Raymond Joseph Traylor, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0758

Raymond Joseph Traylor, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed December 4, 2017
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-14-3082

Raymond Traylor, Rush City, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chie f Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s denial of his petition for postconviction
relief on his convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the district
2
court judge who presided at his jury trial and an earlier postconviction proceeding should
have been disqualified. We affirm.
FACTS
Following a 2014 jury trial, appellant Raymond Joseph Traylo r was convicted of
two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. This court affirmed his convictions on
direct appeal, rejecting numerous claims of trial and sentencing errors, prosecutorial
misconduct, and other pro se claims. State v. Traylor, No. A15-0029, 2016 WL 854578,
at *2-11 (Mar. 7, 2016). Appellant brought his first petition for postconviction relief in
2016, requesting forensic testing that was purportedly unavailable at the time of trial. The
postconviction court ruled that the claim was procedurally barred and lacked merit. He did
not appeal the first postconviction decisi on. Appellant filed a second petition for
postconviction relief in February 2017, alleging that the district court judge who presided
at trial was a “disqualified adj udicator.” Separately, appella nt moved to have the same
district court judge removed from presiding over this postconviction matter.
Just after conducting pretrial proceedings on the 2014 charges, the district court
judge wrote a letter to the parties to disclose his likely involvement in a 2003 criminal case
in which appellant was the defendant. The j udge stated in the letter that, while he was
working as an assistant county attorney in 2003, he represented the state in an appeal before
the Minnesota Supreme Court to argue a pretrial evidentiary issue in appellant’s case. The
judge was not the charging or trial attorney in that case. Nevertheless, the judge interpreted
the judicial code of conduct to require hi s disqualification in the 2014 case if his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned because of his participation in the 2003 matter.
3
In the letter, the judge informed the parties of the potential conflict and sought their input,
writing, “To be clear, if either party has an objection to me handling this case, I will recuse
and have the matter assigned to a different judge.” The letter was filed in district court on
July 3, 2014. The district court record also includes defe nse counsel’s response to the
letter, which states that appellant “has no obje ction to having [the judge preside] on [the
2014] matter.”
The postconviction court summarily denied appellant’s petition without a hearing,
ruling that the claim was proced urally barred and without merit. The district court also
rejected appellant’s request that the judg e recuse himself from presiding over the
postconviction proceeding. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the postconviction c ourt abused its discretion by summarily
dismissing his second postconviction petition. We disagree.
“A petition for postconviction relief is a colla teral attack on a conviction that carries
a presumption of regularity.” Greer v. State, 673 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Minn. 2004). Under
the well-recognized rule of State v. Knaffla, once a petitioner has had a direct appeal of a
conviction, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be
considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243
N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976); see Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2016) (codifying Knaffla rule).
We review postconviction decisions for an abuse of discretion. Moua v. State, 778 N.W.2d
286, 288 (Minn. 2010). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is
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based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley
v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
We first note that the district court j udge followed proper procedure by disclosing
his involvement in the 2003 criminal matter, seeking inpu t from the parties, and offering
to recuse from hearing the case if requested to do so. See Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule
2.11(A) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. . . .”); State v. Yaeger, 399 N.W.2d 648, 652
(Minn. App. 1987) (requiring “affirmative showing of prejudice” to disqualify a substituted
judge for claimed bias). In this case, the district court judge’s impartiality cannot be
reasonably questioned. The judge’s disclosure letter was properly sent to counsel for
appellant, as required. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 33.02 (requiring service to a represented
party to “be made on the attorney”). Appellant’s attorney responded that appellant had “no
objection” to the judge presiding over the case. As a defendant ’s waiver of non-
fundamental rights may be made by counsel, appellant’s counsel’s waiver of any objection
to the judge presiding over appellant’s 2014 case is valid. See State v. Halseth, 653 N.W.2d
782, 786 (Minn. App. 2002) (permitting waiver of non-fundamental rights to be “effected
by action of counsel”). Ultimately, appellant proceeded pro se to trial, Traylor, 2016 WL
854578, at *1, and he was given full access to the district c ourt record in 2014. As the
record included the relevant documents pe rtaining to the judge’s recusal offer and
appellant’s waiver of the recusal, appellant is deemed to have received notice of that issue
5
in 2014. Under the facts presented, a ppellant’s claim is bot h without merit and
procedurally barred under Knaffla.1
Further, appellant has not offered evidence that would require the district court
judge to recuse himself from presiding over appellant’s second postconviction proceeding.
As discussed, before trial on the current offenses in 2014, the judge properly disclosed his
limited, isolated appearance in an unrelated 2003 criminal matter involving appellant.
Appellant alleges no other basis for disqualification. Again, recusal of a judge is required
only when the judge’s impartiality can be reasonably questioned. See Yaeger, 399N.W.2d
at 652 (requiring “affirmative showing of pr ejudice” to demonstrate basis for judge
disqualification).
The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request
for relief.
Affirmed.

1 To the extent that appellant’s claim depends on his counsel’s purported failure to disclose
the district court judge’s letter to appellant, appellant’s claim for that conduct is ineffective
assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2068 (1984). Because appellant was clearly identified by tw o women who were brutally
raped by him, one of whom knew him, and me dical evidence tied him to the crime, any
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would fail. See Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d
1, 10 (Minn. 2013) (requiring for viable ine ffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that “a
reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s
errors”). In commenting on th e weight of the evidence ag ainst appellant, this court
previously noted that “the evidence against [appellant] was overwhelming.” Traylor, 2016
WL 854578, at *4.