State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0711

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Phillip D. Mallett, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed April 30, 2018
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-16-5734

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Hannah J. Prokopowicz, Assistant County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Jud ge; and Ross,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In this appeal from his conviction of misdemeanor domestic assault, appellant
argues that (1) the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to

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cause fear of bodily harm and (2) the district court committed plain error that affected his
substantial rights when it admitted relationship evidence of his prior domestic conduct
under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2014). We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Phillip D. Mallett, Jr., and the victim, A.A.S., began dating in December
2015 and began living tog ether in early 2016. In late May 2016, Mallett shoved A.A.S.
into a chair when he was angry and told her to go to her mother’s or things would get
violent. In June 2016, when Mallett began having his three -year-old daughter stay with
him and A.A.S. 50% o f the time, Mallett told A.A.S. that if she caused him to lose his
daughter, he would cause her to lose her daughter, who lived with them. On June 17, 2016,
Mallett was angry because A.A.S. did not want his daughter to sleep in their bed. Mallett
lifted up and dropped the couch that A.A.S. was sleeping on, began arguing with her, and
threw a bar stool at her.
On Mallett’s daughter’s birthday, June 20, 2016, A.A.S. had planned to spend the
day with Mallett and the girls and then meet up with a friend during the evening. A.A.S.
explained that she expected that the birthday celebration would be “something simple,
getting a cake and going to the park or something.” When Mallett got home from work at
about 6:30 a.m. on June 20, he quickly got angry about A.A .S.’s evening plans and began
yelling at her, and they argued for much of the morning. During the argument, Mallett
began recording A.A.S. with his cell phone, and A.A.S. went into another room because
she did not want to be recorded. A short time later, thinking that the argument had ended,
A.A.S. went into the kitchen to talk to Mallett. When A.A.S. entered the kitchen, Mallett

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picked up his daughter and began recording A.A.S. again. A.A.S. approached Mallett and
tried to grab his phone away from him. Mallett “swung” the phone out of A.A.S.’s hand
and accidentally struck his daughter in the head in the process.
As A.A.S. turned to pick up her daughter, Mallett clenched his fist at A.A.S. Mallett
brought his fist up from his side like he was about “to throw a punch.” A.A.S. thought that
Mallett was going to hit her, and she turned and ducked, but Mallett did not follow through
with hitting her. As A.A.S. backed out of the kitchen, Mallett punched a closet door that
was within five feet of her, which put a hole in the door and caused it to fall down. Mallett
picked up the closet door and put it back and told A.A.S. that it would be her face next
time.
When A.A.S. finished getting her daughter ready for the day, she left the residence,
called 911, and went to the police station. After taking a statement from Mallett and
examining the scene, Officer Daniel Nelson arrested Mallett, and, based on the incident on
June 20, Mallett was charged with one count of misdemeanor domestic assault with intent
to cause fear of bodily harm, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2014).
At trial, the district court admitted evidence of the May 2016 and June 2016
incidents. Mallett made a pretrial objection to the evidence, the district court made a
preliminary ruling that it was admissible, and the record does not show that Mallett
renewed his objection when the evidence was admitted. Before admitting the evidence,
the district court instructed the jury that the evidence was offered for the limited p urpose
of showing the nature and extent of the relationship between Mallett and A.A.S. to assist
the jury in determining whether Mallett committed the charged offense and that Mallett

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was not being tried for and could not be convicted of any other behavior. The district court
also gave a limiting instruction during closing instructions.
The jury found Mallett guilty as charged. This appeal followed sentencing.
D E C I S I O N
I.
A defendant who “commits an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate
bodily harm” is guilty of domestic assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1). Mallett
does not dispute that he committed an act that caused fear when he punched the closet door.
He argues, however, that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to cause
A.A.S. fear of bodily harm.
When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court carefully examines
“the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to
the conviction,” was sufficient to allow the fact-finder to reach the verdict that it reached.
State v. Caine, 746 N.W.2d 339, 356 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We must assume
that the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and did not believe any contrary evidence.
State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013). We will not disturb the verdict if
the fact -finder, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence ” and the
requirement of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that [the]
defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618,
621 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
“Intent must be determined from all the objective facts and circumstances,
including the defendant’s conduct and/or statements at the ti me of the act.” State v.

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Whisonant, 331 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn. 1983). “Because intent is a state of mind,” it is
generally proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Essex, 838 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Minn.
App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Jan. 21, 2014). “A conviction based on circumstantial
evidence . . . warrants stricter scrutiny.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn.
2010). A conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires that the circumstances
proved be consistent with a defendant’s gu ilt and inconsistent with any other rational or
reasonable hypothesis. State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 257 (Minn. 2008).
To determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with a defendant’s
guilt and inconsistent with any other rational or reas onable hypothesis, the court applies a
two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, the court
determines the circumstances proved, giving due deference to the fact -finder and
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. at 598–99. Second,
the court determines whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any other rational or reasonable hypothesis. Id. at 599. This analysis
requires that the court look at the circumstances proved not as isolated facts but rather as a
“complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of
the defendant as to exclude . . . any reasonable inference other than guilt.” Al–Naseer, 788
N.W.2d at 473 (quotation omitted). This analysis gives “no deference to the fact finder’s
choice between reasonable inferences.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted).
Mallett argues that he punched the closet door out of anger and frustration over
A.A.S. having made plans with a friend instead of celebrating his daughter’s birthday with
the family, not because he wanted to cause A.A.S. fear of bodily harm. Mallett’s argument,

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however, ignores A.A.S.’s testimony that, during the argument on June 20 , Mallett
clenched his fist and raised it as if he was about to punch her, and she turned and ducked.
A person acts “with intent to” cause fear of immediate bodily harm if he “either has
a purpose to . . . cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause
that result.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2014) (defining mental states, including
“[w]ith intent to”). “Intent may be inferred from events occurring before and after the
crime and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823,
840 (Minn. 2003). A victim’s reaction to an act is circumstantial evidence that is relevant
to intent. See State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 401, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1975) (stating
that victim’s reaction to t hreat “was circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of
intent”).
The only reasonable inference from the evidence that Mallet raised his fist to A.A.S.,
and she turned and ducked, is that Mallett intended to cause fear of immediate bodily harm.
See Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016) (“Intent can be inferred from the
idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions.” (quotation
omitted)). Even without the relationship evidence, the circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to prove intent.
II.
Because Mallett did not renew his objection to the relationship evidence at trial, this
court reviews the admission of the evidence for plain error. State v. Word , 755 N.W.2d
776, 783 (Minn. App. 2008). Under the plain-error test, the defendant must show that there
was (1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected appellant’s substantial rights. State

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v. Vick , 632 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2001). If this court concludes that any of the
requirements of the plain-error test are not satisfied, it need not consider the others. State
v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn. 2012).
“An error is plain if it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious.’” State v. Milton , 821 N.W.2d 789,
807 (Minn. 2012). Minn. Stat. § 634.20 governs the admissibility of domestic -conduct
evidence in domestic -violence cases. Under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, the district court may
admit evidence of similar conduct b y the accused against the victim of domestic abuse if
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153,
159 (Minn. 2004).
“Evidence presented under section 634.20 is offered to demonstrate the history of
the relationship between the accused and the victim of domestic abuse.” State v.
Barnslater, 786 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Minn. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 2010).
The supreme court has recognized “the inherent value of evidence of past acts of violence
committed by the same defendant against the same victim.” State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d
227, 236 (Minn. 1999).
Mallett argues that the admission of the relationship evidence was plain error
because it had low probative value as to Mallett’s intent and that any probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice given the close proximity in
time between the charged offense and the earlier conduct. In State v. Meyer, 749 N.W.2d
844, 849 (Minn. App. 2008), the victim’s credibility was at issue, and the appellant asserted

8
that the domestic-conduct evidence led the jury to find him guilty based on past conduct
rather than on evidence of the current charged offenses. This court determined that “the
three prior acts of domestic violence . . . provided a context in which to examine [the
victim’s] credibility.” Id.; see also State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. App.
2008) (noting that relationship evidence has “significant probative value in assisting the
jury to judge witness credibility”). As in Meyer and Lindsey, proof of Mallett’s intent
turned on the jury’s assessment of A.A.S.’s credibility, and the relationship evidence had
significant probative value in assessing witness credibility. It is not apparent why the
temporal proximity of the charged offense and the earlier conduct would cause the jury to
improperly consider the relationship evidence.
Citing State v. Hormann, 805 N.W.2d 883, 891 (Minn. App. 2011) , review denied
(Minn. Jan. 17, 2012) , Mallett also argues that the probative value of the relationship
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because it painted
him as a physical abuser and created the risk that the jury would determine his intent in
punching the closet door based on his past acts rather than his actual intent on June 20. In
Hormann, this court concluded that the district court erred in admitting testimony that the
defendant, “during a 20–year marriage, broke every door in the couple’s home, broke the
walls, physically abused his wife, engaged in ‘a lot of violence,’ was ‘very angry,’
‘controlled all the money,’ didn’t want his wife to have friends, and continually subjected
her to humiliating, controlling, and hostile behavior.” Id. This court stated that the
evidence “was only marginally relevant to establish why [appellant’s wife] believed her
car was being tracked by appellant” and that “the testimony – which is devoid of detail as

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to time, place, circumstance, or context – presents the risk of leading the jury to improperly
conclude that appellant has a propensity to behave criminally and should . . . be convicted,
and punished, for the charged offenses.” Id. Unlike the evidence in Hormann, A.A.S.’s
testimony about Mallett’s prior conduct was specific as to time, place, circumstances, and
context.
Admission of relationship evidence requires a bala ncing test, and we find no basis
to conclude that the district court erred in applying that test.
Affirmed.