In the Matter of the Welfare of: N. J. S., Child.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0651

In the Matter of the Welfare of:
N. J. S., Child.

Filed November 20, 2017
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Fillmore County District Court
File No. 23-JV-16-618

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Susan Andrews, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant N.J.S.)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brett A. Corson, Fillmore County Attorney, Melissa Hammell, Assistant County Attorney,
Preston, Minnesota (for respondent state)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant-juvenile was found guilty of fifth -degree assault and adjudicated
delinquent by the district court following a court trial. A separate disposition hearing was
later held, at wh ich time the court continued its prior order adjudicating the juvenile
delinquent and issued a written disposition order indicating the same. The juvenile argues

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that the district court failed to follow the rules of juvenile delinquency procedure and erred
by denying him a stay of adjudication. Because the district court corrected the procedural
error, and because the district court has broad discretion to decide whether or not to
adjudicate a juvenile delinquent, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 22, 2016, stepbrother-victim J.A.B., then age 7, was visiting his father’s
home for the weekend, where appellant -juvenile N.J.S., then age 15, also lives. Victim’s
father is married to juvenile’s mother. Victim and juvenile were home alone together.
Victim was eating in the kitchen when juvenile turned on the gas stove, heated a spoon,
and touched the spoon on victim’s calf, causing victim pain and burning his leg. When
victim returned to his mother’s home on July 24, his mother noticed a significant burn mark
on victim’s leg and took him to Olmsted County Medical Center for treatment. Victim was
diagnosed with a second-degree burn on his left lower leg (posterior calf).
A county child protection social worker spoke to victim on July 27 and to juvenile
later that same day about the incident. Victim said that juvenile heated the spoon on the
stove to make it hot, chased him, and then put the spoon on his leg. The social worker
observed the burn mark. Juvenile initially told the social worker that he trip ped and the
spoon hit victim’s leg. After further discussion, juvenile admitted to the social worker that
he held the spoon on victim’s leg. Juvenile also spoke to an investigator about the incident
and initially told him that it was an accident. Juvenile changed his story a couple times
before acknowledging that he chased victim around saying, “I’m gonna get you,” and that

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he intentionally touched the spoon on victim’s leg. Juvenile said that he did not think the
spoon was that hot.
On September 16, 2016, juvenile was charged by juvenile delinquency petition with
two counts of assault, the first of which was dismissed for lack of probable cause. 1
Following a court trial on the remaining charge on February 7, 2017, the district court
found juvenile guilty of fifth-degree assault—inflict or attempt to inflict bodily harm . In
the February 8 posttrial order, the district court found that the fifth-degree assault charge
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, issued its guilty verdict, and made related factual
findings.2 In the same order, the court adjudicated juvenile delinquent for the offense,
ordered a predisposition report, and scheduled a disposition hearing.
Community corrections sub sequently sub mitted a predisposition report, which
placed juvenile in a low-risk category to reoffend and recommended probation. The report
emphasized that juvenile was 15-years-old at the time of the offense and that he exhibits
functioning and behaviors consistent with those on the autism spectrum. The report also
noted that juvenile had no criminal history, did fairly well in school, showed remorse for
the incident, and engaged in therapeutic services prior to the disposition hearing.

1 Juvenile was charged with third-degree assault—substantial bodily harm and fifth-degree
assault—inflict or attempt to inflict bodily harm. On November 21, 2016, the court
dismissed the third-degree assault charge because it found that the injury to victim did not
constitute substantial bodily harm.
2 Following the conclusion of a trial, Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 13.09 provides that the
district court has seven days to issue an order making a general finding of guilt and 15 days
to make specific findings of fact to support the finding of guilt.

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A separate disposition hearing was held on March 27, 2017, at which the district
court heard juvenile’s argument regarding both adjudication and disposition . At the
hearing, the court denied juvenile’s request for a stay of adjudication and continued its
prior order adjudicating juvenile delinquent. On the record, the court imposed a disposition
of supervised probation for an indeterminate time period with conditions. The court issued
its written disposition order the same day, imposing juvenile’s disposition, and again noting
that juvenile was adjudicated delinquent.3 Juvenile appeals the district court’s adjudication
of delinquency and asks this court to reverse and remand for a new disposition hearing.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court cured the procedural deficiency.

Juvenile argues that the district court failed to follow the rules of juvenile
delinquency procedure by adjudicating him delinquent in the same February 8, 2017 order
that found him guilty of fifth-degree assault, without holding a separate disposition hearing
first. The state concedes that the district court erred in prematurely adjudicating juvenile
delinquent in its February 8 order, but contends that any procedural error was corrected by
the later March disposition hearing and disposition order. We agree.
We review the interpretation of procedural rules de novo. Melillo v. Heitland, 880
N.W.2d 862, 864 (Minn. 2016). Pursuant to the rules of juvenile delinquency procedure,
once the court has found that the charge contained in the juvenile delinquency petition was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the court must hold dispositional proceedings pursuant

3 Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.02, subd . 2, provides that “[t]he [district] court shall enter a
dispositional order . . . within three[] days of the disposition hearing.”

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to rule 15. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 13.10. For each charge proved, the court must either:
(A) adjudicate the juvenile delinquent pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1 (2016),
or (B) continue the case without adjudication pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7
(2016). Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1(A), (B). The adjudication decision must
be made “at the same time and in the same court order as the disposition.” Id., subd. 1(B).
The district court enters a disposition order pursuant to rule 15.05 only after a
disposition hearing. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.02, subd. 2. The disposition hearing must
be a separate hearing where the juvenile and his counsel are present. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq.
P. 15.04, subd. 1. The disposition hearing may take place immediately after the hearing in
which the court finds that the charge was proved, or the court may continue the disposition
hearing for a later time. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.02, subd. 1. Accordingly, the court’s
adjudication decision under rule 15.05, subdivision 1(A) or (B), must take place at the same
time and in the same order as the disposition, which the court may only issue after a
separate disposition hearing has occurred.
Here, the district court did not follow the procedural timeline provided in the rules
of juvenile delinquency procedure. The court prematurely adjudicated juvenile delinquent
in its February 8 order before holding a separate disposition hearing, and did so in a
different order than the disposition decision. However, the court scheduled a separate
disposition hearing in its February 8 order, indicating that the required hearing would take
place at a later date. The separate disposition hearing took place on March 27, and the
court then issued its disposition order, which included the adjudication decision.

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An order adjudicating a juvenile delinquent prior to disposition is ineffective and
not appealable, and it only becomes appealable as part of a disposition once a disposition
order is made . Minn. R. Juv. Del inq. P. 21.03, subd. 1(A)(3); In re Welfare of
G._(NMN)_M., 533 N.W.2d 883, 884 (Minn. App. 1995). Thus, t he district court’s
February 8 order adjudicating juvenile delinquent did not become final or appealable until
after the March 27 disposition hearing and resultant disposition order. See Minn. R. Juv.
Delinq. P. 21.03, subd. 1(A)(3) (providing that a juvenile “may appeal . . . an adverse final
order[,]” which includes “adjudication and disposition in delinquency proceedings[]”).
At the March 27 hearing, juvenile’s attorney ack nowledged the court’s unusual
procedure and argued for a stay of adjudication. This was proper because the court’s
premature adjudication decision was not yet final or appealable pursuant to Minn. R. Juv.
Delinq. P. 21.03, subd. 1(A)(3) . The parties and community corrections presented
arguments regarding both the adjudication and the disposition. After hearing these
arguments, the court again adjudicated juvenile delinquent on the record, imposed a
disposition, and issued its written disposition order accordingly. The record shows that the
parties and the court treated the March 27 hearing as the separate disposition hearing
required by the rules. Therefore, we conclude that the district court cured the procedural
deficiency by later holding a sepa rate disposition hearing as required by the rules , and
thereafter issuing a disposition order, in which juvenile’s adju dication of delinquency
became final and appealable.

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating juvenile
delinquent.

Juvenile argues that the district court erred in denying hi s request for a stay of
adjudication and that the district court’s disposition order must be reversed and remanded
because the court failed to consider all of the factors relevant to a determination of
necessity.4
“A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to continue an
adjudication in a delinquency proceeding.” In re Welfare of J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241, 244
(Minn. App. 2002) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002). “When it
is in the best interests of the child to do so and not inimical to public safety . . . the court
may continue the case for a period not to exceed 180 days on any one order.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260B.198, subd. 7 (emphasis added); see also Minn. R. Juv. Del inq. P. 15.05, subd. 4.
Section 260B.198, subd ivision 7, does not require the district court to explain why an
adjudication of delinquency is the least restrictive alternative (as opposed to a continuance).
In re Welfare of J .L.Y., 596 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. App. 1999), review granted (Minn.
Sept. 28, 1999) and order granting review vacated (Minn. Feb. 15, 2000). “Imposing an
adjudication within the limits prescribed by the legislature is not an abuse of discretion.”
Id.
Juvenile contends that the court was required to make the findings of necessity
required under Minn. R. Juv. Del inq. P. 15.05, subd. 2(B )(1), in making its decision to

4 Although juvenile challenges the district court’s disposition order, juvenile does not
challenge the disposition decision itself.

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adjudicate juvenile delinquent. But rule 15.05, subdivision 2(B)(1), requires the distr ict
court to consider the principle of necessity in issuing a proper disposition, not in making a
decision to adjudicate a juvenile delinquent or to stay an adjudication of delinquency.
Juvenile’s argument conflates the court’s adjudication decision with the court’s disposition
decision. Although rule 15.05, subdivision 1, requires that the adjudication decision take
place in the same order and at the same time as the disposition decision, the adjudication
decision is not the disposition decision. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1 (stating that
if the court finds a juvenile delinquent, “it shall enter an order making one of the following
dispositions . . . .”).
Further, while the district court must make particularized findings for a disposition,
there is no similar requirement for the court’s adjudication decision.
We find nothing in the statute that requires particularized
findings on the court ’s decision to impose or withhold
adjudication of delinquency. The particularized findings,
including the finding on the least restrictive means for restoring
a juvenile to law-abiding conduct, are required in determining
a disposition, but not when deciding whether to adjudicate or
stay adjudication. The dispositions listed in subdivision 1 are
separate from the subdivision 3 provisions allowing a court to
continue an adjudication.
J.L.Y., 596 N.W.2d at 695.
Here, the error made in juvenile’s argument is similar to the error made by the
juvenile in J.R.Z., where this court found that the juvenile incorrectly argued that a district
court’s decision to adjudicate must be the “least drastic step necessary to restore law -
abiding conduct in the juvenile.” 648 N.W.2d at 245. We explained that, “[a]ppellant
confuses the standard for staying adjudication with the standard for ordering a particular

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disposition.” Id. at 245-46. Because the district court is not required to make any
particularized findings about its adjudication decision, the only inquiry for this court on
appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in adjudicating juvenile delinquent.
The court’s February 8 order found juvenile guilty and initially adjudicated him
delinquent without further explanation. Before continuing its decision to adjudicate
juvenile delinquent on the record at the March 27 disposition hearing, the court noted that
it relied on the information set forth at the adjudicatory hearing (the trial), and that it had
previously found juvenile committed bodily harm against victim. The court also indicated
that it was concerned that the incident had occurred. The court noted that it had to “weigh
factors such as punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, and what it’s going to take” and that
the “[delinquency] disposition [was] required in the particular case.”5
Here, the court sat through the trial, was familiar with the case and juvenile, weighed
the evidence and nature of the offense, and heard the arguments and recommendations from
the parties and community corrections before deciding that a stay of adjudication was not
appropriate. The court’s decision to adjudicate juvenile delinquent was an adjudication
within the prescribed legislative limits, and based on this record we cannot conclude that
the district court abuse d its discretion in d enying juvenile’s request for a stay of
adjudication.
Affirmed.

5 It appears that in passing the district court also conflated its decision to adjudicate juvenile
delinquent with the disposition imposed following an adjudication or stay of adjudication
of delinquency.