Gideon Charles Arrington, II, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0695

Gideon Charles Arrington, II, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 12, 2018
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-13-8457

Gideon Charles Arrington II, Rush City, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Atto rney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant Gideon Charles Arrington II challe nges the district court’s denial of his
petition for postconvicti on relief following his Alford plea1 to the charge of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct. Arrington contends that the postconvic tion court should have
permitted him to withdraw his plea because his counsel was ineffective and withdrawal
was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2013, Arrington was charged with three counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct and one count of kidnapping. About two months before his trial, Arrington
asked to represent himself and waived his ri ght to counsel. Arringt on’s previous public
defender was discharged, and advisory counsel was assigned. Advisory counsel prepared
for trial in case Arrington changed his mind about self-representation.
On the day his trial was scheduled to be gin, Arrington requested counsel. The
district court appointed Arrington’s advisory counsel to represent him, and counsel stated
on the record that she was prepared to proc eed and understood the theory of the case.
Although the district court offered to delay the trial for a few days, and Arrington’s attorney
advised postponing to allow time to look in to the DNA evidence, Arrington elected to
proceed with the trial as scheduled.

1 An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence of the
charged offense because there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find him guilty at trial.
State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. 1977) (discussing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970)).

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Four days later, after jury selection but before opening statements, Arrington entered
an Alford plea to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and waived his right to
a Blakely jury trial2 on the state’s request for an upward sentencing departure in exchange
for a maximum executed sentence of 324 months and dismissal of the remaining counts.
After the state’s offer of proof at the pl ea hearing, Arrington expressed concerns
about inconsistencies in the anticipated witness testimony. Based on these reservations,
the district court had Arrington meet privately with his attorney to confirm that he wished
to proceed with his plea. Upon returning to court, Arrington reiterated multiple times that
he wished to proceed with the plea and that the state had shown sufficient evidence to
convict him. Before accepting the plea, the district court had Arrington confirm for a final
time that he was satisfied that his attorney had been “up to speed” and that he was not being
“forced” into a plea. The district court accep ted the plea and, at sentencing, imposed a
324-month sentence based upon four aggravating factors.
Arrington appealed, challenging his sentence as unduly exaggerating the criminality
of his conduct and seeking to withdraw his plea due to ineffe ctive assistance of counsel
because, he asserted, counsel pressured him to enter the plea. State v. Arrington, No. A14-
1945, 2016 WL 102476, at *1, *3 (Minn. App. Jan. 11, 2016), review denied (Minn.
Mar. 29, 2016). We affirmed Arrington’s sentence, but, because the record was
insufficient to determine whether the plea wa s invalid based on ineffective assistance of

2 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-04, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536-37 (2004), holds that
a defendant is entitled to a ju ry determination on whether there are aggravating factors
warranting an upward durational sentencing departure. State v. Dettman, 719 N.W.2d 644,
647 (Minn. 2006).

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counsel, we preserved that issu e for postconviction proceedings. Id. at *2-3. Following
that decision, Arrington file d a petition for postconviction re lief seeking to withdraw his
plea due to ineffective assistan ce of counsel and manifest injustice. Arrington based his
claims on alleged statements that his attorn ey had made to him at their out-of-court
discussions surrounding his plea deal.
An evidentiary hearing was held in Novemb er 2016. Arrington testified that his
attorney told him that he would lose at tr ial because it was an “election year,” that the
system was “rigged,” and that he had “no chance at winning.” He also claimed his attorney
told him that the judge would not give him an upward departure and that he was generally
unware that he could receive a 324-month sentence under the plea agreement. The attorney
testified that she had never made any of the alleged stat ements regarding Arrington’s
chance of success at trial or stated that he would not r eceive an upward dispositional
departure. She testified that, in fact, sh e had told Arrington just the opposite—that he
would get an upward departure—although she could not predict exactly what the departure
would be.
The postconviction court found Arrington’s testimony not credible. The court found
that Arrington “understood the plea, understood he was giving up the right to challenge the
[s]tate’s evidence and was agreeing that there was a subs tantial likelihood a jury would
convict him, even though he questioned perceived inconsistencies in the statements of one
witness.” The court also found that Arringt on’s attorney was “clearly proficient in the
facts” and “prepared to try the case.” Accordingly, the postconviction court concluded that
there was no basis for Arrington to withdraw his plea and denied his petition for relief.

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Arrington appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A person convicted of a cr ime may petition the district court for relief from his
conviction or sentence based on a claim that “the conviction obtained or the sentence . . .
violated the person’s rights under the Constituti on or laws of the Unite d States or of the
state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (20 16). We review the denial of postconviction
relief for an abuse of discretion. Gulbertson v. State, 843 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Minn. 2014).
“A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is ba sed on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d
162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). In reviewing a postconviction court’s decision
to deny relief, issues of law are reviewed de novo and issues of fact are reviewed for
“whether the postconviction court’s findings are supported by sufficient evidence.” Leake
v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Min n. 2007). “A petitioner se eking postconviction relief
has the burden of establishing, by a fair prep onderance of the eviden ce, facts that would
warrant relief.” Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Minn. 2002).
I. Arrington’s plea was not invalid based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
As the first basis for withdrawing his pl ea, Arrington argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim,
a defendant must show “(1) that his couns el’s representation ‘fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness’; and (2) ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the pr oceeding would have been different.’” Nissalke
v. State, 861 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

6
688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984)). “The objective standard of reasonableness
is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the custom ary skills and diligence
that a reasonably competent attorney woul d perform under similar circumstances.” State
v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 26 6-67 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted). Trial counsel’s
performance is presumed reasonable, Schneider v. State , 725 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn.
2007), and appellant bears the burden of proving both prongs of the Strickland test, Gates
v. State, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987).
We review the denial of postconviction relief premised upon a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel de novo because such a claim involves a mixed question of law and
fact. See Hawes v. State, 826 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Minn. 2013) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2070). Here, the dist rict court found that Arrington’s testimony was
“not credible” and concluded that his counsel was “not deficient and was certainly within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”
Arrington’s ineffective-a ssistance-of-counsel claim, as it was argued at his
postconviction hearing, was premised upon hi s attorney’s alleged representations to
Arrington during their private conference in the middle of his plea hearing. The claim thus
turns on the district court’s determinations about the credibility of the two competing
witnesses. “Because the postc onviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness
credibility, we review its credibility determinations under the clearly erroneous standard.”
Bobo v. State, 860 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Minn. 2015) (citations and quotation omitted). Under
this standard, “[w]e will not disturb the postconviction court’s findings of fact if reasonable
evidence supports those findings.” Id. at 685 (citations and quotation omitted).

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Reasonable evidence supports the postconvi ction court’s decision to credit the
attorney’s testimony over Arrington’s. Arri ngton’s attorney had been a public defender
for over 10 years. She was ordered to prepare to try the case while serving as advisory
counsel over a month before trial and had creat ed her own trial notebook. On the day of
trial, she confirmed that she was prepared and ready to proceed with a theory of the case.
Reiterating her preparation at the postconvicti on evidentiary hearing, she testified that,
although she would have liked additional tim e to look into the DNA evidence, Arrington
wanted to proceed with the trial as scheduled and she was prepared to accommodate this
request. Based on the record, Arrington’s attorney was clearly prepared to try the case on
schedule. She thus had no apparent motive to force a plea deal. Moreover, Arrington’s
attorney testified unequivocally that she never told Arrington the things he claimed.
In addition, as the postconviction cour t found, Arrington’s allegations at the
postconviction hearing “clearly contradict[ed]” his earlier sworn testimony. At the plea
hearing, Arrington testified that he was “clearheaded” and making a “knowing, voluntary
and intelligent decision.” He sp ecifically agreed he was not “being forced into this plea
because things went too fast” and confirmed that no one had made “promises or threats” to
him regarding the plea agreement. Th e plea petition, which Arrington signed and
acknowledged at the plea hearing, also st ated that no one, including his attorney, had
threatened him or made any promises in order to obtain the plea.
On this record, the postconviction court had ample basis to believe the attorney, and
not Arrington, whose unsupported assertions of coercive statements contradicted his own
sworn testimony at the plea hearing. The pos tconviction court thus did not clearly err in

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finding that Arrington’s counsel did not pressure him into pleading guilty, nor did the court
err in concluding that Arrington’s plea was no t invalid based on ineffective assistance of
counsel.
II. Arrington’s plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
As a second basis for postconviction relief, Arrington argues that his plea was not
accurate, voluntary, or intelligent. 3 A court must allow a defe ndant to withdraw a guilty
plea if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A
manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Perkins
v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997).
Accurate
Arrington argues that he did not believe there was a subs tantial likelihood that the
state’s evidence, if introduced at trial, would lead a jury to convict him. For a guilty plea
to be accurate, a proper factual basis must be established. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712,
716 (Minn. 1994). In a typical guilty-plea cas e, a factual basis is established by the
defendant testifying to and admitting the facts of the crime. State v. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d
210, 215 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015). In the case of an Alford

3 The bases for Arrington’s challenge to his guilty plea appear to exceed the scope of issues
that this court preserved for postconvictio n review on Arrington’s direct appeal, see
Arrington, 2016 WL 102476, at *3 (preserving “the issue of whether Arrington’s guilty
plea is invalid based on ineffective assistance of counsel”), and may be procedurally barred
under State v. Knaffla , 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976) (holding that,
once a petitioner has had a direct appeal of a conviction, all matters that were or should
have been raised are barred from further postc onviction review). However, because the
state did not make that objection and the po stconviction court decided the issues on the
merits, we, too, will address the issues.

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plea, however, the defendant maintains his or her innocence; in that case an adequate
factual basis exists if the defendant “agrees that evidence the [s]tate is likely to offer at trial
is sufficient to convict.” Id. Because of the inherent conflict between pleading guilty and
maintaining innocence, caselaw requires a “strong factual basis for an Alford plea.” State
v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007).
Here, Arrington pleaded guilty to firs t-degree criminal sexual assault. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c) (2 012) (stating that a person is guilty of first-degree sexual
conduct crime if he engages in sexual penetration with another person, causing reasonable
fear of great bodily harm). The state made an offer of proof spanning nearly 15 pages of
transcript, including anticipated testimony of an eyewitness who saw the abduction, a
detailed recounting of the sexual assault by the victim, and DNA evidence matching
Arrington’s profile. After hearing the state’s case on the record, Arrington agreed there
was sufficient evidence to establish a substantial likelihood that he would be convicted by
the jury at trial. Later, af ter meeting privately with his a ttorney during the middle of the
plea hearing, Arrington confirmed that he wa nted to proceed with the plea, specifically
acknowledging that he would no longer be able to challenge inconsistences in witnesses’
statements. These facts are sufficient to esta blish a strong factual basis for the plea and
thus satisfy the accuracy requirement.
Voluntary
At his postconviction hearing, Arrington ar gued that his attorney coerced him into
pleading guilty by telling him that he would not receive a fair trial and had no chance of
winning and by making false promises about the sentence he would receive. Courts

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determine whether a plea is voluntary by c onsidering all relevant circumstances and
ensuring the defendant did not plead guilty due to improper pressure or coercion. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 2010). As discussed abov e, the postconviction court
properly concluded, based on findings supported by the evidence, that Arrington’s counsel
did not pressure him to plead guilty. Arri ngton’s claim that his plea was involuntary is
without merit.
Intelligent
Finally, at the postconviction hearing, Arrington argued that his plea was
unintelligent because he did not know he could receive a 324-month sentence under the
plea deal and that he was misled about the length of the sentence he would receive. For a
plea to be intelligent, the defendant must understand the charges against him, the rights he
is waiving, and the cons equences of the plea. Id. The postconviction court found not
credible Arrington’s claim that “he did not see ‘324 months’ on the Plea Petition” and noted
that “[t]he transcript from th e plea hearing is full of refe rences to the potential of a 324
month sentence.”
As the district court observed, the record includes a number of instances in which
Arrington had his plea agreement explained in detail and confirmed that he understood it.
At the plea hearing, Arrington was reminded of the possible 324-month sentence at least
three different times. First, the state explai ned the plea deal, specifically stating the
“maximum sentence the defendant could re ceive under this agreement would be 324
months in prison. The defense is free to argue for anything below that.” Later, Arrington’s
attorney reviewed the substance of the plea agreement, specifically reminding Arrington

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that “[the agreement is] limited in the sentence that [the judge] could give you of up to 324
months.” Finally, prior to accepting his plea, the district court summarized the substance
of Arrington’s proposed plea and confirmed that he understood the rights he was waiving
and his potential sentence:
THE COURT: You understand that part of this plea agreement
is you’re waiving your right to the trial and you agree that the
State can submit to me the evid ence that they have and I’ll
make the determination whethe r those aggravating factors
exist?
[ARRINGTON]: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: And in making th at determination, that’s how
I’ll decide if we go up to the max 324 months.

In addition, the signed plea petition, which Arrington acknowledged reviewing with his
attorney and understanding fully, outlines his plea deal, including the maximum sentence.
Overall, these facts amply support the postconviction court’s findings that Arrington
understood the charges against him, the rights he was waiving, and the consequences of his
guilty plea, notably that he was facing up to 324 months in prison. Because the
postconviction court properly determined that Arrington’s plea was accurate, voluntary,
and intelligent, the court did not err in denying Arrington’s request to withdraw his guilty
plea.
III. Arrington’s remaining claims fail.

Arrington asserts, for the first time, claims involving prosecutorial misconduct and
false statements by witnesses in the case. We ordinarily will not c onsider matters raised
for the first time on appeal. Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Pro se
litigants generally are held to the same standards as attorneys. Liptak v. State ex rel. City

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of New Hope , 340 N.W.2d 366, 367 (Minn. App. 1983). Moreover, these claims are
procedurally barred since Arrington should have known of thes e issues at the time of his
direct appeal, yet he failed to raise them. See Leake, 737 N.W.2d at 535. As these claims
are not properly before us, we decline to address them further.
Affirmed.