A17-1096

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A17-0819
A17-1096

Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals Lillehaug, J.
Took no part, Chutich, J.
Anthony Gist,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: April 4, 2018
Office of Appellate Courts
Atlas Staffing, Inc. and Meadowbrook Claims Service,

Appellants/Cross-Respondents,

and

Fresenius Medical Care,

Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
________________________

Benjamin J. Heimerl, Heimerl & Lammers, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Brent Kleffman, Beth A. Butler, Peterson, Logren, & Kilbury, P.A., Saint Paul, Minnesota,
for appellants/cross-respondents.

Mark A. Frederickson, Katie H. Storms, João C.J.G. de Medeiros, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan
& Peterson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
1. The compensation judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that
respondent’s work-related silica exposure was a substantial contributing factor to his

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kidney failure.
2. Under 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2016), a provider cannot recover payment from
third parties for any services billed to Medicaid after the provider has accepted payment
from Medicaid for those services.
3. Respondent/appellant’s 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal to the
Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals had not expired at the time of filing the appeal
because the findings and order of the compensation judge were not served directly on
respondent/appellant.
4. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals did not err by reviewing and
modifying the compensation judge’s order instructing appellants to make workers’
compensation payments “in accordance with all other state and federal laws.”
5. The question of whether Minnesota’s workers’ compensation fee schedules
apply to medical bills for treatment incurred prior to a finding of primary liability is
remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
O P I N I O N
LILLEHAUG, Justice.
Shortly after leaving his job at Atlas Staffing, Inc. (“Atlas”), respondent Anthony
Gist was diagnosed with end stage renal disease (“ESRD”)—kidney failure. His job with
Atlas exposed him to silica, a known cause of ESRD. Gist sought workers’ compensation
benefits from Atlas and its insurer, Meadowbrook Claims Services (collectively,
“appellants”). Appellants denied coverage, and Gist began receiving treatment from

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respondent/cross-appellant Fresenius Medical Care (“Fresenius”). Fresenius billed
Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurer Medica for the costs of Gist’s treatment, and
accepted payments from each.
After a hearing, the compensation judge found that Gist’s silica exposure was a
substantial contributing factor to his kidney disease, and ordered that appellants pay
workers’ compensation benefits. After dismissing Fresenius’s cross- appeal as untimely,
the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (“WCCA”) largely upheld the compensation
judge’s decision. In the consolidated appeal s brought by appellants and Fresenius, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the WCCA.
FACTS
Gist worked for Atlas, a temporary staffing agency, from September 2011 through
June 2013. Atlas assigned him to Waltek Casting Company, which creates casting molds
for boats, planes, and farming equipment engines. Gist’s job at Waltek involved placing
wax figures on a rack and then a conveyor, after which a robot would drop the figures into
a silica-sand tank. He was also required to fill and clean the silica -sand tanks. Filling
occurred 8 to 10 times per 8-hour shift, and the tanks were cleaned at least once per day.
Because exposure to si lica sand is hazardous, Gist wore ear plugs, safety gla sses,
gloves, and a paper mask. Gist described the 2-hour cleaning process as hot, wet, and
muddy. Silica sand got inside his pants and stuck to his skin.
Gist left the job on June 28, 2013, at age 50 . About a month later, he was seen at
Mercy Hospital “for evaluation of kidney concerns after being informed by his clinic that
his blood work had evidence for kidney failure.” Thereafter, Gist saw a number of doctors.

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In November 2014, he filed a claim petition seeking workers’ compensation benefits from
appellants.
The compensation judge held a hearing in August 2016, at which the sole issue
relevant to this appeal was whether silica exposure was a “substantial contributing factor
to [Gist’s] kidney failure.”1 The parties stipulated that “[a]ll medical treatment to date has
been reasonable and necessary” and that Gist was “permanently and total[ly] disabled.” At
the time of the hearing, approximately $1.5 million in medical bills and indemnity benefits
were at issue.
A great deal of evidence regarding Gist’s medical history was presented at the
hearing. We summarize that history as follows:
• In February 2008, Gist was diagnosed “as having a left foot wound with
cellulitis and elevated blood sugar, most likely diabetic.”

• In June 2011, Gist was “diagnosed with hypertension, left-sided chest
pain, mild anemia, and resolving diverticulitis.”

• In July 2013, Gist was evaluated by Dr. James Lee and then hospitalized
for acute renal failure. Gist told Dr. Lee that he believed that his kidney
failure was due to silica exposure.

• An August 2013 biopsy showed that Gist had a condition “globally
interpreted as irreversible, non-salvageable kidney failure.”

• A week after his biopsy, Gist saw Dr. James Rusin, a family physician.
Dr. Rusin “did not feel silica had anything to do with [Gist’s] kidney
problem.”

• On August 27, 2013, Gist saw Stephanie Gordon, a nurse practitioner.
Gordon told Gist that “the kidney biopsy results were not consistent with

1 The compensation judge’s finding that silica exposure was not a substantial
contributing factor in Gist’s “skin lesions and cysts” has not been appealed.

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findings of some type of exposure.”

• On November 4, 2013, Gist was evaluated by Dr. Arthur Ney, a surgeon.
Dr. Ney noted that Gist had “a history of ESRD . . . possibly
hypertension” and deemed him a “reasonable candidate for transplant.”
Gist was approved for a transplant.

• On November 12, 2013, Janet Andersen, a kidney transplant coordinator,
“spoke with Dr. Kyle Onan, Nephrologist . . . . [ Dr. Onam stated that it
is] hard to say if the silica sand caused [Gist’s] renal failure.”

• On November 26, 2013, Gist had a follow-up appointment with Dr. Lee,
who noted that “[o]f the information I have at my disposal, silicosis can
be a cause of chronic renal failure.”

• In February 2014, Gist started dialysis treatment with Dr. George Canas,
who later issued a report opining that “the most likely, and most
reasonable, cause of [Gist’s kidney failure] is through his exposure to
silica as a result of his work through both a respiratory route and direct
contact.”

• In April 2014, Gist met with Dr. David Parker, an occupational medicine
doctor, who advised him that silica exposure “was not the likely cause”
of his kidney failure.

• In February 2015, Gist was examined by Dr. Merlin Brown, appellants’
expert, who opined that “silica exposure was not a substantial
contributing factor in the cause of [his] chronic kidney disease.”

Gist received treatment from Fresenius Medical Care in Coon Rapids from July
2014 until June 2015, and in Michigan from June 2015 through June 2016. Fresenius
intervened in this case in October 2015, seeking reimbursement from appellants for the
difference between the treatment costs that it had billed to Medicaid and Medicare and
what it was actually paid.
2 When the hearing was held before the compensation judge, Gist

2 The record reflects that Fresenius has been paid $20,678.75 of the $564,780.31 it
billed to Medicaid, $13,160.76 of the $537,241.30 billed to Medicare, and $49,995.00 of
the $533,153.08 billed to Medica.

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had not yet received a kidney transplant.
The compensation judge’s decision turned on whether she credited one of Gist’s
treating physicians, Dr. Canas (a nephrologist), or the appellants’ examiner, Dr. Brown (an
internal medicine specialist). The judge found the opinion of Dr. Canas “more persuasive”
than the opinion of Dr. Brown, and concluded that “the silica [Gist] was exposed to while
working . . . was a substantial contributing cause of [his] ultimate development of end stage
renal failure.” The judge also concluded that the Minnesota workers’ compensation fee
schedules applied “to all charges for services provided to [Gist] for the work-related
condition while in the state of Minnesota.” For services provided in Michigan, the laws
and fee schedules of Michigan applied. Finally, the judge concluded that she lacked
jurisdiction to interpret the Medicaid and Medicare laws, and ordered that appellants “pay
to [Fresenius] . . . in accordance with all other state and federal laws, [its] outstanding
intervention interests associated with the employee’s end stage renal disease.” Appellants
were also ordered to reimburse Medica and the Minnesota Department of Human Services
(“DHS”).
The compensation judge’s findings and order were served on the parties via U.S.
mail on October 24, 2016. Fresenius’s counsel, but not Fresenius itself, was served. On
November 8, 2016, appellants filed a notice of appeal . The notice had been served on
Fresenius the day before. Fresenius served a notice of cross-appeal by mail on November
22, 2016, which was received by the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH ”) on
November 28, 2016. On May 12, 2017, the WCCA dismissed Fresenius’s cross-appeal for

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lack of subject- matter jurisdiction, concluding that Fresenius’s notice should have been
filed by November 23, 2016.3
On June 21, 2017, the WCCA largely affirmed the compensation judge’s decision.
First, it held that “[s]ubstantial evidence, including medical expert opinion, supports the
compensation judge’s finding that [Gist’s] exposure to silica sand . . . was a substantial
contributing factor to [his] kidney failure.” Gist v. Atlas Staffing, Inc., No. WC16-6019,
2017 WL 3400792, at *7 (Minn. WCCA Jun. 21, 2017). Second, it concluded that “the
compensation judge properly determined she lacked jurisdiction to interpret and apply
Medicaid and Medicare statutes and rules.” Id. at *8. Third, it concluded that “the
compensation judge properly rejected [appellants’] argument that a medical provider that
accepts payments from Medicaid and Medicare is barred from receiving workers’
compensation payment.” Id. at *9. Fourth, it modified the compensation judge’s order,
striking the language that ordered payment to be made “in accordance with all other state
and federal laws” because that language was “contrary to the determination . . . that [the
judge] lacked jurisdiction to apply federal law” and was “too vague to be enforceable.” Id.
On the same day that appellants petitioned for a writ of certiorari, Fresenius moved
to lift the stay of its appeal and consolidate the two appeals. We granted Fresenius’s
motion.

3 Fresenius filed a petition for writ of certiorari on May 25, 2017, appealing the
dismissal of its cross-appeal, which we stayed pending the WCCA’s decision on the merits
of appellants’ appeal.

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ANALYSIS
The parties raise five issues. First, appellants challenge the compensation judge’s
finding of liability, arguing that Dr. Canas’s medical report lacked adequate foundation.
Second, appellants argue that, under a federal Medicaid regulation , Fresenius may not
obtain from them the amounts billed to, but not paid by, Medicaid. 4 Third, Fresenius
challenges the WCCA’s dismissal of its cross-appeal as untimely. Fourth, appellants argue
that the WCCA erred by striking the “in accordance with all other state and federal laws”
language f rom the compensation judge’s order. F ifth, Fresenius argues that the
compensation judge erred by concluding that the Minnesota workers’ compensation fee
schedules applied to its medical bills for treatment incurred prior to the finding that
appellants were liable.
I.
We first consider whether the compensation judge improperly relied on Dr. Canas’s
report to conclude that Gist’s work-related silica exposure was “a substantial contributing
factor” to his kidney disease. Appellants frame this issue as whether this report had an
adequate factual foundation. But appellants failed to lodge a foundation objection when
Dr. Canas’s report was offered into evidence, did not move for oral testimony, and did not

4 Appellants argued below that Fresenius is barred from collecting the outstanding
balance of treatment costs billed to Medicaid and Medicare. In their brief to this court,
appellants waived the preemption argument as to Medicare, solely arguing that “federal
Medicaid law preempts state law as it relates to Spaeth balances.”

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seek to cross-examine Dr. Canas.5 See Scott v. Kirk Minn. Co., 135 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn.
1965) (“While relator now complains that the foundation for an opinion expressed by one
of the doctors . . . was inadequate in that it ignored other medical testimony, no objection
was made at the hearing.”). Thus, the correct question before us is whether, when viewing
the entire record—including Dr. Canas’s report—there is substantial evidence that supports
the compensation judge’s causation determination.
We will affirm the WCCA’s decision upholding a compensation judge’s decision
unless the findings are manifestly contrary to the evidence. Hengemuhle v. Long Prairie
Jaycees, 358 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Minn. 1984). We review the facts in the light most favorable
to the decision below, and will not reverse unless “it is clear that reasonable minds would
adopt a contrary conclusion.” Id. at 61. But “where the evidence is conflicting or more
than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the findings of the
compensation judge are to be upheld.” Id. at 60; see also Anderson v. Frontier Commc’ns,
819 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Minn. 2012).
Here, the compensation judge was presented with conflicting medical reports.
Dr. Canas treated Gist, reviewed his medical records back to 2005, and consulted medical
studies to complete his report. His report concluded that “the most likely cause (as well as
the most reasonable) for Mr. Gist’s end stage kidney failure is through his exposure to

5 Minnesota Rule 1420.2900, subpart 3, provides that “[i]f a party believes that the
oral testimony of a physician . . . is crucial to the accurate determination of the employee’s
disability, the party shall file a written motion,” and subpart 4 provides that “[a]ll parties
have the right to present evidence, to cross- examine witnesses, an d to present rebuttal
testimony.” Minn. R. 1420.2900, subps. 3A, 4 (2017). The record does not reflect that
appellants made any such motion.

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silica as a result of his work exposing him . . . both via a respiratory route as well as direct
contact.” Dr. Brown examined Gist, reviewed his medical records, and concluded that
silica exposure was “not a substantial contributing factor” causing Gist’s kidney disease.
Based on a thorough review of the record, we conclude that it was reasonable for
the compensation judge to credit Dr. Canas’s report. Dr. Canas is a highly credentialed
expert, having been recognized as one of the state’s top nephrologists. He personally
treated Gist, and to complete his report he reviewed a decade of medical records. Although
other doctors expressed doubts that silica exposure caused Gist’s kidney failure, they
presented no clear alternative causality for Gist’s condition. Tellingly, even Dr. Brown,
appellants’ own expert, thought that Dr. Canas’s report was reasonable. In an addendum
report, Dr. Brown stated: “I have reviewed Dr. Canas’ report. His view is reasonable . . . .
There is not enough evidence to say with certainty that silica did cause the kidney failure.
At the same time, it is reasonable to assume, it is in the differential diagnosis.”
Accordingly, the compensation judge did not abuse her discretion by relying on Dr.
Canas’s report to find that work-related silica exposure was a substantial contributing
factor to Gist’s kidney failure. See Gianotti v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 152, 889 N.W.2d 796, 803
(Minn. 2017) (“In weighing medical evidence, a compensation judge has the discretion as
the trier of fact to choose between competing and conflicting medical experts’ reports and
opinions.”); see also Ruether v. State, 455 N.W.2d 475, 478 (Minn. 1990) (“We have
frequently had occasion to point out that it is axiomatic that a conflict in the opinions of
expert medical witnesses is to be resolved by the trier of fact.”).

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II.
Next, we consider whether appellants are liable for the difference between the cost
of the services that Fresenius billed to Medicaid and what Medicaid paid for those services.
The WCCA held that “the compensation judge properly rejected [appellants’] argument
that a medical provider that accepts payments from Medicaid . . . is barred from receiving
workers’ compensation payment for treatment provided to an injured employee.” Gist,
2017 WL 3400792, at *9. Appellants challenge this holding, arguing that by accepting
Medicaid payments under federal Medicaid rules, Fresenius received “payment in full” and
is barred from recovering the unpaid balance from appellants.
In response, Gist and Fresenius ask us to extend the Spaeth-balance rule to the
Medicaid context. Spaeth held that a treatment provider is “entitled to payment of his
charges for medical services provided to the employee, to the extent allowed under the
workers’ compensation medical fee schedule,” even if the provider has already received
partial payment from a private, non-employer insurer. Spaeth v. Cold Spring Granite Co.,
56 Minn. Workers’ Comp. Dec. 136, 148-49 (WCCA 1996) (Olsen, J., dissenting).
6
Appellants argue that the applicable Medicaid regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (2016), is
unambiguous, and would conflict with any Spaeth-balance rule in the Medicaid context.

6 We cite to Judge Olsen’s dissent here because, on appeal, we reversed the WCCA
by “adopt[ing] the rationale of the [WCCA] dissenting opinion.” Spaeth v. Cold Spring
Granite Co., No. C4-96-2249, Order at *2 (Minn. Jan. 29, 1997). We have since referred
to this concept—that a provider may collect from a liable employer the difference between
the amount paid by a private insurer and the amount permitted under the fee schedule—as
a “Spaeth balance.” Gamble v. Twin Cities Concrete Prods., 852 N.W.2d 245, 247 n.2
(Minn. 2014).

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A.
We begin by considering the meaning of section 447.15. “The interpretation of an
administrative regulation presents a question of law that we review de novo.” J.D.
Donovan, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 878 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2016). “Like statutes,
administrative regulations are governed by general rules of construction.” White Bear Lake
Care Ctr. v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 319 N.W.2d 7, 8 (Minn. 1982). “[W]hen the
language of the regulation is clear and capable of understanding, we give no deference to
the agency’s interpretation . . . .” In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake NPDES/SDS
Permit Issuance for the Discharge of Treated Wastewater, 731 N.W.2d 502, 515 (Minn.
2007).
The Medicaid regulation at issue here provides that:
A State plan must provide that the Medicaid agency must limit participation
in the Medicaid program to providers who accept, as payment in full, the
amounts paid by the agency plus any deductible, coinsurance or copayment
required by the plan to be paid by the individual.

42 C.F.R. § 447.15. This regulation is unambiguous. By its plain language, section 447.15
imposes a bright-line rule: when a provider participates in Medicaid, bills services to
Medicaid, and accepts Medicaid payment for those services, it accepts the amount paid as
“payment in full,” and thus cannot recover from third parties any unpaid amounts.
Accordingly, after accepting a payment from Medicaid for services provided, a provider is
barred from recovering any additional amounts for those services from a liable employer.
If the federal government had wanted to exem pt workers’ compensation cases from this
rule, it could have said so, just as it did in its Medicare regulations. See 42 C.F.R.

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§ 411.31(b) (2016) (“With respect to workers’ compensation plans . . . a [Medicare]
provider or supplier may bill its full charges and expect those charges to be paid unless
there are limits imposed by [other] laws . . . .”). No such exception appears in section
447.15.7
Gist and Fresenius pro pose an alternative reading of section 447.15—that it only
speaks to the provider-patient relationship and does not apply to a provider seeking
payment from a third party.8 We are not persuaded.
Gist and Fresenius’s reading of section 447.15 is not supported by its plain language.
The regulation does not distinguish between a provider seeking additional payment from a
treated individual as opposed to a liable employer. See Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation ,
184 N.W.2d 588, 594 (Minn. 1971) (“[C]ourts cannot supply that which the legislature
purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.”).

7 On this issue of federal law, we note also that multiple federal courts have held that
the “payment in full” language bars a provider from recovering additional payments from
any non-Medicaid source. See, e.g., Spectrum Health Continuing Care Grp. v. Anna Marie
Bowling Irrecoverable Tr., 410 F.3d 304, 318 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The clear import of these
words is that the Medicaid payment is the total amount owed to the provider for the services
rendered . . . .”); Rehab. Ass’n of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1447 (4th Cir. 1994)
(“Service providers who participate in the Medicaid program are required to accept
payment of the state-denoted Medicaid fee as payment in full . . . [they] may not attempt
to recover any additional amounts elsewhere.” (emphasis added)); Lizer v. Eagle Air Med
Corp., 308 F. Supp.2d 1006, 1009 (D. Ariz. 2004) (“This language prevents providers from
billing any entity for the difference between their customary charge and the amount paid
by Medicaid. Providers are not merely prohibited from balance billing patients
themselves.” (emphasis in original)).

8 Gist and Fresenius cite Pearson v. C.P. Buckner Steel Erection Co., 498 S.E.2d 818
(N.C. 1998), in support of their alternative reading of section 447.15. But Pearson engages
in no substantive preemption analysis, and thus has little persuasive value.

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Begging to differ, Fresenius asks us to read section 447.15 alongside part of 42
C.F.R. § 447.20 (2016), arguing that section 447.20 suggests that the “payment in full”
provision of section 447.15 only applies when the provider is seeking additional payments
from the treated individual. But sections 447.15 and 447.20 came into effect on different
dates. The last substantive change to section 447.15 occurred in 1983. See Medicaid
Program; Imposition of Cost Sharing Charges Under Medicaid, 48 Fed. Reg. 5730-01,
5735–36 (Feb. 8, 1983). Section 447.20 was first enacted in 1990. See Medicaid Program;
State Plan Requirements and Other Provisions Relating to State Third Party Liability
Programs, 55 Fed. Reg. 1423-02, 1433 (Jan. 16, 1990). Thus, we may only read these
regulations together by invoking in pari materia—the related-statutes canon. Because
section 447.15 is unambiguous, we cannot invoke in pari materia. 9 See State v.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017) (stating that in pari materia “is an
extrinsic canon that applies only to ambiguous statutes”).
Accordingly, because section 447.15 requires a provider that has accepted Medicaid
payments to accept them as “payment in full,” we must consider whether extending the
Spaeth-balance rule would conflict with the federal regulation.10

9 Even if we were to read sections 447.15 and 447.20 together, we reject Fresenius’s
argument that section 447.20 undercuts the “payment in full” language of section 447.15.

10 Fresenius correctly points out that the compensation judge ordered appellants to
reimburse DHS for payments already made, and now contends that this decision allows it
to seek additional payment from appellants. But that DHS has been reimbursed does not
change the fact that, prior to this litigation, Fresenius “accepted” Medicaid payments,
thereby triggering the regulation’s “in full” requirement.

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B.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal law
preempts conflicting state law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. “[T]he question of whether
federal law preempts state law” is reviewed de novo. Angell v. Angell, 791 N.W.2d 530,
534 (Minn. 2010). We have previously held that only conflict preemption can exist in the
Medicaid context. Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2002).
Conflict preemption exists “when state law conflicts with federal law, either because
compliance with both federal and state law is impossible or because the state law is an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of the federal sche me.” Id. “Preemption
of state laws is generally disfavored,” id., but “[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-
emptive effect than federal statutes,” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
Because section 447.15 requires a provider that accepts a Medicaid payment to
accept it as “payment in full,” extending the Spaeth-balance rule to the Medicaid context
would conflict with the federal regulation. If Fresenius recovered additional Medicaid-
billed amounts from appellants under the Spaeth-balance rule, then its accepted Medicaid
payment would not be a “payment in full.” The federal regulation and the Spaeth-balance
rule are incompatible. Accordingly, we decline to extend the Spaeth-balance rule to the
Medicaid context.
III.
Next, did the WCCA err when it dismissed Fresenius’s cross-appeal as untimely?
Fresenius argues that the 30-day period to file a notice of appeal never commenced because

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the compensation judge’s findings and order were not served on it directly. In light of the
statute’s plain language, we agree.
The compensation judge’s findings and order were served via U.S. mail on October
24, 2016. The workers’ compensation law provides that “within 30 days after a party in
interest has been served with notice of an award or disallowance of compensation . . . the
party may appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 1 (2016). “Where service is by mail,
service is effected at the time mailed if properly addressed and stamped.” Minn. Stat.
§ 176.285, subd. 1 (2016). Assuming proper service, the 30-day period to file a notice of
appeal ran on Wednesday, November 23, 2016.
The OAH did not receive Fresenius’s notice of cross-appeal until Monday,
November 28, 2016.11 It follows that Fresenius’s notice of cross-appeal was untimely filed
unless an exception applies. One does.
Minnesota Rule 1415.0700 provides that “[s]ervice on the attorney is considered
service on that party, except that all final orders, decisions, awards . . . and notices of
proceedings must also be served directly on the party.” Id., subp. 1 (2017) (emphasis
added). The compensation judge’s decision was a final order that needed to be directly
served on the parties themselves.

11 To properly appeal, a party must “file the original notice . . . with the chief
administrative law judge and file a copy with the commissioner” within the 30-day period.
Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 4 (2016). We have previously held that “the meaning of the
term ‘filed’ is plain and means that the notice of appeal must actually be received within
the statutory period.” Langer v. Comm’r of Revenue, 773 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. 2009)
(citing State v. Parker, 153 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn. 1967)).

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Here, Fresenius itself was not served directly, and the OAH’s proof of service shows
that.12 Therefore, Fresenius’s time to cross-appeal had not expire d by November 28.
Further, section 176.285 provides that “[i]n case of nonreceipt . . . an allowance shall be
made for the party’s failure to assert a right within the prescribed time.” Minn. Stat. §
176.285, subd. 1 (emphasis added). Because Fresenius was not itself served with the
compensation judge’s findings and order, it would have been entitled to such an
“allowance.” Accordingly, Fresenius’s notice of cross-appeal was timely.13
IV.
We now address appellants’ argument that the WCCA improperly struck the “in
accordance with all other state and federal laws” language from the compensation judge’s
findings and order. This language appears in Orders 3 and 4 of the compensation judge’s
findings and order.
Appellants argue that the WCCA should not have considered this issue because it
was only raise d in Fresenius’s cross-appeal, which the WCCA dismissed. Plainly, the
WCCA can only review the issues raised in a notice of appeal or cross-appeal. The statute
governing appeals to the WCCA provides that “[o]n appeal . . . the Workers’ Compensation
Court of Appeals’ review is limited to the issues raised by the parties in the notice of appeal

12 By contrast, the proof of service shows that the other parties, and their counsel, if
any, were served directly.

13 Fresenius argues, alternatively, that (1) because the OAH served the compensation
judge’s findings and order via U.S. mail, the “mailbox rule” entitled it to 3 additional days
to file its notice of cross-appeal, thereby making its cross-appeal timely, or (2) the 30-day
period should run from the date of receipt, not the date of mailing, which would extend the
filing deadline to November 28, 2016. We need not consider these alternative arguments.

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or by a cross-appeal.” Minn. Stat. § 176.421, subd. 6 (2016). But t his issue was raised,
and by appellants themselves. Appellants’ notice of appeal to the WCCA states that “the
specific findings and orders appealed from are . . . O[rders]: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.” Thus,
Orders 3 and 4 were raised by appellants, and the WCCA had jurisdiction to consider and
modify them. Moreover, we have reinstated Fresenius’s cross-appeal.
V.
Because we conclude that Fresenius’s cross-appeal was timely, Fresenius invites us
to consider an issue raised solely in its cross-appeal to the WCCA: whether the Minnesota
fee schedules apply to medical bills for treatment incurred prior to a finding of primary
liability. Because the WCCA has special expertise in this area of law, Hengemuhle, 358
N.W.2d at 61, we decline to consider this issue and remand it for consideration by the
WCCA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the WCCA decision in part, reverse in part,
and remand to that court for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

CHUTICH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.