Florkime Sannie-joy Paye, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0793

Florkime Sannie-joy Paye, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdullah Kiatamba,
Appellant.

Filed February 5, 2018
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-HR-CV-17-191

Eva C. Wood, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

John Arechigo, Arechigo & Stokka, P.A., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges a harassment restraining order (HRO) issued against him,
contending that evidence he contacted respondent three times, in violation of an ex parte
order for protection (OFP), was insufficient to support issuance of an HRO and that the
district court’s findings are inadequate. We affirm.

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FACTS
On February 24, 2017, respondent Florkime Sannie-joy Paye petitioned for an OFP,
alleging that she was sexually assaulted twice by appellant Abdullah Kiatamba during that
month. Kiatamba and Paye had known each other for several years through the African
Immigration Services (AIS), where he is the executive dir ector and she was a volunteer.
The district court issued an emergency ex parte OFP that prohibited Kiatamba from having
contact with Paye, either directly or through third parties, and set the case for an evidentiary
hearing.
At the evidentiary heari ng, Paye’s counsel initially verified that Paye sought an
HRO in the event the district court denied the OFP petition. Paye then testified that she
and Kiatamba had just begun a romantic relationship when Kiatamba forcibly raped her on
two occasions and t hat, before the second assault , he ripped her phone out of her hands,
yelled and swore at her, and ordered her to ask his permission before using her own phone.
Following the second incident, Paye sought medical attention and contacted the police.
Paye further testified that Kiatamba attempted to contact her three times on March 4,
after issuance of the ex parte OFP. First, Kiatamba sent a text message to Paye’s mother
that stated, “Tell your daughter to give us back the keys to our office.” Second, Kiatamba
contacted Paye’s brother and asked him to “ tell your sister to give us our office keys or
mail it back to us.” Third, Paye received a call from a board member of an organization of
which Paye was also a board member . Kiatamba had told the board member about his
relationship with Paye, Paye’s allegations, and the missing keys. The board member
informed Paye of that conversation, asking her if she “really [took] it that far .” Paye also

3
received an individually addressed email from Kiatamba on Mar ch 10 that notified her of
an event.
When asked what effect “all this” had on her day-to-day life, Paye testified that she
was afraid, paranoid, anxious, sleepless, and traumatized. She described Kiatamba as
vengeful and prone to assaultive behavior, and said she feared he would kill her during one
of his rages. She also explained that she was afraid of future sexual violence by Kiatamba
or physical violence by him or his friends, to punish her for seeking the OFP and reporting
his assaults to police.
Kiatamba testified that his sexual encounters with Paye were consensual and that
Paye had initiated their romantic relationship, including sexual contact. Kiatamba admitted
to sending Paye’s mother and brother text messages in order to retrieve the office keys, and
described the email that Paye had received as part of a mass mailing that was auto -
generated. An AIS volunteer who was a confidant of both parties gave testimony
supportive of Kiatamba, describing Paye as a jilted lover.
The district court concluded that Paye had failed to sustain her burden of proof for
issuance of an OFP. But the district court issued an HRO, finding that “[t]he harassment
has or is intended to have a substant ial adverse effect on [ Paye’s] safety, security, or
privacy.” The district court made additional findings on the record , including that
Kiatamba intentionally violated the ex parte OFP on “at least three occasions,” and that his
actions “had a substantial adverse effect upon [ Paye]” and were intended to do so.
Kiatamba appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
An appellate court reviews “the issuance of an HRO . . . for abuse of discretion.”
Peterson v. Johnson , 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). We will not disturb a
district court’s findings of fact “unless [they are] clearly erroneous” and must defer to “the
district court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quotation omitted);
see Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. But we “will reverse the issuance of a restraining order if it is
not supported by sufficient evidence.” Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Minn.
App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004).
A district court may issue an HRO if it finds “that there are reasonable ground s to
believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd.
5(b)(3) (2016). “Harassment” includes “[r]epeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts,
words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial
adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship
between the actor and the intended target. ” Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2016). A party seeking an
HRO must prove “objectively unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser,”
and “an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to harassing
conduct.” Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 764 (quotations omitted).
Kiatamba argues that his conduct did not constitute harassment, that Paye “failed to
articulate how the text messages and email had a substantial adverse effect on her safety,
security or privacy,” and that the district court’s findings were inadequate to support an
HRO. We disagree.

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As to whether Kiatamba committed r epeated intrusive or unwarranted acts , the
district court found that after being ordered not to have any contact—direct or indirect—
with Paye, Kiatamba indirectly contacted her “on at least three occasions.” Paye’s
testimony supports this finding. And it is partially supported by Kiatamba’s admission that
he contacted Paye’s mother and brother separate ly seeking return of Paye’s office keys.
The three indirect contacts through Paye’s family and a community board member
occurred on the same day, which made them more likely to intrude on Paye’s sense of
privacy and security. This is particularly true in light of Kiatamba’s defiance of the order
prohibiting any conduct. We are not persuaded by Kiatamba’s assertion that the innocuous
substance of his indirect communications through Paye’s family members negates a finding
of objectively unreasonable conduct or intent. See, e.g., State v. Egge, 611 N.W.2d 573,
574-75 (Minn. App. 2000) (upholding HRO violation occasioned by a third-party insurance
agent contacting victim about a policy application at the defendant’s behest), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 15, 2000). And Kiatamba’s assertion that the district court erred because the
harassment statute “does not allow for automatic entry of a[n] HRO whenever there has
been a violation of an [e]x [p]arte OFP” is unavailing. Kiatamba cites no caselaw
supporting this proposition and we are aware of none. Even where, as here, an ex parte
OFP is dismissed following an evidentiary hearin g, prior violations are, by definition,
unwanted. And, as noted above, the district court’s finding of harassment is grounded in
more than a single violation of the OFP.
As to the impact of Kiatamba’s conduct, the district court found that it “has or is
intended to have a substantial adverse effect on [Paye’s] safety, security, or privacy.” See

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Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). When asked how she had been affected by the sexual
assault and the harassing con tacts, Paye testified that “all this” caused her to fear for her
life and to beco me paranoid, anxious, sleepless, and traumatized. It is clear from the
context of her testimony that Paye made these statements in reference to Kiatamba’s
unwanted contacts after issuance of the ex parte OFP, as well as in reference to the sexual
assaults. While the district court did not make specific findings on witness credibility, its
assessment that Paye’s testimony was credible can be inferred from its other findings. See
Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (on conflicting testimony,
observing that the district court’s OFP findings “implicitly indicat[ed]” that it found certain
evidence credible, and deferring to that credibility determination).
Finally, we are not persuaded by Kiatamba’s argument that the district court failed
to make adequate findings. While the HRO itself contains only one finding concerning the
impact Kiatamba’s conduct had on Paye, the district court made oral findings at the
conclusion of the evide ntiary hearing that meet all of the statutory requirements for an
HRO. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that it is “sufficient if the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence”). In sum, the evidence and the district court’s findings are sufficient to show
that Kiatamba’s repeated unwanted and intrusive acts both had and were intended to have
a substantial effect on Paye’s safety, privacy, or security. On this record, we di scern no
abuse of discretion by the district court in issuing the HRO.
Affirmed.