State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0709

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ryan Michael Beach,
Appellant.

Filed February 20, 2018
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-16-1163

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wi ng County Attorney, Canda ce Prigge, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
Appellant Ryan Michael Beach challenge s the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying his convicti ons of receiving stolen property and of possessing stolen checks,

2
arguing that the circumstantial evidence was in sufficient to prove that he constructively
possessed the stolen items. B ecause sufficient evidence supp orts appellant’s convictions
beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.
D E C I S I O N
The state charged appellant with receiving stolen property, possession of counterfeit
checks, and possession of a controlled substa nce, stemming from an incident in March
2016. Police officers responded to a disturba nce call at appellant’s apartment, which he
shared with his girlfriend. Officers discove red a red mesh bag in a common area of the
apartment building containing computer equi pment, a glass pipe with methamphetamine
residue, and a checkbook for a dental office. Several of these items had been reported
stolen from a dental office. Officers obtaine d a search warrant for appellant’s apartment,
where they discovered additional stolen ite ms, including computer equipment, dental
supplies, and two checkbooks be longing to A.G. and to M.S. A jury convicted appellant
of receiving stolen property and of possessing stolen checks, but acquitted him of the drug-
possession charge.
Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prov e he was guilty of
receiving stolen property and possessing stolen checks. W ith respect to receiving stolen
property, “any person who receives, possesses, transfers, buys or conceals any stolen
property or property obtained by robbery, knowing or having reason to know the property
was stolen or obtained by robbery” is guilty of a crime. Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1
(2016). As to the second offense, “[a] person who . . . possesses . . . a check that is stolen
. . . , knowing or having reason to know the check is stol en . . . , is guilty of a crime” and

3
may be sentenced for a felony crime if the offe nse involves two or more direct victims.
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.528, subds. 2, 3(3) (2016). Because th ese offenses require proof that
he knew they were stolen, an d knowledge is a state of mind, appellant’s knowledge is
proved by circumstantial evidence.
Officers did not find appellant in actual physical possession of the stolen items.
Therefore, the state was required to prove that appellant constructively possessed the items.
See State v. Peterson , 375 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn. App. 1985) (“In proving [defendant]
possessed the stolen property, the State had to show either actual or constructive
possession.”). The constructive-possession doctrine allows a conviction to stand where the
state cannot prove actual possession, but where “the inference is strong that the defendant
physically possessed the item at one time and did not abandon his po ssessory interest in
it.” State v. Smith, 619 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Jan. 16,
2001). When stolen items ar e found in a shared space, the state must “show a strong
probability, inferable from other evidence, that [the defend ant] consciously exercised
dominion and control over the stolen items.” State v. Zgodava , 384 N.W.2d 522, 524
(Minn. App. 1986).
Our review of a sufficiency-of-the-evidenc e challenge is “limited to a painstaking
analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when view ed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, wa s sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which
they did.” State v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 108 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). When
an element of the offense has been proven circumstantially, we apply a heightened standard
of review. State v. Al-Naseer , 788 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Minn. 2010) (holding that a

4
conviction based on circumstantial evidence warrants heightened scrutiny). But “[w]hile
it warrants stricter scrutiny, circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as direct
evidence.” State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Minn. 1990). This heightened standard
of review requires us to first identify the ci rcumstances proved and defer to the jury’s
“acceptance of the proof of thes e circumstances,” and then “examine independently the
reasonableness of all inferences that migh t be drawn from the circumstances proved,
including inferences consistent w ith a hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Porte , 832
N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). We defer to the jury’s
acceptance of the circumstances proved and rej ection of evidence conflicting with those
circumstances. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013).
The state satisfied its burden of proof here. “Knowledge that the property was stolen
may be proven by circumstantial evidence,” Peterson, 375 N.W.2d at 95, and “[a]n
individual’s unexplained possession of stolen property within a reasonable time after a theft
will in and of itself be sufficient to sustain a conviction.” State v. Hager, 727 N.W.2d 668,
677-78 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted). Here, the evidence establishes that stolen
items valued at over $1,000 were discovered in appellant’s apartment within one week of
the burglary at the dental office. Appellant’s friend, who had spent the day with appellant,
testified that he had seen a ppellant carrying the red bag in to the apartment. Officers
discovered checkbooks from two separate vic tims in appellant’s ap artment, and each
victim testified at trial that appellant did not have permi ssion to possess each checkbook.
The circumstances proved by the state demonstrate that appellant received stolen property
and possessed stolen checks, satisfying the first prong of the heightened-scrutiny test.

5
The second step of our analysis is to determine whether the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt a nd inconsistent with any hyp othesis other than guilt. See Al-
Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473. This part of the an alysis gives “no deference to the fact
finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599. Appellant
argues that even if the stolen items and the stolen checkbooks were found in his home, the
state failed to show that he exercised “ dominion and control” over those items. To
successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, appellant bears
the burden of “point[ing] to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory
other than guilt.” State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). But the possibility
of a defendant’s innocence does not require reve rsal if “the evidence taken as a whole
makes such theories seem unreasonable.” Id.
Appellant has not identified evidence in th e record consistent with a theory other
than guilt. Appellant argues that the stolen items could belong to someone else, and notes
that he shares the apartment with his girlfriend. Appellant also suggests that the individuals
who caused a disturbance in his apartment could have left the stolen items behind—in the
kitchen, the living room, and appellant’s bedroom drawers—when they fled. These
inferences are unreasonable in light of the evid ence as a whole. The stolen property was
found throughout the apartment, including in appellant’s kitchen, the living room, and the
bedroom. Some of the dental items had been used. The stolen checkbooks were discovered
in two separate rooms. Appellant has not identified evidence in the record consistent with
a rational theory other than guilt.

6
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring
to the jury’s credibility determinations, State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009),
the jury could reasonably conc lude that appellant was guilty of the charged crimes. The
reasonable inferences from th e evidence are consistent with appellant’s guilt and
inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Su fficient evidence exists to
permit the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt th at appellant was guilty of
receiving stolen property and of possessing stolen checks.
Affirmed.