State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0839

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bradley Justin Miles,
Appellant.

Filed April 16, 2018
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Pipestone County District Court
File No. 59-CR-16-44

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Damain Sandy, Pipestone County Attorney, Pipestone, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Following a jury trial at which he repres ented himself, appella nt Bradley Justin
Miles challenges his convictions of a number of offenses arising from his holding captive

2
and assaulting his ex-wife. Miles argues that his waiver of the right to counsel was not
voluntary because the district court abused its discreti on in denying his request for
substitute counsel. Miles also challenges his sentence on his kidnapping conviction,
arguing that the district court erred in using a severity level of nine. Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miles’s request for substitute counsel and
because Miles’s waiver of the right to c ounsel was voluntarily made, we affirm his
convictions. Because the district court used an incorrect severity level, we reverse his
sentence and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
On January 28, 2016, the state charged Mile s with one count of terroristic threats
and one count of misdemeanor domestic assault. The compla int alleged that, two days
earlier at around 7:00 p.m., Miles arrived at his ex-wife R.C.’s workplace in Sioux Falls,
South Dakota, intoxicated and with their three children in the van. R.C. got in the van, and
Miles started yelling at her and told her that he was going to kill her. Miles punched R.C.
twice in the arm and choked her until she almost passed out. Miles drove backroads to
Jasper, Minnesota, where R.C. and the childr en lived. Miles continued driving around,
until he got the van stuck in the snow. R.C. and the children walked back to their house,
as did Miles, arriving around 10:00 p.m. R.C. felt unable to leave, as Miles questioned her
when she tried to move. Miles slept on a mattress in the livi ng room. The following
morning, R.C. put a note in one of the children’s backpacks, stating that she had been
beaten and was being held against her will by her ex-husband and asking that the police be

3
sent to her home. A teacher found the note and called law en forcement, who went to the
house and arrested Miles.
The district court appointed a public defender to represent Miles on the day he was
charged. On February 9, Miles filed a request for discovery. Trial was thereafter scheduled
for June 9 and 10. About a week before tria l, Miles requested a continuance so that he
could file a reverse-Spreigl motion.1 The district court granted Miles’s request.
The state filed an amended complaint, a dding one count of kidnapping, one count
of false imprisonment, and one count of domestic assault by strangulation. Miles pleaded
not guilty to all five charges. On October 4, Miles filed his reverse- Spreigl motion. On
November 22, the district court denied the motion and rescheduled the trial for December 1
and 2.
The day before the scheduled trial date, the state served late discovery responses of
evidence it had obtained from the Sioux Falls Police Department. On December 1, Miles
made an oral motion to dismiss the case for violation of discovery rules and violation of
due process because of the length of time he had been in custody without a trial. The state
responded that it had only learned of the existence of the new evidence a few days earlier
and asked the district court to grant a continuance rather than dismiss the case. The district
court took the motion under advisement a nd struck the trial from the calendar. On

1 A reverse- Spreigl motion is a motion by a defendant to introduce evidence of another
person’s prior bad acts. State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 485 (Minn. 2005) (citing State
v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965)). Miles wanted to introduce evidence
that his ex-wife had previously made a false report of domestic assault.

4
December 6, Miles asserted a speedy-trial demand. The district court later denied Miles’s
motion to dismiss and rescheduled the trial for February 2 and 3, 2017.
On December 29, 2016, Miles filed a written motion to dismiss for undue delay.
However, at the motion hearing on January 10, 2017, Miles requested a continuance of the
hearing. The district court denied the request because of “the timeline here for trial” and
instead heard oral argument from counsel on the motion to dismiss. In addition, Miles
addressed the district court personally, sayi ng that he wanted “to file a motion for
ineffective counsel.” Miles alleged that th e public defender had not filed a motion for
discovery and never demanded a speedy trial, which Miles asked for “back in February
when [Miles] met [the public defender].” Mile s also alleged that he had not been able to
talk to his counsel since January 5, 2017. Miles said that he was “asking for new counsel”
or, in the alternative, a continuance of the trial so he could find private representation.
On January 12, the district court denied the motion to dismiss and denied Miles’s
request for substitute counsel.
On January 23, Miles’s public defender filed a motion to withdraw. The following
day, the district court held an off-the-record hearing on the motion and granted the motion
subject to a review hearing. On January 31, the district court held a review hearing to “ask
[Miles] questions about whether [he was], in effect, waiving [his] right to an attorney” and
to “explain things to [Miles] . . . with the hope of being fair to both parties.” The district
court informed Miles that “[he was] entitled to a public defender but not a public defender
of [his] choice.” The court explained that it had denied the motion for substitute counsel
conditionally and had wanted the review hearing to happen before making a final decision

5
on whether to discharge the public defende r. The court informed Miles that its
understanding was that Miles had indicated to the public defender that Miles did not want
the public defender to represent him. Miles responded, “That’s true.” The district court
further asked, “So do you understand that the practical impact of that decision is that you
would be representing yourself if this matter goes to trial on Thursday?” Miles replied,
“Yes.” The district court then asked Miles if he was waiving his right to counsel and stated
that if Miles did waive the right, the court would read a waiver form to him and Miles
would have an opportunity to sign it. The district court read the waiver form, but Miles
refused to sign it, stating that he “[didn’t] want to agree to [the waiver] because [he]
want[ed] to seek [his] own counsel.” The di strict assigned advisory counsel but pushed
the trial back to allow Miles time to retain private counsel.
The jury trial began on February 9, a nd Miles represented himself. After both
parties rested, the state informed the district court that “the evidence is insufficient to
establish great bodily harm” for kidnapping and requested that the special question on that
issue be removed from the verdict form. The district court agreed, stating that “[t]here has
been no evidence of . . . gr eat bodily harm,” and removed the question relating to great
bodily harm. The jury was asked to answer the remaining special question on whether the
victim was “released in a safe place.”
The jury found Miles guilty of all charges and answered “no” to the released-in-a-
safe-place special question.

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On March 7, based partly on a severity le vel of nine, the district court sentenced
Miles to 117 months in prison for kidnapping. The district court did not impose a sentence
for the other four convictions.
Miles appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Miles’s waiver of the right to counsel was voluntarily made because the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miles’s request for substitute
counsel.

Miles argues that his waiver of the right to counsel was involuntary because the
district court abused its discretion in deny ing his request for substitute counsel without
determining whether Miles’s claims against his original public defender amounted to
“exceptional circumstances” warranting the appointment of substitute counsel.
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miles’s request
for substitute counsel.

“The decision to grant or deny a request for substitute counsel lies within the
[district] court’s discretion.” State v. Clark , 722 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 2006). “The
right to counsel includes a fair opportunity to secure an attorney of choice, but an indigent
defendant does not have the unbridled right to be represented by the attorney of his choice.”
State v. Worthy , 583 N.W.2d 270, 278 (Minn. 1998). “A court will grant an indigent’s
request for different counsel only if excepti onal circumstances exist and the demand is
timely and reasonably made.” Id. (quotation omitted). Excep tional circumstances “are
those that affect a court-appointed attorney’s ability or competence to represent the client.”
State v. Gillam, 629 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2001). When the defendant “voices serious

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allegations of inadequate representation,” th e district court should conduct a “searching
inquiry” before ruling on a defendant’s request for substitute counsel. Clark, 722 N.W.2d
at 464. However, “a defendant’s general dissa tisfaction with appointed counsel does not
amount to an exceptional circumstance.” State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 586 (Minn. 2013)
(quotation omitted).
Miles argues that the district court’s denial of his request for substitute counsel was
an abuse of discretion because the district court applied the erroneous ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel standard rather than the exceptional-ci rcumstances standard. This
argument is unconvincing. The district court denied Miles’s request for substitute counsel
because it found “no indication from the record that defense counsel’s performance [fell]
below an objective standard of reasonableness nor that the defendant ha[d] been prejudiced
by counsel’s performance.” Al though the district court described the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel standard, its determination on the public defender’s performance was
effectively a determination concerning “a court-appointed attorney’s ability or competence
to represent the client.” Gillam, 629 N.W.2d at 449. By concluding that the public
defender’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, the
district court implicitly found that no exceptional circumstances existed.
Miles argues that the district court failed to conduct “a proper searching inquiry” to
“determine whether Miles’s claims about hi s attorney’s performance were accurate,”
asserting that the district court’s order denying his request for substitute counsel “contained
no findings whether Miles’s claims were accurate.” However, the district court did conduct

8
a sufficient inquiry by hearing out Miles rega rding his concerns and considering Miles’s
complaints in light of the record and the public defender’s performance on the case.
In addition, the court’s implicit finding that no exceptional circumstances existed is
supported by the record. Miles provided four reasons to support his request for substitute
counsel. First, Miles clai med that his public defender had “not filed a motion for
discovery.” However, the record demonstrat es that the public defender had filed a
discovery motion on February 9, 2016. Seco nd, Miles claimed that his public defender
never demanded a speedy trial, which Miles asked for “back in February.” The first time
Miles asserted a speedy trial demand was on De cember 6, 2016. But even after that
demand, Miles asked for continuances. In a ddition, before his December 6 speedy-trial
demand, Miles had sought continua nces, including to file a reverse- Spreigl motion. The
record supports the determination that any delay in the case was not an exceptional
circumstance affecting Miles’s counsel’s ability or competence. The third reason advanced
by Miles was the public defender’s lack of communication with him. Miles’s own
testimony undermines this argument. At the January 10, 2017 hearing, Miles claimed that
he had not been able to talk to his public defender sin ce January 5. However, at the
January 31 review hearing, Miles claimed that the public defender “hasn’t communicated
with [him] since December 1st.” Moreover, at the same hearing, Miles admitted that the
public defender “came and talked to [him] last week.” These contradictory statements do
not support Miles’s claim of an exceptional circumstance. Fourth, Miles claimed that the
public defender “made oral motions” to dismiss for violations of due process and discovery
rules at the December 1, 2016 hearing, and “has not file d [written] motions.” This claim

9
also fails because Miles’s counsel did file a written motion to dismiss for undue delay on
December 29 and, in any event, Miles’s gene ral dissatisfaction with how the public
defender presented a motion does not amount to an exceptional circumstance.
Finally, Miles argues that the district court erred by holding an off-the-record
hearing on defense counsel’s motion to withdraw. However, at that time, the district court
granted the public defender’s motion to withdr aw subject to a review hearing, which the
district court held a week later. Therefore, even though the district court held an initial off-
the-record hearing, its decision granting the motion was not final until the review hearing,
which was held on the record.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miles’s
request for substitute counsel.
B. Miles’s waiver of the righ t to counsel was voluntary.
This court reviews the district court’s “fi nding of a valid waiver of a defendant’s
right to counsel” under the clearly-erroneous standard. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496,
504 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). However, “[w]hen the facts are undisputed,” the
question of whether a defendant validly waived his right to counsel “is a constitutional one
that is reviewed de novo.” State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 2012). Because
the facts are not disputed here, we review the question de novo.
A defendant’s waiver of the right to co unsel must be knowi ng, intelligent, and
voluntary. Id. at 884. “[T]o ensure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver-of-
counsel, district courts s hould comprehensively examine the defendant regarding the
defendant’s comprehension of the charge s, the possible punishments, mitigating

10
circumstances, and any other f acts relevant to the defendant’s understanding of the
consequences of the waiver.” Id. at 885-86 (quotation omitted). “A district court’s failure
to conduct an on-the-record inquiry regardin g waiver, however, does not require reversal
when the particular facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate a valid waiver.” Id. at
886.
Miles suggests that he did not waive the ri ght to counsel because he refused to do
so orally or in writing. Miles also argues that, even if he did waive counsel, his waiver was
not voluntary. We reject both contentions.
After the district court denied Miles’s motion for substitute counsel, Miles informed
his public defender that he did not want to be represented by him, and the public defender
moved for permission to withdraw. The district court held a review hearing on that motion.
At the hearing, the district court told Miles, “[Y]ou’re entitled to a public defender but not
a public defender of your choice.” Af terwards, the district court asked, “[M]y
understanding is that you indicat ed to [the public defender] that you do not want him to
represent you. Is that true?” Miles replied, “That’s true.” In addi tion, the district court
stated to Miles, twice, that “the practical ef fect” of his decision to discharge the public
defender was that he “would be representing [him]self,” and Miles responded that he
understood this effect.
The district court, at the hearing, carefully explained the nature of the charges, all
offenses included within the charges, the range of punishments, possible defenses, and any
mitigating circumstances that may exist. The district court also informed Miles that “a jury
trial is a complicated proceeding” and that “an attorney representing [him] at trial can be a

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benefit to a criminal defendant.” The district court also read aloud the waiver form. The
district court satisfied the requirements of Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). Miles refused
to sign the waiver form, but, on these facts, he nevertheless waived his right to counsel.
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4) (providi ng that, “[i]f the defendant refuses to sign
the written waiver form, the waiver must be made on the record”); Jones, 772 N.W.2d at
504-05 (recognizing me thods of waiver); Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276 (holding that the
defendants waived their right to counsel by dismissing their counsel knowing they did not
have a right to different court-appointed attorneys.)
Miles argues, however, that any waiver of the right to counsel was not voluntary
because, being indigent, he only had two options: “proceeding with his appointed attorney,
against whom he had made complaints, or re presenting himself.” A defendant’s request
for another attorney before choosing self-re presentation “will not by itself undermine the
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of the defendant’s waiver of counsel,”
particularly when the defendant “is aware that he has no right to a different attorney and
must proceed pro se upon rejection of the appointed attorney ’s assistance.” State v.
Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 173 (Minn. 1997). The mere fact the Miles had to represent
himself at trial does not make his waiver involuntary.
Miles asserts, however, that his waiver wa s involuntary because the district court
did not “carefully examine” his co mplaints about counsel. Bu t, as discussed above, the
district court did make a sufficient inquiry in to Miles’s complaints and the determination
that exceptional circumstances did not exist to warrant substitute counsel was supported by
the record.

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We conclude that Miles’s waiver was voluntarily made, and, as a result, we affirm
Miles’s convictions.
II. The district court used an incorrect severity level in sentencing Miles for
kidnapping.

Miles argues that the district court erred in using a severity level of nine to sentence
him for kidnapping when the evidence was insufficient to prove that the victim had suffered
great bodily harm. The state agrees.
The district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is subject to de novo
review. State v. Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012). A sentence that is unauthorized
by law may be corrected at any time. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. A criminal sentence
that is contrary to the requirements of the applicable sentencing statute is unauthorized by
law. State v. Cook , 617 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. App. 2000), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 21, 2000).
Miles was convicted of kidnapping in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3)
(2014). Subdivision 2 of that statute, which sets a 40-year maximum sentence, applies “if
the victim is not released in a safe place” or “if the victim suffers great bodily harm during
the course of the kidnapping.” Id., subd. 2(2) (2014). Miles’s offenses occurred in January
2016, so the 2015 senten cing guidelines apply. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines (2016)
(“Effective August 1, 2016”). For a kidnappi ng conviction, the sentencing guidelines
provide a severity level of nine if the victim suffered great bodily harm and a severity level
of eight if the victim was not released in a safe place. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 5.A (2015).

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The victim testified at trial that Miles “took the back of his arm . . . and smashed it
on the side of [her] face,” “punched [her] in the arm [twice]” and “choked [her],” and she
“could feel swelling in [her] jaw [and] arm.” After both parties rested, the state informed
the district court that “the evidence is in sufficient to establish great bodily harm” for
kidnapping and requested that the second sp ecial question—asking about great bodily
harm—be removed from the verdict form. The di strict court agreed, stating that “[t]here
has been no evidence of . . . great bodily harm,” and removed that special question from
the verdict form. In answer to the remaining special question, the jury found that the victim
had not been released in a safe place. Theref ore, the correct severity level for sentencing
is eight. Because Miles had a criminal history point of one, the presumptive sentence is 58
months with a range of 50 to 69 months. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2015).
Because the district court ap plied the incorrect severity level, we reverse Miles’s
sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.