James Michael McConnell, et al., Appellants,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0668

James Michael McConnell, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Blue Earth County, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge
Dissenting, Reyes, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CV-16-4559

Richard D. Snyder, Cynthia A. Moyer, Anupama D. Sreekanth, Fredrickson & Byron, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Nicholas J. Maxwell, Joseph M. Bromeland, Eric G. Iverson, Mankato, Minnesota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of their petition for a writ of
mandamus and request for injunctive relief directing Blue Earth County to record their
marriage-license certificate and issue certified copies. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Appellants James Michael McConnell and Pat Lyn McConnell a/k/a Richard John
Baker1 have been together as a couple for almost 50 years. Appellants first applied for a
marriage license in Hennepin County on May 18, 1970. A Hennepin County clerk refused
to issue them a marriage license because appellants are the same sex. Appellants petitioned
for a writ of mandamus in Hennepin County District Court, requesting that the district court
order t he clerk to issue the license. The district court denied appellants’ petition, and
appellants moved the district court for relief from the order, a new trial, and a stay of entry
of judgment. The district court denied the motion. Appellants appeal ed to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. The supreme court affirmed the district court’s denial on October 15,
1971, holding that “Minn. [Stat. §] 517 [did] not authorize marriage between persons of
the same sex and that such marriages [were] accordingly prohibited.” Baker v. Nelson, 291
Minn. 310, 312, 191 N.W.2d 185 , 186 (1971), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges , 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015).2
On August 9, 1971, while their appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court was
pending, McConnell submitted a second marriage-license application in respondent Blue

1 Appellant Richard John Baker changed his name to Pat Lyn McConnell before appellants
applied in respondent Blue Earth County for a marriage license but subsequently changed
it back to Richard John Baker. We refer to him as Richard John Baker to avoid confusion.

2 We recognize that Obergefell holds that same -sex couples may now exercise their
fundamental right to marry in the United States. 135 S. Ct. at 2599. But this cas e is not
about appellants’ constitutional right to marry in 2017. Instead, this case is about whether
the district court abused its discretion by denying appellants mandamus relief for conduct
that occurred in 1971.
3
Earth County. The marriage application referred to Baker as a female . Baker’s address
was listed in Blue Earth County. McConnell’s address was listed in Hennepin County.
Blue Earth County issued the marriage license on August 16. Sometime before
August 31, the Blue Earth County attorney’s office determined that the marriage license
was defective and invalid, and the clerk of district court sent both appellants a letter to the
addresses that they provided on their marriage-license application, advising them of their
defective and invalid license. Both letters were returned as undeliverable. On September
3, after the county mailed the letters informing appellants that the marriage license was
defective and invalid, an ordained minister performed appellants’ marriage ceremony. On
September 7, Baker mailed the bottom portion of the marriage license to Blue Ear th
County, but the county never recorded the license.
Forty-three years later, on September 29, 2014, McConnell mailed a letter to the
Blue Earth County clerk requesting certified copies of the recorded marriage certificate.
Blue Earth County responded by informing appellants that it could not locate the license.
After appellants’ counsel sought clarification, the county attorney informed him that
[b]ecause the Blue Earth County Attorney’s Office determined
that the marriage license issued on August 31, 1971, was
legally defective and that a lawful marriage did not arise from
that license, the marriage was not considered valid and has not
been recorded. We cannot, therefore, provide you with
certified copies of the marriage record.

On November 18, 2016, appellants petitioned the district court for a writ of
mandamus and filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, requesting
that it order Blue Earth County to record their 1971 marriage license. The district court
4
denied the petition for a writ of mandamus and request for injunctive relief because it
determined that it needed a more fully developed factual and legal record to properly
analyze the case . The district court determined that appellants could proceed with the
declaratory-judgment action. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
This court will affirm a district court’s order denying mandamus relief unless “there
is no evidence reasonably tending to sustain the [district] court’s findings.” Popp v. County
of Winona, 430 N.W.2d 19, 22 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 1988).
When the district court’s decision on a writ of mandamus is based on a legal determination,
we review that decision de novo. Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn.
2006). A district court may issue a writ of mandamus “to any inferior tribunal, corporation,
board, or person to compel the performance of an act which the law spe cially enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office.” Minn. Stat. § 586.01 (2016). Mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy based on equitable principles and is awarded at the district court ’s discretion .
Chanhassen Chiropractic Ctr., P.A. v. City of Chanhassen, 663 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Minn.
App. 2003).
For the district court to issue a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must demonstrate that
“(1) the official has failed to exercise a duty imposed by law; (2) due to this failure,
[appellants are] specifical ly injured by a public wrong; and (3) there is no adequate
alternative legal remedy.” Id. A petitioner may only satisfy the first requirement by
demonstrating that “the existence of a legal right to the act demanded . . . is so clear and
complete as not to admit any reasonable controversy.” Houck v. E. Carver Cty. Schs., 787
5
N.W.2d 227, 233 (Minn. App. 2010) (quotations omitted). As to the third factor, the
existence of an adequate alternative legal remedy that is “equally as convenient, complete,
beneficial, and effective . . . and . . . sufficiently speedy to prevent material injury,”
precludes granting a writ of mandamus. Kramer v. Otter Tail Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs , 647
N.W.2d 23, 26-27 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted).
Both appellants and the dissent assert that the district court found that appellants
satisfied all three requirements of mandamus but nevertheless refused to issue the writ. We
disagree with this interpretation of the district court’s order . As to the first factor, the
district court stated that “the recording of a properly and timely completed and returned
Certificate is not discretionary, and should be seen as a ministerial duty, clearly imposed
by law.” But the district court also stated:
[T]his Court is troubled by information contained in the record
that the Application itself may have contained incorrect
information, which led to the issuance of the License. . . .
Indeed, the issuance of the License does not appear to be
simply a ministerial duty: it appears to be quasi -judicial in the
sense that the individual issuing the license had five days to
determine if some legal impediment existed to the marriage.
Quasi-judicial decisions are characterized by their effect on the
rights of individ uals, investigation into a disputed claim and
weighing of evidentiary facts, application of those facts to a
prescribed standard, and a binding decision regarding the
disputed claim.

In the present case, or in any case, if the issuance of a
license was based upon inaccurate or false information, then it
can be argued that the license was not legitimately issued if it
was not legitimately applied for. Accordingly, on the record
presently before it, this Court is skeptical that the issuance of
marriage lice nses is purely ministerial. Whether or not the
[respondents] had the authority to refuse or decline to record
the Certificate in the circumstances presented by this case
6
requires a more fully developed record, both factually and
legally.

(Emphasis added.) (Citation omitted.) This language demonstrates that the district court
concluded that the existing record is insufficient to determine whether appellants
demonstrated that Blue Earth County failed to exercise a duty clearly imposed by law. And
as to th e third factor, the district court stated that “it is an open question as to whether
getting married now is an adequate alternative legal remedy.” Thus, the district court did
not find that all th ree factors were satisfied. Instead, the district court concluded that it
required a more fully developed factual and legal record to determine whether the county
had the authority to refuse to record appellants’ marriage license.
We agree with the district court that the record is insufficient to support a p roper
analysis of this case. Because the factual record is insufficient to conclude that a legal right
“which is so clear and complete as not to admit any reasonable controversy” exists here ,
appellants have not established that the county failed to exerc ise a duty imposed by law .
Houck, 787 N.W.2d at 233. A duty is ministerial if it is absolute or certain and involves
the execution arising from fixed or designated facts. Schroeder v. St. Louis County , 708
N.W.2d 497, 506 (Minn. 2006). A duty is quasi -judicial if it involves investigating a
disputed claim and weighing evidentiary facts, applying those facts to a prescribed
standard, and making a binding decision of a disputed claim. W. Circle Props. L.L.C. v.
Hall, 634 N.W.2d 238, 241 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2001).
Although the recording of a properly applied-for marriage license is ministerial, the
county has authority to determine whether a legal impediment to issuing a license exists.
7
Compare Minn. Stat. § 517.08 (1969) (stating “clerk shall examine upon oath the party
applying for license relative to the legality of such contemplated marriage”) , with Minn.
Stat. § 517.10 (1969) (stating “clerk shall record such certificate”). Here, appellants’
marriage-license application stated that “her post office address is” and “ she is a resident
of the City of Mankato,” in reference to Baker, who is male. (Emphasis added.) And the
district court noted that “James McConnell apparently swore upon oath to the accuracy of
the information in the form and that ‘there [was] no legal impediment to said contemplated
marriage.’”
The district court stated that “ [i]t is not clear from the exhibit whether it was
McConnell, the Court Clerk, or some other person who actually filled out the Application,”
and therefore it is unclear who made the false statements. It is also unclear from the record
whether Baker was a resident of Blue Earth County at that time , as required for the
marriage-license application. Blue Earth County issued the marriage license on August
16, 1971, and the marriage ceremony occurred on September 3. Sometime before August
31, the Blue Earth County attorney’s office determined that the license was defe ctive and
therefore invalid. Before appellants had their marriage ceremony, t he Blue Earth County
clerk mailed two letters, one to Baker at his Mankato address and one to McConnell at his
Minneapolis address, advising them of the invalid and defective license. Both letters were
returned to the county as undeliverable . Because there is insufficient evidence in the
record, the district court was unable to properly determine whether “the existence of a legal
right [to have their marriage license recorded] . . . [was] so clear and complete as not to
admit any reasonable controversy.” See Houck, 787 N.W.2d at 233. Based on the facts of
8
this case, we agree with the district court that the record is insufficient to determine whether
the clerk had a duty imposed by law to record appellants’ marriage license.3
The district court also found that the record is insufficient to properly determine if
appellants have an adequate alternative legal remedy. The county asserts that appellants
have an available alternative legal remedy because they may now legally marry .
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05. Appellants and the dissent assert that marrying now is
an inadequate legal remedy because they are seekin g recognition that they have been
married for the past 46 years and getting married now will not be as complete, beneficial,
or effective.
But appellants bear the burden of establishing each factor, and they have not
demonstrated the particular harm that they would suffer. Other than appellants’
unsupported assertion that a 46-year marriage would convey more rights and benefits than

3 The dissent contends that even if appellants provided the false statements in the marriage
license application, the marriage would only be voidable, and not void. See In re Kinkead’s
Estate, 239 Minn. 27, 31, 57 N.W.2d 628 , 631 (1953) (stating that “the validity of a
marriage is not affected by the fact that the marriage license was obtained by fraud or
perjury”); see also Appeal of O’Rourke , 310 Minn. 373, 375, 246 N.W.2d 461, 462 -63
(1976) (concluding that a husband’s failure to divorce first wife from a “limited purpose
marriage” before getting married to another woman made the marriage voidable, but not
void). The dissent asserts that because appellants are not seeking to void the marriage, the
county had a duty to record the license regardless of who made the false statements. We
do not find the distinction between void and voidable marriages to be relevant here. The
district court was not required to determine whether appellants’ marriage was valid, but
instead, was required to analyze whether appellants met their burden of est ablishing that
appellants’ legal right to have their marriage license recorded is so clear and complete as
not to admit any reasonable controversy. See Houck, 787 N.W.2d at 233. The district court
determined that the recording of a “properly and timely c ompleted” marriage license is
ministerial. But here, the record does not establish whether appellants’ marriage license
was properly completed. Thus, we agree with the district court that the false statements
“may or may not be of import.”
9
a marriage of just a few months and their citation to sources discussing that the length of a
marriage may impact Social Se curity benefits, appellants provided no other evidence to
support the assertion that their benefits or legal rights would be detrimentally impacted if
they were to marry now. We agree with the district court’s conclusion. Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ petition for writ of
mandamus.
Appellants also argue the district court abused its discretion by denying appellants’
request for injunctive relief. We will not reverse a district court’s denial of an injunction
unless, based upon the whole record, the district court abused its discretion. Medtronic,
Inc. v Advanced Bionics Corp., 630 N.W.2d 438, 451 (Minn. App. 2001). Appellants must
demonstrate that there is no adequate legal remedy and that “the injunction is necessary to
prevent great and irreparable harm.” Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc. , 278
N.W.2d 81, 92 (Minn. 1979). Because we are not persuaded by the record before us that
appellants have no adequate alternative legal remedy if Blue Earth County does not record
the 1971 marriage license, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying appellants’ request for injunctive relief.
Affirmed.

D-1
REYES, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. Appellants petitioned the district court for, inter alia, a writ
of mandamus to direct Blue Earth County to record their 1971 marriage license and issue
certified copies. A district court may issue a writ of mandamus when (1) a person or entity
has failed to perform an official duty clearly imposed by law; (2) the petitioner has suffered
a “public wrong” and was specifically injured by the failure to act; and (3) the petitioner
has no other adequate legal remedy. Breza v. City of Minn etrista, 725 N.W.2d 106, 109 -
110 (Minn. 2006). The district court concluded that appellants had suffered a public wrong
and had no other adequate legal remedy. 1 The district court stated that it did not
“necessarily agree that a marriage now is an adequate legal remedy when compared to a
marriage of 46 years,” and acknowledged that “the status of being legally married (or not
legally married) is critical to many aspects of public and private life.” More importantly,
on appeal, respondents challenge only the first element. “[F]ailure to address an issue in
[a] brief constitutes waiver of that issue.” Peterson v. BASF Corp., 711 N.W.2d 470, 482
(Minn. 2006).
The district court also determined that the recording of a marriage certificate is a
ministerial duty clearly imposed by law, not a quasi -judicial decision. “[A] duty is

1Although the majority suggests that appellants have an adequate legal remedy because
they can now legally marry, an alternative remedy must be “equally as convenient,
complete, beneficial, and effective as would be mandamus and be sufficiently speedy to
prevent material injury.” Kramer v. Otter Tail Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 647 N.W.2d 23, 26-
27 (Minn. App. 2002) (quotation omitted). But appellants may not be able to marry again
while the current litigation is pending; appellants take pride in the length of their 46 -year
relationship; and appellants allege that there are possible legal consequences if they marry
now but one of the parties dies within one year. Both appellants are over 70 years old.
D-2
ministerial if it is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a
specific duty arising from fixed and d esignated facts.” Schroeder v. St. Louis C ty., 708
N.W. 497, 506 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted) . The 1971 statute was clear: once a
marriage certificate is submitted, “[t]he clerk shall record such certificate in a book kept
for that purpose.” Minn. Stat. § 517.10 (1971) (emphasis added). Therefore, the recording
of a marriage certificate is a ministerial duty clearly imposed by law.
Both respondents and the majority appear to believe that the issue is whether a
marriage license should have been issued, asserting that this is a quasi -judicial act that
cannot be decided without further factfinding. But that is not the issue before this court.
The only issue is whether the district court should issue a writ of mandamus to compel
respondents to record appellants’ marriage certificate and issue certified copies.
The clerk of district court had a duty to examine the marriage-license application to
determine the legality of the contemplated marriage. Minn. Stat. § 517.08, subd. 1 (1971).
However, i f no legal impediment was found within five days after the application was
made, the clerk had an obligation to issue the license. Id. (stating that clerk “shall” issue a
license at the expiration of the five-day period). Nothing in this statute enlarges this five -
day period or grants the clerk the power to continue investigating an application. Having
found no legal impediment, the clerk issued a marriage license to appellants.
Once issued, the statute does not empower the clerk to continue to investigate or to
retroactively determine that a license should not have been issued, and respondents have
cited no authority or legal support for that proposition. Respondents argue that the statute
does not prohibit the clerk from continuing to investigate or subsequently revoking or
D-3
invalidating a license, and, therefore, this power is implicit. But this is not how court s
interpret a law . If a st atute is clear and unambiguous, we look no further than the plain
meaning of the statute. State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 382 (Minn. 2011). “We will
not supply words that the Legislature either purposely omitted or inadvertently left out.”
Id. The 1971 statute is unambiguous and provides no authority to the county to revoke or
invalidate an issued marriage license.
Here, appellants complied in all respects with the statutory requirements that follow
issuance of a marriage license: they were mar ried by a clergyman , Minn. Stat. § 517.04
(1971), in the presence of two witnesses, Minn. Stat. § 517.09 (1971), and they submitted
the completed certificate to the clerk within five days after the marriage ceremony. Minn.
Stat. § 517.10 (1971). Once sub mitted, the clerk was required to record the marriage
certificate. Id.
Respondents argue that this marriage should be set aside because of allegations of
fraud in the marriage -license application. Even assuming that all of these allegations are
true, any fraud in a marriage-license application would not void a marriage, but could only
make it voidable. 2 In In re Kinkead’s Estate , 239 Minn. 27, 57 N.W.2d 628 (1953), the

2 Minn. Stat. § 518.01 (1971) defined which marriages were void, including marriages
when one party was still lawfully married to another person, ones violati ng the rules of
consanguinity, and underage marriages. None of these apply here. Minn. Stat. § 51 8.02
(1971) described “voidable marriages” to include those in which one party was incapable
of consenting because of “want of age or understanding,” or one in which consent was
obtained by “force or fraud.” A voidable marriage could only be annulled by s uit filed by
the injured party. Id. Neither of these chapters explicitly prohibited same-sex marriage or
described a procedure in which a clerk of district court could sua sponte declare a marriage
void.
D-4
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the question of whether a marriage in Iowa was void
because the decedent husband had procured an Iowa marriage license by falsely declaring
that he had not been divorced within the past year. Id. at 30, 57 N.W.2d at 631. He married
in Iowa within five months of his divorce, and returned to Minnesota, wh ere he and his
new wife were residents. Id. at 29, 57 N.W.2d at 630. Construing Iowa law on whether
the marriage was void because of the false statement, the supreme court stated, “It is
generally held that, in the absence of legislative declaration to the contrary, the validity of
a marriage is not affected by the fact that the marriage license was obtained by fraud or
perjury.” Id. at 31, 57 N.W.2d at 631.
In Appeal of O’Rourke , 310 Minn. 373, 246 N.W.2d 461 (1976), decedent had
entered into a “limited purpose marriage” to facilitate his wife’s immigration from Canada.
Id. at 374, 246 N.W.2d at 462. Without divorcing the immigrant wife, he married another
woman. Id. Despite questions about the validity of a “limited purpose marriage,” the
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the first marriage was voidable, not void. Id. A
voidable marriage may be ended by request of the injured party, but “may not be
collaterally attacked.” Minn. Stat. § 518.02 (1971); Appeal of O’Rourke, 310 Minn. at 375,
246 N.W.2d at 463. Here, neither appellant seeks to void the marriage. More importantly,
the county was not an injured party and cannot collaterally attack appellants’ marriage.
Respondents also raise statute-of-limitations and laches arguments. But according
to their own assertions, respondents took no legal action to revoke or invalidate the
marriage certificate, instead burying it in a file where it has la nguished for 46 years. In a
letter sent out by the clerk on August 31, 1971, but returned as undeliverable, the county
D-5
attorney had unilaterally “ruled that this marriage license is defective and therefore
invalid,” but did not take any steps to seek a formal ruling from the co urts. After sending
in their marriage certificate on September 7, 1971, the county failed to record the marriage
certificate. Instead, on the count y attorney’s advice, the clerk placed it in a file without
notifying appellants that she would not record it. These arguments weigh as heavily against
respondents as they do against appellants, particularly when appellants have asserted they
were married for 46 years. By concealing the completed marriage certificate while taking
no legal action to revoke or i nvalidate it, the district attorney issued a “ruling” that
appellants had no opportunity to contest.
Finally, this court should acknowledge that in the intervening 46 years, the law has
changed. In Obergefell v. Hodges , 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) , the United States
Supreme Court overruled Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 93 S. Ct. 37 (Mem) (1972)3 and
stated, “The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not await
legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. . . . An individual can invoke a right
to constitutional protections when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees
and even if the legislature refuses to act.” 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
I would reverse and issue a writ of mandamus directing Blue Eart h County and its
clerk of district court to record appellants’ marriage certificate and issue certified copies.

3In this decision, the Supreme Court refused to review, for want of a federal question, the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 310, 191 N.W.2d
185, 185 (1971), in which the supreme court affirmed the denial of a petition for a writ of
mandamus to direct Hennepin County to issue appellants a marriage license. However,
this decision was released after appellants were married pursuant to the license issued by
Blue Earth County.