State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0814

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Harry Maddox, III,
Appellant.

Filed May 7, 2018
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge

Sibley County District Court
File No. 72-CR-16-60

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota;

David E. Schauer, Sibley County Attorney, Winthrop, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HALBROOKS, Judge
Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea to the crime of offering forged
checks, arguing that his plea is inaccurate because he did not state in his plea colloquy that
he intended to defraud. We affirm.

2
FACTS
In 2015, an Eagan police officer was investigating a burglary involving business
checks that were stolen from a bakery . According to the officer, the checks began
appearing at gas stations in Minnesota and Wisconsin signed with names such as M.K.,
M.P., and A.W. Through video surveillance, the officer identified appellant Harry
Maddox, III, as the individual who had forged the checks.
Police executed a search warrant at Maddox’s residence. They found clothing that
matched what Maddox wore in the gas -station surveillance videos and Minnesota
identification cards belonging to M.P. and A.W. Maddox subsequently admitted offering
forged checks.
The state charged Maddox with offering forged checks under Minn. Stat. § 609.631,
subd. 3 (2014). The state offered Maddox a plea whereby he would be sentenced to
24 months in prison with 348 days’ credit for time served , all fines and surcharges would
be waived, and a civil judgment would be created for the victims who filed restitution
affidavits. Maddox accepted the offer and pleaded guilty. The district court accepted
Maddox’s plea and sentenced him according to the terms of the plea agreement. This
appeal follows.1

1 A defendant can seek plea withdrawal in a direct appeal without first presenting the matter
to the district court. See State v. Anyanwu , 681 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. App. 2004) ,
overruled on other grounds by Wheeler v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2018 WL 1414708,
at *8 (Minn. Mar. 21, 2018).

3
D E C I S I O N
A defendant does not have an absolut e right to withdraw a guilty plea . State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). But a district court must allow a defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea if withdrawing the guilty plea is “necessary to correct a manifest
injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice arises when a guilty plea
is not valid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A guilty plea is valid if it is accurate, voluntary,
and intelligent. Id. The defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty plea carries the burden
of proving that his plea was invalid. Id. We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo.
Id.
“The accuracy requirement protects a defendant from pleading guilty to a more
serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if he insisted on his right to trial.”
Id. A guilty plea is accurate if it is establ ished by a proper factual basis. Id. A proper
factual basis includes sufficient record facts that when taken together s upport a
determination that the “defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires to
plead guilty.” State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003) (quotation omitted). A
factual basis is inadequate if the defendant makes statements during the plea hearing that
“negate an essential element of the charged crime .” See id. at 350 (reasoning that “such
statements are inconsistent with a plea of guilty”).
Maddox pleaded guilty to offering forged checks . See Minn. Stat. § 609.631,
subd. 3. The elements of the crime of offering a forged check are: (1) a person, with intent
to defraud, (2) offers, or possesses with intent to offer, (3) a forged check , whether or not
it is accepted. Id.

4
At the plea hearing, Maddox’s public defender asked Maddox a series of questions
about the check-forgery allegations:
Q. Okay. And specifically, in the period between
September 1st, 2015, and December 31, 2015, so in this
three-month period, do you admit that you had
possession of checks that were not in your name?
A. What was that? Where does it say that?
Q. No, I’m trying to—
A. Oh, oh—
Q. —ask you.
A. Yes, I have—yes, I did so they say, yes.
Q. Well, Mr. Maddox, you have to either admit to different
elements of this crime or not?
A. How many? Okay, yes.
Q. When you had possession of these checks, is it correct
that you offered these checks to various businesses?
A. Yes, to the best of my recollection.
Q. And part of that is that there are many businesses listed
in this complaint, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. In offering these forged checks to the businesses, you
were going to get a financial benefit back, correct? By
giving them the forged check, you were getting
something of value?
A. Yes, it was services, products and financial ability.
Q. Okay. And the establishments you were giving those
checks to were not getting anything of value back?
A. I doubt it.
Q. You agree that this list of different establishments I’m
not asking you to remember each one of those events or
even admit that each one of t hose events was you,
however, taken together is over $7,000; do you admit
that?
A. Yes, that’s the State’s calculation.
Q. You do admit that you took part in the forgery of over
$2,500 worth of it?
A. Yes.

Maddox makes two arguments in support of his p osition that plea withdrawal is
necessary here. First, Maddox maintains that the factual basis does not establish the intent

5
element of the crime of offering forged checks because he did not explicitly state during
the plea colloquy that he had the specific intent to defraud. We disagree. A defendant need
not expressly state that he had the specific intent to defraud in order for a plea colloquy to
establish a proper factual basis because intent is most often proved circumstantially by the
inferences that can be drawn from the defendant’s words or his actions “in light of all the
surrounding circumstances.” Nelson v. State , 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted). For example, in State v. Knight, the supreme court affirmed a guilty
plea of theft by check, which also required that the state prove the defendant acted with the
intent to defraud even though the defendant did not expressly state in the plea colloquy that
he specifically intended to defraud. 292 Minn. 419, 422, 192 N.W.2d 829, 831 (1971).
Maddox admitted during the plea colloquy that (1) he possessed checks that were
not in his name, (2) he offered them to businesses, and (3) he received “services, products
and financial ability,” and (4) the business received nothing of value in return. These facts
are sufficient to establish that Maddox offered forged checks with the intent to defraud the
businesses to which he offered them. Cf. Chapman v. State, 282 Minn. 13, 22, 162 N.W.2d
698, 704 (1968) (concluding defendant’s guilty plea t o a murder charge was inaccurate
because he “specifically denied an intent to kill”).
Second, Maddox checked a box in his plea petition stating: “I do . . . make the claim
that I was so drunk or so under the influence of drugs or medicine that I did not know what
I was doing at the time of the crime. ” After that sentence, there is hand -written text that
says, “pain killers.” Maddox contends that this statement in the record “calls into doubt
whether [he] was even capable of forming the specific intent to defraud.” We disagree.

6
We determine the accuracy of a guilty plea based on statements made on the record
at the plea hearing. Vernlund v. State, 589 N.W.2d 307, 310 (Minn. App. 1999). During
the plea hearing, Maddox did not testify that he lacked the proper state of mind or that he
was high on pain killers when he offered the forged checks to various businesses. And
when the district court asked Maddox follow-up questions about his state of mind to enter
a guilty plea, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Sir, one of the questions you were asked too about is
whether you were thinking clearly today and you said, I
hope so. Is there a question in your mind as to whether
you’re thinking clearly enough to fully understand the
plea agreement that has been reached.
A. Again, your Honor, that’s a very, very difficult question
when you’re under nine different medications without a
psychiatrist or medical doctor present for me to say, but
as far as how I feel and how I think, yes.
Q. Well, I’m sorry, I can’t accept your plea petition unless
I’m sure that you are thinking clearly now; do you
understand?
A. Yes, yes, I do at the moment, yes.
Q. So you do understand what you’re doing today?
A. Correct, as of today, yes.
Q. Well, we’re taking your plea today so, as long as you
understand this process today, and you are thinking
clearly enough today, I can take your plea.
A. Correct.
Q. And you are thinking clearly eno ugh, you fully
understand what’s happening here today; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. All right.

Based on the factual basis provided at the plea hearing, we conclude that there are
sufficient facts that establish that Maddox’s guilty plea was accurate. Because the plea was
accurate, it is not invalid. There is therefore no manifest injustice requiring plea
withdrawal.

7
In a pro se supplemental brief, Maddox argues that his imposed sentence exceeds
the statutory limit and violates Apprendi and Blakely. M inn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 4 (2)
(2014), provides that a person who is convicted of offering forged checks under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.631, subd. 3, may be sentenced “to imprisonment for not more than ten years . . . if
the forged check or checks are used to obtain or in an attempt to obtain, property or services
of more than $2,500 or the aggregate amount of the forged check or checks is more than
$2,500.” (Emphasis added.) The district court sentenced Maddox to 24 months in prison—
a duration well within the statutory limit.
With respect to Maddox’s pro se argument, “[a]ny fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized
by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Booker , 543
U.S. 220, 244, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005) (emphasis added); see Blakely v. Washington ,
542 U.S. 296, 313, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
497, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2366 (2000). Here, Maddox admitted in his plea colloquy that he
offered checks that totaled more than $2, 500. Therefore, there is no Blakely issue. The
district court did not err by imposing a 24-month sentence.
Affirmed.