State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0806

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Erik Charles Knutson,
Appellant.

Filed March 19, 2018
Reversed and Remanded
Randall, Judge*

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-16-5362

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Randall,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RANDALL, Judge
On appeal from his conviction f or third-degree controlled -substance crime (sale),
appellant argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea under the manifest-
injustice standard. He argues his plea was involuntary and inaccurate. We agree. We
reverse and remand to allow appellant to withdraw his plea.
FACTS
Appellant Erik Knutson was charged with third-degree sale of a controlled
substance, fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. The complaint alleged that on December 23, 2016, a vehicle driven by
appellant’s girlfriend, Tracy Oddson, in which appellant was a passenger, was stopped for
speeding. The complaint also alleged that when police searched the vehicle, a “large clear
bag” was discovered on the back seat of the vehicle that contained $10,000 in cash and a
small black lock box. Inside the lock box were “three small baggies of marijuana,” “two
baggies of methamphetamine,” “two hydrocodone pills,” “several empty unused baggies,”
and a “scale; spoon; straw; and a glass pipe.” According to the complaint, “Oddson stated
[that] the drugs in the lock box were for her and [appellant].”
In addition to charging appellant, respondent State of Minnesota charged Oddson
with third-degree sale of a controlled substance. The state later filed a notice of intent to
seek an aggravated sentence of 360 months for appellant. The state alleged that because
appellant has an extensive criminal history, including several controlled-substance crime
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convictions, the state would seek an aggravated durational departure under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.1095, subd. 4 (2016).
In February 2017, appellant pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree sale of a
controlled substance. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the state dismissed the other
two counts in the complaint, and agreed to seek a 57- month sentence. Further, the state
agreed to dismiss the third-degree sale of a controlled substance charge against O ddson.
The district court accepted appellant’s plea and sentenced him in accordance with the plea
agreement to 57 months in prison. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
“Once a guilty plea has been entered, there is no absolute right to withdraw it.” State
v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017). But a defendant may challenge his guilty
plea on direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. State v. Miller, 849 N.W.2d 94, 97
(Minn. App. 2014). A defendant must be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea if “withdrawal
is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn.
2010) (quotation omitted). “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Id. at
94. To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Id.
Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea, arguing that it was both
involuntary and inaccurate. The defendant bears the burden of establishing the facts that
support his claim that the guilty plea is invalid. Id. The validity of a guilty plea, however,
is a question of law that we review de novo. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d at 603.
To determine whether a plea is voluntary, we examine what the parties reasonably
understood to be the terms of the plea agreement. State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674
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(Minn. 2000). The voluntariness requirement ensures that a defendant is not pleading
guilty due to improper pressure or coercion. State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.
1983). Whether a plea is voluntary is determined by considering all relevant
circumstances. State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994).
Additional scrutiny, however, is required for a “package deal ” in which the plea
agreement includes leniency for a defendant’s accomplices. Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d
333, 339 (Minn. 2003); Danh, 516 N.W.2d at 542. In Danh, the defendant entered into a
plea agreement that was linked to, and dependent on, plea agreements with three co-
defendants. Id. at 540-41. The “package deal” provided, among other things, for a more
lenient sentence for the defendant’s younger brother. Id. The district court conducted a
rule 15.01 inquiry before accepting the plea, but neither party mentioned the contingent
nature of the plea. Id. at 541. The defendant later moved to withdraw his plea, but the
district court denied the motion. Id.
On appeal, the supreme court held that such “package deal” agreements, although
not per se invalid, are “generally dangerous because of the risk of coercion,” particularly
in cases involving related third parties, where “there is a risk that a defendant, who would
otherwise exercise his or her right to a jury trial, will plead guilty out of a sense of family
loyalty.” Id. at 542. Accordingly, the court held that in order to ensure that package- deal
plea agreements are voluntarily made, “the state must fully inform the [district] court of
the details of the agreements,” and the district court must conduct “further inquiries”
beyond the standard rule 15.01 inquiry. Id.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has not specified what further inquiry must be made.
In Danh, the supreme court provided guidance from other jurisdictions, noting that the
district court might inquire into seven factors:
Whether the prosecutor had a “reasonable and good faith” case
against the third party; the strength of the factual basis for the
plea; the nature and degree of coerciveness, for example,
whether a third party has threatened the defendant; whether the
leniency to a third party was an “insignificant factor” in the
defendant’s choice to plead guilty; the age of defendant;
whether defendant or the prosecutor had initiated plea
negotiations; and whether charges had already been pressed
against a third party.

Id. at 543 (quoting I n re Ibarra, 666 P.2d 980, 986- 87 (Cal. 1983), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Howard, 824 P.2d 1315 (Cal. 1992)). The most important
consideration is whether the contingent plea agreement was a significant factor in a
defendant’s decision to plead guilty. See id. (describing Ibarra’s approach as a “significant
factor” test and approving of a similar approach in which the plea was involuntary because
the defendant entered it primarily because of a contingent agreement). Thus, at a minimum,
the district court’s questioning must be sufficient to determine whether the benefit to the
other defendant was a significant factor in the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. Id.
Appellant asserts that his “guilty plea was induced by a promise that the [state]
would dismiss a third-degree sale charge against [appellant’s] co-defendant and girlfriend,
Tracy Oddson.” That promise was part and parcel of appellant’s decision to go through
with a plea bargain and plead guilty.
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The plea agree ment here is a “package deal.” In exchange for appellant’s guilty
plea, the state agreed to dismiss the third- degree sale of a controlled substance charge
against Oddson. In Danh, the supreme court stated:
In future cases,[1] a defendant must be allowed to withdraw his
or her guilty plea if the state fails to inform the [district] court
of the nature of the plea, or if the [district] court fails to
adequately inquire into the voluntariness of the plea at the time
of the guilty plea. This holding is in accordance with those
cases which hold that [district] courts must take extra steps to
determine the voluntariness of these types of pleas.

516 N.W.2d at 542-43 (footnote emphasis added). The supreme court emphasized that the
inquiry must be made at the time of the guilty plea. Id. at 542 n.4. Specifically, the supreme
court noted that “a later hearing cannot replace a full inquiry into the voluntariness at the
time the plea is entered” because “[t]here is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the
record at the time the plea is entered the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the
charge against him.” Id. (quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
Here, unlike in Danh, the record reflects that t he district court was apprised of the
“package deal” at the time of the plea agreement. The district court also conducted a Rule
15.01 inquiry, and asked appellant if the “package deal” was his “understanding of the
agreement,” to which appellant replied, “Yes sir. It is.” The district court later asked
appellant if, “[b]esides the terms and along with the agreement regarding Ms. Oddson’s
case, besides that, did anyone promise you anything or threaten you in any way to get you
to plead guilty?” Appellant answered, “No.” After a factual basis for appellant’s plea was

1 Because of the “unusual circumstances” present in Danh, the supreme court remanded
for an evidentiary hearing. 516 N.W.2d at 544-45.
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stated on the record, the district recognized that appellant has “been very forthright here.”
The district court then stated: “And I believe that you would agree that the bag, the cash
and the drugs belonged to you and perhaps your girlfriend knew about it but you are taking
ownership for those; is that correct?” Appellant answered, “It is.”
We conclude the standard set forth in Danh was satisfied here. The district court’s
questioning sufficiently demonstrated that the benefit to Oddson was a significant factor in
appellant’s decision to plead guilty. See Danh, 516 N.W.2d at 543 (providing factors to
guide a district court’s “further inquiry” regarding package plea-agreement deals); see also
Butala, 664 N.W.2d at 339-40 (concluding a guilty plea was voluntary despite the parties’
failure to lay out the entire plea agreement , where the promise not to prosecute the
defendant’s family members was revealed following a motion to withdraw the plea; the
defendant proposed the third-party deal, and the postconviction court found no coercive
effect stemming from the agreement).
Appellant also contends that his plea was involuntary because the state failed to
“fully inform the [district] court and [appellant] about facts relevant to its promise not to
prosecute Ms. Oddson.” Specifically, appellant claims that “[j]ust two weeks after” the
state’s agreement not to prosecute Oddson “induced [his] plea,” the state filed “six new
drug sale charges against Ms. Oddson” based on a previous investigation of her. Appellant
argues that “[b]y not disclosing its separate drug sale case against . . . Oddson, the state . . .
violated its duty to conduct plea negotiations in good faith.” We agree.
To support its claim, appellant refers to several newspaper articles, as well as the
district court file involving Oddson, in which charges were filed on March 7, 2017. None
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of this material was part of the record below. Although appellant claims that th is court
should take judicial notice of this material, the state “objects to the inclusion of the news
articles/stories as not being a proper part of the record.” The state does not object to the
MNCIS records involving Oddson. Even without considering the news articles cited by
appellant, we conclude that Oddson’s precarious criminal position was known long before
the appellant’s plea agreement.
“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled.” Brown, 606 N.W.2d at 674 (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971)). And this court has stated that “[p]lea agreements must be
negotiated in good faith, and unqualified promises must be honored in order to maintain
public respect for the integrity of the state’s criminal process.” State v. Anderson, 520
N.W.2d 184, 188 (Minn. App. 1994).
MNCIS records reflect that on March 7, 2017, two weeks after appellant pleaded
guilty and the state dismissed the third-degree drug-sale charge against Oddson, the state
filed a new complaint against Oddson, charging her with three counts of second-degree
sale of a controlled substance and three counts of third-degree sale of a controlled
substance. The charges arose from sales occurring in October and December 2016. The
fact that these charges were filed only two weeks after appellant pleaded guilty is prima
facie evidence that the state knew of the pending charges and prosecution when they made
the plea agreement to “not charge” appellant’s girlfriend Oddson. It is not reasonable to
believe that was not the case. The prosecutor’s knowledge of this information proves the
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state’s plea offer was disingenuous. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
appellant’s plea was voluntary.
The involuntariness of appellant’s plea is further supported by the state’s threat of
an illegal sentence. Shortly after the complaint was filed, the state filed a notice of intent
to seek an aggravated sentence of 360 months. Although the state concedes on appeal that
the maximum sentence it could have sought was 240 months, the state argues that its
“miscalculations” did not render appellant’s plea involuntary.
To be voluntary, a guilty plea may not be based on “any improper pressures or
inducements.” Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). “Improper pressures
or inducements can come in a variety of forms. At one extreme, the government may not
produce a plea through actual or threatened physical harm, or by mental coercion
overbearing the will of the defendant.” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017)
(quotations omitted). The state also cannot induce a guilty plea based on a promise by the
prosecutor that goes unfulfilled or was unfulfillable from the start, such as a plea agreement
involving the promise of an illegal sentence. Brown, 606 N.W.2d at 674. “In short, a
plea is involuntary when it is induced by coercive or deceptive action.” Dikken , 896
N.W.2d at 877.
Here, the state threatened the appellant with an illegal sentence. Although there is
no evidence that the state’s miscalculations were intentional or meant to be coercive, the
prosecutor’s threat of an illegal 360-month sentence indicates that appellant’s deal was not
based on the totality of correct facts. W hen considered in conjunction with the state’s
decision to charge Oddson with second- and third-degree controlled-substance crimes two
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weeks after agreeing to the package deal involving the dismissal of other charges, it was
not based on the totality of correct facts. Even without this element of 360 versus 240,
appellant is entitled to withdraw his plea. It was involuntary because appellant actually
believed the state “was offering something” by agreeing not to charge Oddson.
We reverse and remand to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea to correct this
manifest injustice. Because we conclude that appellant’s guilty plea was involuntary, we
need not address the accuracy of the plea.
Reversed and remanded.