In re the Matter of: Joseph Loren Conner, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0782

In re the Matter of:
Joseph Loren Conner, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jakklyn Marie Netland,
Appellant.

Filed February 20, 2018
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-09-1849

Gary A. Debele, Messerli & Kramer, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jakklyn Marie Netland, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges two district court orders, arguing that the district court
erred when it (1) decided respondent -father’s countermotions because they were not
properly before the court, (2) dismissed as untimely her challenge to a decision made by
the parties’ parenting consultant, (3) deemed her motion for amended findings to be a

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motion to re consider, and (4) limited her ability to present evidence and arguments at a
motion hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother Jakklyn Marie Netland and respondent -father Joseph Loren
Conner have one joint minor child who was born in November 2007. In December 2010,
the parties, who were never married, were granted joint legal and joint physical custody of
the child with a parenting -time schedule that gradually increased father’s parenting time
until the parties had a 5-2-2-5 parenting-time schedule. T he order set a 7 -7 summertime
parenting-time schedule beginning in 2016. The order also appointed, by stipulation of the
parties, a parenting consultant (PC) to assist the parties in settling disputes outside of court.
On February 2, 2011, the terms of the selected PC’s contract were incorporated into a court
order.
On June 28, 2016, mother filed a motion to modify child support. On August 8, she
filed three more motions requesting that the district court (1) sanction father for sharing the
parties’ “sealed court file” with a psychotherapist who evaluated their son, (2) remove and
replace the PC, and (3) overrule a decision made by the PC on July 13, 2016 (the July PC
decision) that “[n]either parent will attend an activity for [the child] which occurs during
the other parent’s parenting time, and which has been paid for by th at other parent.” On
August 12, father filed countermotions requesting a year -round 7 -7 parenting-time
schedule, rather than a school -year reversion to the 2 -5-5-2 parenting-time schedule, and
seeking a court order mandating that the child resume psychotherapy.

3
In an August 1 2 email responding to a request from the PC that mother provide
outstanding information related to disagreements between the parties, mother stated that
she c annot afford the PC’s services and that the PC should not address the parties’
disagreements until after their August 22 motion hearing. The PC agreed not to address
any pending matters until after the parties’ motions were heard by the court.
On August 17, father filed a responsive motion in district court, requesting that the
court deny mother’s motions to modify child support, to remove the PC, and to impose
sanctions. Father also requested that mother’s motion to overturn the July PC decision be
dismissed as untimely because mother failed to object to the PC’s decision within 14 days
pursuant to the February 2, 2011 order, or that it be denied on its merits.
On August 18, mother filed additional pleadings in support of her motions, but the
district court determined that they were not timely served and filed under Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 303(c) and did not consider them.1 On August 22, mother filed an affidavit opposing
father’s countermotions, but the district court determined that it was also not timely served
and filed under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 303(c) and did not consider it.
Mother’s motions and father’s countermotions were heard at the August 22, 2016
motion hearing.2 Mother was given an opportunity to discuss her motions and began with

1 Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 303(c) provides that: “The Rules establish deadlines for responding
to motions. All responsive pleadings shall be served and filed with the court administrator
no later than five days prior to the scheduled hearing. The court may, in its discretion,
disregard any responsive pleadings served or filed with th e court administrator less than
five days prior to such hearing in ruling on the motion or matter in question.”
2 A referee presided over the parties’ hearings, and a district court judge approved the
resultant orders.

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her motion to overturn the July PC decision. Mother restated arguments and information
presented in her pleadings. The district court noted that the issues mother raised would be
reviewed and that mother filed “plenty of information” related to each of her motions. The
court then gave father an opportunity to respond to mother’s motions. 3
Father addressed mother’s motion to modify child support, her motion for sanctions,
and her motion to remo ve and replace the PC. Father also addressed mother’s challenge
to the July PC decision arguing that not only was the challenge untimely , but that the
decision was appropriate and should be upheld substantively. Father also discussed his
countermotions, noting that he would be agreeable to replacing the PC, but that he believed
a timely decision was necessary regarding the parenting -time schedule and the child’s
psychotherapy. Father asserted that, under normal circumstances, he would wait for the
PC’s decision on the matters addressed in his countermotions, but that mother had already
asked the PC not to make decisions and was also attempting to remove the PC. The district
court indicated that it would decide the parenting -time and psychotherapy issues, and
mother did not object.
Mother indicated that she wanted an opportunity to rebut father’s claims and alleged
that father made “several unfair and untrue allegations.” The parties then agreed to replace
the PC and negotiated a replacement procedure. The district court indicated that while the
parties selected a new PC, the remaining issues would be taken under advisement by the

3 Throughout the relevant proceedin gs, mother was pro se and father was represented by
counsel.

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court and that the court would issue a temporary order regarding the parenting -time
schedule for the parties to follow until a permanent order was filed. Mother did not object.
The district court also ordered on the record that the child resume psychotherapy.
Mother stated that she was opposed to this and claimed that she did not have an opportunity
to be heard on the matter. The district court indicat ed that the hearing was over because
the court had other commitments. Mother requested a continuance so she could argue the
issue at a later date. The court noted that mother “filed volumes of pleadings” which would
be thoroughly reviewed again before an order was filed, but that the temporary order was
for the child to resume psychotherapy. Mother requested leave to file more information
and the court explained that mother could attempt to file additional information at court
administration, but that it would not be accepted in the courtroom and would be considered
only if it was timely served and filed. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 303(c).
On August 26, after these motions and countermotions were under advisement,
mother wrote a letter to the district co urt requesting to withdraw her motions to modify
child support, to remove the PC, and for sanctions against father. Mother indicated that
she still intended to pursue her motion to overturn the July PC decision, and that she
believed that her motion was timely.
On September 2, the district court ordered that the parties temporarily continue the
summertime 7-7 parenting-time schedule. The court found that this would provide stability
and continuity for the child while the parties’ motions were pending. On September 6, the
court filed an amended temporary order adding a provision ordering that the child resume
psychotherapy. On September 6 and again on September 14, mother requested permission

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to file a motion to reconsider the September 2 temporary orde r pursuant to Minn. R. Gen.
Pract. 115.11.4 On October 10, the district court denied mother’s request to file a motion
to reconsider. The court noted that mother’s request only raised issues and arguments that
were addressed at the August 22 motion heari ng and did not show compelling
circumstances that warranted reconsideration.
On November 18, the district court filed an order addressing the parties’ various
motions. The court ordered that the 7-7 parenting-time schedule continue on a permanent
basis. The court also dismissed mother ’s motion to modify child support, dismissed with
prejudice her motion for sanctions, denied her motion to remove the PC, and denied her
motion to vacate the July PC decision because mother’s motion was untimely.
Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Father’s countermotions for modification of the parenting -time schedule and
for the child to resume psychotherapy were properly before the district court.

The portion of the PC’s contract , which was incorporated into the district court’s
February 2, 2011 order, that is most relevant to this appeal states:
The parties agree to abide by all determinations that are made
by the [PC] within the scope of authority per this Order, unless
modified by subsequent court order. If one or both of the
parties disagree with the decision of the [PC], that party must
obtain a court hearing date to contest the [PC’s] decision. The
party in disagreement with the decision of the [PC] must

4 “Motions to reconsider are prohibited except by express permission of the court, which
will be granted only upon a showing of compelling circumstances. Requests to make such
a motion, and an y responses to such requests, shall be made only by letter to the court of
no more than two pages in length, a copy of which must be served on all opposing counsel
and self-represented litigants.” Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11.

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provide written notice of the hearing date to the o ther parent
and the [PC] within fourteen (14) days of receiving the written
decision from the [PC]. The party shall be obligated to file and
serve pleadings on the motion within the time frame of the law
and procedural rules governing Family Court.

The parties agreed to utilize the PC to attempt to settle parenting disputes outside of
court. “ [S]tipulated judgments are generally deemed binding contracts.” Szarzynski v.
Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 293 (Minn. App. 2007). Minnesota statutes do not use the
term “parenting consultant,” but “[i]n practice, the term refers to a creature of contract or
of an agreement of the parties which is generally incorporated into . . . a district court’s
custody ruling.” Id. The district court retains authority over parenting issues, irrespective
of the appointment of a PC. See id. (noting that contracts are not construed to reach harsh
or absurd results and that “there can be legitimate reasons to remove or replace a parenting
consultant”); see also Minn. Stat. § 518.175 (2016) (recognizing district court’s continuing
authority to decide and modify parenting time); Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (2016) (authorizing
district court to modify custody orders or parenting plans); Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 114.04(b)
(permitting court, at its discretion, to order parties to participate in alternative dispute
resolution). Furthermore, the welfare and best interests of the child take precedence over
any stipulation by the parents. Sydnes v. Sydnes, 388 N.W.2d 3, 7 (Minn. App. 1986).
Mother argues, without supporting legal analysis or argument , that the district
court’s failure to require father to follow the stipulated process before it addressed his
countermotions violated her due-process rights. Mother also argues that the district court
erred by modifying the parties’ parenting-time schedule and by ordering the child to resume
psychotherapy without first requiring father to follow the stipulated process set out in the

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provision above. Mother asserts that, due to the parties’ stipulation, appointment of the PC
divested the district court of authority or subject-matter jurisdiction over parenting issues
and therefore over father’s countermotions. These arguments are not supported by law and
we reject them.
Mother also asserts, witho ut providing supporting legal analysis, that the district
court’s decision to grant father’s countermotions was not in the child’s best interests. A
district court has broad discretion in deciding parenting -time questions based on the best
interests of the child and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Olson v. Olson,
534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995); Matson v. Matson, 638 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Minn. App.
2002); Braith v. Fischer, 632 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn.
Oct. 24, 2001). “A district court abuses [its] discretion [regarding parenting time] by
making findings unsupported by the evidence or improperly applying the law.” Hagen v.
Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn. App. 2010) (citing Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d
705, 710 (Minn. 1985)). A district court’s findings of fact, on which a parenting -time
decision is based, will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Griffin v. Van Griffin,
267 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. 1978). “If modification would serve the best interests of the
child, the court shall modify . . . an order granting or denying parenting time, if the
modification would not change t he child’s primary residence.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175,
subd. 5(b) (2016).
This issue need not be addressed due to mother’s failure to adequately brief her
argument. See State v. Modern Recycling, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997)
(issues not supported by analysis or argument are waived and need not be considered unless

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prejudicial error is obvious on mere i nspection). A review of the record, however, shows
that the district court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and that it did not
misapply the law. See Wilson v. Moline, 234 Minn. 174, 182, 47 N.W.2d 865, 870 (1951)
(stating that the function of an appellate court “does not require [it] to discuss and review
in detail the evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that it supports the trial court’s
findings” and that an appellate court’s “duty is performed when [it] consider[s] all the
evidence . . . and determine[s] that it reasonably supports the findings”); Cook v. Arimitsu,
___ N.W.2d ___, 2018 WL 492638 , at *6 n.3 (Minn. App. Jan. 22, 2018) (applying this
aspect of Wilson in a family law appeal). The district court did not abuse its discre tion
when it determined that the modified parenting-time schedule and resuming psychotherapy
was in the best interests of the child.
II. The district court did not err by dismissing mother’s challenge to the July PC
decision.

Mother argues that her ch allenge to the July PC decision should not have been
dismissed as untimely because she complied with the stipulated process set out in the
February 2, 2011 order, and that father’s assertion to the contrary was “fraudulent.” Mother
also argues that dismissing her motion was not in the child’s best interests , which should
be the district court’s paramount concern, and that all decisions by the PC should be able
to be challenged in district court regardless of compliance with the stipulated process.
Here, the district court found that mother failed to comply with the procedure set
out in the February 2 order by failing to obtain a hearing date and to notify father of that
date in writing within 14 days of receipt of the July PC decision. Mother failed to comply

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with that procedure at a time when the PC’s appointment was not being challenged in
district court. These findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.
See Griffin, 267 N.W.2d at 735. Although the district court retained authority over
parenting issues and could have chosen to address mother’s challenge on its merits, the
court also had the discretion to decline to address it. See Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 114.04(b)
(noting that in its discretion the district court may order t he parties to utilize alternative
dispute resolution). On this record, the district court’s decision to dismiss mother’s
untimely motion was not an abuse of discretion. 5 See Hagen, 783 N.W.2d at 215 (“A
district court abuses [its] discretion by making fi ndings unsupported by the evidence or
improperly applying the law.”).
III. The district court did not err when it deemed mother’s “motion for amended
findings” to be an improper motion to reconsider.

On December 19, 2016, mother filed a motion to amen d the November 18 , 2016
order’s findings. The motion was argued at a January 25, 2017 hearing, and the district
court filed an April 21 order dismissing mother’s motion as an improperly filed motion to
reconsider. In her motion, mother requested that the court’s findings be amended and that
its order granting father’s countermotions be reversed because father committed fraud upon
the court. Mother c haracterized father’s opinion that the child needs psychotherapy as a
“material misrepresentation” and c haracterized evidence that she failed to properly serve
and file before the August 22, 2016 motion hearing as “newly discovered.” On appeal,

5 Mother argues that it is inconsistent to hold her to the terms of the February 2, 2011 order
and not to hold father to those terms as well, but it is important to note that mother’s attempt
to remove the PC interfered with father’s ability to utilize the PC’s services.

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mother asserts that the district court erred when it deemed her motion for amended findings
to be a motion to reconsider.
A review of the record reveals that, as the district court found, mother did not make
arguments for amended findings in her motion. Instead, mother attempted to present
evidence that was available to her before August 22, 2016 , in order to re -litigate the
motions argued at the August 22 hearing. Based on the substance of mother’s motion, the
district court did not err when it concluded that mother was attempting to pursue a motion
to reconsider under Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 115.11. Mother failed to request permission to
file such a motion as required by the rule, and the district court did not err when it denied
the motion on those grounds.
IV. Mother’s due-process and equal-protection rights were not violated when the
district court limited her time to argue and present evidence at the August 22,
2016 motion hearing, and denied her request for a continuance.

Mother argues that she was not allowed adequate time to rebut father’s arguments
or to argue her motion for sanctions at the August 22, 2016 motion hearing. Mother asserts
that father received a “default judgment” which is not in the best interests of the child. She
also argues that because her time was limited at the hearing, and because she was denied a
continuance of the he aring, her due -process and equal -protection rights were violated.
Other than citing to Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co. , 220 Minn. 318, 326, 19 N.W.2d 795,
799 (1945), for the principle that “[d] ue process requires notice before judgment and an
opportunity to be heard in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case,” mother
does not provide any legal analysis to support her position . Because mother failed to

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adequately brief this issue, we need not address it . See Modern Recycling, Inc. , 558
N.W.2d at 772.
However, a review of the August 22, 2016 motion hearing transcript shows that
mother was given adequate time to make an ora l presentation of her arguments , and that
the district court reviewed mother’s extensive pleadings . Mother was prevented from
submitting new evidence at the hearing, but she failed to file and serve the documents in
question in accordance with Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 303(c). Here, mother had an opportunity
to be heard , and her due -process and equal -protection rights were not v iolated by the
district court limiting her time to argue.
Affirmed.