A17-1036

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0800
A17-1036

In re the Marriage of:
Justin James Jurkovich, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Rebecca Jean Jurkovich,
Respondent.

Filed March 19, 2018
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge
Dissenting, Schellhas, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-15-3931

John M. Jerabek, Thomas Tuft, Letty M -S Van Ert, Tuft, Lach, Jerabek & O’Connoll,
PLLC, Maplewood, Minnesota (for appellant)

Christopher D. Johnson, Samantha J. Graf, Johnson/Turner Legal, Forest Lake, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Before their marriage of 17 years was dissolved, appellant Justin Jurkovich and
respondent Rebecca Jurkovich lived an affluent lifestyle. While they stipulated to many
2

issues in the dissolution proceeding, spousal maintenance was a source of dispute. After
considering the income of both parties, their standard of living, their monthly budgets, and
other factors, the district court awarded Rebecca $9,955 per month in permanent spousal
maintenance. Justin appealed the district court’s decision to award permanent, instead of
temporary, spousal maintenance. He argues that the district court abused its discretion by
misapplying the statutory factors it must consider when awarding spousal maintenance.
We disagree and affirm the district court.

FACTS
Respondent Rebecca Jean Jurkovich met appellant Justin James Jurkovich while
still in undergraduate school, and they married in 1998, a year after her graduation. Both
Rebecca and Justin worked early on in the marriage. Rebecca began work as a fire-claims
adjuster, and after a couple of years, she became an in -house sales employee. Over the
next several years, Rebecca moved on to other positions, which included mortgage
underwriting and compliance auditing. Her salary for these positions ranged from the
upper twenty thousands to the upper thirty thousands. Meanwhile, Jus tin started a
mortgage company, Apollo Home Mortgage, in 1999.
In 2003 or 2004, Rebecca considered attending dental school, but Justin asked her
if she could help him with Apollo Home Mortgage. The company was growing and he
needed assistance in the office. She agreed, and they both worked together at Apollo Home
Mortgage. However, there is no evidence that Rebecca received a salary or any
compensation for this position, outside of funding for her 401K account.
3

As Justin’s income significantly grew through Apollo Home Mortgage , so did the
couple’s expenses. They bought motorcycles, boats, recreational vehicles, and seasonal
cars. Vacations and cruises were frequent, and the couple built a new house on a lake.
They started going to nicer restaurants and collecting wine as a hobby. As the district court
stated, the couple had a high standard of living.
In 2007, the mortgage industry plummeted. Justin was forced to dissolve Apollo
Home Mortgage, and a separate company assumed its employees and business. While no
longer the owner, Justin was retained at the successor business as a branch manager. Soon
he moved to a different company. Rebecca, on the other hand, transitioned into a stay-at-
home role after Apollo Home Mortgage dissolved, as the first of t hree children was born
in 2008. Justin soon recovered from the collapse of the mortgage industry: he earned
approximately $181,000 in wages in 2010 and then $298,000 in 2011. From 2012 through
2015, Justin’s average annual income was $799,470. During this period, Rebecca worked
part-time on occasion, but primarily remained at home to raise their children.
In 2015, Justin started working at Bay Equity as a regional sales manager and
suggested to Rebecca that it would be good for her to start working again, hoping they
would find more in common to discuss, given recent tension in the marriage. With Justin’s
help, Rebecca was hired as a business development manager at Bay Equity with a monthly
income of $6,000. Justin was her direct supervisor. Working together did not resolve their
relationship hurdles, and after 17 years of marriage, they separated in June 2015. At th e
time, Rebecca was 40 years old and Justin was 42.
4

After the couple decided to dissolve their marriage, Rebecca quit her position at Bay
Equity and started working at a new company as a loan processor earning $4,583.33 a
month. Shortly after, Rebe cca moved to her now current position at American Mortgage
& Equity Consultants, Inc., with the same job title and same gross monthly income. This
position also includes incentives: she receives $100 per loan she closes as long as she closes
11 or more files a month.1 Meanwhile Justin continued working at Bay Equity with a gross
monthly income of $65,900.
Prior to going to trial in June 2016, the parties submi tted stipulated findings of fact
and conclusions of law. This set forth all of their assets, which included: a homestead; a
townhome; three parcels of la nd; retirement accounts and plans, shared and sole bank
accounts; three automobiles; a boat, multiple utility vehicles; and personal property valued
at over $50,000. They agreed on most issues: Rebecca would have sole physical custody
of the children whil e there would be joint legal custody; Rebecca would receive the
homestead; Justin would receive the townhome; the parcels of land would be sold and the
revenues split; Justin would receive the bank accounts and retirement accounts in his name;
Rebecca would receive the shared accounts and retirement accounts in her n ame worth a
total value of approximately $270,000;2 and Rebecca would receive two of the automobiles
and the utility vehicle s. They did, however, reserve various financial issues, including
amount and duration of spousal maintenance, for trial.

1 Rebecca testified that she believed she could close up to 15 files a month in the future ,
depending on the market and her ability.
2 This amount includes Rebecca’s IRA account valued at $202,587.45 and her 401(k)
account valued at $17,703.56.
5

The parties proceeded to trial on June 1, 2016. The trial lasted one day and there
were five witnesses: Rebecca’s expert witness on finance, Justin’s expert witness on
finance, Rebecca’s father, Rebecca, and Justin. The majority of the testimony focused on
Rebecca’s estimated budget for her and her children’s monthly expenses. Rebecca put
forth an estimated monthly budget of $15,918, and her expert witness testified that Rebecca
would need spousal maintenance of $15,435 a month and child support of $2,414 a month
to cover the budget, taking taxes into account . Justin’s expert witness testified that
Rebecca’s estimated budge t was excessive, and a more reasonable amount was between
$10,273 and $11,773. Justin’s witness did not testify to the appropriate duration of
maintenance. No evidence of Rebecca’s future potential earnings or potential job growth
was provided at trial.3 Nor were any vocational evaluations of Rebecca conducted. 4
In September 2016, the district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The court held in favor of Justin on the issue of amount of spousal maintenance,
finding that Rebecca’s monthly expenses were $11,157.13.5 Taking into account taxes and
Rebecca’s wages, the court found that Rebecca would need $3,254 in child support and
$9,155 monthly in permanent spousal maintenance to cover her expenses. The parties were
accustomed to a high standard of living, the court found. Justin was the primary provider,
while Rebecca was “primarily a homemaker” and the court further pointed out that Rebecca

3 On direct examination, Rebecca stated that she currently was working at “full capacity,”
but there was room for career growth at her current position. No evidence was submitted
to expand on this potential career growth.
4 A vocational evaluation may be used to determine a spouse’s earning potential.
Rauenhorst v. Rauenhorst, 724 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. App. 2006).
5 The district court found that Justin’s monthly expenses were $18,035.
6

stopped working and stayed at home so that Justin could build his business. As a result,
the court determined that Rebecca’s income was not nearly suffi cient to maintain the
standard of living established during the marriage.
In October 2016, Justin filed a motion for new trial, amended findings, and for an
amended judgment. He requested that the findings be amended to reflect Rebecca’s
extensive work history and that she does have the means to be self-supporting. The motion
requested that the spousal maintenance amount be reduced and that it should be
temporary—not permanent—spousal maintenance. In January 2017, a hearing was held
on the motion to am end findings or for a new trial. The hearing primarily focused on
Justin’s argument that permanent spousal maintenance was inappropriate because Rebecca
is in her early 40s and currently employed with the means to better her situation. The
district court stated permanent spousal maintenance was appropriate. The court reasoned
Rebecca “doesn’t stand a prayer of ever generating” enough incom e to reach her monthly
budget. The court did issue amended findings that changed the child support from $3,254
to $2 ,686, which caused the spousal maintenance amount to increase from $9,155 to
$9,955.
This appeal follows.

D E C I S I O N
Justin contends that the district court abused its discretion by granting permanent,
instead of temporary, spousal maintenance. He does not contest the amount of spousal
maintenance. This court reviews the district court’s determination of the proper duration
7

of spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion. Maiers v. Maiers, 775 N.W.2d 666, 668
(Minn. App. 2009). And an abuse of discretion occurs when the district court makes
findings unsupported by the record or when it improperly applies the law. Hemmingsen v.
Hemmingsen, 767 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. App. 2009), review granted (Minn. Sept. 29,
2009), and appeal dismissed (Minn. Feb. 1, 2010).
Justin’s arguments are numerous, but primarily fall within two categories: (1) the
district court misapplied several of the spousal maintenance statutory factors and made
findings for those factors that were unsupported by the record; and (2) the district court
failed to properly weigh those factors. Finally, Justin argues that the district court abused
its discretion by failing to include incentives to rehabilitate or failing to award temporary
maintenance while reserving the issue of future maintenance. W e address each argument
in turn.
The district court properly applied the statutory factors regarding spousal maintenance.
District courts may grant temporary or permanent spousal maintenance after
considering all relevant factors, including eight statutorily defined factors. Minn. St at.
§ 518.552, subd. 2 (2016). In addition to setting forth necessary considerations, the statute
dictates that when the factors j ustify permanent maintenance, nothing in the statute “ shall
be construed to favor a temporary award of maintenance over a permanent award.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3 (2016). And t his court has stated that the purpose of spousal
maintenance “is to al low the recipient and the obligor to have a standard of living that
approximates the marital standard of living, as closely as is equitable under the
8

circumstances.” Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 358 (Minn. App. 2004). Within this
context, as the district court was required to do, we now address each factor.
The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance

The district court must consider “the financial resources of the party seeking
maintenance, including marital property apportioned to the party, and the party’s ability to
meet needs independently.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a). The district court explicitly
considered this factor. It found that Rebecca’s gross monthly income was $4,583.33, she
did not have significant liquid assets outside of her retirement accounts to supplement her
income, and that her income was not nearly sufficient to provide for her monthly expenses.
Justin argues the district court misapplied this factor because it failed to make
findings as to whether the assets Rebecca received through the divorce were available to
meet Rebecca’s monthly needs. This argument is unsupported by the record. The district
court found that, outside of her retirement accounts, “Rebecca is not receiving any
significant liquid assets which might supplement her income.” Inherent in this statement
is that the court factored in the other assets and determined they lacked significance.
Justin points to Rask v. Rask to support his argument. 445 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. App.
1989). There, the district court awarded the spouse $2,000 a month in permanent spousal
maintenance, but this court reversed its decision because, in part, the district court failed to
mention available assets at all when discussing spousal maintenance and because the assets
could be invested to help supplement her income. Id. at 853-54. But unlike Rask, the
district court here explicitly stated that Rebecca would not receive any significant liquid
9

assets to supplement her income outside of her retirement accounts.6 The district court did
not abuse its discretion in addressing Rebeca’s financial resources.
Educational and employment outlook and the r esulting probability of becoming
self-supporting

The district court must consider the educational and employment outlook of the
party seeking maintenance and the probability of that party becoming fully or partially self-
supporting. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(b). Here the district court found that R ebecca
reestablished employment, with a gross monthly income of $4,583.33, and that this income
was not enough to meet her monthly expenses. It further found that Rebecca would be
unable to ever reach the earning capacity necessary to afford the monthly expenses. While
Justin argues the district court never addressed Rebecca obtaining gainful employment and
how it relates to the award of spousal maintenance, this is unsupported by the record. The
district court explicitly referenced Rebecca’s income and how it was not sufficient to reach
the monthly expenses.
We also note the paucity of evidence, outside of the mere fact that Rebecca had a
job, that she could fully self-support the lifestyle she had in the marriage. There is nothing
to suggest that through additional education or employment opportunities, Rebecca would
be able to earn enough to meet her monthly expenses. The financial experts did not testify
to this effect. Nor did Justin introduce any vocational evaluations of Rebecca. Without

6 Similarly, Justin argues that the finding that Rebecca does not have the ability to meet her
own needs is clearly erroneous because it ignores the fact that Rebecca received substantial
assets that would likely yield additional income for her. But as the district court found, the
assets she received were not liquid. It was not clearly erroneous for the district cour t to
determine Rebecca would not be able to meet her monthly expenses on her own.
10

any evidence showing Rebecca could one day independently meet her monthly expenses—
expenses which Justin does not challenge on appeal —it was not clearly erroneous for the
district court to reach the opposite conclusion.
Standard of living
The district court must consider the standard of li ving e stablished during the
marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(c). Here, the district court found that the couple
had a high standard of living and that the spousal maintenance amount is necessary to
maintain that standard of living.
Justin argues that the standard-of-living factor is not a “trump card” that supersedes
other relevant factors and that the district court was too focused on this factor. He cites to
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain to support his argument. 615 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Minn. App.
2000), review denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000) . There the appellant argued that the district
court focused too much on the standard of living, and the rest of the factors did not support
permanent maintenance. Id. at 411-12. But the Chamberlain court rejected appellant’s
argument and stated the affluent lifestyle was a relevant factor, and the district court had
wide discretion in how it chose to weigh the factors. Id. at 412. In sum, t he argument
made in Chamberlain is similar to the argument Justin makes today and fails for the same
reason. There is nothing to suggest the district court here applied the standard-of-living
factor in an improper manner that would result in an abuse of discretion, but instead the
district court found it was a relevant factor in its determination.
11

Duration of marriage and length of absence from the workforce
The district court must also consider “the duration of the marriage and, in the case
of a homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the extent to which a ny
education, skills, or experience have become outmoded and earning capacity has become
permanently diminished.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(d). Here, the district court found
the marriage was 17 years long and a long-term marriage. It also found th at during the
marriage Rebecca was primarily a homemaker. Justin takes issue with both of these factual
determinations.
Justin argues that the marriage was not a long -term traditional marriage because ,
while it was 17 years long, Rebecca held significant jobs throughout the marriage. He
contends the finding that the marriage was long -term was not justified , noting that the
length of time until retirement age was significantly longer than the marriage. We disagree.
Whether the marriage is a long -term traditional marriage is more than a numbers
game, and district courts may reach this determination by examining numerous factors.
Here there was enough evidence to allow the district court to find this was a long -term
traditional marriage. The record shows the marriage was 17 years long, it started from the
time both parties were very young, they helped start each other’s career, they had children
together, Rebecca stopped working to raise the children, they built a home together, and
they acquired many a ssets together. There is nothing to suggest the district court was
clearly erroneous in its finding.7

7 Justin directs us to Gales v. Gales , which involved an 11 -year marriage, where the
husband was ordered to pay permanent spousal maintenance. 553 N.W.2d 416, 417 (Minn.
12

Justin also contends that the district court made a clearly erroneous finding when it
determined Rebecca was primarily a homemaker. Justin argues that she worked full-time
for the majority of the relationship —10 out of the 17 years of the marriage —and that she
was employed at the time of separation. A close examination of the record reveals that
Rebecca worked full -time between the start of the marriage in 1998 until approximately
2004 when she helped Justin with his company. It is unclear , however, how much she
worked once she st arted helping with the company in approximately 2004. But it is
undisputed she did not receive a salary for this work. Rebecca then did not work full-time
from late 2007 until 2015, the same year the marriage dissolution process began.
Depending on whether Rebecca’s work with Justin’s company constitutes full -time work,
she worked full time approximately either 6 or 10 years out of the 17-year relationship.
But this, too, is more than a numbers game. Beyond purely looking at the math to
determine what fraction of the marriage Rebecca worked full -time, the district court
properly considered that once the couple had children, it was Rebecca who stayed at home
and raised them. And it was Rebecca who was asked to stop what she was doing to help
Justin’s business. U nder the clearly erroneous standard of review, it was not a n error for
the district court to determine Rebecca was primarily a homemaker, because since

1996). The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision to order
permanent maintenance because it did not believe it was a long-term traditional marriage
where one spouse was dependent on the other, as the wife had pursued her own busines s
career. Id. at 421. Here, Rebecca was dependent on Justin to cover their monthly expenses,
as her monthly income was insufficient on its own. Through much of the marriage, she
stayed at home to raise their children. And when she went back to work, sh e earned
significantly less than Justin.
13

approximately 2003 or 2004, she primarily either helped with Justin’s company or was a
stay-at-home mother.
Loss of earnings and employment opportunities
The district court must consider the loss of earnings and employment opportunities
forgone by the spouse seeking spousal maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(e).
The district court found that the growth of Justin’s business was in part due to Rebecca’s
sacrifice to work as an unpaid employee. The record supports this finding, as Rebecca
testified that she decided to forgo dental school, at least in part, due to Justin asking her to
help him with his business. She then helped his business and did not take a salary outside
of enough to fund her 401K.
Justin argues that Rebecca did not lose any opportunities and was immediately hired
when she decided to seek a job. But while Rebecca did return to the workforce, this does
not change the fact that she gave up opportunities to help Justin’s business. And we are
troubled by the practical implications of Justin’s argument: that a dependent spouse who
finds employment at the end of a long -term marriage irretrievably undercuts a claim for
permanent maintenance. This approach creates an incentive for continued dependency
rather than steps toward independence, which Rebecca took here. The district court did
not abuse its discretion when it determined that Rebecca did forgo opportunities.
Age and health
The dis trict court must consider the age and health of the spouse seeking
maintenance. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(f). The court found that Rebecca was 40 at
the time of separation and did not make any findings of poor physical or emotional
14

conditions. Justin argues that the district court erred with this factor because there was
nothing to suggest Rebecca’s ability to earn was impacted by her age or health. But the
court never stated that Rebeca’s ability to earn was impacted by age or health, and Justin’s
argument rests on a false assumption that age or health must impact a spouse’s ability to
earn before permanent maintenance can be awarded. Justin’s argument that the district
court misapplied this factor is without merit.
Ability of spouse to meet own needs while meeting needs of spouse seeking
maintenance

The district court must consider “the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance
is sought to meet needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2( g). The court found that Justin’s monthly gross income was
approximately $ 65,900 a month. Justin does not dispute that he has the ability to pay
monthly support but contends that the district court focused too much on this factor.
Justin points to Rask, where this court stated it was an abuse of discretion when the
district court “concentrated on the maximum amount it determined appellant could afford
to pay respondent and still meet his basic needs.” 445 N.W.2d at 853. But it is unclear
why Justin believes the district court concentrated on the maximum amount he could afford
when the court —faced with conflicting testimony about the amount of maintenance
Rebecca needed —sided with Justin. Because there is nothing to suggest the district
improperly focuse d on this factor or the maximum Justin could afford as in Rask, the
district court did not improperly weigh this factor.
15

Contribution of each spouse
The district court must consider “the contribution of each party in the acquisition,
preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property,
as well as the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or in furtherance of the other party’s
employment or business.” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(h). The district court found that
Rebecca’s sacrifice helped grow Justin’s business and allow ed Justin to earn a high level
of income. Justin argues that this business failed, so Rebecca’s contribution to the business
“while meritorious, ultimately resulted in a net zero gain to the bo th parties because the
company failed.” This is contradicted by the record. The business did fail, but Justin was
maintained by the company that overtook his business in a managerial position, and he
continued to earn a high level of income. Diminishing Rebecca’s contribution to that
company, while ignoring that Justin went on to have a very successful career after his
company was acquired, is not supported by the record.
The district court acted within its discretion when weighing the factors.
Apart f rom challenging the statutory factors on an individual basis, Justin also
contends that the district court abused its discretion in how it weighed the factors. He
argues that the court focused too much on the couple’s high standard of living and Justin’s
large income, instead of on Rebecca’s potential earning capacity in light of her youth, work
history, and educational background.
Justin contends this case is more akin to cases where this court affirmed the district
court’s decision to order temporary spousal maintenance. For example, in Hall v. Hall, the
spouse seeking maintenance was 39 years old, the marriage was 18 years long, and she
16

worked sporadically throughout the marriage but was working at the time of separation.
417 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Minn. A pp. 1988). In Napier v. Napier , the marriage was
approximately 20 years long, the spouse seeking spousal maintenance was 41 years old,
and she also worked only sporadically throughout the marriage. 374 N.W.2d 512, 514
(Minn. App. 1985). Similarly, in Buhr v. Buhr, the marriage was approximately 25 years
long, the spouse seeking maintenance did not have a coll ege degree but worked both full-
time and part-time during the marriage. 395 N.W.2d 433, 434 (Minn. App. 1986). Each
of these cases has similarities to the case at hand, but all also have factual differences—as
different marriages lasting over a decade are bound to have . For example, all three
involved much lower standards of living than what is present here. Hall, 417 N.W.2d at
301; Napier, 374 N.W.2d at 514; Buhr, 395 N.W.2d at 434.
And as Rebecca points out, there are also cases with similar facts where the district
court awarded permanent maintenance. For example, in Chamberlain the marriage was 20
years long, both spouses worked full-time at the time of separation, one spouse earned
significantly more than the other, they had numerous assets, a more than $1 million
homestead, and the couple had a high standard of living. 615 N.W.2d at 407-08.
These cases with similar facts to a varying degree, but with different results,
illustrate the difficulty of using caselaw to compare sets of facts in spousal maintenance
cases when those cases involve different versions of an evolving statute. See Gaines, 553
N.W.2d at 418-20 (stating that the spousal-maintenance statute evolved significantly in the
1980s, as the result of several amendments). Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
cautioned: “ [w]e take this opportunity to remind counsel that each marital dissolution
17

proceeding is uniq ue and centers upon the individualized facts and circumstances of the
parties and that, accordingly, it is unwise to view any marital dissolution decision as
enunciating an immutable rule of law applicable in any other proceeding.” Dobrin v.
Dobrin, 569 N .W.2d 199, 201 (Minn. 1997). As a result, the court reiterated the wide
discretion district courts have: “the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to
award maintenance and before an appellate court determines that there has been a clear
abuse of that discretion, it must determine that there must be a clearly erroneous conclusion
that is against logic and the facts on record.” Id. at 202.
Justin has not met this threshold. While he has pointed out cases with similar facts
that reached different results, this is not sufficient, especially when those different results
were impacted by the evolution of the statute. These cases fail to establish that the district
court here abused its discretion by either making findings unsupported by the r ecord or
misapplying the law. Hemmingsen, 767 N.W.2d at 716.
The district court acted within its discretion by not including incentives or reserving
jurisdiction to later examine the issue.

Justin contends that awarding permanent spousal maintenance was an abuse of
discretion as it eliminates any incentive for Rebecca to be independent. Justin points to
Passolt v. Passolt to support his argument. 804 N.W.2d 18, 25 (Minn. App. 2011). There,
the spouse seeking maintenance was making only $3,000 annually but had an educational
background. Id. at 19. At trial, evidence showed the potential income the spouse could
earn if she started working. Id. at 20. The district court granted permanent s pousal
maintenance. Id. at 21. This court reversed because , in part, the district court failed to
18

consider all of the required factors. Id. at 25. In remanding the case, this court noted that,
“[s]tep reductions may be appropriate to provide employment incentives for a rehabilitating
spouse.” Id. The facts here are distinguishable from Passolt where the wife had an
educational background but was not fully utilizing it, because here Rebecca was alread y
working full-time and using her educational background.
More importantly, Passolt does not stand for the proposition that a trial court abuses
its discretion by failing to include these incentives to rehabilitate. It instead states that it
may be appropriate for the district court to consider the possibility of step reductions when
it undertakes the issue of the spouse’s potential earning capacity. Justin does not point to
any caselaw that suggests it is an abuse of discretion for a district court not to provide these
incentives, nor do we find any. And here there is a lack of evidence in the record on
vocational issues or Rebecca’s potential earning capacity, which prevents us from
analyzing whether incentives could be proper in this case. In fact, this court has held it is
an abuse of discretion to award step reductions when it is merely speculative whether a
party’s financial situation would change. Schreifels v. Schreifels , 450 N.W.2d 372, 374
(Minn. App. 1990) (stating it was an abuse of discret ion to include step reductions when
the reductions were based on the uncertain assumption the spouse’s income would increase
in the future). Here the district court acted within its discretion by declining to include
incentives for Rebecca to become independent.
Justin also argues that a more appropriate result would be to award temporary
maintenance for several years and for the district court to reserve the issue of maintenance
for further determination at the expiration of the temporary maintenance . But the issue
19

before us is no t whether awarding temporary maintenance while reserving the issue of
future maintenance would be a better decision. The question is whether the decision to
instead award permanent maintenance is an abuse of discretion. And we do not determine
it is an abuse of discretion because: (1) there was no evidence that Rebecca’s financial
situation would change; (2) there is a statutory preference for permanent maintenance in
the face of uncertainty; and (3) the pivotal case on this dis tinction, Maiers, supports this
result.
Awarding temporary maintenance and reserving the issue of future maintenance,
while an option, is one the district court may decline to apply in the absence of evidence
suggesting Rebecca’s financial situation wo uld change. Rebecca’s current job includes
incentives and bonuses, but it will not be enough to close the gap between her income and
expenses. Justin continuously points to this job as a factor the district court did not properly
take into account. But the mere fact Rebecca is employed is not enough. No evidence
infers that Rebecca’s financial situation would change. There was no expert testimony on
that subject and no vocational evaluations. While Rebecca’s earning capacity could
increase, this is on ly speculation and not grounded in the record. It was not an abuse of
discretion for the district court to decline to award temporary spousal maintenance while
reserving the issue of future maintenance, in a case where there is no evidence suggesting
the situation will change.
This determination is further supported by the statutory preference for permanent
maintenance when there is uncertainty as to whether permanent maintenance is necessary.
The spousal maintenance statute states “[w] here there is some uncertainty as to the
20

necessity of a permanent award, the court shall order a permanent award leaving its order
open for later modification. ” Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3 (201 6); see also Minn. Stat.
§ 645.44, subd. 16 (2016) (stating that “‘[s]hall’ i s mandatory”). Here, the district court
found there was no evidence that Rebecca would ever be able to independently support her
expenses, meaning there was uncertainty regarding whether Rebecca would ever reach a
financial level where she would not requi re maintenance. Because there is a statutory
preference for permanent maintenance when there is uncertainty regarding whether a
spouse needs it, awarding temporary maintenance while reserving the issue of future
maintenance is not appropriate in light of the court’s findings. Nardini v. Nardini , 414
N.W.2d 184, 198 (Minn. 1987) (“That the trial court retains jurisdiction over a temporary
award does not make temporary maintenance an acceptable alternative when it is uncertain
that the spouse seeking maintenance can ever become self-supporting.”).
Finally, t his distinction between permanent maintenance and temporary
maintenance while reserving the issue of future maintenance is highlighted in Maiers. In
Maiers, where a 17-year marriage was dissolved, the district court found that the wife
would no longer need support at some point in the future. 775 N.W.2d at 667-69. This
court held that the district court’s award of temporary maintenance, while reserving the
issue of future maintenance , was proper because the issue was when —not whether—the
spouse would no longer need maintenance.8 Id. at 669-70. This stands in contrast to cases

8 In Maiers this court distinguished its determination from that of Nardini, 414 N.W.2d
184. In Nardini the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s award of
temporary spousal maintenance because it wa s uncertain whether the spouse would ever
become self-supporting. Id. at 198-99.
21

requiring permanent maintenance where it is unclear whether a spouse would ever not
require maintenance. Id. at 668 (“Wit h respect to the duration of an award of spousal
maintenance, a district court must order permanent maintenance if the court is uncertain
that the spouse seeking maintenance can ever become self -supporting.”) (internal
quotations omitted). Here, the distr ict court’s findings make it clear it was uncertain
whether—not when—Rebecca would ever not require maintenance. Thus, the award of
permanent maintenance was consistent with our decision in Maiers.9
We acknowledge that the district court had a difficult decision regarding the
duration of maintenance, as well as several tools available to reach different results.
Indeed, the possibility of different results, any of which may be affirmable on appeal, is
inherent in a question on which the district court exercises its discretion. Its conclusion is
not necessarily what this court would have done, but this court reviews for an abuse of
discretion and is not the initial decision maker. See Chamberlain , 615 N.W.2d at 412
(“While a different result is supporta ble, and we might have reached a different result, on

9 Justin also contends that the district court relied on improper purposes —compensatory
and punitive—of the spousal maintenance statute. Justin points to Gales as an example
where the district court improperly ordered permanent spousal maintenance by
misinterpreting the purpose of spousal maintenance. 553 at 421-22. In Gales, the district
court made a finding that one of the spouses suffered emotional distress due to the
separation. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision to
order permanent spousal maintenance, in part because the purpose of spousal maintenance
is not punitive —so the finding of emotional suffering was improper. While Gales
illustrates that the district court’s reliance on an improper purpose may result in an abuse
of its discretion, the court here did not focus on an improper purpose. The district court
did not make any findings or conclusions of law that sugge sted it was punishing Justin or
compensating Rebecca. In fact, one of the two major issues at trial was the amount of
maintenance, and the court sided with Justin, not Rebecca, on this issue.
22

this record we cannot say an award of permanent maintenance is an abuse of discretion.”).
Here the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding permanent spousal
maintenance.10
Affirmed.

10 And we remind the parties that while the maintenance is lab eled permanent, it is not set
in stone, but can be modified . See Poehls v. Poehls, 502 N.W.2d 217. 218 (Minn. App.
1993) (noting that “permanent maintenance” is a “term of art,” which does not mean
maintenance cannot end, only that the burden in later pro ceedings to reduce or terminate
the award is on the obligor). Minnesota Statutes section 518A.39 (2016) allows parties to
seek modification of spousal maintenance under a variety of circumstances, including a
substantial change of gross income of one of parties.
D-1

SCHELLHAS, Judge (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the district court’s award of
permanent spousal maintenance of $9,955 per month to respondent Rebecca Jurkovich.
Appellant Justin Jurkovich does not dispute the amount of the spousal-maintenance
award. He argues that the district court abused its discretion in awarding permanent spousal
maintenance to Rebecca, at age 41, following the parties’ 17 -year marriage because the
record lacks any evidence that Rebecca’s physical or emotional conditions impacts her
ability to earn, Rebecca has a bachelor’s degree, she worked full time for approximately
ten years during the marriage, and she obtained employment immediately after a seven -
year hiatus from the work force. I agree.
The parties separated in 2015, and the district court dissolved their marriage in 2016.
In April 2015, Rebecca began employment at Bay Equity as a business development
manager, with a starting income of $72,000 annually. She reasonably left that employment
due to the parties’ dissolution because Bay Eq uity also employed Justin. In March 2016,
Rebecca became employed at Axia, earning $55,000 annually. In May 2016, after the
president of AMEC contacted her, Rebecca left her employment at Axia and became
employed at AMEC as a senior loan processer, earning a base salary of $55,000 annually
and receiving a signing bonus of $1,500, an additional bonus at six months, as well as an
incentive package based on the number of files closed each month. On cross-examination,
Rebecca acknowledged that she had the poten tial to earn an additional $18,000 in bonus
income and a total annual salary of $73,000. She also testified that she “anticipate[d]
continued career growth in [her] current position.”
D-2

This case is somewhat in a “league of its own,” given Justin’s monthly e arnings of
approximately $65,000. But it also is in a league of its own because in no published case
in Minnesota has a spouse been awarded permanent spousal maintenance at age 41, after a
17-year marriage, when the facts clearly show that the spouse has t he ability to earn a
substantial income now and in the future. See, e.g., Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 250,
257 (Minn. 2016) (reversing and remanding issue of spousal maintenance when district
court awarded no maintenance to unemployed spouse when parties separated after 22 years
of marriage); Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 199 (Minn. 1997) (reversing permanent-
spousal-maintenance award after two -and-one-half-year marriage); Gales v. Gales , 553
N.W.2d 416, 417, 422 (Minn. 1996) (reversing permanent award of maintenance for 34 -
year-old spouse after 12 -year marriage, and concluding that award of rehabilitative
maintenance of no longer than five years was appropriate under facts and circumstances of
case); Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 185, 197−99 (Minn. 1987) (reversing five-year
award of spousal maintenance after 31-year marriage, and remanding for permanent award
to 56-year-old spouse, who had been out of labor market for 29 years and suffered from
severe chronic skin disease); Passolt v. Passolt, 804 N.W.2d 18, 19, 25 (Minn. App. 2011)
(remanding question of spousal maintenance after court awarded permanent maintenance
to 52 -year-old spouse after 30 -year marriage based on court’s misunderstanding of
caselaw, and remanding the question of step r eduction in maintenance), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 15, 2011); Maiers v. Maiers , 775 N.W.2d 666, 667−68 (Minn. App. 2009)
(affirming five-year award of spousal maintenance with reservation under section 518.552,
subdivision 3, to spouse who was not self-supporting at time of dissolution after nearly 17-
D-3

year marriage); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain , 615 N.W.2d 405, 407, 412 (Minn. App.
2000) (affirming permanent -spousal-maintenance award to 50 -year-old teacher after 20 -
year marriage but concluding that $2,000 -per-month award was excessive and reversing
and remanding amount of award), review denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000); Duffey v. Duffey,
432 N.W.2d 473, 474−77 (Minn. App. 1988) (affirming permanent -spousal-maintenance
award for 43 -year-old spouse after 20 -year marriage when spouse did not work outside
home during marriage and had completed only one year of college); Hall v. Hall , 417
N.W.2d 300, 301 (Minn. App. 1988) (affirming temporary instead of permanent award of
maintenance to 39-year-old spouse after 18 years of marriage).
I mention the above caselaw mindful of the supreme court’s admonition in Dobrin,
that “each marital dissolution proceeding is unique and centers upon the individualized
facts and circumstances of the parties and that, accordingly, it is unwise to view any marital
dissolution decision as enunciating an immutable rule of law applicable in any other
proceeding.” 569 N.W.2d at 201. In this case, the facts and circumstances support only an
award of temporary maintenance. The record contains no e vidence to support uncertainty
about Rebecca’s ability to be self-supporting.
Although only of persuasive value, I note that the State of New Jersey amended its
spousal-maintenance (alimony) statute in 2014. See 2014 N. J. Laws ch. 42, § 1. Among
other changes, New Jersey eliminated permanent spousal maintenance, changing it to open-
duration alimony. Id. Open-duration alimony is now awarded only in long-term marriages,
which are defined as 20 years or more. N. J. Rev. Stat. § 2A: 34−23 (2016). Under New
Jersey law, marriages of less than 20 years are subject to “limited duration alimony.” Id.
D-4

And, while not at issue in the case before us, alimony can be ended or reduced when an
obligor reaches the federal retirement age of 67. Id.
In this case, as support for a permanent award of maintenance to Rebecca, the
district court characterized the parties’ 17 -year marriage as a long -term marriage. Unless
the permanent award of maintenance is reversed, Justin could very well pay spousal
maintenance to Rebecca for a period of time greatly exceeding the length of the marriage.
This reality makes the marriage and resulting spousal -maintenance award akin to an
annuity, which it is not. See Kaiser v. Kaiser, 290 Minn. 173, 184, 186 N.W.2d 678, 685
(1971) (noting that “[t]he purpose of alimony is to care for the wife’s needs after divorce,
not to provide her with a lifetime profit -sharing plan” (quoting Homer H. Clark Jr., The
Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, § 14.9, at 460) (1968)); see also Snyder v.
Snyder, 298 Minn. 43, 53, 212 N.W.2d 869, 875 (1973) (quoting this facet of Kaiser);
Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing this aspect of Snyder),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007). Under Minnesota law, “an award of maintenance
‘depends on a showing of need’ but even an unemployable spouse ‘is not by that fact alone
necessarily entitled to maintenance.’” Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 252 (quoting Lyon v. Lyon ,
439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989)).
I would reverse the district court’s permanent award of spousal maintenance and
remand for a temporary award of maintenance for a period not exceeding ten years. At the
very least, the case should be remanded to the district court with instructions to lea ve the
permanent award of maintenance open for later modification under Minn. Stat. § 518.552,
subd. 3 (2016). See Maiers , 775 N.W.2d at 668 (stating that “with a reservation of
D-5

jurisdiction, a subsequent request to extend spousal maintenance would be base d on the
factors applicable to awarding maintenance in the first instance, not the standards for a
modification of spousal maintenance”).