In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. P. and C. G., Parents

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0757

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
S. P. and C. G., Parents

Filed October 23, 2017
Affirmed
Stauber, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-JV-17-24

John E. Mack, Mack & Daby, P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellant mother S.P.)

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Dawn Weber, New London, Minnesota (for father C.G.)

Geri Krueger, Glenwood, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Stauber,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
STAUBER, Judge
Appellant challenges the termination of her parental rights, arguing that she rebutted
the presumption that she is a palpably unfit parent and that the record does not show that
termination is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
FACTS
On January 24, 2 017, appellant-mother S.P.’s parental rights to her two children
were involuntarily ter minated. On February 7, 2017, appellant gave birth to H.P.
Respondent-county petitioned to terminate appellant’s parental rights to H.P., alleging that
she was presumed to be a palpably unfit parent because her parental rights to her older
children were involuntarily terminated.1
On April 18, the district court held a hearing. Appellant testified that she used drugs
since she was 17 years old ( nearly ten years). She testified that she used marijuana while
she was pregnant with H.P. and that H.P. tested positive for marijuana at birth. Appellant
testified that she attempted inpatient treatment at least three times, but was never “ ready”
because she did not feel she had an addiction. Appellant testified that she last attempted
inpatient treatment on February 21, 2017. While there, appellant was told that she would
be able to visit H.P. only one day per week, which caused her to threaten to cut herself.
Appellant testified that she had been a “bad cutter for a long time” but had not cut herself
in over a year. Appellant left inpatient treatment the next day. She testified that she sought
approval to attend outpatient treatment so that she could spend more time with H.P.
Appellant testified that she began outpatient treatment on March 30 and has 60 hours
remaining. Appellant testified that she also attends NA meetings. Appellant testified that
she has abstained from marijuana for six months and methamphetamine for 14 months.

1 C.G. is the children’s father. His parental rights were involuntarily terminated in this
action. He does not challenge the termination of his parental rights.
3
Appellant testified that she has been employed for a little over one month. She
works 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. and is typically off on Wednesday. Prior to her current
employment, appellant held two jobs that each lasted approximately three months; the last
was over a year and a half ago.
Appellant testified that she has Crohn’s disease, and admits a connection between
the disease and her drug use, but stated that she has not been sick since s he removed the
stress from her life. Appellant identified that “stress” as “all the friends that [she] used to
go with [to do drugs]. The theft that [she] got charged with, the drug habit that [she] had.”
Appellant testified that she has been living with her mother since she was released from
jail and plans to stay there because she does not have enough money to live on her own.
She testified that her mother would provide child care for H.P. when she worked.
Appellant testified that she was not in a romantic relationship, but her Facebook
page states that she is in a relationship with J.P. The record shows that J.P. has an extensive
criminal hi story, i ncluding drug charges. Appellant claimed that she indicated on
Facebook that she is in a relationship with J.P. because she thinks that knowledge of this
relationship will discourage certain people from contacting her. Appellant testified that
she recently visited J.P. in jail and is trying to be a sober person to him while he attempts
to change. Appellant admitted that she posted on Facebook “the other day” that she loved
J.P. and that he is a great person.
Appellant testified that although she was diagnosed with PTSD and as bipolar, she
is not doing anything to a ddress her mental health because “it’s changed a lot since [she]
4
stopped using [drugs].” Appellant testified that her mental-health issues are under control
because she does “journaling” and talks to her sponsor.
Appellant testified that although she waited for the county to offer her parenting
classes, she looked online for “different parenting things [.]” Appellant testified that she
could not “mentally or physically take care of [her other children] due to [her] illness,” but
claimed that she is no longer depressed, cares more about herself, and thinks positiv ely
every day about her growing strength.
Appellant testified that since H.P.’s birth, she had the opportunity to see her three
times a week - approximately 30 visits. Appellant testified that she saw H.P. approximately
12 times because of scheduling conflicts and her work schedule.
Appellant’s mother testified that she has seen no indication that appellant is using
drugs. She testified that appellant has the potential to be a good parent. Appellant’s mother
is on probation for 25 years for aiding and abetting second -degree sa le of a controlled
substance.
A social worker testified that she has concerns about appellant parenting H.P.
because H.P. needs a “sober parent[,]” “a safe and stable [drug-free] home[,]” and “a parent
who’s secure with their mental health.” She did not approve of appellant’s mother
providing child care because appellant’s mother would not meet the requirements to be a
county-approved child-care provider.
A guardian ad litem (GAL) testified that it is not in H.P.’s best interests for appellant
to parent her because appellant used drugs multiple times a day during her pregnancy, had
no interest in inpatient treatment, and has a history of not giving “credible narrative[.]”
5
The GAL was concerned about appellant’s infrequent visits with H.P. and her inability to
see reason to address her mental-health issues.
The district court ordered the termination of appellant’s parental rights to H.P. after
concluding that she failed to rebut the presumption that she is a palpably unfit parent and
that it is in H.P.’s best interests to terminate appellant’s parental rights. This appeal
followed.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by terminating her
parental rights. A district court may terminate parental rights when at least one statutory
ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence and the court
determines that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L.,
853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014). This court reviews the district c ourt’s findings for
clear error. In re Welfare of Ch ildren of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008). A
finding is clearly erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. at 660-61 (quotation omitted). We
review the district court’s decision to terminate parental rig hts for an abuse of discretion.
In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N .W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). An abuse of
discretion occurs if the district court improperly applie s the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin , 569
N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
If a parent’s rights to another child have been involuntarily terminated, a
presumption arises that the parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent -child
relationship. Minn. Stat. § 2 60C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2016). A par ent may rebut the
6
presumption by introducing evidence demonstrating that she is not palpabl y unfit. In re
Welfare of Child of J.W., 807 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn.
Jan. 6, 2012). To meet her burden, a parent must produce evide nce showing that she “is
suitable to be entrusted with the care of the child[].” R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137 (quotation
omitted). A parent need not meet the clear -and-convincing evidentiary standard for
termination; rather, she must produce evidence of imp roved parenting skills that “if
believed, would justify a finding contrary to the assumed fact” that she is palpably unfit.
J.W., 807 N.W.2d at 447 (quotation omitted). Whether a parent has satisfied this burden
is “determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 446. We review de novo the district court’s
determination that a parent’s evidence failed to meet the burden of establishing that she is
not palpably unfit. Id. at 446.
Here, the presumption applies because a ppellant’s parental rights to her older
children were involuntarily terminated on January 24, 2017. She later gave birth to H.P.
The hearing on the petition was held on April 18. According to appellant, she did the
following between January 24 and April 18: (1) began outpatient chemical-dependency
treatment, (2) abstained from drug use, (3) attended NA meetings, (4) obtained
employment, (5) removed stress from her life, (6) abstained from romantic relationships,
(7) controlled her mental health through “journaling” and talking to a sponsor, (8) searched
Facebook for parenting instructions , (9) cared more about herself, and (10) visited H.P.
approximately 12 times. Other evidence shows that appellant cares appropriately for a
friend’s child and interacts well with H.P. during visits. Appellant’s social worker
described her as more “proactive” due to her improved efforts at maintaining contact .
7
Appellant had a negative drug test.2 And appellant’s mother testified that appellant gave
no indication that she is using drugs. The district court concluded that appellant did not
rebut the presumption that she is a palpably unfit parent. We agree.
First, as of April 18, appellant had been in outpatient tr eatment fewer than three
weeks. This was after she left inpatient treatment on Febru ary 22, the day after she was
admitted, because she threatened to harm herself if she re mained in inpatient treatment.
There is no evidence that between February 22 and March 30 appellant sought or received
chemical-dependency treatment other than attend ing NA meetings, and she failed to
explain why she waited over one month to attend outpatient treatment. Second, appellant
testified that she last used marijuana on October 12, 2016. However, H.P. tested positive
at birth on February 7, 2017, which, as the district court found, indicated “use much more
recently.”
Third, the record shows that appellant is likely in a relationship with J.P., who has
a lengthy criminal history. The district court found appellant’s statements about her lack
of relationship with J.P. not credible. Fourth, appellant’s evidence does not show that she
is doing anything to address her m ental-health issues despite being diagnosed with PTSD
and as bipolar. The district court noted concern about appellant’s lack of attention to her
mental health, especially after she posted on social media that she wanted to kill herself
and threatened to cut herself at inpatient treatment.

2 The results of a second test were not yet reported.
8
Fifth, appellant has not taken parenting classes. The record shows that appellant
left her older children in the care of her family before her parental rights were terminated.
Thus, she has not shown that she ever learned how to adequately p arent an infant.
Additionally, her visitation with H.P. has been monitored; she has never been alone with
H.P. Sixth, appellant has not found housing. She testified that she has no immediate plans
to leave her mother’s home and that her mother will care for H.P. when she works. But
appellant’s mother has a felony drug convict ion and would not meet requirements for
approval as a child-care provider.
Finally, and most importantly, although appellant was allowed to visit H.P. three
times a week since H.P.’s birth in February, she visited her only 12 times out of a possible
30 times, due to work conflicts . However, appellant testified that her work day ended
around 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. and s he had Wednesday s off. V isitation records show that
appellant’s visits began at 3:00 p.m. or later and lasted only one -and-a-half hours.
Additionally, H.P. was born February 7 and appellant had been working for only one month
at the time of the hearing on April 18; thus, if appellant began working around March 18,
her work conflicts fail to explain the missed visits over the five weeks between February 7
and March 18. Moreover, appellant testified that she threatened to cut herself in inpatient
treatment because she was told that she w ould be able to see H.P. only one day per week.
While she claims that she needed outpatient treatment to see H.P. more often, she visited
two-month-old H.P. only 12 times in 70 days.
Appellant claims that she introduced “more than enough evidence of fitness”;
however, the record shows that she: (1) has been receiving outpatient treatment for o nly
9
three weeks, (2) was not truthful abou t her drug abstinence, (3) is likely in a relationship
with an individual with a lengthy criminal history, (4) is not addressing her mental-health
issues, (5) is not taking parenting classes, (6) is not in stable h ousing, and (7) rarely visits
H.P. A ppellant has failed to rebut the presumption that she is a palpably unfit parent .
Because it is presumed that appellant is a palpably unfit parent, at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Appellant also argues that the district court gave “insufficient reasons why the
termination of [her] parental rights was in the best interests of the child.”
In any termination -of-parental-rights proceeding, “the best interests of the child
must be the paramount consideration[.]” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2016). “[If] the
interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child are paramount.” Id.
Consideration of a child’s best interests includes the child’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship, the parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship,
and any other competing factors. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3). “Competing
interests include such things as a stable environment [and] health considerations . . . .” In
re Welfare of Children of K.S.F. , 823 N.W.2d 656, 668 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation
omitted). “An order termin ating parental rights must explain the district court’s rationale
for concluding why the termination is in the best interests of the children.” In re Tanghe,
672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003). We review a district court’s best -interests
determination for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of D.F. , 752 N.W.2d
88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008).
10
The district court concluded: “It is detrimental to the best interests of [H.P.] to have
any contact with . . . [appellant].” The district court found that H.P.’s interests are served
by placement with stable parents with whom she can bond. The district court found that
“[a] drug free environment is of paramount importance for [H.P.], and [appellant] has not
proven she can provide that.” The district court stated:
[H.P.] needs stability and predictability, and [appellant] simply
has not proven she can provide that. Her history of drugs and
crime is extensive, and her history of treatment, rehabilitation
and responsibility is brief. It is not in the best interests of the
child that [appellant] have parental rights of H.P. because she
is too much of a question mark. It was a mere three months
ago when [appellant] gave up her parental rights to her older
children on an involuntary basis.

The district co urt thoroughly analyzed why termination is in H.P.’s best interests. See
K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d at 668 (concluding that children’s needs for a sta ble and safe home,
stability, and predictability were best served by terminating parental rights). The district
court did not abuse its discretion in its determination regarding H.P.’s best interests.
Affirmed.