Hassan Mohamed Abdillahi, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0797

Hassan Mohamed Abdillahi, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 20, 2017
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-08-52463

Hassan M. Abdillahi, Bayport, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Michael Richardson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s denial of his fourth petition for
postconviction relief, arguing that his conviction was based on unconstitutionally
suggestive identification procedures and that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because of newly discovered evidence. We affirm.
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FACTS
A jury found appellant Hassan Mohamed Abdillahi guilty of second -degree
intentional murder for the death of A.H. The district court sentenced Abdillahi to 391
months in prison. Abdillahi directly appea led his conviction to this court in 2011. This
court affirmed the conviction and the Minnesota Supreme Court denied Abdillahi’s petition
for review. State v. Abdillahi, No. A09-2011, 2011 WL 691623 (Minn. App. Mar. 1, 2011),
review denied (Minn. May 17, 2011) (Abdillahi I).
Abdillahi has since filed several petitions for postconviction relief. This court
affirmed the denial of his first petition in June 2013, Abdillahi v. State , No. A12 -1477,
2013 WL 2924900 (Minn. App. June 17, 2013), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2013)
(Abdillahi II), his second petition in August 2015, Abdillahi v. State, No. A14-1795, 2015
WL 4877721 (Minn. App. Aug. 17, 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2015) (Abdillahi
III), and his third petition in August 2016 , Abdillahi v. State, No. A16 -0179, 2016 WL
4069294 (Minn. App. Aug. 1, 2016), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2016) (Abdillahi IV).
In February 2017, Abdillahi filed his fourth postconviction petition accompanied by
several requests to compel disclosure of certain evidence and information. The primary
claim in his petition is that the police utilized unconstitutionally suggestive procedures to
identify him as the suspect and that the prosecution unlawfu lly withheld this information
from him.
In May 2017, the postconviction court denied the petition and his collateral motions
without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court concluded that all of
Abdillahi’s claims are barred under Knaffla, stating “all of the claims raised in the Fourth
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Petition . . . were raised, were known, or should have been known at the time of
[Abdillahi’s] appeal, First Petition for Post -Conviction Relief, and/or Second and Third
Petitions for Post -Conviction Relief.” The postconviction court further concluded that
Abdillahi failed to establish that any of the exceptions to the Knaffla rule apply to his case.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Abdillahi contends that the postconviction court erred by denying his fourth
postconviction petition. We review the denial of a postconviction petition, including the
denial of relief without an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nicks,
831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). We review legal issues de novo and factual issues by
considering whether there is suffic ient evidence to support the postconviction court’s
findings. Vance v. State, 752 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2008).
The postconviction court may summarily deny a petition without a hearing if the
record demonstrates that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Hooper v. State, 888 N.W.2d
138, 141 (Minn. 2016). For instance, the postconviction court may deny the petition if it
is untimely or procedurally barred. Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 2015).
We resolve all doubts about whether an e videntiary hearing is necessary in favor of the
petitioner. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012).
Here, the postconviction court concluded that Abdillahi’s claim is procedurally
barred by the Knaffla rule. Once a direct appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein,
and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for
postconviction relief.” State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).
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Minnesota courts “have extended the Knaffla rule to claims that were, or should have been,
raised in a previous postconviction petition.” Lussier v. State, 853 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn.
2014). “There are two exceptions to the Knaffla rule: (1) if a novel legal issue is presented,
or (2) if the interests of justice require review.” White v. State , 711 N.W.2d 106, 109
(Minn. 2006).
Abdillahi argues that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by using
“unconstitutionally suggesti ve” identification procedures. He asserts that police
investigators coerced or pressured two witnesses, A.I. and S.M., into identifying him as the
suspect of the offense. And he claims that the prosecution’s failure to disclose these
identification procedures violated his due process rights and constituted a Brady violation.
See Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196 –97 (1963) (holding that
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). The postconviction court concluded that
these claims are Knaffla-barred because Abdillahi had previously claimed that the state
committed a Brady violation by not disclosing A.I.’s pretrial interview , and therefore he
could have or should have brought this additional Brady claim in a prior petition.
Abdillahi raised several forms of prosecutorial misconduct in a past a ppeal. For
instance, in his third postconviction petition, Abdillahi alleged that the prosecution’s failure
to disclose A.I.’s pretrial statements was prosecutorial misconduct that amounted to a
Brady violation. Abdillahi IV, No. A16 -0179, 2016 WL 406929 4, at *3 –4. This court
concluded that even assuming that the claim was not Knaffla-barred from prior petitions,
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the claim failed on its merits. Id. at *4 –5. And, the alleged Brady violation that the
prosecution withheld information regarding A.I.’s pret rial statements shares striking
similarity to the claim no w alleged in his fourth petition that the prosecutor committed a
Brady violation by withholding information regarding the police ’s alleged use of
unconstitutionally suggestive procedures to identify him as the suspect. See id., at *4. It
is reasonable to conclude that Abdillahi could have raised this claim, or should have raised
this claim, in a prior postconviction petition or on direct appeal. Therefore, this claim is
Knaffla-barred.
Although Abdillahi concedes that he raised a Brady violation claim in a prior appeal,
he contends that this claim is different and not barred due to newly discovered evidence,
the interests of justice exception, his actual innocence, cause and prejudice, and equitable
tolling. His support for these arguments derives from an affidavit in which he alleges that
S.M. told him that the police detectives “pressured, coached and directed” S.M. and A.I. to
identify him as the suspect. But, as discussed below, these additional arguments are
unpersuasive.
Newly Discovered Evidence
Abdillahi may be entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his claim of newly discovered
evidence passes the Rainer test. See Nissalke v. State , 861 N.W.2d 88, 91 (Minn. 2015)
(citing Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1997)). An evidentiary hearing is
warranted if the petitioner establishes that:
(1) the evidence was not known to the petitioner or counsel at
the time of trial; (2) the failure to learn of the evidence before
trial was not due to a lack of diligence; (3) the evidence is
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material, not merely impeaching, cumulative, or doubtful; and
(4) the evidence would probably produce either an acquittal or
a more favorable result.

Roby v. State , 808 N.W.2d 20, 26 n.5 (Minn. 2011). In order for the evidence to be
material, it must be credible. Tscheu v. State, 829 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Minn. 2013).
The only support for Abdillahi’s newly discovered evidence claim is his own self-
serving affidavit. See Davis v. State , 784 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 2010) (stating that
allegations in postconviction petition must be more than argumentative assertions lacking
factual support). The affidavit is grounded in hearsay because S.M . did not submit an
affidavit, and the substance of the affidavit is based entirely on what S.M. allegedly told
Abdillahi. Abdillahi also alleged that a private investigator would interview S.M. but had
yet to do so. And while Abdillahi claims that this is new information, he fails to explain
how he could not have learned of this evidence earlier with due diligence. Moreover, it is
doubtful that this new information would lead to a more favorable result because S.M.
refused to testify at Abdillahi’s trial. Therefore, we conclude that the postconviction court
did not abu se its discretion by denying his petition on the basis of newly discovered
evidence.
Interests of Justice Exception
Abdillahi also asserts that his petition falls under the interests of justice exception
to the Knaffla rule. This exception applies if fairness requires review and Abdillahi did not
deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the claim on a previous appeal. See Blom v. State,
744 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Minn. 2007). But fairness does not require review if Abdillahi fails to
present “a colorable explanation of why he failed to raise these claims previously.” Perry
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v. State, 731 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Minn. 2007). Here, Abdillahi has raised numerous claims
spanning over four previous appeals to this court. This alone de monstrates Abdillahi’s
familiarity with the record and that it was inexcusable for him to not raise this claim on an
earlier occasion. He does not provide a n adequate explanation for why he has failed to
make this claim in a previous petition. The intere sts of justice exception is inapplicable
here.
Actual Innocence
Abdillahi next argues that his petition is not barred because of his actual innocence
of the alleged offense. ‘“[A]ctual innocence’ requires the petitioner to prove it is more
likely than not that no reasonable jury would convict.” Brown v. State, 863 N.W.2d 781,
788 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). In the postconviction context, “actual innocence”
is typically considered as part of the requirements to fulfill the newly discovered evidence
exception for time -barred claims under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2016). Roberts v.
State, 856 N.W.2d 287, 292 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 2015).
Abdillahi fails to provide any relevant authority as to why this standard is applicable to his
claims, which the postconviction court concluded to be Knaffla-barred. Moreover, he
raised a similar actual innocence claim in a prior postconviction appeal. Abdillahi III, No.
A14-1795, 2015 WL 4877721, at *5. And, even if we were to consider his claim, his self-
serving affidavit fails to provide sufficient proof that this new evidence renders it more
likely than not that no reasonable jury would convict him. See Davis, 784 N.W.2d at 391.
This claim has no merit.
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Cause and Prejudice
Abdillahi apparently argues that “cause and prejudice” allows him to overcome the
Knaffla bar to his claims. This argument relies primarily on Murray v. Carrier, in which
the United States Supreme Court discussed the application of the cause and prejudice
standard for procedural defaults in habeas cases. 477 U.S. 478, 485 –88, 106 S. Ct. 2639,
2644–45 (1986). Again, Abdillahi attempts to use this analysis as an exception to the time
bar under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, but not the procedural bar under Knaffla. He fails
to provide any meaningful authority regarding how this “cause and prejudice” analysis
overcomes his failure to raise a similar argument in a prior postconviction petition. See
State v. Butcher , 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 –81 (Minn. App. 1997) (refusing to consider
argument mentioned but not developed in brief), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997). This
argument is without merit.
Equitable Tolling
Abdillahi finally asserts that his claim is not Knaffla-barred because of the doctrine
of “equitable tolling.” “The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a court to consider the
merits of a claim when it would otherwise be barred by a statute of limitations.” Sanchez
v. State , 816 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Minn. 2012). This doctrine may apply if Abdillahi
demonstrates “that he was diligently trying to pursue relief on his claim during the
limitations period and that a state actor or some other ‘paramount authority’ prevented him
from doing so.” Id. at 562. However, as discussed previously, this argument doe s not
adequately address the fact that the postconviction court concluded that Abdillahi’s claims
are procedurally barred by Knaffla, not that they were untimely. And, even if this court
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were to consider the merits of this argument, Abdillahi does not pro vide the relevant
authority or required proof to invoke this doctrine. See id. at 561 (“[T]he standard
[appellate courts] have used to toll statutes of limitations is necessarily a high one.”).
For these reasons, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Abdillahi’s fourth petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.