In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: S. M. H., Parent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A17-0841

In the Matter of the Welfare of
the Children of: S. M. H., Parent.

Filed November 6, 2017
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-16-2423

Mary Moriarty, Fourth District Public De fender, David W. Merchant, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant-mother S.M.H.)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta K. Ni cholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Human Services and
Public Health Department)

Eric S. Rehm, Burnsville, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem MaryAnn Lundquist)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant S.M.H. appeals from the district court’s decision to terminate her parental
rights. Clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the district court’s termination
of her rights for neglecting the duties imposed on her by the parent-child relationship, and
we affirm on that statutory basis.

2
FACTS
Appellant first came to th e attention of child protection authorities in January 2015
after a report alleged that appellant had subjected her daughter, A.M.M., to controlled
substances in utero and that she was failing to prot ect A.M.M. by engaging in unsafe
sleeping practices. The report alleged that appellant was sleeping with A.M.M. in
appellant’s bed, which resulted in A.M.M. falling out of the bed at least twice.
Additionally, the child-protection report alleged a domestic incident between appellant and
her boyfriend, M.J.M., during which both parties were pu lling on A.M.M. Finally, the
report stated that appellant was continuing to use illegal drugs after A.M.M.’s birth,
abusing prescription drugs, and had missed some of her urine tests for drugs.
Appellant admitted to using controlled substances, incl uding heroin, marijuana,
Xanax, and Percocet, while she was pregnant with A.M.M. In the hospital after A.M.M.
was born, M.J.M. was using heroin in the ho spital bathroom and setting up drug deals on
his phone. Based on these and other admissions by appellant, the Hennepin County Human
Services and Public Health Department (department) filed a Child in Need of Protection or
Services (CHIPS) petition, and A.M.M. was adjudicated as a child in need of protection or
services. Appellant admitted that she had a chemical-dependency problem that adversely
affected her ability to parent. Custody of A.M.M. was transf erred to the department for
placement.
Appellant was ordered to follow a case pl an requiring her to demonstrate sobriety
by submitting to urine testing as requested, complete a chemical-dependency assessment
and follow the resulting recommendations, cooperate with the department and a guardian

3
ad litem, and cooperate with supervised visits. The court also ordered appellant to maintain
suitable housing, refrain from exposing her ch ild to controlled substances, and complete
mental-health and parenting assessments and follow the resulting recommendations.
Appellant successfully completed all requirements of her case plan and, after successful
unsupervised visits and a trial home visit, appellant was again allowed to care for A.M.M.
Appellant gave birth to A.G.M. on January 1, 2016, and, on January 7, 2016, the district
court terminated jurisdiction over the earlier CHIPS case.
On April 26, 2016, A.M.M. and A.G.M. were placed on a 72-hour health-and-
welfare hold. They were placed at their great-grandmother’s home, and the department
petitioned to terminate the parent al rights (TPR) of both pare nts on April 29, 2016. The
petition included allegations similar to those in the earlier CHIPS case, including that
appellant was sleeping in the same bed as her children and that appellant was using
methadone and benzodiazepines in combinati on. Appellant had a prescription for both
drugs at the time. Additionally, the petition alleged that appellant brought her children
home with scabies, that she let their medical insurance coverage lapse, and that she would
return home late at night, sometimes accompanied by A.G.M., who was only a few months
old. The petition also alleged that appellant left A.G.M. at a friend’s house overnight, that
appellant and M.J.M. argued in front of the children causing the children to cry, that
appellant had been “doctor hopp ing” to obtain pain medicati on, and that appellant would
fall asleep while holding A.G.M. The investigating social worker and appellant’s probation
officer observed appellant fall asleep while holding A.G.M., and, while waiting to meet

4
with her probation officer, appellant fell asleep four times while A.G.M. was in a car seat
next to her.
After a hearing, the district court issu ed an order for emergency protective care
(EPC) and transferred custody of the children to the department. At the EPC hearing, the
department presented appellant with a voluntary case plan that largely mirrored the case
plan from her 2015 case: (1) complete a rule 25 assessment 1 and follow the
recommendations, (2) maintain sobriety and submit to random urine tests, (3) refrain from
having the children around anyone who was using controlled substances, (4) work on
parenting and mental-health issues, (5) maintain safe and suitable housing, and (6) attend
supervised visitations. The di strict court’s EPC order listed these recommendations as a
“voluntary interim case plan.”
Shortly after the children were ordered into out-of-home placement, appellant
completed a rule 25 chemical-healt h assessment, from which no treatment
recommendations resulted. Appellant was not then using illegal drugs. The child-
protection investigator la ter testified at the TPR trial that the originating allegations that
appellant had been using illegal drugs were determined to be unsubstantiated. The
investigator also testified that the allegations that appellant was engaging in unsafe sleep
practices were not substantiated. A photograp h purporting to show appellant sleeping on

1 Minnesota Rule 9530.6615 provides that any client seeking treatment for a substance-use
disorder must have a chemical-use asse ssment, commonly referred to as a rule 25
assessment, before being placed in a treatmen t program. This chemical-use assessment
consists of an interview and a written list of the client’s spec ific chemical-use issues and
description to allow the assessor to determin e an appropriate treatment plan. Minn. R.
9530.6605, subp. 8 (2016).

5
top of her daughter seemed not to show that at all. The investigator also testified later that
appellant was well-informed about safe sleep practices. As such, the allegations forming
the primary basis of the TPR petition were ultimately determined to be at least unfounded,
and likely untrue. But appella nt’s situation rapidly deteri orated after custody of the
children was transferred to the department.
Throughout this time, and as a condition of her probation from an unrelated criminal
case, appellant was required to maintain sobriety and not use any alcohol or nonprescribed
controlled substances. Her pr obation officer required her to submit to urine testing to
monitor her abstinence. Appellant tested positive for marijuana on May 13, and for heroin
on August 18, 2016, which were violations of her probation.2 Appellant tested positive for
marijuana, benzodiazepines, heroin, opiates, and cocaine on other occasions. Appellant’s
probation officer was concerned that appella nt was taking prescribed benzodiazepines
while also taking methadone as part of a therapeutic program. This combination of
substances was not recommended by appellant’s clinic because it wo uld tend to make a
person sleepy very quickly.
Appellant eventually signed a case plan on August 8, 2016. Social worker P.C.
testified that she discussed the plan with appellant before August 8, 2016, and that the plan
may have been agreed-upon before that. That date was the first time appellant was given

2 Between May 13, 2016 and August 18, 2016, appellant was not providing urine samples
to probation because she was supposed to be submitting to testing by child protection as
part of a case plan. Her probation officer had told her to submit her urine tests only to child
protection. Yet, appellant failed to comply with testing and failed to provide samples to
child protection on many occasions during this period.

6
a written plan. Appellant said she met with P. C. two or three times before that; however,
she testified that the first tim e she was told about her case plan was in August when she
signed it.
Appellant also missed many of the scheduled visitations with her children in the
first months after the April 29 hearing. The foster parent reported that A.M.M. would kick,
scream, and get angry when appellant would not show up to visits. When appellant did
show up to a visit, she seem ed to do “pretty good ” with the children, despite A.G.M. not
seeming to have a strong bond with appellant.
Trial on the TPR petition was held on Augus t 31 and September 1, 2016, and then
again on February 1 and Febr uary 13, 2017. Another rule 25 assessment was done in
September 2016. In this assessment, appellant admitted that she had been using heroin
daily and cocaine weekly. The assessor recommended that appellant go to intake at New
Perspectives treatment facility . Appellant did not complete intake at New Perspectives.
She later completed yet another rule 25 assessment that recommended inpatient treatment
at RS Eden, an inpatient facility. Appellant started treatment there, but absconded from
the program on December 1, 2016. Between December 1, 2016 and February 7, 2017,
there was an active warrant for her arrest for violating probation conditions in the criminal
case. Officials did not know where she was. Appellant did not appear for trial on
February 1, 2017. Of course, appellant did not comply with urine testing, visit her children,
or complete any other parts of her case plan during this time. Appellant was arrested on
February 7, 2017.

7
Appellant testified on the last day of th e TPR trial that she was planning to enter
chemical-health treatment with mental-hea lth components through drug court. She
estimated that, if she particip ated in this programming fully, she could finish in about 18
months. She also testified that the last tim e she saw her children was a few days before
she left treatment and that she had made no inquiries about visiting them since then because
she was using drugs again. While all parties ag reed that appellant was not able to parent
her children as of the last day of trial, appellant testified that if she received treatment and
continued to take care of her mental health and addiction, she believed that she would again
be able to properly parent. In contrast, P.C. testified that further services would not help
appellant achieve reunification with her ch ildren because appellant had rejected the
services that she was offered, she did not follow through with treatment or other referrals,
and she did not attend visits with her children. P.C. further opined that the children would
be at risk of harm if they were under appellant’s care because she could not provide a sober
or safe housing environment. P.C. also testified that A.G.M. and A.M.M. need safety and
stability.
On April 7, 2017, the district court terminated appellant’s parental rights to A.G.M.
and A.M.M. This appeal followed.3
D E C I S I O N
There is a “presumption that a natural parent is a fit and suitable person to be
entrusted with the care of his or her child.” In re Welfare of A.D. , 535 N.W.2d 643, 647

3 The father’s parental rights were also terminated, and he has not appealed the termination
of his rights.

8
(Minn. 1995). “Ordinarily, it is in the best interest of a child to be in the custody of his or
her natural parents.” Id. Accordingly, “[p]arental rights are terminated only for grave and
weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990).
Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b) (2016), provides nine bases
on which parental rights may be terminated. The district court may terminate parental
rights when at least one statutory basis for termination is proved by clear and convincing
evidence and the district court determines that termination is in the children’s best interests.
In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Minn. 2014). “If statutory grounds
for termination exist and termination is in the best interests of the child, the appellate court
then determines whether there is clear a nd convincing evidence that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family.” In re Children of T.A.A. , 702 N.W.2d 703, 708
(Minn. 2005).
“We give considerable deference to the district court’s decision to terminate parental
rights.” In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). We
review the district court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error. In re Welfare of
Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 2008). A finding is clearly erroneous if it
is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” Id. at 660-61 (quotation omitted). We review the district court’s
decision to terminate parental ri ghts for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 93 (Minn. App. 2012). A district court abuses its discretion if its
underlying findings of fact are clearly erroneous, if it misapplies the law, or if it resolves
the matter against logic and the record evidence. See Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199,

9
202 (Minn. 1997). We closely examine th e record to determine whether clear and
convincing evidence supports the termination. S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We will defer
to the district court’s termination decision if at least one statutory ground is proven by clear
and convincing evidence. T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661.
I. The record supports one statutory basis for terminating appellant’s parental
rights.

A. Minn. Stat. § 260C. 301, subd. 1(b)(5 ), does not support termination on
this record.

The district court may terminate parental rights if clear and convincing evidence
establishes “that following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under
the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions l eading to the child’s
placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). The statute sets out a presumption that
reasonable efforts have failed upon a showing th at: (1) a child under the age of eight has
resided out of the parental home under cour t order for six months unless the parent
maintains regular contact with the child an d the parent complies with the out-of-home
placement plan; (2) the court has approved the out-of-home placem ent plan; (3) the
conditions leading to the out-of-home placem ent have not been corrected, which is
presumed when the parent does not substantia lly comply with the court’s orders and a
reasonable case plan; and (4) the social servic es agency has made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. Id. The statute also presumes that reasonable
efforts have failed upon a showing that: (1) th e parent has been diagnosed as chemically
dependent, (2) the parent has been require d to participate in chemical-dependency
treatment by a case plan, (3) the offered treatm ents were appropriate, (4) the parent has

10
either failed two or more times to successfully complete treatment or has refused to
participate in treatment at two or more sepa rate meetings with a caseworker, and (5) the
parent continues to abuse chemicals. Id.
The district court found that the statutor y presumption of Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5), was met and concluded that appellant failed to correct the conditions leading
to her children’s out-of-home placement. Howe ver, this statutory ba sis cannot be relied
upon as a reason to terminate appellant’s parental rights on this record because, as the
department now concedes, the true conditions at the time the petition was filed were far
different than the TPR petition alleged. Appellant was not using heroin or other controlled
substances at that time, as evidenced by th e clean urine samples she was providing to her
probation officer. At the tim e the children were placed in the department’s custody,
appellant was not using illegal drugs at all. Her use of illicit drugs was not then a condition
that needed correcting. At most, the department opened the 2016 file because it saw
concerning signs that appellant might begin using controlled substances again. The
“conditions leading to the [children’s] place ment” in April 2016 simply did not include
appellant’s use of illegal drugs or the cons tellation of resulting pr oblems caused by her
relapse.4 As such, the district court abused its discretion in finding a statutory basis to
terminate appellant’s parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).

4 It is beyond the scope of this appeal, a nd beyond our proper role, to ascertain the
relationship between the department’s actions in April and appellant’s later relapse and
downward spiral. This appeal is from the termination of parental rights; it is not an appeal
from the EPC order. One way to view the record would be to conclude that the department
jumped the gun on removing th e children, contributing to appellant’s relapse. Another
reasonable interpretation of the record would be that the department, keenly aware of

11
B. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b )(2), provides a statutory basis for
termination, and the record supports the district court’s finding that this
statutory basis for termination was proved.

Because subdivision 1(b)(5) cannot suffice on this record to terminate appellant’s
parental rights, we consider whether the evidence is sufficient to clearly and convincingly
establish the statutory basis for termination under subdivision 1(b)(2). That provision
states that the district court may terminate parental rights if it finds
that the parent has substantially , continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon
that parent by the parent and ch ild relationship, including but
not limited to providing the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control
necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health
and development, if the parent is physically and financially
able, and either reasonable efforts by the social services agency
have failed to correct the conditi ons that formed the basis of
the petition or reasonable efforts would be futile and therefore
unreasonable[.]

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1( b)(2). To support termination on this basis, the district
court must determine that, at th e time of termination, the pare nt is not presently able and

appellant’s child-protection history, intervened at an early point in time, thereby removing
the children from appellant’s care before they could be harmed by her relapse. We cannot
return in time to when the ch ildren were removed, and we cannot and do not review the
propriety of the district court’s removal of the children from appellant’s custody. In
general, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(a)
(2016), and appellant made no effort to appeal from the initial transfer of custody after the
EPC hearing. Whether that initial custody tran sfer would be reviewable by discretionary
review, extraordinary writ, or otherwise is not before us. See In re Welfare of Child of
E.G., 876 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. App. 2016) (holding that a dist rict court’s intermediate
dispositional orders in a CHIPS case are not a ppealable as a matter of right). The record
evidence before us now is that concerns about immediate danger to the children when the
TPR petition was filed were “unsubstantiate d,” which the department now commendably
concedes.

12
willing to assume her responsibilities and that the condition will continue for the reasonably
foreseeable future. See In re Welfare of J.K., 374 N.W.2d 463, 466-67 (Minn. App. 1985),
review denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1985). We generally require more than mere failure to
complete a case plan to affirm termination based on this statutory ground. See, e.g., In re
Welfare of Children of K.S.F. , 823 N.W.2d 656, 666-67 (Min n. App. 2012) (affirming a
termination of parental rights based on failure to comply with parental duties, noting both
that the parent failed to comply with the case plan and that the record ot herwise showed
that the parent did not adequately care for the children); In re Child of Simon, 662 N.W.2d
155, 163-64 (Minn. App. 2003) (describing a parent’s failure to comply with key case-plan
components, the parent’s failure to provide meaningful parenting to the child, and the lack
of evidence that the parent possessed the skills and know ledge to parent the child
effectively). We have said that “[t]he critic al issue is not whether the parent formally
complied with the case plan, but rather whether the parent is presently able to assume the
responsibilities of caring for the child.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89.
While a case plan is not a prerequisite to a termination of parental rights under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), it is notable that the department offered appellant a case
plan in an attempt to facilitate reunification between appellant and her children even after
removal and the filing of a TPR petition. Gene rally, a case plan shou ld be prepared and
signed by the social services agency and the parent, and filed with the court within 30 days
of the petition being filed. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.212, .178, subd. 7 (2016). Here, the TPR
petition was filed on April 29, 2016, but appellant did not sign the case plan until August 8,
2016, clearly more than 30 days after the petition was filed. It appears that social services

13
met with appellant on at least one occasion within the 30-day period, but it is unclear why
the case plan was not signed earlier. We need not resolve that question. The case plan had
been read to appellant at the April 29 hearin g and during at least one meeting with P.C.
The essence of the case plan was set forth in the district court’s EPC order. Appellant did
not dispute the case plan. She did not ask for any additional services. Appellant eventually
cooperated with rule 25 assessments and acted in other ways consistent with knowledge of
the case plan.
More important, there is ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s
conclusion that appellant was in no position at the end of tria l to care for her children in
the reasonably foreseeable future. As of the last day of trial, all parties agreed that appellant
was then unable to parent her children. The district court cited to a number of factors in
finding that appellant had neglected her parental duties. First, the district court pointed to
appellant’s failure to demonstrate sobriety and that she prematurely left chemical-
dependency treatment. This finding is supported by testimony that appellant left RS Eden
without notice and against the recommendati on of her counselors, even after being
classified as having a high vulnerability for further substance use. Further, appellant’s own
statements to the counselors at RS Eden demonstrate that she is unable to pay attention to
her children when she is using controlled substances. Appellant candidly admits relapsing
and a return to using heroin and other drugs. There was an arrest warrant out for her for
several months, during which period her condition was pitiable, but certainly not conducive
to parenting children. The re cord supports the district court’s reliance on and acceptance

14
of these facts to find that, for the foreseeabl e future, appellant will be unable to “assume
the responsibilities of caring for a child.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89.
The district court also noted that appella nt had failed to maintain suitable housing
and that she sought to blame respondent fo r her lack of housing rather than taking
responsibility for it herself. This finding is supported by P.C.’s testimony that appellant
had been homeless for a major ity of the case and appellant ’s own testimony that she had
been living out of her car at times. In addition, appellant did not provide suitable sleeping
space for her children even when they were all living with appellant’s grandmother;
A.G.M. slept in a “baby hammock” and A.M.M. on a pile of blankets on the floor. As
noted by the district court, providing shelter is one of the duties of a parent listed in Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Appellant failed to provide adequate shelter.
The facts underlying the district court’ s conclusion that appellant neglected the
duties imposed upon her by the parent-child relationship are supported by evidence in the
record. The district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the district
court acted within its discretion in finding a statutory basis for termination of appellant’s
parental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).
II. The district court acted within its discretion in finding that termination was in
the children’s best interests.

Even after determining a statutory basis for termination, the district court must also
determine that termination is in the child’s best interests. See In re Welfare of Children of
R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). “[T]he best interests of th e child must be the
paramount consideration,” and if the child’s in terests and parent’s interests conflict, the

15
child’s interests take priority. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd . 7 (2016). “In analyzing the
best interests of the child, the court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) th e parent’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; and (3) any comp eting interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B. ,
492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.05, subd. 3(b)(3).
“We review a district court’s ultimate determin ation that termination is in a child’s best
interest for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn.
App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). The best-i nterests analysis is “generally
not susceptible to an appellate court’s globa l review of a record ” because it involves
credibility determinations; as su ch, we give considerable defe rence to the district court’s
findings. In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003).
The district court found that it would be in the children’s best interests for
appellant’s parental rights to be terminated because she would not be able to care for them
in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court reasoned th at appellant had rejected
services offered by the department, the childre n had not received proper care from her in
the past, they would face immediate risk of harm in appellant’s care, and they “need a
permanent placement where they will have stability, a safe environment, predictability and
care.” In making this determination, the di strict court credited the testimony that the
children need a permanent, sa fe, stable home. It found that appellant’s chemical
dependency rendered her unable to parent and meet the ch ildren’s needs or make good
decisions for them. Th e only person to testify at trial that termination of appellant’s
parental rights would not be in the children’ s best interest was appellant herself. The

16
district court is in the best position to make credibility determinations, Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d
at 625, and it chose to believe the other witnesses.
While appellant points to her sobriety at the time the TPR petition was filed as a
reason that she should retain her parental righ ts, appellant had returned to regular use of
heroin and other drugs by the time the TPR trial ended. As noted, the issue in this appeal
is not whether the district court’s EPC orde r was correct. By wh atever causal chain,
appellant showed little interest in being involved with her children for months, even after
respondent offered her services. She left ch emical-dependency treatment against advice.
Contrary to appellant’s argument, the district court found termination to be in the children’s
best interests not because they could not be returned to appellant immediately, but because
they could not return to appe llant in the reasonably foreseeab le future. And the record
evidence amply sustains that finding. The di strict court acted within its discretion in
finding that the children’s be st interests would be served by terminating appellant’s
parental rights.
III. The district court’s finding that the de partment made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate appellant and reunite the family is not clearly erroneous.

To terminate appellant’s parental rights, the district court must make “specific
findings” that the department made reasonab le efforts to rehabilitate appellant and to
reunite the family. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8 (2016). The district court must
consider “whether services to the child and family were: (1 ) relevant to the safety and
protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally
appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under

17
the circumstances” unless reasonable efforts ar e futile. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2016).
“Reasonable efforts at rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of form so
as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144,
150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). A court
should consider “the quality and quantity of efforts” given. Id. We review a district court’s
reasonable-efforts finding for clear error. A.D., 535 N.W.2d at 648.
Whether reasonable efforts were made by the department to prevent or avoid
removal of the children from appellant’s care in April 2016 is debatable. But the question
now is whether the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the family after removal.
The record shows that appellant had many opp ortunities to accept services after the
children were ordered to out-of-home place ment. Appellant’s contention that the
department did not make reasona ble efforts to reunite her fami ly is principally based on
the case plan not having been presented to her for signing until August 8, 2016. She argues
that, by then, she had become discouraged and had no reason to believe that the department
was serious about wanting to provide assistance to reunify. Essentially, appellant argues
not that the department did not offer her appropriate services, but that the offered services
came too late and that she did not believe the department would actually follow through.
First, even if the department’s delay in having appellant sign the case plan was
improper, appellant still had more than six months from when she signed the plan on
August 8, 2016, to co mply with the case plan and get her children back. Instead, and
despite both this child-protection case and a criminal probationary sentence, appellant
resumed using heroin and other drugs. She stopped visiting her children. She left treatment

18
with no indication of her whereabouts for over two months. And appellant was aware of
the case plan’s requirements designed to allow her to resume caring for her children. She
scheduled a rule 25 assessment and knew that she was required to submit urine for testing.
Finally, appellant’s argument that “the depart ment’s offer of services rings hollow” is
undermined by the fact that the department tried to get appellant into chemical-dependency
treatment. Appellant refused to attend intake at New Perspectives. She later entered RS
Eden, but left against counselor recommendations. It is appellant’s commitment to sobriety
that rings hollow. The facts in the record support the district court’s finding that the
department offered appropriate services to appellant, tailored to help appellant reunite with
her children. Appellant declined to comply with those services.
The record evidence supports the district court’s finding of a basis for terminating
appellant’s parental rights u nder Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). The record
evidence also supports the district court’s findings that termination is in the children’s best
interests and that the depart ment made reasonable efforts to reunify the family after
removal.
Affirmed.