A17-0802

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0801
A17-0802

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
T. R., Parent
A17-0801,

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
T. R., and D. J., Parents
A17-0802.

Filed September 11, 2017
Affirmed
Peterson, Judge

Mower County District Court
File Nos. 50-JV-17-333, 50-JV-17-334

Daniel T. Donnelly, Austin, Minnesota (for appellant-mother T.R.)

Paul R. Spyhalski, Austin, Minnesota (for appellant-father D.J.)

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Aaron Jones, Assistant County Attorney, Austin,
Minnesota (for respondent Mower County Health and Human Services)

Todd Schoonover, Hollandale, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
PETERSON, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellant parents challenge the termination of their
parental rights. Both appellants argue that the district court should have applied a less-
restrictive alternative to termination of their parental rights , and father argues that
termination of his parental rights is not in the children’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother T.R. has three children, O.J., born in 2010, N.R., born in 2014,
and L.R., born in 2016. Appellant-father D.J. is the father of O.J. and N.R. The father of
L.R. is not a party to this appeal.
In an earlier CHIPS proceeding, O.J. and N.R. were removed from mother’s custody
from April 7, 2016 , to October 19, 2016, due to mother’s “substantial cocaine usage.” 1
Mother and father admitted to using cocaine at that time. Mother participated in a case
plan that recommended chemical -dependency treatment and aftercare, and , in May 2016,
she was successful ly discharged from inpatient treatment for chemical dependency.
Following treatment, she resided in a halfway house where the children could potentially
live with her, but she was discharged after testing positive for cocaine in August 2016 and
later admi tted to relapsing; she was pregnant with L.R. at that time. Mother then
participated in out-patient chemical-dependency treatment from September 2016 through
December 2016. The children were returned to mother’s care in October 2016, and the

1 A social worker testified that cocaine was the parents’ drug of choice. Mother testified
that cocaine and marijuana are her drugs of choice.

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CHIPS file was closed in November 2016. The social worker testified that the CHIPS file
was closed because mother was “following her services” and her urine tests “were clean
for a couple months.” The children were placed out of home for a total of 195 days during
the 2016 CHIPS matter.
Father chose not to participate in any services offered by the county during the 2016
CHIPS matter, including a chemical -dependency assessment, parenting services, and
mental-health services, and he did not maintain contact with the county or his children’s
guardian ad litem. Father has fifth -degree controlled-substance convictions from 2007,
2009, and 2014. On February 2, 2017, father was taken into custody for a probation
violation on the 2014 offense after he admittedly used coca ine; he was incarcerated until
March 27, 2017.
On February 3, 2017, Austin police were called to mother’s home on a report that a
four-month-old child was having a seizure. When no one answered the door, police entered
the home and found mother holding L.R.; she told police that L.R. was “fine,” although the
child appeared to have a slight foam around the mouth. N.R., then three years old, was
“running around naked.” Mother told the police that an adult male, J.D., “was the one
having the seizure[,] but he fled on foot when the police were called.”
Police discovered J.D., a registered sex offender who appeared to be under the
influence, hiding upstairs. They also discovered “baggy corners on the bed next to the
baby’s bottle,” drug residue that tested positive for cocaine on a dresser, drug
paraphernalia, another baggy that appeared to contain methamphetamine, and two pills that
were controlled substances. There were “active warrants” for J.D. and mother, and both

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were arrested.2 All three children were taken to a hospital, and each of them tested positive
for cocaine.
Police initially placed the children on a 72 -hour hold, and on February 7, 2017,
respondent Mower County Health and Human Services filed a petition to terminate
appellants’ parental rights. Appellants entered denials to the petition, and the case
proceeded to trial on April 6, 2017.
Mother testified that she relapsed into daily cocaine and marijuana use about two
weeks before the February 3 incident, and, on February 3, she had used J.D. as a babysitter
for two days while she was consuming cocaine “on a bender” at a friend’s house. She
testified that she told J.D. that she would be right back when she left and that J.D. had been
living with her for two weeks. She knew that J.D. had been a drug user, but she did not
believe he was currently using drugs , and she claimed that she was n ot aware of J.D.’s
status as a sex offender. She admitted that, by leaving the children with J.D., she put them
in serious danger, but she also testified that she had known J.D. for years and knew that he
would not hurt her children. Mother was in custody on pending criminal charges at the
time of the trial.3
Following trial, the district court terminated mother’s parental ri ghts to O.J. and
N.R. The termination decision was based on (1) mother’s refusal or neglect to comply with

2 The responding officer who testified at the permanency trial testified that J.D. had a
warrant “for absconding from his reported address as a predatory offender.”
3 According to the social worker, mother was incarcerated and had executed her sentence
even though she could have gotten a furlough to begin recommended chemical-dependency
treatment.

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her parental duties under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2016), and (2) failure of
the county’s reasonable efforts to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-
home placement under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2016). The district court
also terminated mother’s parental rights to L.R., and the termination decision was based on
mother’s refusal or neglect to comply with her parental duties under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).
The district court terminated father’s parental rights to O.J. and N.R. based on its
determination that (1) father refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
him as a parent within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (2) reasonable
efforts of the county failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home
placement within the meaning of Minn . Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), and (3) the
children remained neglected and in foster care within the meaning of Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(8) (2016). Mother and father appealed separately, and this court
consolidated their appeals.
D E C I S I O N
A parent’s rights to a child may be terminated “only for grave and weighty reasons.”
In re Welfare of M.D.O. , 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 199 0). But a district court may
terminate parental rights when at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by
clear and convincing evidence and the court determines that termination is in the child’s
best interests. This court reviews the district court’s findings for clear error, In re Welfare
of Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008) , and its decision to terminate
parental rights for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87

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(Minn. App. 2012). “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is manifestly contrary to the weight
of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of
Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 665 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Less-restrictive alternative
Mother does not specifically challenge the district court’s conclusion regarding any
of the statutory grounds upon which the district court terminated her parental rights .
Instead, she argues that “it would not be detrimental for her children to return to her care
once she is released from jail and is maintaining sobriety,” “[s]he has a support network in
place to care for the children during her period of incarceration and treatment,” and “[a]
less restrictive alternative to termination is available in a temporary transfer of custody to
a family member.” Father also argues that there were “less[] restrictive options to
termination” of his parental rights, including temporary placement of the children with
mother’s family until mother regains sobriety.
Appellants have not cited any authority that required the district court to determine
whether there was a less -restrictive alternative to termination of their parental rights.
Under the permanency statute, “[t]ermination of parental rights and adoption, or
guardianship to the commissioner of human services through a consent to adopt, are
preferred permanency options for a child who cannot return home.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.513(a) (2016). The permanency statute does not require the district court to
consider any option other than termination, if statutory grounds for termination exist.
Also, t he argument of both parents that custody of the children should be
temporarily transferred to mother’s family members res ts on the premise that mother will

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be able to parent in the foreseeable future. But terminating a parent’s rights under section
260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), for refusing or neglecting to comply with parental duties, requires
the district court to find that the parent is not “presently able and willing to assume [the
parent’s] responsibilities” and that the parent’s neglect of those duties “will continue for a
prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of J.K., 374 N.W.2d 463, 466-67 (Minn.
App. 1985) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1985); see In re Welfare of
H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Minn. App. 1990) (upholding termin ation of parental rights
under section 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), when “the present conditions of neglect will
continue for a prolonged and indeterminate time”), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).
Evidence presented at trial showed that mother has had a prolonged dependency on
controlled substances and was subject to criminal charges that arose from the February 3,
2017 incident. She had recently taken a chemical -dependency assessment that
recommended inpatient treatment for 60 to 90 days. During the previous year, mother had
several known relapses following treatment, one of which occurred while she was about
eight months pregnant with L.R. and being monitored in a halfway house after treatment,
and one of which occurred when she told J.D. that she would be “right back” and then went
on a two -day “bender” of cocaine use. Mother concedes that she is currently unable to
parent her children, and the record supports the district court’s determination that she will
not be able to parent them in the foreseeable future. The district court’s determination
refutes appellants’ premise that mother will be able to parent in the foreseeable future.

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Best interests
Father also does not specifically challenge the district court’s conclusions regarding
any of the st atutory grounds upon which the district court terminated his parental rights ,
but he argues that termination is not in his children’s best interests. Even when a statutory
ground for termination exists, the district court must find that termination is in the child’s
best interests, which are paramount. In re Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Minn.
2005); Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2016). In determining the child’s best interests,
the district court must analyze: “(1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent -child
relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any
competing interests of the child.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895,
905 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
Father concedes that the primary reason for terminatin g his parental rights was his
admitted cocaine use. He argues, however, that he “did not have the benef it of chemical
dependency treatment” and the children were not in his care when they were exposed to
J.D.
But the children were exposed to J.D., in part, because father was n ot available to
parent due to his incarceration for a controlled-substance offense. Also, the district court
found that father was diagnosed as chemically dependent and was required to participate
in treatment, but he declined to do so. The district court found that father’s trial testimony
that he would complete chemical -dependency treatment to avoid losing his children was
not credible because father continued using controlled substances while on probation and
chose to serve out his 2014 sentence in prison “rather than complete treatment.” Father

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also testified that he did not bel ieve that chemical -dependency treatment would “be the
answer” to help him maintain sobriety , and the district court found that further efforts by
the county to assist father would be “futile” because father “failed to take any steps to
address his chemical dependency issues.” On this record, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that terminating father’s parental rights is in the children’s
best interests. See In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P. , 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App.
2004) (rejecting parent’s best -interests argument when parent had a 30 -year history of
chemical dependency and relapses, and guardian ad litem testified that parent should be
sober at least two years before the family could be reunited); see also In re Welfare of
Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 96 (Minn. App. 2008) (upholding vacation of conditional
stay of voluntary termination of parental rights, based on parent’s failure to take steps to
address issue of illegal drug use).
Affirmed.