveal “prejudicial error [tha t] is obvious on mere inspection” (quotation
omitted)).
Here, the district court found that Pose y was operating his vehicle with an alcohol
concentration of 0.09. The district court therefore determined that CPS proved that Posey’s
driver’s license was properly revoked under Minn. Stat. § 169 A.52, subd. 4. Posey does
not challenge any of the district court’s findings and otherwise fails to articulate any error
made by the district court. He also fails to cite any legal authority in support of his
argument. Moreover, no obvious prejudicial error exists on mere inspection. Accordingly,
Posey waived his challenge to the revocation of his driver’s license , and we decline to
further consider his argument.
Affirmed.