In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: D. K., Parent

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0744

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
D. K., Parent

Filed August 21, 2017
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-JV-16-2529

Daniel T. Donnelly, Austin, Minnesota (for appellant D.K.)

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Aaron Jones, Assistant County Attorney, Austin,
Minnesota (for respondent Mower County Human Services)

Todd Schoonover, Hollandale, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the termination of his parental rights, arguing that the
record does not support the distri ct court’s determinations that (1) he failed to rebut the
presumption that he is a palpably unfit parent, (2) he has failed to comply with the duties

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointme nt pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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of the parent-child relationship, and (3) termination is in the children’s best interests . We
affirm.
FACTS
In 2012, appellant -father D.K.’s parental rights to X.N. were involuntarily
terminated. In 2013, a child -in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) matter was
initiated involving D.K.’s child, A.L-K., due in part to D.K.’s history of abusive behavior
toward A.L-K.’s mother, K.L. K.L. worked a case plan and the matter was closed. D.K.
did not participate in a case plan.
In August 2016, respondent Mower County Health and Human Services (county)
received a maltreatment report after law enforcement responded to D.K.’s suspected drug
overdose while he was caring for his children, A.L -K. and B.L -K. D.K. told la w
enforcement that he had taken K.L.’s prescription medication and used methamphetamine.
In December 2016, the county petitioned to terminate D.K.’s parental rights to
A.L-K. and B.L-K. The district court held a hearing on the petition. K.L. testified that the
2013 CHIPS matter was due, in part, to D.K.’s drug use, and physical and mental abuse
toward her. K.L. testified that D.K. did not participate in a case plan because of his drug
use and, around that time, he violated his probation and went back to prison. K.L. testified
that the CHIPS case was closed as to D.K. because he was in prison.
K.L. testified that prior to August 2016, D.K. had “[b]arely a ny” contact with the
children. In August 2016, K.L. asked D.K. if he w ould babysit while she worked. She
testified that she received a phone call that 911 had bee n called to her home . When she
arrived at her home, D.K. was being transported by an ambulance to a hospital because he
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had taken K.L.’s prescription medication. Since that incident, D.K. has had contact with
the children twice. One time, K.L. visited D.K.’s mother and D.K. showed up. The second
time, D.K. called K.L. and A.L-K. answered the phone. K.L. testified that A.L-K. is afraid
of D.K. K.L. testified that her husband, L.A., has been a father figure to the children and
wants to adopt them.
A guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that he met with the children one time and they
did not mention D.K. The GAL testified that the children were “very bonded” to L.A. and
that one of the children called L.A. “dad” during the GAL’s visit at the home.
The GAL testified that his limited contact with D.K. was “[d]ifficult,” “angered,”
and “very unstable.” He testified that D.K. once called him and stated that K.L. and the
children were dead and the GAL had to find their hidden bodies. D.K. called the GAL a
second time and stated that he wanted to see the children. The GAL told D.K. that he could
not make that decision. The GAL testified that D.K. repeatedly threatened to “kill” him,
to “f-ing kill” him . The GAL testified that D.K.’s threats were s o “bold” and “explicit”
that he shared his concern with security at the courthouse before the hearing.
The GAL testified that D.K. “never presented . . . as being a stable individual and
has never presented to . . . being involved in the children’s life.” The GAL testified that it
was “[n]ot at all” safe for the children to be around D.K. The GAL recommended that
D.K.’s parental rights be terminated, which would allow for them to be adopted by L.A.,
“the man they consider their father.”
D.K. testified that the termination of his parental rights to X.N. was due to
abandonment and that he did not have a significant relationship with X.N. D.K. testified
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that he improved himself since his parental r ights to X.N. were terminated, claiming that
he called the children from prison and when he was out of prison he was home every day.
D.K. testified that the CHIPS matter involving A.L -K. was closed after he participated in
services and “everything checked out good-to-go,” and had “nothing to do” with him going
back to prison.
D.K. testified that he was subject to a civil commitment after being foun d to be
chemically dependent. He testified that he spent time in a detox facility before transferring
to a treatment facility, which he left against medical advice due to “drug use at the facility
that [he] didn’t want to be around.” D.K. testified that he has been diagnosed as chemically
dependent, bipolar, and having bord erline paranoia schizophrenia. He also suffers with a
post-traumatic stress disorder, an anxi ety disorder, and depression. D.K. testified that
treatment offered while he is incarcerated i s limited, but he has participated in weekly
therapy sessions for several months and is on medication.
D.K. testified that in August 2016, when he was watching the children, K.L. insisted
that he take her anxiety medication, w hich led to him having a panic attack. He claimed
that he has seen the children “[n]umerous times,” since that incident, and that prior to that
incident he “was in [the children’s] life every day.”
D.K. testified that he provides for the children’s needs “[t]o the best of [his] ability”
by providing diapers and diaper wipes; making sure the c hildren’s shots are up to date;
attending doctor visits; and provided clothing, shelter, food and “anyt hing they needed at
all times.” He testified that he provides for the children’s mental -health needs by “just
being there to support them . . . as a loving father. . . . Giving them the care and love that
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they need.” D.K. testified that he provides for the children’s emotional needs by teaching
time-outs, correcting the children’s wrongs, and telling them they are loved.
The district court terminated D.K.’s parental rights after finding that court orders
evidencing the involuntary termination of D.K.’s parental rights to X.N. established a
presumption that D.K. is palpably unfit to be a parent to the children. The district court
concluded that D.K. failed to rebut the presumption that he is palpably unfit to parent the
children. The district court concluded that termination of D.K.’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interests. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
A district court may terminate parental rights when at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the court determines t hat
termination is in the children’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d
127, 137 (Minn. 2014). This court reviews the district court’s findings for clear error. In
re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008). A finding is clearly
erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. at 660-61 (quotation omitted). This court
reviews the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion.
In re Welfare of the Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). An abuse of
discretion occurs if the district court improperly applied the law. Dobrin v. Dob rin, 569
N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
If a parent’ s rights to another child have been involuntarily terminated, a
presumption arises that the parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent -child
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relationship. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2016). If the presumption of palpable
unfitness applies, the parent has the burden to introduce evidence demonstrating that he is
not palpably unfit. In re Welfare of Child of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. App. 2011),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). To meet his burden, the parent must produce evidence
showing that he “is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the child ren.” R.D.L., 853
N.W.2d at 137 (quotation omitted). This court reviews de no vo the district court’ s
determination that a parent’s evidence failed to meet the burden of establishing that he is
not palpably unfit. J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 446.
Here, the presumption applies because D.K.’s parental rights to X.N. were
involuntarily terminated. D.K. argues that he rebutted the presumption that he is palpably
unfit by demonstrating that “he has worked with mental health practitioners and is actively
seeking additional services to support additional changes in his life.” The district court
found that there was no credible evidence demonstrating that D.K. is not palpably unfit.
The district court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that D.K. failed to improve his
parenting abilities and “continues to be mentally unstable and palpably unfit to parent the
children.” The record supports the district court’s conclusion.
First, in order to meet his burden, D.K. had to produce evidence sufficient to support
a finding that he “is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the children.” See R.D.L., 853
N.W.2d at 137 (quotation omitted). But the last time that he was left to care for the children
in late August 2016, 911 was called because D.K. took K.L.’s prescription medication and
methamphetamine. And not long after that, D.K. was subject to a civil commitment due to
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his chemical dependency, which shows that his chemical dependency is an issue that D.K.
has not yet adequately addressed.
Second, the district court found that when the 2013 CHIPS matter was closed
because K.L. completed a case plan, D.K. was incarcerated and did not complete a case
plan. K.L. testified that the CHIPS matter was closed as to D.K. because he “went back to
prison.” Regarding the CHIPS matter, D.K. testified:
We had gone through the proceedings with the county
workers and the social workers. . . . We had numerous meetings
. . . with county workers, social workers, Gu ardian ad Litems,
at the time. . . . We also had some case planning th at we did
with me, [ K.L.], our family members, you know, as in
reference to a support system; who is in the child’s li ves, her
family, my family, and vice versa. That ended up closin[g]
because everything checked out good -to-go, and it was up to
their standards. And then they no longer needed to come over.

D.K.’s narrative in no way explains how he worked a case plan and does nothing to satisfy
his burden to prove that he is not palpably unfit to parent the children.
Finally, D.K. testified about how he meets the children’s needs. B ut the district
court found “no credible evidence ” showing that D.K. ever provided for the children’s
needs, care, health, or development. The district court found that D.K.’s testimony was
“not credible,” stating:
[D.K.] has a significant criminal history, with multiple assault
convictions and current pending criminal charges . . . . In
December 2016, [D.K.] was ordered . . . in a civil commitment
matter . . . to begin chemical dependency treatment, but he left
the treatment center against medical advice shortly thereafter.
To date, [D.K.] has not comp leted any chemical dependency
treatment program. When questioned . . . about his chemical
dependency, [D.K.] refused to admit to the use of any drugs
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that were not prescribed, which is in clear contradiction to his
well-documented history of methamphetamine use.

The district court’s findings are supported by the record. D.K. admitted to having a
significant criminal history, stating that he has “eigh t or so” assault convictions. D.K.
admitted that he “left [the treatment facility] against medical advice ” and is “ still under
commitment.” The petition to terminate D.K.’s parental rights referenced D.K.’s
methamphetamine use. And K.L. testified that the 2013 CHIPS matter was initiated, in
part, due to D.K.’s drug use and that he did not participate in services because of the same.
Based on this record, D.K. has failed to rebut the presumption that he is palpably
unfit to parent the children. Because it is presumed that D.K. is a palpably unfit parent, at
least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The district court concluded that termination of D.K.’s parental rights is in the best
interests of the children. In any termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, “ the best
interests of the child[ren] must be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 7 (2016). “[If] the interests of parent and child [ren] conflict, the interests of the
child[ren] are paramount.” Id.
D.K. argues that he “listed the many ways in which he was in contact with and
supported his children.” The district court disagreed. The district court found “no credible
evidence in the record indicating that [ D.K.] has ever provided the children with food,
clothing, shelter, education or other care and control necessary for the children’s health and
development. Nothing in the record indicates [that] [D.K.] has even paid child support for
the children.” The district court also found that D.K. has little to no relationship with the
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children. The district court found that it is “unsaf e to return the chil dren to [D.K.]’s care
as he is under civil commitment for chemical dependency, has recently made violent
threats, has made statements that his children are dead, and has used methamphetamine as
recently as August 30, 2016.” The record supports the district court’s findings.
K.L. testified that prior to August 2016, D.K. had “[b]arely a ny” contact with the
children. And since his suspected drug overdose in August 2016, D.K. has had only limited
contact with the children twice. The GAL testified that D.K. told him that K.L. and the
children were dead and that their bodies were hidden. The GAL also testified that D.K.
threatened to “kill” him, to “f -ing kill” him when he told D.K. that he could not make the
decision whether D.K. could see the children.
Finally, D.K. argues that he “is not necessarily seeking full custody” and should be
entitled to “parental time with his children.” He also asserts that the termination is an “end
around” in order for K.L’s husband to adopt the children rather than a “ consideration of
[his] rights as to his children.” But these arguments focus on what D.K. wants and believes
that he is entitled to. The records shows that at least one child is fearful of D.K. The record
also shows that the children are bonded to K.L.’s husband, call him dad, and consider him
their father. D.K.’s interest in a relationship with his children conflicts with the children’s
interests, and the children’s interests are paramount. See id. Based on the entire record,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating D.K.’s parental rights.
Affirmed.