State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0718

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Scott Bradley Knutson,
Appellant.

Filed February 5, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-16-8100

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem , Olmsted County Attorney, James P. Spencer, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Jennifer D. Plante, Assistant County Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
In this appeal from final judgment of his conviction and sentence for third -degree
assault, appellant argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his Alford plea on the

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grounds that (1) the evidence presented did not establish a factual basis for third -degree
assault because the intent and substantial -bodily-harm elements were lacking and (2) the
district court failed to conduct its own independent analysis of the factual basis. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Scott Bradley Knutson with third -degree assault
(substantial bodily harm) under Minn. Stat. § 609.2 23, subd. 1 (2016). The elements of
that crime are: “Whoever assaults another and inflicts substantial bodily harm may be
sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more
than $10,000, or both.” Minn. Stat. § 609 .223, subd. 1. The state alleged that, u pon
returning from a hospital procedure, Knutson jumped off a gurney , struck hospital
employee M.A.N. in the face, and pushed her into a wall. M.A.N. gave chase, but Knutson
escaped. During the investigation, police (1) learned that M.A.N. separated her shoulder,
(2) interviewed employee-witness B.Y. who confirmed M.A.N.’s story, and (3) reviewed
surveillance video that was consistent with statements provided by B.Y. and M.A.N.
Knutson faced a presumptive sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment, with a range of
26 to 36 months, consecutive to a sentence that he was currently serving. Knutson and the
state reached a plea agreement whereby Knutson would plead guilty to third-degree assault
in exchange for a “concurrent sentence of 26 months . . . , no fines or surcharges, [and]
time served.”
At his sentencing hearing, after attempting a traditional guilty plea, t he prosecutor
suggested an Alford plea. The district court explained the Alford plea process, and Knutson
responded that he understood. Knutson confirmed that the state provided him with all the

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evidence that the state would introduce at trial and that he had seen the evidence. The
prosecutor then questioned Knutson on the record about all the evidence the s tate would
introduce at trial:
Q. Mr. Knutson, . . . [M.A.N.] would testify, the State
expects when they cal led her, that she fell down as a
result of being pushed and struck. Do you understand
that?
A. Yup.
Q. And she was also pushed against the wall. You
understand that that would be her testimony. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you understand that she would testify that as a
result of that, her face, neck, shoulder, and arm were
injured. Do you understand that would be her
testimony?
A. Yes.
Q. You understand that the State would also call [B.Y.] to
testify as well. Correct? That was another lady in that
area.
A. Apparently, yeah.
Q. And [B.Y.] would testify observing you push
[M.A.N.]. You understand that that’s what the State
would present at trial.
A. Yeah.
Q. And you understand the State would also call a doctor
who treated [M.A.N.] to testify regarding her injuries,
including the fact that she had a separated shoulder
following this incident. Do you understand that?
A. Yup.
Q. And you understand that [M.A.N.] would testify that
she had her arm in a sling for a while that impaired her
ability to use her arm following this incident. You’re
aware of that.
A. I guess I am.
Q. And I guess I should word that differently. You’ re
aware that the State would elicit that testimony at trial.
A. Sure.
Q. And you understand that the State would also call
officers to testify regarding their investigation. Is that
fair?

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A. Yup.
Q. And you understand the State would play surveillance
video depicting these events. Is that fair? And I know
you have a different interpretation of the surveillance
video, but you understand the State would play that.
A. I’d be more than willing to watch them tapes.
Q. And you could play them, too, at trial. You understand
that.
A. Yeah.
Q. Based on the State presenting that evidence, do you
agree that it would be sufficient, if believed by the jury,
for the jury to find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of the offense of third degree assault?
A. Yup.

The district court determined that the state’s evidence was “sufficient to support a jury
verdict of guilty” and stated that it was satisfied that appellant understood the benefit of
the plea. The district court therefore accepted Knutson’s Alford plea, adjudicated Knutson
guilty, and sentenced him to 26 months’ imprisonment with 134 days’ credit for time
served. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Knutson argues that his Alford plea is invalid because it is inaccurate and that the
district court did not make its own finding that the evidence was sufficient. A guilty plea
is valid if it is accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94
(Minn. 2010). “Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that [an appellate
court] review[s] de novo.” Id.
A defendant enters an Alford plea if he maintains his innocence but “reasonably
believes, and the record establishes, the state has sufficient evidence to obtain a
conviction.” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994) (citing North Carolina v.

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Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970)). An Alford plea is accurate if (1) it is
established by a proper factual basis, which exists if the plea is based on “evidence
discussed with t he defendant on the record at the plea hearing” and (2) the defendant
“agrees that evidence the State is likely to offer at trial is sufficient to convict.” State v.
Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007). The former can be established through “an
interrogation of the defendant about the underlying conduct and the evidence that would
likely be presented at trial.” Id. The latter can be accomplished by having the defendant
“specifically acknowledge on the record at the plea hearing that the evidence the State
would likely offer against him is sufficient for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard,
to find the defendant guilty of the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” Id. Both
requirements “provide the court with a basis to independently conc lude that there is a
strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he
pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of innocence.” Id. If both are satisfied, “an
Alford plea meets the accuracy prong.” Id.
Here, t he state was required to prove that Knutson intentionally inflicted bodily
harm upon another, see Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (defining third -degree assault);
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(2) (2016) (defining assault-harm), resulting in “a temporary
but substantial loss or impairment of the function” of M.A.N.’s shoulder ,” see Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 7a (2016) (defining substantial bodily harm).
Knutson reasons that his Alford plea is not supported by an adequate factual basis
because there is “no evidence or admission that the act of pushing was intentional” or that
M.A.N. suffered substantial bodily harm. We disagree.

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As required by Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649, the prosecutor first stated, and Knutson
agreed, that the state would introduce the following evidence: (1) M.A.N.’s testimony that
she fell after Knutson hit her and pushed her into a wall and that she sustained injuries to
her face, neck, shoulder, and arm; (2) B.Y.’s testimony that she saw Knutson push M.A.N.;
(3) the police officer’s testimony about the investigation of the assault; (4) the physician’s
testimony that M.A.N. suffered a separated shoulder; and (5) surveillance video. The
above evidence provides a strong factual basis that would satisfy the intent and substantial-
bodily-harm elements of third-degree assault.
The prosecutor then asked Knutson if, based on that evidence, he agreed that “it
would be sufficient, if believed by the jury, for the jury to find [Knutson] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of third degree a ssault.” Knutson said, “Yup.” Because
the prosecutor questioned Knutson with the evidence that the state would introduce at trial
and Knutson agreed that evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict him beyond a
reasonable doubt, Knutson’s plea is accurate. See Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649.
Knutson also contends the district court failed to make its own independent findings
that there is a strong probability he would be found guilty at trial . We rejected this
argument in Johnson, although in the context of a Norgaard plea.1 State v. Johnson, 867
N.W.2d 210, 215 -17 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015). “The

1 A Norgaard plea is similar to an Alford plea but different in that in a Norgaard plea, the
defendant’s “ inability to admit the allegations in the complaint is due to his lack of
recollection” and not due to maintaining his innocence. Johnson, 867 N.W.2d at 215 n.1.
Johnson advised that the “caselaw indicates that the same standard applies to either type of
guilty plea.” Id.

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statement in Theis concerning what a district court must ‘independently conclude’ indicates
merely that a district court must assure itself that the accuracy standard is satisfied.” Id. at
216 (quoting Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649). Here, the district court stated on the record its
assurance of the Alford plea’s accuracy. Therefore, Knutson’s plea is valid.
Affirmed.