Matthew Roy Woller, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0684

Matthew Roy Woller, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 26, 2017
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-14-1165

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Andrew T. Jackola, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district co urt’s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief, arguing that his guilty plea to aiding and abetting second-degree assault is inaccurate
and therefore invalid and that reversal is required to correct a manifest injustice. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Matthew Roy Woller, T.H., S.M.H., and D.S. drank alcohol together at a
bar late one winter evening. Woller had also ingested methamphetamine. Woller indicated
that his former friend J.E.V. owed him money. Woller, T.H., S.M.H., and D.S. agreed to
a plan in which T.H., driving in one vehicle, would pick up J.E.V., bring J.E.V. to a meeting
spot, and wait for S.M.H., D.S., and Woller, following behind in a different vehicle, to
confront J.E.V.
T.H. drove to J.E.V.’s location early the next morning. J.E.V. eventually got inside
T.H.’s vehicle, and T.H. began driving with S.M.H., D.S. , and Woller following behind ,
preparing for a “confrontation between [D.S.] and [J.E.V.].” Woller exchanged text
messages with T.H. during the drive. After some time had passed, T.H. parked, and J.E.V.
got out of T.H.’s vehicle. D.S. exited the other vehicle and approached J.E.V.
D.S. then shot J.E.V. Woller heard the gunshot. D.S. returned to the vehicle where
Woller and S.M.H. were waiting so that the three could flee. But when S.M.H. tried to
drive away, the vehicle got stuck in a rut. Woller and D.S. tried unsuccessfully to push the
vehicle out of the rut. Woller and D.S. then ran and hid together in a ditch. Woller called

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T.H., who picked up S.M.H., D.S., and Woller . But police arrested all four a few miles
away.
The state charged Woller with aiding and abetting second -degree assault under
Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 2 (2012), with reference to Mi nn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1
(2012), which carries with it a presumptive and mandatory -minimum sentence of 36
months’ imprisonment. The state and Woller reached a plea agreement whereby Woller
would complete treatment, remain sober, and provide clean urinalysis sam ples up until
sentencing. In exchange, the state agreed to seek a downward departure to a probationary
term of up to ten years. Woller provided the following factual basis at his plea hearing:
PROSECUTOR: And . . . you and [J.E.V.] had, at one point,
been friends or acquaintances; is that true?
WOLLER: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And [J.E.V.] owed you money; is that
correct?
WOLLER: Yes.
PROSECUTOR: And so during the evening hours of February
15, 2014, did you make arrangements with T.H. to meet
[J.E.V.]?
. . . .
WOLLER: Well, I mean, [T.H.] was going to meet him and we
were going to follow behind and talk to him.
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: . . . But what was the purpose in you
following T.H.?
WOLLER: Confrontation between [D.S.] and [J.E.V.].
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: But it was for your behalf; is that fair to say?
I understand that it ’s your position that you didn‘t know that
[D.S.] was going to shoot [J.E.V.].
WOLLER: I had no idea. I didn’t know he had a gun.
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: And when [D.S.] got out of the ve hicle and
confronted [J.E.V.] he shot him, correct?
WOLLER: I heard a gunshot. I didn’t see it. Yes.

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PROSECUTOR: And then he got back in the vehicle that you
were in?
WOLLER: Correct.
PROSECUTOR: And then you guys started to drive away,
correct?
WOLLER: Correct.
. . . .
PROSECUTOR: Her vehicle got stuck?
WOLLER: True. Yep.
PROSECUTOR: So that you guys tried to push the vehicle out
of the rut?
WOLLER: True.
PROSECUTOR: And that didn’t work?
WOLLER: Right.
PROSECUTOR: So then you and [D.S.] took off on foot,
right?
WOLLER: True.
PROSECUTOR: And then you actually ended up hiding in a
ditch for a little bit, right?
WOLLER: True.
PROSECUTOR: And then [D.S.] ditched the gun?
WOLLER: I don’t know what [D.S.] did with the gun.
PROSECUTOR: Okay.
WOLLER: I never saw it.
PROSECUTOR: And then [T.H.]—you called [T.H.] to come
back and get you, correct?
WOLLER: Correct.
PROSECUTOR: And then she came back and got you?
WOLLER: Yep.
PROSECUTOR: As well as [D.S.]?
WOLLER: Yep.

Woller pleaded guilty, but the district cou rt deferred accept ance of his guilty plea
until the sentencing hearing. Woller requested two separate continuances of the sentencing
hearing so that he could have more time to complete his drug program and provide clean
urinalysis samples. The state expressed concerns about granting the continuances ,
reasoning that Woller repeatedly failed to submit to urinalysis tests and that the samples

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that Woller had provided tested positive for amphetamines. The district court granted both
continuances.
Woller failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. The district court rescheduled
Woller’s sentencing hearing a third time. Woller appeared for his sentencing hearing and
requested a downward departure. The district court declined to downward depart , citing
Woller’s failed urinalysis samples, failure to appear for sentencing , and shortcomings
regarding treatment, and sentenced Woller to 36 months’ imprisonment. Woller petitioned
the district court for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground
that his p lea was invalid because it was not accurate. The district court denied Woller’s
petition. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Woller argues his guil ty plea is not supported by an adequate factual basis . He
contends that he negated the essential element s of aiding and abetting second -degree
assault by stating in his plea colloquy that he did not know that D.S. intended on assaulting
J.E.V. until he heard the gunshot , did not know D.S. possessed a gun, and did not intend
his presence or actions to further D.S.’s second-degree assault.
Upon review of a postconviction court’s decision, we examine “only whether the
postconviction court’s findings are supported by sufficient evidence,” and will reverse only
if that court abused its discretion. Lussier v. State , 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012)
(quotations omitted). A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea, but a court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing if
“withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice,” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1,

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which “exists if a guilty plea is not valid ,” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn.
2010). Whether a guilty plea is valid is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.
A guilty plea is valid if it is accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. “A defendant
bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.” Id. “The accuracy requirement protects
a defendant from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he could be
convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.” Id. A guilty plea is accurate if it is established
by a proper factual basis providing “sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion
that [the] defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he de sires to plead guilty.”
State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). “The factual
basis of a plea is inadequate when the defendant makes statements that negate an essential
element of the charged crime because such statements are inconsistent with a plea of
guilty.” Id. at 350.
Woller pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting second-degree assault, a conviction that
requires that Woller “intentionally aid[ed]” another person who “assault[ed] another with
a dangerous weapon and inflict[ed] substantial bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. §§ 609.05, subd.
1, .222, subd. 2. The intentionally aiding element “embodies two important and necessary
principles: (1) that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit
a crime, and (2) that the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the
commission of that crime.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012) (quotations
omitted).
Woller contends that his plea colloquy did not satisfy the requisite knowledge
element for aiding and abetting second -degree assault because he stated that he did not

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know that “[D.S.] intended to assault J.E.V. before the assault happened ” or that D.S.
possessed a gun. We disagree. We concluded in State v. Smith that “[a] defendant who
acquires the requisite knowledge while the accomplice is in the process of committing the
offense, and makes the choice to aid in its commission either through [his] presence or [his]
actions, is guilty as an accomplice under the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 609.05.” 901
N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. App. 2017), review denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2017). The district
court in Smith instructed the jury with respect to proof of the knowledge element that “the
defendant knew her alleged accomplices were going to or were committing a crime .” Id.
at 660. The appellant in Smith contended that the district court misstated the law, arguing
that “foreknowledge of the accomplice’s plan or intent to commit a crime is necessary for
a conviction under section 609.05 .” Id. at 662. We concluded that the district court did
not err, id. at 664, reasoning that accomplice liability attaches if the defendant “possess[es]
knowledge of the crime before the defendant intentionally aids in its commission .” Id.
at 662.
It follows from Smith that, although Woller stated that he did not know that D.S.
possessed a gun or intended to shoot J.E.V., Woller’s conduct nevertheless satisfied the
knowledge requirement for aiding and abetting second -degree assault . Woller’s plea
colloquy established that Woller acquired knowledge of the assault before his presence or
actions furthered its commission. See id. Woller admitted in his plea colloquy that he
observed D.S. exit the vehicle and approach J.E.V. While Woller denied knowing about
or seeing a gun, he admitted he heard a gunshot. And Woller did not deny that D.S. shot

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J.E.V. Therefore, Woller had the requisite knowledge of the second -degree assault. See
id.
We must next determine if Woller’s plea colloquy establishes that, after forming the
knowledge of the second-degree assault, he intended his presence or actions to further its
commission. Woller maintains that his plea -colloquy statements do not establish that he
intended his presence or actions to further the commission of D.S.’s second-degree assault.
Woller asserts that he anticipated only a confrontation between D.S. and J.E.V. We
disagree.
Woller testified that, after hearing the gun shot, and knowing that D.S. shot J.E.V.,
he helped D.S. try to push the vehicle out of a rut, ran and hid with D.S. in a ditch, and
contacted T.H. to pick them up. Woller’s plea colloquy satisfied the essential elements of
aiding and abetting second -degree assault and provided an adequate factual basis for his
guilty plea.
Because there is no manifest injustice requiring a plea withdrawal, the district court
acted within its discretion by denying Woller’s petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.