Dorothy Manni, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0706

Dorothy Manni,
Relator,

vs.

Duluth Clinic, Ltd.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and
Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed November 6, 2017
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Department of Employment and
Economic Development
File No. 35224261-3

Dorothy Manni, Virginia, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Duluth Clinic, Ltd., Duluth, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri Phillips, Lee B. Nelson, Department of Employment and Economic Development,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
In this unemployment-benefits appeal, relator Dorothy Manni argues that a looming
potential dress code constituted a good reason to quit caused by her employer and
challenges the unemployment -law judge’s determination that she was ineligible for
unemployment benefits. We affirm.
FACTS
Manni started working for respondent Duluth Clinic, Ltd. in 2014. The clinic had a
business-casual dress code, and she often wore a business jacket. Manni interviewed for a
different position at a separate Duluth Clinic location and ultimately got the position. She
started to work at the new job in September 2016. During the interview process, the dress
code was not discussed , and Manni continued to wear the same type of clothes once she
started her new position.
At the new location, workers had recently unionized, and a potential dress code
consisting of mandatory polo shirts was part of ongoing negotiations between management
and the union . Manni first learned about the potential dress code at a November staff
meeting, where she informed management that she did not like to wear polo shirts . S he
thought they were “tacky” and unprofessional. A couple of hours after the meeting, she
informed a manager that she was uncomfortable wearing polo shirts and would not stay
with the company if it became a requirement. The manager mistakenly replied that the
dress code would become mandatory on January 1, 2017 , when in fact it was only part of
a tentative agreement between Duluth Clinic and the union.
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On that same day, Manni sent an email to her union p resident and expressed
concerns over the dress code. The union president replied a week later that the dress code
was part of ongoing negotiations. Throughout the next few weeks, Manni spoke with
several managers and received conflicting information on whether the dress code was
going to become mandatory, or if it was just a tentative agreement. Despite the confusion,
Manni stated in documentation she submitted to the ULJ prior to the hearing that she was
aware “it was just a [t]entative [a]greement and it was not going to be mandatory Jan. 1,
2017.” During a meeting with her supervisor, Manni said that she would not wear polo
shirts and would have to be fired instead. The supervisor replied that she would not
terminate her, but there would be repercussions if she did not follow the dress code.
In late December, Manni received a job offer from a different employer , and she
quit her job with the provided reason of “I have been offered a position with a school closer
to home.” Prior to quitting, Manni never informed Duluth Clinic why she could not wear
polo shirts other than thinking they were unprofessional . She never informed the clinic
about a medical condition preventing her from wearing polo shirts, or if she needed an
accommodation. Manni also did not ask Duluth Clinic if the proposed dress code would
allow her to wear a business jacket over the polo shirt.
Manni applied for unemployment benefits but was determined ineligible. She
appealed and argued that Duluth Clinic caused her to quit by saying the polo shirts would
be part of a mandatory dress code and that it failed to disclose this dress code policy during
the interview. She also argued that polo shirts would negatively affect her:
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In addition to be [sic] given false information, the polo shirt
would cause a severe negative affect on me. These shirts are
too tight fitting. I am unable to wear tight fitting clothes. For
personal reasons, there are many days I need to adjust, unhook,
or remove my undergarment.

At the hearing, she did not mention any medical conditions, but she did say that
undergarments occasionally cut off her breathing so she needs to remove them. Manni
further explained that she needs to wear undergarments with polo shirts, because the lack
of undergarments is too noticeable.
The ULJ determined that Manni was ineligible for benefits because she quit and did
not fall within any statutory exception. This included determining Manni did not quit due
to a good reason caused by the employer under Minnesota Statutes section 268.095,
subdivision 1(1) (2016), because: (1) she quit before any dress code went into effect, so
there were no adverse working conditions; ( 2) even if the dress code did go into effect,
Manni’s dislike of polo shirts was a personal preference, and not the result of a medical
condition; and (3) Manni never requested an accommodation.
Manni filed a request for reconsideration, arguing that she had a medical condition
that prevented her from following the dress code. She presented a letter from her doctor
stating, “Due to complications with her medical condition, [Manni] is unable to adhere to
the dress code.” The ULJ affirmed his previous det ermination because Manni did not
explain what the medical condition was or how it prevented her from wearing polo shirts,
she did not request any accommodations from Duluth Clinic, and there were no adverse
working conditions at the time she quit. This appeal follows.
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D E C I S I O N
Individuals who quit employment are generally ineligible to receive unemployment
benefits unless they fall within a statutory exception, one of which includes applicants who
quit because of a “good reason caused by the employer.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1).
A good reason cau sed by the employer is a reason “ (1) that is directly related to the
employment and for which the employer is responsible; (2) that is adverse to the worker;
and (3) that would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed
rather than remaining in the employment.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a). Furthermore,
employees who allege that there are adverse working conditions must complain to the
employer and give the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse conditions.
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c). Whether an applicant had a good reason to quit caused
by the employer is a question of law, which we review de novo, but factual findings by the
ULJ should not be disturbed if they are substantially sustained by the evidence. Rowan v.
Dream It, Inc., 812 N.W.2d 879, 882-83 (Minn. App. 2012).
Manni argues that she quit because she could not wear polo shirts due to a medical
issue, Duluth Clinic gave false information to her regarding the status and effective date of
the dress code, and the dress code was not discussed during the interview. She argues that
the ULJ erred in determining these were not good reasons to quit caused by her employer.
We address these arguments in turn, in addition to a failure-to-accommodate argument that
Manni alludes to.
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The potential dress code is not a good reason to quit caused by the employer.
Manni primarily argues that the dress code in itself was a good reason to quit caused
by her employer. But this argument fails because the dress code had not yet caused any
adverse conditions as required under Minnesota Statutes section 268.095, subdivision 3(a),
and even if it did, Manni did not give Duluth Clinic a reasonable opportunity to correct any
adverse conditions pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 268.095, subdivision 3(c).
The dress code did not create any present adverse conditions because it was not yet
enacted. While there were some miscommunications about the status of the dress code,
the ULJ found that Manni learned that it was only tentative and would not become
mandatory on January 1 , 2017. And regardless of her knowledge regarding a future
effective date, the dress code was not in effect at the time she quit. Any concerns regarding
the impact of the new dress code were speculative. Similarly, the record is devoid of
evidence showing whether t he polo shirts would actually be tight fitting or cause Manni
any of the issues she was concerned about . This undermines Manni’s argument because,
for conditions to be adverse to the worker, the conditions must be supported by more than
mere speculation. See Johnson v. Walch & Walch, Inc., 696 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. App.
2005) (holding that a change of work location was not an adverse working condition
because the possibility of a reduction in wages and hours was merely speculative), review
denied (Minn. Jul y 19, 2005). Like in Walch, the adverse working conditions here are
speculative, and b ecause there were no active adverse conditions, the dress code cannot
constitute a good reason to quit under Minnesota Statutes section 268.095,
subdivision 3(a)(2).
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Even if there were adverse working conditions, Manni failed to give Duluth Clinic
a reasonable opportunity to correct them. Manni complained multiple times about the polo
shirts, but these complaints centered on the shirts being tacky or unprofessional. Manni
never mentioned that the polo shirts were too tight fitting for her, that there was an
underlying medical condition affecting her ability to wear polo shirts , or that she needed
an accommodation of any kind. The unemployment statute does not just require that the
applicant complain to her employer, but to also “give the employer a reasonable
opportunity to correct the adverse working conditions.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(c).
Because Manni never explained to Duluth Clinic why she cannot wear polo shirts, and
instead only expressed that it was a personal preference that she did not like polo shirts,
she did not giv e her employer a “reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working
condition[]” pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 268.095, subdivision 3(c).
Because of both the lack of adverse effects stemming from a potential dress code
and the lack of communication from Manni regarding her concerns, the dress code in itself
was not a good reason to quit caused by the employer.
Information provided to Manni regarding the status and effective date of the dress code
is not a good reason to quit caused by the employer.
Broadly interpreted, Manni also argues the miscommunications about the status of
the dress code and the fact the dress code topic did not occur during the interview constitute
good reasons to quit caused by Duluth Clinic. We disagree. Two facts d rive Manni’s
argument: (1) Duluth Clinic mistakenly told her that the dress code would become
mandatory and (2) the dress code was never d iscussed during the interview. However,
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neither of these issues constitutes a good reason to quit, as a miscommunication and failure
to address dress codes during an interview are unlikely to cause a reasonable person to quit.
This is especially true given that Duluth Clinic corrected its miscommunication with Manni
and she was aware the dress code was part of ongoing negotiations.
A failure-to-accommodate violation did not occur, and therefore cannot serve as a good
reason to quit caused by the employer.
Manni argues that she had a medical condition preventing her from complying with
the potential dress code and that her managers should have taken the initiative to find out
if any possible accommodations were necessary. While Manni does not explicitly equate
her argument to possible Americans with D isabilities Act ( ADA) or Minnesota Human
Rights Act (MHRA) failure-to-accommodate violations, this court has discretion to review
any matter in the interest of justice. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04.1
Both the ADA and MHRA require employers to provide reasonable
accommodations to qualified individuals with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (A)
(2012); Minn. Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 6(a) (2016). A disabled individual is someone who
has an impairment affecting a major life activity, has a record of such an impairment, or is
regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (20 12); Minn. Stat.
§ 363A.03, subd. 12 (2016). But t he employee has the initial burden of putting the
employer on notice of a need to accommodate. See Rask v. Fresenius Med. Care N. Am. ,

1 Because the record does not establish that a violation occurred, this court does not need
to reach the issue of whether an ADA or MHRA violation can constitute a good reason to
quit caused by the employer.
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509 F.3d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 2007); Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d
534, 547 (Minn. 2001).
Here, Manni is unable to establish an ADA or MHRA failure-to-accommodate
violation. Importantly, the record is not sufficiently developed to determine if Manni is a
qualified individual with a disability. The only known information of her medical
condition is the letter from her doctor , dated after she quit, which states , “Due to
complications with her medical condition, [Manni] is unable to adhere to the dress code of
[Duluth Clinic].”2 This does not explain what the condition is or any effects it has on major
life activities.
More fundamentally, Manni did not satisfy her initial burden of putting the
employer on notice of a need to accommodate, which is central to a viable ADA or MHRA
claim. See Rask, 509 F.3d at 470; Hoover, 632 N.W.2d at 547. The ULJ made a finding
that Manni never requested an accommodation. This i s supported by the record.
Additionally, t here is no evidence that Duluth Cl inic knew or should have known that
Manni had a disability, and the medical letter from her do ctor was dated after she quit.
Because of these shortcomings, an alleged failure to accommodate does not rise to an ADA
or MHRA violation and cannot serve as a good reason to quit caused by the employer.

2 On appeal, Manni attached a new letter from her doctor, providing more detail about her
medical condition. However this letter was not part of the record and cannot be considered
on appeal. See Deike v. Smelting, 413 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that
a document not in the record cannot be considered on appeal).
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Accordingly we conclude that the potential dress code, Duluth Clinic’s
miscommunications, and Duluth Clinic’s alleged failure to accommodate were not good
reasons to quit caused by the employer. Manni is not entitled to unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.