In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: I. C. G. and T. A. T., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0672

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
I. C. G. and T. A. T., Parents.

Filed October 30, 2017
Affirmed
Cleary, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-16-1483

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michelle A. Hatcher, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department)

Mary F. Moriarty, Fourth District Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant T.A.T.)

Jody M. Alholinna, El-Gh azzawy Law Offices, LLC, Mi nneapolis, Minnesota (for
guardian ad litem Ruth DiMucci)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pres iding Judge; Cleary, Chief Judge; and
Worke, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CLEARY, Chief Judge
Appellant-father T.A.T. argues that the district court erred in determining that clear
and convincing evidence supported three statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights.
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T.A.T. also argues that termination was not in the best interests of his children, IL.G. and
IM.G. We affirm.
FACTS
IL.G. was born in February of 2009 and IM.G. was born in October of 2010 to I.C.G.
and T.A.T. I.C.G.’s parental rights were terminated in a separate proceeding and are not
at issue in this appeal.
The family has a lengthy child protectio n history. From 2008 to 2015, child
protection services from four different counties intervened on behalf of the children on 17
occasions. As a result, the children have spent over 800 days in some form of out-of-home
placement over the last five years. Child services often became involved due to domestic
violence between T.A.T. and I.C.G. or I.C.G.’s serious mental health issues and abuse of
the children in her care. The most serious domestic violence incident between T.A.T. and
I.C.G. occurred in 2013 and involved I.C.G. attacking and stabbing T.A.T. in front of the
children. After this incident, T.A.T. left the children in the care of I.C.G. and began
working as an over-the-road truck driver in Mexico. T.A.T. lived primarily in Mexico from
2014 to May of 2016.
In September of 2015, a child protection so cial worker (the social worker) was
assigned to work with the family. She explai ned that both children have special needs.
She stated that T.A.T. needed to demonstrate that he coul d provide a stable environment
for himself and the children, develop the ability to separate from I.C .G., and learn to be
responsible for two children with special need s before the children could be placed in his
care. She described T.A.T. as reluctant to engage with the services provided by the county
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throughout the case and expressed serious concerns about his ability to provide a stable life
for himself and the children and to keep I.C.G. from inflicting further harm on the children.
In October of 2015, Henne pin County Human Services (the county) opened a child
in need of protective services (CHIPS) case on two children in I.C.G.’s care following a
report of physical abuse. In December of 2015, all four children in I.C.G.’s care, including
IL.G. and IM.G., were removed from her home and placed in foster care. T.A.T. monitored
the case from Mexico and return ed periodically. He belie ved that his children would
eventually be returned to I.C.G. T.A.T. returned permanently to Minnesota in May 2016
after I.C.G.’s parental rights were terminated.
In March of 2016, the county filed a petition to terminat e T.A.T.’s parental rights.
The petition alleged termination was proper because: (1) T.A.T. abandoned the children;
(2) he substantially or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed
upon him by the parent and child relationshi p; (3) following the ch ildren’s out-of-home
placement, reasonable efforts had failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s
placement out of home; and (4) the children were neglected and in foster care. Shortly
after the petition was filed, the county offered a case plan to T.A.T. to connect him with
the services that he needed to demonstrate his fitness as a parent. The case plan consisted
of four components: (1) “provide safe a nd stable housing for himself and the children;”
(2) “submit to random [urinalysis testing] at the direction of the department;” (3) “attend
individual therapy, specifically to addre ss co-dependence and boundary issues;” and
(4) “establish ongoing, regular visitation with his children with enough time in advance to
accommodate the children’s schedules and emoti onal needs.” It was also suggested that
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T.A.T. complete a parentin g assessment and follow the recommendations of that
assessment.
In June of 2016, the court appointed a guardian ad litem. She stated that IL.G. has
serious emotional, educational, and behavioral needs that have delayed his progress in
school. She stated that IM.G. had sexualized behavioral issues upon entering foster care,
but addressed those issues through therapy. She emphasized that bo th children required
stability and a caregiver who understood and a ppreciated their needs and was committed
to providing them with access to the services they needed.
The termination trial began in January of 2017 and was held over the course of four
days, spread over two months. Extensive te stimony was offered about the family’s child
protection history, the children’s special needs, T.A.T.’s historical parenting abilities, and
his progress over the course of the 17 month case. T.A.T. testified that he loves his children
and that he could provide for them now that he had returned from Mexico. He stated that
individual therapy was unnecessary and that he ended his relationship with I.C.G. in 2013.
He stated that he understood the special needs of his children, but attributed these issues to
his children being separated from him and that they could be resolved by the children being
placed in his care and in sports programs.
Extensive testimony was offered about T.A. T.’s compliance with his case plan.
T.A.T. did not substantially comply with his case plan. T.A.T. complied with the urinalysis
component of his case plan an d does not have any chemical dependence issues. T.A.T.
moved into his parents’ home and stated that his children could live there as well if returned
to his custody. However, his history of instability and cycle of homelessness indicated that
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he would not be able to pr ovide a long-lasting stable e nvironment and his failure to
understand his children’s special needs led the social worker an d guardian ad litem to
conclude that the children would not receive the services they needed if placed in T.A.T.’s
care. T.A.T. resisted the individual ther apy requirement and did not believe it was
necessary. During the 17 month case, T.A.T. attended individual therapy four times.
During those sessions, T.A.T. resisted the process and defended or made excuses for I.C.G.
T.A.T. failed to establish a regular visitation schedule due to the demands of his jobs and
still required supervised visits at the time of tr ial. T.A.T. participated in the parenting
assessment but did not follow its reco mmendations, which included attending his
children’s therapy appointments and getting involved with their school lives.
Both the guardian ad litem and the social worker testified that T.A.T. was reluctant
to get involved in the termination proceedings while living in Mexico. Both believed
T.A.T. lacked the ability and understanding to properly address his children’s special
needs. Both discussed T.A.T.’s lack of compliance with his case plan and his overall lack
of commitment to working with the child protection personnel. The guardian ad litem and
the social worker acknowledged that the children and T.A.T. had a loving relationship. But
both expressed grave concerns that T.A.T. would allow I.C.G. access to the children and
believed I.C.G. posed a real and substantial threat to the health and safety of the children.
Both the guardian ad litem and the social worker believed termination was in the best
interests of the children. The district cour t found the testimony of the guardian ad litem
and the social worker to be credible and persuasive.
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The district court terminated T.A.T.’s parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2), (5), and (8) (2016), after findi ng clear and convincing evidence established
that: (1) he substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with
the duties imposed upon him by the parent and child relationship; (2) following the
children’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court,
failed to correct the conditions leading to the placement; and (3) the children were
neglected and in foster care, and that terminati on was in the best interests of the children.
T.A.T. appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Statutory Grounds
T.A.T. challenges the district court’s decision to terminate his parental rights.
Parental rights may only be terminat ed for grave and weighty reasons. In re Welfare of
M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). There is a “presumption that a natural parent
is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the care of his or her child.” In re Welfare
of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1995).
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subd ivision 1(b), provides nine statutory
grounds for involuntary termina tion of parental rights. A district court may terminate
parental rights if clear and convincing evidence establishes: (1) at least one statutory basis
for termination; (2) that the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family unless
reasonable efforts are not required under the st atute; and (3) termination is in the child’s
best interests. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2016); In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P.,
744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
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Determining whether there is a statutor y basis for involuntary termination of
parental rights requires the district court to make findings of fact and decide whether its
findings show the statutory basis for termination to be present. In re Welfare of Children
of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 899-900 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17,
2012). On appeal, we review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error. In re Welfare
of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is
“manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” Id. at 660-61. Considerable deference is given to the district court’s
ultimate decision regarding whether to actually terminate parental rights. S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d at 385.
A. Consideration of Case Plan
T.A.T. argues that the district court impr operly considered hi s failure to comply
with his case plan in its analysis and thus th e termination order must be reversed because
it relied upon an alleged failure to comple te a voluntary case plan. T.A.T. relies on
unpublished authority to support his argument. Unpublished opinions are of limited value
in deciding an appeal. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2016) (stating that
“[u]npublished opinions of the court of appeals are not precedential”). Further, we note
that T.A.T. was aware of and understood the components of the case plan. T.A.T. received
a copy of the case plan. T. A.T. reviewed the case plan with counsel and challenged
components of the case plan at a pretrial hearing shortly after the case plan was offered.
He testified that he understood the componen ts and that he met with the social worker
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“several, maybe dozens of times” to discuss the case plan and his obligations under it. The
case plan was known to and understood by T.A.T. and all those involved in the case.
On this record, the district court did not err in considering T.A.T.’s failure to
complete the components of his case plan in determining whether to terminate parental
rights.
B. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2)
T.A.T. argues that there was insufficien t evidence to suppor t termination under
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Unde r this provision, the district court may
terminate parental rights if it finds
that the parent has substantially , continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and ch ild relationship, including but
not limited to providing the child with n ecessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency
have failed to correct the conditi ons that formed the basis of
the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable[.]

To support termination on this basis, the district court must determine that the parent is not
presently able and willing to assume the responsibilities of parenting and that the condition
will continue for the reasonably foreseeable future. See In re Welfare of J.K., 374 N.W.2d
463, 466-67 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1985). This court generally
requires more than mere failure to complete a case plan to affirm a termination based on
this statutory ground. See, e.g., In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 666-
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67 (Minn. App. 2012). The record must otherw ise show that the parent failed to comply
with his or her duties in the parent-child relationship. Id.
T.A.T. argues that there is no evidence to support the district court’s finding that he
failed to comply with the obligations of the pa rent-child relationship. But, the district
court’s conclusion that T.A.T. failed to comple te his case plan and failed to comply with
the duties of the parent-child relationship is supported by the record. The district court
found that he did not substantially comply with his case plan as a whole and found that he
satisfied only one component—the urinalysis component—successfully. The district court
also made numerous non-case plan specific findings regarding T.A.T.’s demonstrated lack
of consistency and stability and his long-standing and ongoing lack of commitment to the
parent-child relationship: T.A.T. never served as the child ren’s primary caregiver during
their lives; could not name the schools his children attended; did not understand their
special needs; and visited them on an inconsis tent and abbreviated basis. Further, the
district court determined that he currently po sed a safety risk to the children due to his
unhealthy relationship and poor boundaries with I.C.G.
T.A.T. also argues that this case is distinguishable from In re Child of Simon, 662
N.W.2d 155 (Minn. App. 2003). We disagree. There, this court affirmed the termination
of parental rights under subdivision 1(b)(2) after determining that the father failed to satisfy
his obligations under his court-ordered case plan, that he “failed to provide any meaningful
parenting” to the child a nd “offered no evidence that he possess[es] the skills and
knowledge to parent” the child. Simon, 662 N.W.2d at 163. Here, the district court came
to a similar conclusion: T.A.T. had a longstanding and ongoing lack of commitment to the
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parent-child relationship and a lack of unders tanding of and ability to provide for the
special needs of either of his children; T.A. T. had a documented history of homelessness
and instability; a history of allowing his children to reside with I.C.G. despite being aware
of the danger she posed to his children; and did not fully understand the serious emotional,
educational, and behavioral special needs of IL.G. The district court’s finding that T.A.T.’s
minimization of IL.G.’s special needs and his lack of knowledge about his children’s lives
demonstrated a lack of the skills and know ledge necessary to pa rent the children is
supported by the record.
In re Welfare of Barron, 268 Minn. 48, 127 N.W.2d 702 (1964), cited by T.A.T., is
not analogous to this case because it does not involve either a parent who has a child with
serious mental health, educational, and emoti onal special needs or a parent who failed to
comply with a case plan designed to equip him with the skills necessary to provide for that
child’s special needs. Likewise, In re Welfare of L.L.N. , 372 N.W.2d 60, 62-63 (Minn.
App. 1985), also cited by T.A.T., is not analo gous to this case beca use there, this court
concluded that “[i]nfrequent visitation and sporadic child support payments are insufficient
reasons to terminate [the] parental rights” of a father who “is presently able to carry out his
fatherly duties.” Here, the district court made extensive findings and determined that
T.A.T. was not presently able to carry out his fatherly duties nor would he be able to do so
in the future.
T.A.T. also argues that termination on this ground is improper due to his
participation in parts of his case plan. But participation in a case plan does not preclude a
finding that a parent has failed to comply with parental duties under the statute. K.S.F.,
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823 N.W.2d at 667. “Rather, the issue is whet her the parent is pres ently able to assume
the responsibilities of car ing for the child.” Id. (quotation omitted). The district court
recognized T.A.T.’s efforts but found a histor ical pattern of neglect of the parent-child
relationship, a present resistance to services, poor insight into his children’s special needs,
and a complete lack of progress during the 17 months of the case.
The district court weighed the credibility of the witnesses and noted T.A.T.’s efforts,
but determined they were insuffi cient to establish that he was able to parent his children,
either presently or in the foreseeable future. The record supports the district court’s finding
that T.A.T. neglected his duties in the pare nt-child relationship. Because clear and
convincing evidence supports this statutory ground, we need not address the other statutory
grounds on which the district court relied. See K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d at 667 (declining to
analyze other statutory bases after affirming on one statutory basis).
II. Best Interests
T.A.T. challenges the district court’s c onclusion that termination was in the best
interests of IL.G. and IM.G. We review a district court’s ultimate determination that
termination is in a child’s best inte rest for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at
905. Once a court has determined that there is a statutory basis for terminating parental
rights, it must consider whether termination is in the child’s best interests. Id. The court
balances three factors: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship;
(2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing
interests of the child.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05,
subd. 3(b)(3). “Competing interests include such things as a stable environment, health
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considerations and the child’s preferences.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (quotation marks
omitted). The stability of the child is an important factor in the best-interests
determination. In re Welfare of K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982). The district court
may also consider “the children’s need fo r stability and predicta bility, [and a parent’s]
limited bond with the children.” K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d at 668.
T.A.T. argues that termina tion cannot be in the best interests of his children because
it is never in the best interest of a child to have the parental rights of both parents
terminated; the case should have been reverted to a CHIPS proceeding because of the social
worker’s testimony that the foster parent may allow T.A.T. to remain in contact with his
children; and there is voluminous evidence that he and his children love each other.
T.A.T.’s argument that termin ation of the parental rights of both a mother and father
can never be in the best intere st of a child is unsupported by law and is without merit.
Likewise, his argument that termination cannot be in the best inte rests of the children
because the social worker indicated the foster parent may allow T.A.T. to continue to see
his children during supervised visits is unsupported and without merit.
The record demonstrates that all of t hose involved in this case—including the
court—struggled with the grave and weighty conclusion that T.A.T.’s time to demonstrate
the understanding and ability to care for his children had run out. In summary, the district
court found that termination was in the best interests of the childre n because: (1) the
children had spent over 800 days in foster care and reverting the matter back to CHIPS
would not be appropriate due to the length of time the children sp ent in foster care;
(2) T.A.T.’s “inconsistency, instability, passi ve involvement, and poor insight” with
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respect to his children’s speci al needs made him incapable of providing the consistency
and stability they required; (3) though T.A.T. and his ch ildren love each other, the
preferences of T.A.T. and his children are strongly outweighed by the children’s competing
interests in stability, permanen cy, structure, and a safe hom e; and (4) termination would
put an end to the children’s uncertainty and the cycle of child protection involvement.
A parent’s bond with a child we ighs in favor of reunification. In re Welfare of
A.J.C., 556 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 1997).
However, a parent’s love may not be en ough to outweigh competing interests. See In re
Welfare of Child of K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 93 (Minn. App. 2012) (concluding that while the
love between parent and child was undisputed, because of the child’s complex medical
needs, the parent lacked the sk ills necessary to provide for the child’s best interests).
Evidence of T.A.T.’s love for his children was presented at trial, considered by the district
court, and found to be outweighed by the competing interests of ensuring that the children’s
special needs and their interests in a stable and safe life were provided for.
The district court did not abuse its disc retion in determining that termination of
T.A.T.’s parental rights would be in IL.G. and IM.G.’s best interests.
Affirmed.